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As an exercise in critical social theory, this thesis operates at a
number of theoretical and practical levels. It offers a critique of the
epistemological protocols which inform social theory and utilizes this
critique to highlight the failure of radical discourse on the British
Welfare State to free itself from the epistemological conditions of existence
which inform traditional welfare discourse.
Social theory proceeds not through the appropriation of the objective
world by way of a privileged methodological discourse which remains immune
from its own strictures, but rather through the formulation, discursive
redemption and reformulation of specific concepts. A radical discourse on
the concept of the British Welfare State must discard recognised modes of
historical analysis. Beginning with the concept of the British national
economy as a determinate social formation, lines of continuity and
discontinuity are identified in welfare discourse, through consideration of
the concepts of the policing of idleness and relations of production.
Given the concept of relations of production (feudal; capitalist;
socialist), it is argued that it has amongst its conditions of existence
the concept of the policing of idleness, that is, the control, care and
supervision of those agents who do not, or cannot, contribute to the
production process (the aged; sick; infirm; unemployed; etc.). To talk of
these concepts and their conditions of existence is not, however, to
determine in advance the specificity of their form or their effectivity in
a determinate social formation. These theoretical issues are illustrated
through discussion of welfare discourse and the policing of idleness in
terms of British feudal and capitalist relations and legislation on poor
relief and the suppression of vagrancy. The continuity of the
epistemological conditions of existence of welfare discourse within
capitalist relations is illustrated through a comparison of Bentham's
Panoptic Poor Plan and Robert Owen's discourse on labour discipline. But,
it is argued, these discourses also show that epistemological, economic,
legal, etc. conditions of existence do not determine the content or
effectivity of discourse. Tnis point is further illustrated through
consideration of Eriendly Societies and industrial welfare in the 19th century.
Finally, contemporary social work discourse is discussed in terms of its
epistemological conditions of existence and it is argued that radical
discourse on welfare and social work must fracture the continuity of those
conditions if it is to offer a socialist discourse on welfare and the
policing of idleness.
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1. Critical Theory, Historical Analysis and the Critique of
Epistemology
This thesis is an exercise in critical social theory. In
substantive terms, it offers a radical critique of discourse on
welfare and, more particularly, discourse on social work. The
thesis seeks to explicate the form and effectivity of welfare
discourse within the context of the British national economy based
upon capitalist relations of production. In the final analysis, th
thesis seeks to contribute to the socialist debate about the nature
of welfare and welfare institutions in the context of capitalist
relations of production and the place that that debate has in the
wider struggle over the transformation of those relations of
production to socialist relations.
Generally speaking, the liberal tradition of commentary on the
British Welfare State has treated it, in historical terms, as an
unqualified success: the rational culmination of British good sense
and the evolution of civilisation. Fabian commentators have,
ultimately, endorsed this view, identifying the Welfare State as a
pragmatic solution to the conflict between labour and capital.
Radical commentators, and particularly Marxist writers, have been fa
more ambivalent about the nature of 'welfare capitalism' seeing it a
one and the same time as a reflection of the concessions won by the
labour movement from capital and as a mechanism through which the
'working class'5 has been 'incorporated' and 'deradicalised'. In th
next chapter I shall review both radical and liberal discourses
on welfare. Hie critique presented will be directed primarily
towards radical theory, however, to highlight the failures in
that discourse to move radically beyond the form of analysis
offered by liberal theorists. Of necessity, then, some time must
also be spent in reviewing liberal discourse. Hinaess and Hirst
have written of "... the weakness of the Left in this country, its
lack of engagement with existing politics and political forces, its
doctrinaire gesture politics, its lack of political theory ..."
(1977:58) and have identified as a consequence "... the weakness of
development of problems for theorisation". Whilst the
effectivity of socialist political practice in ihe welfare realm
depends on much more than the quality of its theoretical discourse,
it will be argued that the failure of radical theorists to move
beyond the parameters of welfare discourse set by liberal theorists
has resulted in a degree of inertia which threatens to stultify
socialist debate. This is very apparent in the social work realm
which appears to offer a field of practice for socialists but
within which theorists struggle to move beyond the terms created
&
within liberal analysis.
Hie thesis, then, seeks to contribute to this debate about
'socialist welfare' and 'radical social work' and, in Chapter 7
some specific suggestions are made about the form that this debate
mi^it take. Primarily, however, the thesis concentrates upon the
task of 'deconstructing' disccurse on welfare and social work on the
premise that radical theorists must acknowledge the limitations of
their present mode of formulation of problems in the welfare realm
before they can begin the task of developing socialist discourse
and practice in this field.
(i) Critical Social Theory. To claim that this thesis is an
exercise in critical social theory is to locate it within a
tradition of social analysis which takes its general concepts and
form of enquiry from the works of Marx and in particular his
critique of 19th century political economy and his analysis of
'the capitalist mode of production' . This is not to argue that
the discourse of the thesis is 'Marxist' or that Marx's basic
concepts have been slavishly followed. Quite the reverse.
Although theoretically and ideologically the thesis acknowledges its
place within a particular intellectual and political tradition, it
is argued that the work of critical social theory is an unending
pursuit. Critical theory refuses the foreclosure and truncation
SflflC if/
of debate which is offered by traditional teieological forms of
social analysis. This means that the work of Marx and Marxists
must be subjected to rigorous analysis and in Chapter 3 the
Critical theory is perhaps more specifically associated with
that brand of Marxist discourse associated with the Frankfurt
School. Tiie disparate works of theorists such as Marcuse,
Adorno, Eromm and, later, Habermas could only, with difficulty, be
presumed to provide a coherent framework for social analysis (Jay,
1973) it will be clear from much that is written in subsequent
chapters that the Hegelian Idealism which informs much of the work
of this 'School' is rejected. Nevertheless, a great deal of
current debate amongst radical social theorists owes much to the
ideological impact which Marcuse has had and the influence of
Habermas' work on this thesis is much deeper than can be reflected
in the process of citation.
critique of radical theories on welfare and social work is
continued and generalised as a critique of fundamental Marxist
concepts and theories accepted unquestioningly by many radicals
in the welfare field.
■There are, I suggest, certain characteristics of the
enterprise of critical theory which have both theoretically and
ideologically informed the development of this thesis, although
they have been modified and refined in that process. First,
critical theory is both empirical and historical without,
however, being reducible to scientism or historicism. Secondly,
and related to the finest, critical theory is practically
(D
orientated towards the general ideals of enlightenment and
emancipation. Thirdly, what Derek Layder (l979sl58) describes as
the "ontological gulf" between human agency and social structure is
a central problem for analysis within critical theory. Finally,
integral to the examination of that issue and the related and
perennial problems for social theory associated with the free-will/
determinism debate, critical theory questions the very conditions o
knowledge through- a critique of epistemologies. It will be a
major argument of this thesis that radical critics of liberal
discourse on welfare have failed to offer a rigorous analysis of th
epistemological premises of liberal discourse. By adopting- the
epistemological and methodological protocols of the discourses they
seek to supplant, radical theorists have offered a merely gestural
radicalism which leaves liberal discourse unscathed'. In the
remainder of this chapter, the broad features of a critique of
r
epistemology will be discussed a.nd a framework for social analysis
constructed on which the ensuing chapters will be based. I want
to begin that process through a discussion of the problems
surrounding the writing of historical analysis. An historical
analysis of the current situation is largely taken for granted by
radical theorists and most radical texts carry an obligatory
chapter providing the 'historical background' . Unfortunately,
this process is rarely theorised: historical chapters act as
simple 'scene-setters', presenting the story-so-far. Much of
this thesis could be read as yet another history of the
development of the Welfare State. It is important, therefore,
that the basis of such a 'history' be firmly understood.
Historical analysis of the 'development of the Welfare State' is
an integral element in both liberal and radical discourses 011
welfare and a critique of these discourses must tackle 'histories'<
But it must also challenge the epistemological protocol which
presents such 'histories' as the teleological revelation of
objective facts, as the ineluctable unfolding of a continuity of
events. Alternative 'histories' may well necessarily be
generated only to be set to one side once consideration of the
current situation is undertaken. As Boucault suggests in his
discussion of historical discontinuity:
"The notion of discontinuity is a paradoxical one ...
it enables the historian to individualize
different domains but can be established only by
comparing those domains". (1972:9)
(ii) Historical Analysis. Hindess and Hirst have written of
their rejection of "... the notion of history as a coherent and
worthwhile object of study" (1975:32l). History is, they
maintain, "... condemned by the nature of its object to empiricism"
(ibid.:310). It is "... a potentially infinite test ...
constantly being re-written" (ibid.:31l). This critique of the
historical enterprise appears in the concluding chapter to Hindess1
and Hirst's Ere-Canitalist Modes of Production and is a necessary
disclaimer that the text is about the historical development of
capitalism. Their work is, as they note, an apparently
"contradictory enterprise". It deals with historical concepts and
yet professes anti-history (ibid.:308). The answer to the paradox
is that the concluding chapter has to be read in the light of the
text's introductory chapter which offers a radical critique of
"theoretical empiricism". It is not until their self-styled "auto-
critique" in 1977 that Kindess and Hirst refine their critique of
empiricist and rationalist epistemologies and, as they acknowledge,
there is a tension between the residual epistemology of their
introduction and its complete rejection in terms of historical
analysis in their concluding chapter. As a result, in the 1975
text, an unwarranted distinction appears to be drawn between social
theory and historical analysis. The object of historical analysis
is described as "whatever is past" which, by definition, "does not
exist" (1975:309)- The object of history is, then, that which
represents what no longer exists. But to use this line of
reasoning to argue away the object of history is to endorse
empiricism by default. The cogency of their critique only
becomes apparent in the 1977 text when it is more forcefully
argued that the objects of discourse are formed by and within
discourse and are not concrete real objects awaiting empirical
discovery. I shall return to that argument later. For the
moment I want, briefly, to explore the epistemological problems
surrounding historical analysis.
The work of the sociologist and that of the historian embody
divergent traditions and professional and scientific ideological
orientations and X would not wish to suggest that such
differences lack consequences. The objects of both sociological
and historical analysis, however, in an otologics! sense, present
f
the same kind of challenge and problem within these disciplines.
This can be illustrated through an examination of a paper by Paul
Roek. ^
Rock, whose major work is broadly within the field known as
the sociology of deviance, is methodologically an individualist
2. In epistemological terms it is the appronriation of the
object of study which presents parallel problems for both the
sociologist and the historian. For Giddens, as social theorist,
"There simply are no logical or even
methodological distinctions between the social
sciences and history appropriately conceived". (1979:2
Tbr 3.P. Thompson, as social historian,
"I must state plainly that in my view, when the
materials are historical, there is no difference
whatsoever in the methodology appropriate to the
sociologist and to the social historian ..."
(l976:389- Emphasis in original.)
3. "Some problems of interpretative historiography" (1976).
and in his paper he acknowledges a debt to Alfred Schutz.
Working within the tradition that is known generically as the
geisteswissenschaften, Rock maintains that "... historical
analysis must finally be construed as an attempt to capture the
everyday reality of men" (1976: 3SU) - ^ It sen construct their
own social reality and if this reality can be studied only through
the medium of those who construct it, it becomes quite clear why
Rock should wish to argue that historical analysis is
"phenomenologically impoverished and unsure" (ibid.). Just as
Hindess and Hirst appeared to be arguing in their 1975 text,
because one does not have direct access to the objects of history,
historical analysis is a dead letter. Because, for Rock, the
historian is "... unable to obtain any immediate access to the
settings which he explores" (ibid.:355)j the past is a series of
"alien existential worlds" (ibid.). In the same way that Winch
reasons that the sociologist is able to describe human action
because he participates in that rule-governed activity, whilst
the anthropologist is not similarly a part of an alien culture which
he studies, Rock argues that the historian is denied access to the
experiences which produced historical objects of analysis.
i|. Discussing methodological individualism, Giddens provides the
following quotation from Popper by way of illustration (1979:95) -
Popper holds that all social phenomena "... should always be
understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes etc.
of human individuals". Phis would seem to be the stance taken by
Rock in his paper.
5. See Winch's The Idea of a Social Science (1958) and his paper
on "Understanding a primitive society" -
Having created cultural and historical barriers, however, neither
Winch nor Rock make it clear what it is that constitutes 'a
culture' or 'the past'. As a result, their relativism of
experience and human judgement could be applied within
recognised cultural entities (can a middle class sociologist
'really' understand working class life?) and within relatively
short time spans (can one generation 'really' understand another?).
Such questions do, of course, pose very real problems for
contemporary social analysts.
Rock's position approximates to what Hindess and Hirst
describe as a Kantian epistemology (1977:ll)« Central to the
geisteswissenschaften tradition is the method of understanding
(verstehen) of the object of analysis. Empathetic apprehension
of the object of social enquiry demands that the social scientist
has direct experience of the phenomenon in question. This
rationalist epistemology requires the support of an empiricist
epistemology for it is through direct experience and judgement that
the scientist is able to appropriate the object in the process of
knowledge formation. Thus, whilst Rock privileges two levels of
discourse which designate the relationship between social scientist
and the objective world of social facts as a relationship of
6. Rock, in fact, demands a standard of verification of
historical knowledge that he is unlikely to demand for the
sociologist when he writes that "... the historian cannot reassure
himself that he knows all that there was to be known about a
society. Neither can he be sure that documents and utterances were
not intended to deceive ..." (1976:357).
10.
•knowledge*, it is the rationalist level which dominates his
(7)
analysis. v,/ The historian, for Rock, mast he in a position
to appreciate the "actor's world" (1976:355) this can he
achieved only through "an extraordinary feat of the imagination"
(ihid.). To assist the historian, however, Rock finds a way of
encapsulating the essential spirit of an age and preserving it
over time and, thereby, leans even more heavily upon the legacy
of Kantian 'categories* which informs his discourse. "Speech
and writing", Rock suggests, "may give rise to some linguistic
(P }
productions which are relatively autonomous ..." (l9?6:359 )•
Historical analysis, then, as Hindess and Hirst were shewn to have
suggested, is the analysis of representations; primarily texts.
Ultimately, however, Rock's suggestion that words can take on an
"objectivity within a community" (ibid.:36l) remains a statement
of hope rather than a. theorised hypothesis for, as he also records,
"There are no practices by which interpretations of past writings
can be shown to correspond with the intended and unintended
7. Such discourse is "privileged" in the sense that it designates
the ground-rules which define what is and is not an object of
knowledge and the methods through which such knowledge is to be
achieved and verified as valid knowledge, but these discourses are
not, themselves, open to a similar form of validation. If they were
subjected to such a process this would simply result in the
privileging of another body of discourse. (See Hindess' and Hirst's
discussion of this issue, 1977:10 et sec.).
8. Epistemological protocols cannot be presumed to determine the
content of discourse and it is clear that Rock finds it necessary
to break out of his earlier view that history is a "virtually
impossible object of enquiry". It would, he suggests "... be
unprofitable to assume a uricri that every cultural item is
equally embedded" (1976:359)•
11.
meanings of their authors" (ibid.:362). It remains unclear why
this is not equally a problem for the sociologist studying survey
responses, documents and newspaper articles.
Having breached the 'hermeneutic circle' he had created,
Rock opens up the way for the more standard view that the present
may be seen "as a moving synthesis of the past" with the past
being "continually celebrated in the present" (ibid.). Thus,
whilst Rock recognises the necessity of respecting the specificity
and particular effectivity of determinate historical events ("The
relegation of all experience to some universe of shared humanity
hampers the recognition of what is peculiar to an event". Ibid.:
365)> he effectively must endorse the traditional view of society
as an evolving or unfolding of events through time. To the
empiricist view of history, represented by the oft-quoted claim
from Ranke that he did not wish to judge the past but merely to show
"what really happened" (Meyerhoff, 1959:13)5 Rock adds the
inter-mediate and refracting factor of the historian-interpreter.
As sociologist, Rock's phenomenolegical approach conceived the
social world as a process, created and recreated by the perceptions
and actions of individuals. As historian, however, Rock finds
that process petrified and his task merely an empirical act of
description. But, in fact, the situation is the same for Rock as
sociologist: his object of study is social beings, perceiving and
acting. In that sense, Rock's epistemology differs little from
the more open empiricism of someone like, say, Mandelbaum who begins
his historical analysis from the a priori position "... that the
order to "be found in nature and history as they are known "by us
may really characterize the events of the world independently of
the mind's activity" (1967:203-1|). ^ Mandelbaum, like Rock,
was, however, very much aware of the teleological nature of those
views of 'the past' which conceived it as a totality of meaning
in a process of evolution or progressive unfolding. Once
the essential 'message', 'spirit' or 'motor-force' of history, or
of an epoch within history, had been 'discovered' all events could
be subordinated to its determination. Mandelbaum, like Rock, did,
then, try to conceive of history .in terms of discontinuity as well
as continuity.
(iii) Historical Discontinuity
"... the grand sweep of events which we call
historical process is made up of an indefinitely
large number of components which do not form a
completely inter-related set". (Mandelbaum, 1967:27k)
Mandelbaum specifically refutes what he sees as earlier
teleological and organismic philosophies of history. .Although he
talks in terms of causal relationships, he denies that reference is
being made to any universal laws of causation and that his approach
is determinist. In place of the layman's perception of history
9. Mandelbaum continues: "We shall not attempt to justify this
assumption ...".
10. Under such conceptions, as Giddens notes, social change is
treated as:
"... the progressive emergence of traits that
a particular type of society is presumed to have
within itself from its inception". (1979:223)
based on a model which sees causes as substances producing, in
a temporal order, subsequent events, Mandelbaum substitutes
what he calls a "scientific view" (l967:2iU et seq.). For
Mandelbaum, "events" in history are made up, or determined by,
"sub-events". Their relationship he describes as one of
"existential dependence". Sub-events are not conceived as the
antecedents of events but as being contemporary with them. In a
sense, then, Mandelbaum acknowledges that the events of historical
analysis are the constructs of' the historian and not concrete, real,
objects. This is the substance of the statement by Eindess and
Hirst that "History is not a real object, an object prior to and
independent of thought, it is an object constituted within definite
ideologies and discourses" (1975:3^8) and of that by Foucault when he
* (6/
describes discourse analysis as the study of "... practices that
systematically form the objects of which they speak" (1972:35). I
shall return to this point later. For the moment, it roust be noted
that the tension in Rock's paper between the structuring of the
social world which allows continuity and, therefore, access to the
past and the specificity of events as a function of the relativity
engendered by individual actors, is also apparent in Mandelbaum* s
discourse. The fragmentation of the historical process which
Mandelbaum. seeks to conceptualise appears merely as the result of the
phenomenological orientation of the historian. History is a matter
of "concrete investigations" (1975:276), of "descriptive analysis"
v/hich owes little to the "theoretical social sciences" (ibid.:
261,). <")
Both Rock and Msndelbaum offer a challenge to traditional and
simplistic views of history as a rational and progressive continuity
but at the price of importing, to a greater or lesser extent, a
relativity which creates no boundaries against its inevitable
logical regression. Having introduced a heuristic device through
(12)
a change in the topographical metaphor of history, s Mamdelbaum
immediately switches to a view of history as a series of strata,
loses a grip on the changed mataphor and, ultimately, presents a
modified linear conception of history. 5br a combination of the
rejection of teleological, rational conceptions of history;
Mandelbaum1s search for a vertical conception of history; and Rock's
emphasis upon the objectification of the social "world as discourse,
we must turn to the theoretical "works of Michel Foucault.
11. Whereas Rock's philosophy of history closely resembles what
Hindess and Hirst call the idealist historical school which conceives
the method of "... interpretation of historical texts as
understanding, the recreation of the spirit or cultural essence of a
period or society through the meanings present in the representations
of it which are still extant" (l975:309)> that of Mandelbaum is
basically empiricist. "Positivist historical method interprets
representations by means of rules and procedures intended to determine
the veracity of the record, to eliminate distortion and to read back
through the record to the real conditions of which it is a
representation" (ibid.).
12. In trying to conceive of history not in horizontal and
evolutionary terms but as vertical and sedimented, Mandelbaum quotes
Stern with approval: "... the total structure of history is to be
understood as vertically stratified; not as a. single linear connection
of occurrences ... and also not as a set of independent historical
unitary entities standing side by side ..." (Mandelbaum quoting Stern,
1976:237).
15.
Whilst Rock's phenoraenological perspective did not permit him
seriously to consider that "... the consequences of actions
chronically escape their initiators' intentions in processes of
objectification" (Giddens, 1979:550* Foucault is intent upon
exorcising the 'knowing subject' from his analysis of
(l?)
discourse. K In his The Birth of the Clinic. An Archaeology of
Medical Percent ion, Poucault asks: "... is it inevitable that
we should know of no other function for speech (parole) than that
of commentary?" (l973:xv'i)• 'Commentary' attempts to get behind
discourse to discover its 'real' or essential meaning. Idealist
analysis sees discourse as representing the particular instance of
a universal Truth: empiricist analysis treats discourse as the
partial signification of the object-as-fact. In both cases, "...
to comment is to admit by definition an excess of the signified
over the signifier ..." (ibid.). 'Commentary' is the method of
ana-lysis of what Foucault calls, elsewhere, "total history",
Such histories seek to "... reconstitute the overall form of a
civilization, the principle - material or spiritual - of a society,
13. Although Fbucault's work ultimately rests upon the empirical
analysis of history and he has openly encouraged approaches to the
analysis of discourse "... at different levels and with different
methods" (1970:xiv), he specifically rejects the "phenomenological
approach", noting that the historical analysis of discourse should
not pursue "a theory of the knowing subject, but rather ... a
theory of discursive practice" (ibid.).
15. The original French version was published in 1963 but the
English language version translated by Sheridan Smith did not
appear until 1973*
15. The Archaeology of Knowledge appeared in French in 1969 but
was translated and published in English in 1972.
the significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the lav/
that accounts for their cohesion ..." (1972:9). This continuity
and organic totality has, Foucault argues, been challenged by a
form of "general history" which "... speaks of series, divisions,
limits, differences of level, shifts, chronological
specificities ..." and which asks "... what form of relation may be
legitimately described between these different series; what
vertical system they are capable of forming ..." (ibid.:10).
Foucault takes as the metaphor which is to describe his
philosophy of, and method for, historical analysis the practice of
the archaeologist. The metaphor induces the image of the
historian excavating vertically through the fine sedements of
history; some columns working ever downwards, others coming abruptly
to an end. nevertheless, although the metaphor is heuristic.
0Foucault's own epistemological approach is empiricist. Like other
so-called 'reconstructive sciences' which attempt to study the
pretheoretical structure of knowledge, for example, Chomsky's
generative grammar and Habermas' human interests (McCarthy, 1978:
276), Foucault's study of discursive regularities is ultimately an
exercise ill empiricism, no matter how 'deep' the 'structure'.
"What counts in the things said by men", argues Foucanit, "is not so
much what they may have thought or the extent to which these things
*
represent their thoughts, as that which systematizes them from the
16. The "Preface" to Madness and Civilization (French - 1961;




In studying the objects of discourse, the unities they form,
their "discursive regularities", Foucault acknowledges that he is
obliged to take them as they are "already given", for example, as
psychopathology, medicine or social work (1972:26). As Burton
and Carlen note, quoting Derrida: "the already there-ness of
instruments and of concepts cannot be undone or re-invented"
(1979:121). In the analysis of discourse, Foucault is concerned
to understand "... how it is that one particular statement appeared
rather than another?" (1972:27). Foucault contrasts this
enterprise to the analysis of language which studies the rules of
usage and asks "... according to what rules could other similar
statements be made?" (ibid.) and to the history of ideas which seeks
to discover the structure behind rather than ■within discourse.
What is important to discourse analysis is the attempt to "...
restore to the statement the specificity of its occurrence ..."
(ibid.:28) and it is in this sense that the concept of discontinuity
has its relevance, identifying as it does what Foucault describes as
cracks in the geology of history (ibid.).
17. These words were written in 1963. Foucault5s determinism
remains apparent in later texts, however. In the "Foreword" to the
English edition of The Order of Things (1970) Foucault writes:
"I do not wish to deny the validity of intellectual
biographies ... it is simply that I wonder whether
such descriptions are themselves enough ••• I should
' like to know whether the subjects responsible for
scientific discourse are not determined in their
situation ... by conditions that dominate and even
overwhelm them" . (xiii-xiv)
Fhilp, who explicitly adopts the approach outlined by Foucault in
The Order of Things, acknowledges his own text as being "... heavily
determinist for it suggests that discourses constitute sites for
subjects to speak and act from ..." (l979:TO^)»
The exemplary text to illustrate Foucaultts method of
discourse analysis and the identification of discontinuities
is The Order of Things. And yet, despite numerous claims to the
contrary that text regresses into idealism, a charge that Marxist
critics were quick to level (Sheridan, 1980:210), and into what
Dews describes as a "powerful latent historicism" (1979:150).
Foucault's intention, within the archaeological metaphor, was to
excavate the discursive format ionswhich constituted the knowledge
of living beings, the laws of language and the knowledge of
economic facts. This was to be what Foucault described as a
"regional study" and was not a search for a Weltanschauung or the
spirit of Classicism (l970:x). In the concept cf the episteme,
however, Foucault appears to find the universal organising
principle of all discourse. Foucault describes his work in the
following terms:
1... what I an attempting to bring to light is
the epistemological field, the episteme in which
knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria
having reference to its rational value or to its
objective form, grounds its positivity and thereby
manifests a history which is not that of its
growing perfection, but rather that of its
conditions of possibility ... Such an
enterprise is not so much a history, in the
traditional meaning of that word, as an
'archaeology1" (1970:xxii).
®ie episteme, in effect, hegemonises discourse. As Foucault makes
clear later in his text: "... there is always only one episteme
f
that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge ..."
the protocol which Foucauli meticulously lays down for the analysis
of discursive formations and Foucault's own discursive practice
within his text. As Barry Hindess convincingly argues (l977o:223),
however, it is not a sufficient critique of a body of discourse
simply to examine the congruity between the internal relations of
concepts ana propositions of a discourse and the body of rules by
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which it purports to be governed. The effectivity of Ibucault's
work depends upon more than such coherence and, in fact, this
thesis relies heavily upon concepts generated in Foucauit's work.
t will be a major contention in this thesis that orthodox Marxist
political theory has little to contribute to the analysis of the
ideological, cultural and legal conditions of existence cf welfare
discourse; as a consequence it is necessary to look elsewhere for
a range of concepts which can begin the task of a radio critique
in that realm. In the sub-section which follows I shall briefly
describe Foucault's historical analysis and its utilisation of the
concept of the episteme.
18. That Foucault's work is a contribution to what has already been
described as the reconstructive sciences can be seen from his
discussion of the 'deep structure' of the episteme. The euisteme
represents a "middle region" between the "fundamental codes of a
culture" and its scientific and philosophical discourses and is "the
most fundamental of all". Hie enistemerepresents the culturally
embedded nature of man's relationship with, and awareness of, the
order of the objective world. It is "... the pure experience of
order and of its modes of being" (l970:xx-xxi).
(1970:168). (l8) There are, then, obvious tensions between
20.
(iv) Hie Concept of the Bpisteme. In genera]., historians would
appear to proceed much in the way described by E.P. Thompson in
his Whigs and Hunters. The historian 'parachutes' into the
unknown territory of 'the past' "... at first knowing only a. few
yards of land around (himJ ... and gradually extending i_hisJ ...
explorations in each direction" (1975:16). Foucault, however,
begins with a body of discourse and explores its limits, the space
that it occupies, and refuses the continuities offered, for example,
between l8th century discourse on wealth and 19th century economic
thought. In a number of his texts, Foucault outlines a series of
fractures in the epistemological framework of Western culture which
describe discontinuities between the Middle Ages and the Classical
age (generally around the mid 17th century) and the Classical and the
Modern age (generally around the end of the l8th century) (1970:
xxii). Until the inauguration of the Classical age, Ibucault
observes, resemblance played a primary role in knowledge (ibid.:17).
Resemblance operated at two levels. The objects of the world were
believed to be linked in an unbroken chain through similitude.
These similitudes could, however, only be identified through external
3.9. These discontinuities appear in empirical studies by Foucault
of mental illness (Madness and Civilization - 1967); The Birth of
the Clinic - 1973; The Order of Things - 1970- Foucault is
said to view his later publication - Discipline and Punish - 1977?
as marking a new phase in his work, in particular his more explicit
use of the concept of power. Sheridan records that Foucault rut
aside his archaeological metaphor around 1971 (l9SO:13.6) and Dews
notes Foucault's acceptance of the limitations of the concept of the
episteme (l979:l50)« Discipline and Punish certainly does not
openly work with these concepts and yet the episteme remains implicit.
Ibucault's more x^ecent- use of the concept of 'genealogy' to describe
his historical analysis seems a less powerful metaphor for his desire
to move beyond traditional modes of writing history.
signs. Foucault provides the example of the walnut which it was
"believed could cure headaches (1970:27). Within the Renaissance
epistene, it wTas believed that walnut and brain bore similar
properties, the identity of which was a mystery, the 'reality* of
which was evidenced, however, by the similarity between the
convolutions of the brain and the walnut. From the mid-seventeenth
century, this ternary relationship between the subject and object of
knowledge (sign; similitude; signified) gave way to a binary system
of signification (Foucault, 1970:42).
It is, of course, something of a truism to observe that there
was a fundamental change in the form of knowledge in the 17th century
and Descartes is usually identified with this change (Carr, 1965:13U;
Flew, 1971:275). ®ie so-called Cartesian doubt raised the
fundamental question of whether and how anything can be known about
the world (Flew, 1971:282). For Descartes, though objects in
the world were real and concrete, human fallibility meant that
objects could be misconstrued. rfhe Classical episteme is, then,
characterised by representationism based upon the ability to measure
and classify the 'primary qualities' of the objective world.
Descartes' principles of method dictate not simply the way in which
objects are to be appropriated as knowledge but, rather, how those
objects are formed through division and ordering in knowledge
(Foucault, 1970:5U et sea.). Within the Classical episteme the
relationship between sign and signified is one of representation.
20. As Eabermas notes, the fundamental problem of knowledge has
always been: how is reliable knowledge possible" (1978:3).
As a consequence it was possible to conceive of a unified and
finite corpus of knowledge.
The outer-limit of the Classical period is identified by
Foucault towards the end of the eighteenth century. Destutt de
Tracy's emphasis, within his 'science of ideas', upon the veracity
of sense impressions and Kant's critique of representation itself
(21^
mark the ending of the Classical epistemological framework. v '
Consequently, a unified corpus of knowledge was now questionable:
the a priori sciences became separable from the a posteriori
empirical disciplines (Foucault, 1970:2I4.6). For Habermas,
epistemology subsequently ceased to operate as the critique of
knowledge. Prior to the Kantian critique:
"Theories of knowledge did not limit themselves to
the application of scientific method - they did
not merge with the philosophy of science" (1978:3)-
With the Modern episteme, representations become the mere surface
appearances of objects which have "organic, structures", internal
relationships linked by their own complexity of laws (Foucault, 1970:
218). The knowledge process, then, becomes one of refining methods
21. Descartes' 'solution' to the problem of knowledge illustrates
well the form of knowledge which Foucault characterises as the
Classical episteme.
"... God in creating me put this idea in me as the
mark of the workman imprinted on his work; and
furthermore, it is not necessary that this mark
should be something different from the work
itself". (Quoted by Flew, 1971:285).
For Kant, however, the logical apparatus of concepts and principles
could not be based within representation but must be prior to it.
Kant, in effeqt, replaced Descartes' transcendent metaphysics with an
immanent metaphysics of the transcendental.
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for the discovers' of these inner-laws and their translation,
lime knowledge becomes identified with science and the positivism
of its practice and, as Ibucault says, a unity of knowledge is
sought through the mathematicization of the empirical disciplines
(l970:2l|6). Knowledge and Human Interests is Habermas' attempt
to retrace the growing ascendency of positivism and to restore the
critical element to epistemology.
Describing the critical, element of epistemology, Habermas writes:
"Hie only thing standing at the beginning of critique is the radical
project of unconditional doubt" (1978:13)- Habermas begins his
review by considering Hegel1 s critique of Kant. Critical
philosophy demands that the knowing subject should submit to
reflection the conditions of knowledge of which it is capable. Such
a demand does, of course, lead to an infinite regress which is the
general condition cf the specific hermeneutic circle with which Hock
has struggled. As Habermas concludes: "Every consistent
epistemology is caught in this circle from the beginning" (ibid.:7).
x
Hie critique of knowledge, then, "... does not possess the
spontaneity of an origin" (ibid.:8). For Hegel, Kant's critical
philosophy embodies what is known as the organon theory of knowledge.
Within such a framework, critical philosophy directs attention
towards the means of knowledge and postulates knowledge as mediated
either through an instrument which forms the objective world or
through a medium which refracts knowledge of hat world. Hegel is
then able to reason that the task of critical philosophy, that is,
the ascertainment of the functions of the instrument or medium and.
therefore their influences, is superfluous. But, as Habermas
argues, Hegel1s critique depends upon his own presuppositions
about the Absolute and upon his interpretation of critical
philosophy as supposing' that the organon of knowledge represents
a subjective interference in the knowledge process. In fact, for
critical philosophy, the organon "... produces the world v/ithin
which reality can appear at all ..." (1978:12). Hegel, then,
reveals the presuppositions of Kantian critical philosophy - to
know that knowledge is constructed through- an organon is to already
know something shout the knowing subject - but merely substitutes
the concept of an absolute knowledge against which subjective
knowledge mig£it be compared.
Ibr Habermas, the important contrast between Cartesian and
Kantian philosophy and subsequent thought is the fact that, for the
former, 'radical doubt* required no formal legitimation within a
wider methodology because it was methodic in the sense that
consciousness constituted itself through its critical functioning.
Subsequently, however, radical doubt has been replaced by
methodology which demands justification through the formality of a
scientific practice. Epistemology which acknowledged the
problematic nature of what Hindess and Hirst call the privileging
of levels of discourse has been replaced by what Habermas calls
scientism, that is, "science's belief in itself" (1978:1;).
Hegel's objective idealism is a materialist philosophy in the
sense that he draws attention to the phenomenolcgical experience
of the individual mind in relation to the absolute Mind. There is,
then, at this point a further coincidence with Foucault's
conception of the inauguration of the Modern episteme, for as he
records: "Before the end of the eighteenth century, man did not
exist ..." (1970:308). With the Modem episteme Man "becomes what
Poucau.lt calls that "strange empirico-transcendental doublet"
(ibid,:318): Man is both object and subject of knowledge. Thus,
in his analysis of the discursive regularities of life, wealth and
discourse, Poucault describes the discontinuity at the turn of the
19th century which witnessed the incorporation within those
regularities of the new conceptioncf Man: "... since it is he who
speaks, since he is seen to reside among the animals ... fand is
thej ... means of all production" (ibid.:313)- And yet Man is
determined by these regularities and can be known only through his
words, his organism and his artefacts.
"... and he, as soon as he thinks, merely unveils
himself to his own eyes in the form of a being
who is already, in a necessarily subjacent
density, in an irreducible anteriority, a living
being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for
words which exist before him" (1970:313)*
It is this objectification of Man through self-consciousness which
Hegel sees as alienation (self-estrangement) and which he sought to
supersede in his dialectic of History. Marxfs meta^critiaue is the
attempt to overcome the philosophy of identity which German Idealism
had developed in reaction to Kant (Marx, in McLellan, 1978:98-109)*
Modern thought, then, can be characterised: by its attempt
"to traverse an ontological gulf" (Layder, 1979:158) between subject
and object; agency and structure; base and superstructure; by the
desire to reveal that otherness of Man - his alienated nature or
his unconscious self - "by pouring light into the dark recesses
of his History and his Nature. Modern thought is the attempt to
reveal "... the inexhaustible double that presents itself to
reflection as the blurred projection of what man is in his truth ..."
(Poucault, 19705327)* Having once posited the essentially alienated
character of human existence, discourse must identify the force which
determines that existence. To God, Society, the Absolute and the
superego can be added Marx's concept of the mode of production. It
is for this reason that Poucault can declare that: "At the deepest
level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity;
it found its place without difficulty ..." ("1970:26l).
Prom within the matrix of the Modern episteme, the social
sciences emerge. The Order of Things is subtitled An .Archaeology of
the Human Sciences, those discursive regularities excavated by
Foucault - biology, economics and philology - are not, however, the
human sciences in question. v J The human, or social, sciences
emerge from the "... vicinity, on the immediate frontiers, and along
the whole length of those sciences that deal with life, labour and
language" (l970:35l)* There is, then, within the configuration of
the episteme a specificity to the social sciences which is not always
immediately obvious for the other discourses studied in that text.
22. Habermas writes that, ultimately "Marx reduces the process of
reflection to the level of instrumental action" (1978:1j1j.), blurring
the distinction between natural science and critique. Marxists
subsequently have simply endorsed positivism through crude economic
materialism.
i
23. This is not revealed until Poucault5s final chapter (p.3^4 et
sea.-)-
Subsequent chapters will look in more detail at this specificity
for it will be argued that welfare discourse reflects the
practical application of the social sciences. For the moment,
however, concentration remains with the general application of the
concept of the episteme.
Foucault's epistemei sit comfortably with other efforts
directed towards the compartmentalisation of 'the past' into epochs,
although his claim not to be writing a history of ideas is noted.
The analysis of discourses on living things, on wealth and on
language are general histories and yet the text leads us through
the apparently progressive stages of the Renaissance, Classical and
Modern epistemei and it sets this process within the wider
determinant of the episteme in general. Nevertheless, though
parallels may be drawn with both Rock's and Mandelbaum's
problemailsations of historical analysis - for example, like Rock,
Foucault seems to warn against the glib translation of one
existential world in terms of another and, like Mandelbaum, he makes
empirical selections from the complex of history but fails to explain
those selections and the epistemologlcal stance which makes them
possible - Foucault does avoid the historical perspective which
compares that enterprise to looking through the wrong end of a
telescope. Reversing the telescope, the historian gases into 'the
past': the greater the distance, the smaller and more blurred the
image appears. In a sense, Foucault gives each episteme equal
intellectual effort and does not relegate earlier euistemei to the
thin end of the telescope. Each episteme must he appreciated for the
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general form it provides for a variety of discourses and for the
limits it places on the contents of those regularities.
Ibucault reveals the epistemological conditions of determinate
bodies of discourse (medicine; economics; the social sciences;
penology). Within the Modern episteme, for example, he argues that
the conceptualisation of Man as both constitutive of, and constituted
by, History is both a condition of existence of social science
discourse and provides it with its object of analysis. As such,
social science represents "... both knowledge and a modification of
what it knows, reflection and a transformation of the mode of being
of that on which it reflects. Whatever it touches it immediately
causes to move ..." (1970:327)- Attempts to close this
whirlpool of analysis, to reveal the Same in the dark corners of the
Other, lead both to the positivistic search for origins in Man1 s
nature and in the history of his culture and to the search for the
mo tor-force of development of that nature and that history. But, as
has been underlined, the discourse which attempts such analyses must
somehow stand outside of the process analysed: it must operate on a
privileged level. Such a discourse of Truth, Foucan.lt maintains,
leads to positivism in which "... the truth of the object determines
the truth of the discourse ...", or to eschatology in which "... the
truth of the discourse constitutes the truth in formation ..." (1970:
320). This formulation parallels Hindess' and Hirst's discussions
of empiricist and rationalist epistemologies (1977) and will be
2ij.. Elsewhere, Fbucault speaks of "... the strange units of
sociology and-psychology which since their appearance have not ceased
to start afresh ..." (1973:9)-
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utilized in the following chapter to show that, in terms of
epistemological conditions, liberal and radical commentaries on
the Welfare State operate on similar premises. Foucault, then,
offers his own form of critique of knowledge and yet his own
epistemological framework is never clearly explicated. In the next
sub-section this point will be taken up and the framework for this
thesis will be discussed.
(v) Epistemology and Ontology. Dews has noted that whilst
Foucault1s work is directed towards the study of the 'will to truth1,
Foucault has always sidestepped a direct discussion of the
epistemological issues of 'true' knowledge (Dews, 1979:li+7-9)• As a
result, Foucault's discourse replaces the pessimism embodied in
Weber's ineluctable process of rationalisation with the pessimistic
portrayal of history as the aleatory trajectory described by
(2O
competing forces. • nevertheless, given the demands of a radical
project of unconditional doubt, Foucault's work offers a critical
theory of the 'will to truth' which refuses the luxury of any
absolute foundations in contrast to the work of an avowed critical
theorist, Habermas, who seeks to anchor the "will to reason" in the
25. Foucault's conception of the episteme which defines the
conditions of possibility of knowledge has similar effects to
Alihusser's and Salibar's conception of mode of production as a
structured totality: transitions from one episteme to another and from
one mode of production to another become logically implausible. (For
Althusser and Balibar, see Eindess and Hirst, 1979; especially Chapter
6.). Foucault has to surmise "... an erosion from outside ..." the
culture in question (1970:50). In effect, he brackets-out the problem
"... perhaps it is not yet time to pose this problem ..." (ibid.) and
simply accepts "... discontinuities in the simultaneously manifest and
obscure empirical order wherever they posit themselves" (ibid.:5l).
deep structure of the species (human interests) (1973:31^)* But
what are the consequences for political discourse of Foucault's
nihilism? During 1968, Ibucault was questioned directly on this
issue by the editors of Esprit:
"Doesn't a thought which introduces discontinuity
and the constraint of a system into the history of
the mind remove all basis for a progressive
political intervention? Does it not lead to the
following dilemma:
- either the acceptance of the system,
- or the appeal to an uncontrolled event, to the
irruption of exterior violence which alone is
capable of upsetting the system?" (Eoucault, 1978:8).
Jbucault's reply is unlikely to have satisfied his critics; its
adjacency to the events in Paris in May 1968 make his views
particularly interesting however. Sheridan suggests that the
'failure' of those disturbances should have come as no surprise to
the apostle of discontinuities, for whom the State was no mere
central mechanism which could simply be 'taken-over' (1980:113).
What Foucault emphasises in his reply are his long-term objectives
to rid radical critique of its glib solutions. He emphasises the
specificity of determinate bodies of discourse which cannot be
subsumed by a universal theory of historical development. Foucault'
task is "the individualization of discourses" (1978:8) and "the
analysis of different types of transformation" (ibid.:ll).
Towards the end of his reply, Foucauit turns to the relation
between political practice and the discursive regularities he has
studied and notes that the essential point to understand is not that
political tractices influence consciousnesses and, thereby the form
1
and content of discourses but, rather, that political practices
transform "the mode of existence of ... discourse" (1973:21).
What are modified are the "rules of formation" of discourses but
such "... changes are not arbitrary nor 'free': they operaie in
a realm which has its own configuration and which consequently does
not offer limitless possibilities of modification" (ibid.:23).
Foucault, then, is offering from the midst of his often esoteric
work a very practical warning: political practice can influence
the content of specific bodies of discourse through awareness of
thehr conditions of formation but the effectivity of that influence
cannot be legislated for in advance. Finally, inter alia,
Foucault asserts that a "... progressive politics does not consider
that discourses are the result of mute processes or the expression
of a silent consciousness; but rather that ... they form a, practice
which is articulated upon ... other practices" ^ibid.:2i|). In this
and other respects I want to suggest that Foucault1 s enterprise has
much in common with the work of Hindess and Hirst and their
collaborators. Hindess and Hirst, for instance, suggest that -
"In political practice the conditions of calculation of effectivity
and of the production of effect are not separable. Political
practice involves the calculation of effect, of the possibilities and
results of political action, and that calculation rests on political
relations which condition the degrees of certainty of calculation and
the range of the calculable" (1977:59)• Put in making such a
statement, Hindess and Hirst are not merely repeating the Marxist
liturgy that theory only gains credence through practice. For
Hindess and Hirst, calculation cannot be privileged by the
appellation of ,knowledge, because their critique of
epistexaology requires the rejection of any conception of knowledge
as the process of appropriation of the objects of discourse as
concrete objects (ibid.:7).
As I have already tried to suggest in earlier sub-sections,
once a social theorist begins to examine the epistemological
conditions of his or her claims to knowledge and the ontological
status of the subject and object of that process, then it becomes
clear that a form of discourse is developed which necessarily ends
in the braoketing-out of certain problematic issues. In general,
epistemologies postulate a realm of objects (the real, concrete
world) and a knowing subject which, with the benefit of specific
faculties (perception; experience; judgement) and methods
(observation; contemplation; measurement), can appropriate, to a
greater or lesser extent, the reality of that realm of objects. As
Hindess and Hirst put it, epistemology conceives of the relationship
between discourse and object as one of both a distinction acid a
correlation (1977:1-0). Within epistemology, certain ontological
statements have to be made about the nature of the real world (that
it exist in the form in which knowledge appropriates it or that it is
formed to a greater or lesser extent by the process of knowledge) and
about the nature of the knowing subject (that it has certain genetic
or acquired faculties for knowledge). But any epistemology must
claim to "... already know more than it can know according to its own
stated premises" (Habermas, 1978:12). For how can knowledge about,
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for example, the ontological status of the knowing subject be
verified except by reference to that very ontological status?
As already suggested, the premises of positivism have largely
ignored these logical problems of verification, placing faith
almost entirely in sense-experience. However:
"Hie circularity and ultimate dogmatism of all
epistemological conceptions should be evident
since there can be no demonstration that such-and-
such forms of discourse are indeed privileged
except by means of forms of discourse that are
themselves held to be privileged". (Hindess and
Hirst, 1977:13-14)
Rejection of this dogmatism means that the validity and effectivity
of a discourse cannot be measured by reference to objects existing
outside of discourse. In endorsing this position it is necessary
to say, with Eindess and Hirst, that "Hie question of the 'reality
of the external world'is not the issue ... Objects of discourse do
not exist. Hie entities discourse refers to are constituted in it
and by it" (1977:19-20).
There are numerous forms of discourse and they may be subjected
to critique according to the concepts they utilize and the relations
they postulate between those concepts. It is not, however,
legitimate to calculate their effectivity on the basis of other forms
of discourse or according to the dogma of epistemologies. This
thesis is an exercise in theoretical discourse which Hindess and
Hirst define as "... the construction of problems for analysis and
solutions to them by means of concepts" (ibid.:7). Concepts specify
objects within discourse. To say this, is to reject empiricist
epistecologies claiming thai concepts are direct representations
of the objective world and rationalist epistecologies claiming
that concepts represent the essence of the real world. The
process of construction of theoretical discourse proceeds in the
following manner: a general concept, such as capitalist relations
of production, implies other particular concepts, for example,
capitals and labour, and relations between concepts, for example,
forms of law which define the status and activity of capitals and
labour and the relationship between them (contracts of employment,
for example). In this process, capitalist relations of
production specif^, in a general form, other concepts but they do
not determine those other concepts. Theoretical consideration of
the forms of lav/ -under capitalist relations of production may well
lead to a reformulation of the concepts of capitals and labour and .
of capitalist relations of production. Hindess and Hirst describe
the effects in discourse which are the consequences of specifying
determinate concepts as the "conditions of existence" of those
concepts (1977:25-6). Thus, the concept of capitalist relations
of production has, as its conditions of existence, economic agents
occupying the positions of capitals with effective possession of,
end control over, the means of production, and labour which is
effectively separated from ownership and control of those means.
These economic agents and their relationship have conditions of
existence in forms of culture and law "which define and police those
statuses and relationships. Specification of determinate relations
of production results in specification of the general form of other
concepts (political; legal; cultural; economic): it does not
determine those forms or their specific content. As will be seen •
in subsequent chapters, this has implications for a radical theory
of the Welfare State because the specification of the British
(26)
national econony as a social formation } with capitalist
(27)
relations of production v ' does not, ipso facto, specify the form
taken by what I shall be calling the policing of idleness (the care,
supervision and regulation of those agents not within the workforce
children; the disabled; the unemployed; the aged) and it does not
specify the content of that discourse.
2. Concluding Discussion
The mere declaration that the security offered by
epistemological protocols is being rejected is no guarantee that
their effects will be erased from a piece of theoretical discourse.
"These conditions", declare Hindess and Hirst, "are not easy to
26. A "... social formation ..." is "an object of discourse in
which the conditions of existence of determinate relations of
production are secured" (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:26).
27. The concept of relations of production is used rather than mod.
of production because the latter suggests that a social formation is
a structured totality defined and determined by an !economic system*
in effect, 'social formation' becomes synonymous with 'mode of
production'.
28. Hindess and Hirst write: "Legal and political apparatuses and
cultural and ideological forms provide the forms in which the
conditions of existence of determinate relations of production are
secured, but they are not reducible to their defects and they are not
organised into definite structural levels which merely reflect ... a
underlying economic base" (1977:57)-
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satisfy ..." (1977:214.). In this thesis I shall he attempting
to step outside of a sociological mode of analysis which
nevertheless insists at every juncture to provide me with its
concepts, its epistemologies said its meta-language. Poucault
has written that The Order of Things "... may have given the
impression that ... analyses were being conducted in terms of
cultural totality. It is mortifying", he continues, "that I was
unable to avoid these dangers:' I console myself with the thought
that they were intrinsic to the enterprise itself, since, in order
to carry out its task, it had first to free itself from these various
methods and forms of history ..." (1972:16-7). The effectivity of a
body of discourse depends upon much more than the loyalty it maintains
to its protocol of formation. In his "discourse theory of truth"
(McCarthy, 1973:1^1-8; 1978:291 et seaHabermas, 1970: 1976b)
Habermas suggests discursive practice works on the premise of an
"ideal speech situation" in which there is a willingness to arrive at
a rationally grounded agreement. Under such an 'arrangement1, all
privileging of discourses according to epistemological or other
criteria of authority is suspended and discourse is conducted
according to the "unforced force of the better argument" (McCarthy,
1978:292). A body of discourse has its own conditions of existence
and it is an explicit ideological premise of this thesis that
theoretical discourse ought to proceed in terms of approximation to
an ideal communication situation. This is a reflection of the
political and ideological orientation of the theoretical, work of this
r
1
thesis., for the aims of increased socialisation ^ ' anrl
democratisation of social relations axe the conditions of an ideal
communication situation.
Hie selection of specific concepts is the result of
theoretical, ideological and political calculation. Hindess and
Hirst acknowledge, for example, that the discourse of Pre¬
capitalist Modes of Production began with concepts developed by Marx
and Engels and did not investigate the generation of those concepts
(1977:140). Their collaborative work subsequently has begun just
such an investigation (Cutler et al, 1977 a^d 1973)• The results
of my 'critique of radical discourse on the Welfare State suggest
that basic Marxist concepts have little to contribute to discourse
on welfare and the policing of idleness and it is for this reason
that, in later chapters, I shall utilize concepts derived from
Ebucault5s work. Xn particular, I shall be attempting to link
Poucault's concepts of the epistemei of the Middle Ages, the
Classical and the Modern period to the Marxist concepts of feudal and
capitalist relations of production and the transformation from the
former to the latter. The effectivity of such work resides not in
the 1 accuracy' with which history is read but in what it can say about
relationships between determinate conceptions of social formation,
relations of production and their cultural, legal, ideological or
29. Hirst defines socialisation as "... the conversion of
activities and resources to a public or communal property form, the
administration and distribution of activities and resources in non-
commodity forms" (1930:79).
30. Primarily The Order of Tilings and Discipline ana Punish.
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political conditions of existence. As the analysis of discourses
on welfare and the policing of idleness, attention is drawn in the
thesis to what I have called the epistemologlcal conditions of
existence of those discursive regularities, that is, "broadly the
ideological, cultural and theoretical conditions by which they are
governed, validated and achieve legitimacy. Emphasis is given to
epistemological conditions because the thesis offers a critique of
welfare discourse which operates as a science of welfare. Some
attention is also given to the legal conditions of existence cf
those discourses.
"What is offered in this thesis is the attempt to bring into
radical discourse on welfare and social work a series of new concepts,
a radically new mode of analysis and a meta-- language which seeks to
break from the social science framework which is already intimately
integrated into that welfare discourse. "Theoretical work", however,
"proceeds by constant problematisations and reconstructions" (Hindess
and Hirst, 1977:?). is not claimed that this work offers a clear
acid final break with existing discourses on welfare but, rather, that
it may begin a new and more rigorous critique of that body of
discourse.
At the most general level, the thesis works with the concept of
the British national economy as a social formation. In more
fOparticular terms, interest will be centred upon the direcu-economic
agents of production within the social formation, that is, the labour
force and, specifically, the thesis will concentrate upon what I
describe as the policing of idleness as it is manifested as a condition
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of existence of the concepts of national labour force and the
conditions of existence of its regulation.
CHAPTER 2
Literal arid. Radical Theories of the Welfare State :
A Critique of Essentialism
1• Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was argued that discourse which establishes
veracity and effectivity in terms of epistemological presuppositions
about the ontological status of the objective world and its
appropriation as knowledge, must be rejected in terms of its logical
inconsistency. Discourses were not, therefore, challenged on the
basis of their relative success in appropriating or reflecting the
real world; they were not condemned as being *merely' ideological.
Protocols, such as empiricist and rationalist epistemologies, which
establish the terms on which 'true' knowledge can be based,
effectively bracket-out of consideration the verification of those
terms which are thereby given privileged status. In this chapter,
a critique of liberal and radical discourses on the Welfare State is
given which is based upon an analysis of the coherence and
JO
consistency of those discourses^ As a critique of tne protocols
through which they claim coherence and veracity it must be noted that
little can be said about the effectivity of these discourses. It is
clear, for example, that radical critiques of liberal discourse in
the realm of welfare and social work have had a growing influence over
the last decade both amongst academic commentators and practitioners
in welfare organisations. But it will be maintained that the
failure of radical critiques to free themselves from the
*
episteiaclogical conditions which inform liberal discourses has serious
implications for socialist political practice in the welfare
realm. The ideal communication situation, which is a premise
of socialist discourse, is consistently ignored by radical
commentary which seeks to privilege its theoretical work as the
* scientific® analysis of the laws and historical tendencies of
1capitalist' development.
To claim that liberal and radical discourses share
epistemological presuppositions is not to argue away any relevant and
effective differences between them. These two bodies of work have
been deliberately selected for analysis because, despite their
similarities, they are different. In terms of their respective
conditions of existence, in political and ideological terms for
example, there are important contrasts. Radical commentators seek
fundamental changes in the social relations they study: their
liberal counterparts are much more content with existing relations
whilst acknowledging that 'progress' may be necessary in certain
limited realms. This is not, however, to endorse the view that
radical political discourse is 'revolutionary', in contrast to the
reformism of liberal politics. Important changes in the working
and living conditions of individuals cannot be relegated as mere
placatory reforms. Of equal importance, however, "Reforms are not
reformist if they create new grounds for struggle and new sources of
strength" (Hirst, 1979:1/)• Both radicals and liberals may often
find that they are working for similar short-term and practical aims and
radicals should avoid the temptation to claim superiority of purpose
through radical posturing and the exegesis of Marxist texts.
The nomenclature of 'liberal' and 'radical' has been adopted
in preference to apparently more precise descriptions. It is not
suggested that this chapter is an attempt to provide a concise
overview of discourse on welfare such as may be found in the
classification offered in George and Wilding- (1976). ^ Anti-
collectivists such as Hayek (i960) or Raison (1965) accept that
welfare cannot be guaranteed through earnings or wealth but seek to
meet need through the 'private sector', in a commodity form. The
liberal and radical discourses discussed in this chapter are opposed
to such a form and the concern of this thesis is the understanding
of discourses which seek to establish a non-commodity form of
organisation and administration of 'welfare services. Whilst liberal
discourse may see this as its major project, radical discourse
directs attention to ways of increasing the democratic control and
operation of such services. In addition, commentators who adopt a
more precise classification of theoretical discourses on welfare
base their categorisations on theoretical and methodological
perspectives which are often taken as indicators of the political and
ideological orientation of the discourses in question. Underlying
similarities of the epistemological and ontological premises, in
turn, are ignored. Gough, for example, regards the major weakness
of existing theoretical discussion about the Welfare State to be its
over-reliance on either a functionalist or an action-orientated
analysis (1978; 1979)- For Gough, the power of theoretical
1„ Ideology :and Social Welfare. George and Wilding discuss the
"anti-coilectivist"; "reluctant collectivist"; "Fabian Socialist";
and "Marxist" perspectives.
discourse resides in its ability to reflect the structural and the
subjective aspects of the social world. Social administration,
(2)for Gough, is particularly ineffective, gaining acceptance by
default through the failure of other perspectives to provide a
"theoretical synthesis". Thus, whilst writers such as Gough 2nd
Mishra, who classifies social administration under the "empiricist
school" (1977:3-19) are well aware of the political influence
which social administration has had since the beginning of the
(
century, particularly through association with the Fabian Society,
they tend to direct' their critiques of such discourses against
their supposed scientific and methodological inadequacies.
Coughs then, simply side-steps the task of subjecting existing
discourses to a critique by accepting in principle functionalist
and 'action5 theories. All he offers is a project for their
synthesis: a synthesis of "objective" and "subjective" "elements"
in "the historical process" (1979:10). Similar attempts to bridge
this "ontological golf" will be discussed later in this chapter; for
the moment the point to note is that a nomenclature based upon
2. The view that social administration is atheoretical is
particularly prevalent. For its critics, both inside and outside
the discipline, this is a fault often to be rectified through the
importation of sociological theories and methods (Warham, 1973:13-L;
Pinker, 1976:5).
3. Founded in 1884, the Fabian Society adopted, a deliberate policy
of gradualism and permeation of existing institutions as a peaceful
means of engineering social change. Beatrice Webb's self-confessed
"use" of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws illustrates the
strategic use of 'facts5 to support a political doctrine. Mrs Webb
is said to have seen her work with the Royal Commission as "more or
less engineering the evidence in my direction" (Corioark, 1953:29-30:
and see Sonniskm, 1972 and Rruce, 1976).
14*.
theoretical or methodological frameworks is rejected. It will be
suggested that distinctions drawn between functionalist and 'action1
perspectives and between these and structuralist interpretations of
the social world are often vacuous. Using the amorphous
classification of 'radical' and 'liberal' to label the political
and ideological standpoint of the texts in question, discourses will
be reviewed to disclose their essentialist premises.
2. A Critique of Essentialism
Hindess and Hirst have described essentialism as:
"... a philosophical and ideological mode of analysis
in which determinate real phenomena are 'explained'
by reference to the essence ... that they are held
to express" (1975:9)•
In a later text, in which Hindess is less inclined to imply that the
charge of essentialism is the charge of being non-scientific, he
suggests that essentialism is "... a mode of analysis in which social
phenomena are analysed not in terms of their specific conditions of
existence and their effects with regard to other social relations and
practices but rather as the more or less adequate expression of an
essence" (l977t>: 95) •
U. A great deal of effort on the part of sociologists in the West
has, of course, been directed towards the very task of synthesising
the "two sociologies" as Dawe has described functionalism and action
theory (1971 s550-1). Parsons'work since his The Structure of Social
Action in 1937 has been directed towards that goal, resulting in 'work
which Gouidner suggests has "... influenced and captured the attention
of academic sociologists ... throughout the world" (1972:168; end see
Giddens, 1979^50).
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(i) History as the Search for Origins. Historical analyses, like
all great voyages of discovery, are invariably searches for origins
and sources. The teleological, rationalist or idealist versions
of a 'total' history portray historical development as the working
out of some absolute purpose; the realisation of the destiny of a
privileged rare or culture; the programmed evolution of a species;
the perfection of civilisation; the progress of knowledge. Under
such signs, 'the past' is searched for significant milestones; for
moments of birth; for continuities of cause and effect. Each
significant moment registers the essence, a fragment, of the motor-
force of the historical process. Histories of the 'development1 of
the British Welfare State invariably identify empirical signposts
which embody the essential character of that development. Thus,
whilst the process may be broadly portrayed as one of increasing
rationalisation and the progress of Society, this may be condensed
in the form of a series of government reports, statutes or, perhaps,
public scandals. For example, the Family Allowances Act of 19U5
may be shown as the 'inevitable' end result of a process typified by
the Inter-Departmental Committee on Biysical Deterioration of 1901;;
the establishment of a school meals service in 1906 and a school
health service in 1907; along with the wider campaign to reduce
infant mortality. Beveridge described his scheme for a national
insurance as "... in some ways a revolution but in more important
ways it is a natural development from the past" (quoted by Eraser,
1978:200). For someone like Titmuss, however, such a process
requires a catalyst. Conditions of war were felt by Titmuss often to
ignite the basic altruistic nature of Man: "It was the South
African War he wrote, "that touched off the personal health
movement which led eventually to the National Health Service in
191+8". (1976:80).
A number of introductory texts to the British Welfare State
carry in their titles the essentialist notions of their discourse.
But such 'origins* are never sought with the tenacity demanded by
the logic of the protocol. Seed writes humorously about "pseudo-
historians" who attempt to trace social work back to the Acts of
the Apostles, Plato and Aristotle (l973:iz-x)• But his claim to
be substituting an understanding of "... the historical background
to events and traditions from which there is evidence that ideas
about modern social work developed ..." for earlier histories which
simply claimed a "... piece of history as belonging to modern social
work" (ibid.:x), merely substitutes an idealist essentialism for an
essentialism of the object. An object of discourse - contemporary
social work - is represented in discourse, in its essence, before it
has appeared in its reality. In searching for the protoplast,
history is viewed through the wrong end of the telescope with the
consequence that the more original the protoplasm the more diluted i
the essence. Seed, then, begins his history in "Tudor times";
Eraser begins his in the late eighteenth century. The demand to at
least gaze into the blurred image of primitive origins is, however,
5. For example: Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State (1961)
and The Rise of the Welfare State~Tl973T; Eraser, The Evolution of
the British Welfare State'(1975); Gilbert, The Evolution of
National Insurance in Great Britain (1973); Thane, The Origins of
British Social Policy (1961).
strong and Eraser is prompted to include "... some retrospective
glances at earlier developments within the Boor Law" (1978:1).
For Eraser, there is an essential nature to the British Welfare
State; there is something in "English Society", "something about
"... the typical empirical approach of the English" (l96l:ll;).
In Bruce*s terms, the British Welfare State really began in
19^8. Nevertheless, the Elizabethan Poor Law did, he feels,
provide "... the base from which ... social concern developed and
broadened ..." (1973:^-) "until, in the "century and a half" leading
lip to 19^-8, communal altruism began to develop into a "concern for
the welfare of all" (ibid.:l). And yet, if texts by Bruce, Eraser
and Seed rejresent^the'Crtho^Q^ of social policy histories they
differ little from avowedly radical discourses. Corrigan and
Corrigan, for example, present a brief history of state formation
and social policy, beginning in the T'udor period: therein lie the
"... origins of both the modern English state and social policy"
(1979:3/« addition "... the market forms of the capitalist
mode of production "were being established". Tudor social policy
was to lay the "roots" of the distinction between deserving and
undeserving poor and "was to "begin the story" of centralised
administration (ibid.:!;). As the first paper in a collection of
essays on Social Work. Welfare and the State it serves as the
ritual genuflection to the mysterious history of origins. The paper
ends with an apologia - it is not to be understood as an analysis of
naturally evolving social policy or about humanitarian!sm, "...
the atmosphere" (ibid.:!;). Perhaps, as Bruce suggests, it is
although both are also involved" (ibid.: 17-18) . But the motif
is familiar. The capitalist mode of production is a stage in a
rational historical process and its coming can be read in the
f)
social legislation of the sixteenth century.
Radicals, then, look down radical telescopes but they are
pointed in the same direction and at the same facts which interest
liberal writers. Ginsburg, for example, seeks to "... draw out
some simple relationships between the minutiae of policy
development and the broad sweep of qualitative changes ..." (1979:
29). In other words, he seeks to extract the essential features
from the complex matrix of historical events. Early essences are,
however, -weak essences, "little or no tiling" is to be said, therefore
about events prior to the nineteenth century. This is not, however
to throw doubt upon the fact that "... the history of the state as
both a welfare state and as a form of the capital relation goes back
of course to the genesis of capitalism from within the feudal mode
of production" (ibid.:30). Ginsburg1s teleology allows him to
identify characteristics necessary to the concept of 'capitalism'
within the social relations that precede it. "In the period of
primitive accumulation", he writes, "the state assisted in forcibly
creating capitalist social relations ..." (ibid.:3l). But, as
Hindess and Hirst maintain:
"All conceptions in which a structure is defined in
the future anterior, by the future results of
present phenomena, involve a collapse into idealist
and teleologdcal theories of history"(1975:271)•
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Radical historical discourse on social policy seeks to lirik
the essence of that social policy to the essence of 'capitalism1.
Thusj whereas for liberal theorists the rotor-force of welfare
discourse is often the humanitarian nature of a culture or the
logic of progress, for the radical it is the onward march of the
capitalist mode of production - present in its absence. Despite,
then, a degree of emphasis in most radical and liberal discourses
on the ad hoc or contingent nature of social policy, both ultimately
adopt determinist stances. Though the process may be held up for
a while by the efforts of individuals or groups, it cannot be held
back for long because the process is a totality in motion; a self-
adjusting mechanism.
(ii) Convergence Theory or Theoretical Convergence? A notable
consequence of the conception of society as a totality is its
portrayal as a smoothly running synergistic organism or mechanism.
Anything which threatens this 'normal' state (dysfunction) is
systematically and competently neutralised. Under such conceptions,
dysfunctions are technical faults - a failure in childhood
socialisation, perhaps - which are rectified in the process of
reproduction of the totality. For liberal discourses the mechanism
of historical development is often portrayed as the progress of
civilisation, the growth of humanitarianism. For radicals it is
often the gradual consolidation of ruling class hegemony. Thus,
for Bruce:
"Gradually ... the positive role of the state was
developed, in order to ensure ... the establishment
of;all at standard acceptable to civilised society"
(l573:U).
Whilst for Gilbert, the "early architects of the Welfare State" ~
11... although by no means solving the problem of
the condition of the people ... settled the lines
upon which the eventual solution would be found"
(1973: kBl, li52).
For Melossi, on the other hand, the "administrative apparatus of
the modern welfare state", though created through "working class"
struggle, is "turned to the real advantage of capitalism" (1979:96).
For the liberal commentator, the Welfare State often appears to be
an unquestionable good: for the radical it is one-dimensional at
worst (Marcuse, 1968; Hearn, 197^) and an unsatisfactory compromise
at best (Saville, 1957/8; Miliband, 1977; Gou^i, 1979).
In her paper on Tory interpretations of history, Hart notes
that schoolchildren are now taught "as an article of dogmatic faith"
that the 'Whig' interpretation of history is false (l97^+:197).
The 'Whig' interpretation, she points out, is usually condemned for
(6)
its emphasis upon "heroes and villains". - ' This kind of
humanist reduction is, however, common within histories of the
Welfare State. 'Heroes' such as Chadwick, Shaftesbury, Lloyd
George and Beveridge are described as the architects of the modern
6. Herbert Butter-worth's use of the phrase in his The Whig
Interpretation of History (l93l) referred to the tendency of certain
Victorian historiansto view English history as a struggle between
reactionaries (Tories) and progressives (Whigs) which the latter won.
Marx writes of "Macaulay, who has falsified English history in the
interest of the Whigs and the 'bourgeoisie ..." (Capital, Vol.1.,
1977:260, footnote). Although the liberal histories discussed in
this chapter are often portrayed by radicals as the descendants of
the 'Whig' interpretation, radical histories are inclined to endorse
similar interpretations.
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Welfare State whilst Octavia Hill, Samuel Harriett, and so on
always appear as pioneers of social work (Eruce. 19ol; Eraser,
1978; Seed, 1973; Woodroofe, 197U)• As Woodroofe records
succinctly:
"Although human knowledge owes much to the
anonymous many, its greatest debt is to the gifted
few" (197^:101).
The 'Tory' histories which are'reviewed by Hart have, then, much in
common with the liberal histories being discussed, particularly in
terms of their sweeping statements about "the conscience ... of the
nineteenth century" and its "strong sense of social responsibility".
If 'Tory' historians sought to substitute the amorphous essentialism
of the 'onward march of civilisation' for the 'Whig' essentialism of
idealism, Goldthorpe identifies a similar reaction to the trend
which, it was felt, had been established by the jurist Dicey.
For Dicey, legislation represented the end product of a process
which began with the thoughts and ideas of outstanding individuals
and which influenced public opinion. The reaction described by
Goldthorpe saw changes in social policy not as the result of "...
7. Quoted by Hart from Kitson Clark's The Making of Victorian
England. Whilst the form of essentiaiism may be the same, the
political and ideological conditions of existence of 'liberal' and
'Tory' discourses may differ considerably. Self-styled conservative
historians have, in recent years, set themselves the task of showing
that the 19th century period of industrialisation was not necessarily
populated by nasty capitalists and hard done by workers. McCord
writes that "... the new industrial society did not invent child
labour or poor housing or bad sanitation ... it did, however, do
distinctly more to remedy them than any previous generation had done"
(l97b:88). See also The Long Debate on Poverty (institute of
Economic Affairs, 1972~T and Hayek's History and- Politics, described
by the publishers as "A defence of the early factory system and its
_ social and economic consequences by a group of distinguished
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shifts in dominant modes of thought and belief" but, rather, as
"a complex process ... to be interpreted as an integral part of
a general pa,ttern of development of the society as a whole ..."
(I962:ltf). Such a reaction Goldthorpe labels as functionalist.
Hie industrialisation process, for example, was seen to necessitate
state intervention. Polanyi, for example, wrote that "the one
comprehensive feature" of the 19th century was that "Society
protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating
market system". State intervention, within such discourse, is
necessary: to counteract the uncertainties and insecurities of
life in an industrialised nation; to reduce social waste; to
prevent class conflict erupting into rebellion (1962:1$). Hie ad
hoc character of social policy, it is argued, is merely the human-
reaction to an inevitable process which accompanies
industrialisation. As Goldthorpe puts it: "... social problems
came first, social philosophy after" (ibid. :1*9) • Comparative
research, of course, confirms the process as inevitable.
Although Mishra takes his texts from a later period (Mishra,
1973; 1977)5 "the "convergence theory" he describes is identical to
the discourse reviewed by Goldthorpe. 'Society1 is conceived as a
totality (industrialised society); social change as an essence (the
industrialisation process). Changes in the social system are
interpreted as changes necessitated by the requirements of an
industrialised society (Mishra, 1973:538). Thus, a well-organised
compulsory system of education is functionally demanded to provide
the appropriate calibre of workforce for industrial and commercial
occupations (Mishra, 1977;3^)• 'Convergence theory', then,
postulates a specific form of development appropriate for an
industrialised society and, ultimately, all industrialised nations
must follow this general route (ibid.:36). The 'convergence
theory' described by Goldthorpe and by Mishra is, however, only
part of a wider convergence of theories; a conflux of economism,
conspiracy approaches and forms of humanism. Most discourse on
the Welfare State can, in fact, be shown to be variants of some ox-
all of these modes of analysis.
(iii) Economism.
"State forms, like other knowing subjects, carry
within them only that which is given in
predication. Analysis can only rediscover the
realisation of the subtle cleverness of this
already given process a.s it appropriates new
problems" (Burbon and Carlen, 1979:39-^0)•
In its most extreme form, economism is completely deterministic.
In its Marxist form, it conceptualises the capitalist mode of
production as a total and invulnerable system of exploitation by
capital of labour. Social and welfare legislation are reduced
directly to facets of the economic system which guarantee the
reproduction of the forces and relations of production, that is,
healthy, mobile, educated and socialised workers and capitalists.
In this form, volition is ultimately an irrelevance. Amelioration
of suffering can only happen if the net benefit accrues to the
economic system. It may, of course, be argued that such a crude
approach is unlikely to be popularly endorsed and that this
determinist element in Marxist theoretical discourse merely
"... reflects limitations to the concepts and language available ..."
(Gray, 1977:73)• Nevertheless, that language, and those concepts,
are all too readily adopted. The inadequacies of the analysis result
from the way in which concepts are developed and problematised. The
functionalist 'systems theory' a-pproach adopted leads inevitably to
economic determinism. As Hirst says of Althusser's thesis on the
reproduction of the relations of production, when the question posed '
takes the form - 'how is it possible for capitalist social relations
to exist?', "No general answer can be given ... which is not
functionalist" (1979:^-3)• Economism is, then, a most pure form of
essentialism, irrespective of the emphasis vhich may be being given to
materialism. "Once more has teleology found its God and His name is
Capital" (Burton and Carlen, 1979:37)*
Sconomism does, of course, appear in less apparently
deterministic forms. Revision of a pure economism may, for example,
be based on the Marxist conception of the fundamental contradiction of
the capitalist mode of production, that is, the socialised nature of
the production process in contrast to the privatised nature of
ownership of the means of production. This fundamental contradiction
manifests itself in class conflict between capital and labour.
Within the realm of welfare and social policy, the contradiction is
often identified in the supposed incompatibility between the ethic of
altruism which characterises a Welfare State and the form of social
relations necessary within a 'capitalist' economy (George and
Wilding, 1976:viii-ix, 118; Mishra, 1977:3d? Stearn, 1979:20-1;
55.
Corrigan and Leonard, 1973:70). Appreciation of this
Contradiction', perhaps because of its obviousness, is also
apparent within liberal discourse. Marshall, of course, is widely
quoted as identifying that the form of equality ('citizenship')
created by the Welfare State is also the "foundation ... on which
/O \
the structure of inequality could be built". ^ ' It is also
worth noting that it was Titmuss who addressed a Fabian audience
with the following words:
"One of the most important tasks for socialists in
the 1960s will be to redefine and restate the
inherent illogicalities and contradictions in the
managerial capitalist system ..." (The Irresponsible
Society, in Titmuss, 1976:215. Emphasis added.)
Given the obviousness of 'the contradiction', the question
arises as to how 'the exploiters' control 'the exploited'. Hie
basic Hobbesian tenets of the war of all against all are premised
on a view of the anarchic qualities of human nature. Freedom and
desire lea,d to chaos. Hie natural desire for survival, however,
also leads men into a social contract which deposits power with a
sovereign authority (Habermas, 197i;:ii3 et sea.). Hobbes'
'fundamental contradiction5 -- freedom of action results in a
situation in which freedom cannot be exercised - is carried over
into orthodox Parsonian sociology with its conceptions of social
solidarity, the internalisation of norms and its general consensus
theory of social control. On the other hand, for Marxist theorists,
8, Quoted, for example, by Mishra (1977:23) frcm Marshall's
Sociology at the Crossroads.
the 'problem of order1 does rot arise as the result of human
nature hut is a direct reflection of the class structure
appropriate to specific modes of production (Anspack, 1979:6).
Despite this divergence in philosophies of man, however, 'solutions1
are surprisingly similar within liberal and radical discourses.
Speaking of what they term the "politicist position", Burton
and Carlen write:
"The state expresses class power but in a politically
autonomous form. Hie source of this autonomy is ...
derivable from the structure of the economic mode
of production" (1979:38).
The state carries out the task of social control on capital's behalf
but under a flag of neutrality, that is, the political processes of
social democracy. Clearly, 'within the Marxist tradition, the work
of Althusssr has been most influential in presenting this thesis of
the 'relative autonony' of the state. In his paper on "Ideology
and Ideological State Apparatuses" (1971)5 Althusser seeks to
theorise not merely the process by which labour power is reproduced
as one facet of the reproduction of the means of production but also
the way in which a "competent" supply of labour is maintained through
time. What is required, argues Althusser, is not merely the
reproduction of skills but also the reproduction of the workers'
"submission to the ruling ideology" and the reproduction of "the
ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly" by the "agents
of exploitation and repression" (1971:127-8)- Central to this process
Althusser identifies "the capitalist education system". Adopting the
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explicit topographical metaphor of the economic base and the
politico-legal and ideological superstructure, Althusser argues
for determination "in the last instance" by the economic base,
a position which allows "relative autonomy" to the superstructure.
Over and above the state repressive machinery (police; courts;
army; etc.), Althusser theorises the ideological state apparatuses
(ISA). It is the ISAs which provide the legitimation for the
ruling ideology of the ruling class (ibid.:139) an<3- which largely
secure the reproduction of the relations of production (ibid.:lk2).
Althusser's thesis of the relative autonomy of the ideological
state apparatuses can be seen as a theoretical reaction to a number
of empirical problems which have faced Marxists. For example, the
failure of 'capitalist5 economies to break down through internal
contradictions (class conflict; verelendung - the theory of the
r\ flA
gradual emiseration of the proletariat); the apparent
incorporation of the 'working classes' into the ruling ideology: the
ability of the state to operate in direct opposition to the wishes
of capital. As such, the theory has engendered an important interest
in features of capitalist relations of production previously treated
(9)
as epiphenomenal and of minor concern. K J This has Deen
particularly welcomed by Marxist theorists working in academic and
professional realms associated with the superstructural 'levels'.
Ian Gcugk's Hie Political Economy of the Welfare State (1979) has
9. Burton and Carlen note that the concept of relative autonomy has
made it possible to raise questions about the possibility of a non-
correspondence of the economic, political and ideological realms.
aroused a great deal of interest v ' and it is worth spending
some time to examine his use of the notion of the relative
autonomy of the state and the way in which this usage converges
with other approaches discussed in this chapter so far.
"Functionalist theories of the welfare state", argues Goug^i,
"objectify all processes within society and see policy developments
as a passive response to these social or non-social 'forces1" (.1979:
8). Gou^i specifically criticises Marxist forms of this
functionalist approach as they are applied to analyses of crisis
tendencies in 'capitalist' economies (1975:55-7)- It is, however,
difficult to see in what way Gough's work differs from these
functionalist positions. We are told, for example, that because
the 'capitalist class' has been unable to organise "itself" as a
political force the state has had "... to step in and realize its
political hegemony, to act as a class conscious political
directorate" (1975:61+)- Ihe state, then, operates in the ultimate
interests of the "dominant class(es)!i whilst "politically disabling
the dominated classes" through the legitimated medium of the
democratic political system (ibid.:65). Relative autonomy is
required to 'pull off' this subterfuge and is "a structurally
determined characteristic" (ibid.). Relative autonomy allows the
state to act in the long term interests of capital and this
10. Beginning perhaps with his "State expenditure in advanced
capitalism" in New Left Review (Gouga, 1975)- Gough's relative
autonomy thesis is, in fact, based on the work of Poulantzas and of
Miliband but, for present purposes, Poulantzas5 version of 'relative
autonomy' (19J7) is identical to Althusser's usage (1971)•
necessitates the frustration of its short term demands on occasion,
or the support of one fraction of capital against another.
"This 'unstable equilibrium of compromise1 provides
the basis for the whole series of social and
economic reforms extracted by the working class in
the post-war 'welfare states' of advanced capitalist
societies, which yet leaves untouched the political
power of capital ..." (Gough, 1975:65).
For Gough there are "... trends ... clearly discernible in all
advanced capitalist countries" (1975:6l): there is an "...
autonomous dynamic of capitalism" (1979:32) riot unlike the autogeny
of the 'free market' system. Nevertheless, the inherent
contradiction of 'capitalism' constantly "generates new 'needs' or
'requirements' in the arena of social policy" (1979:32).
Apart from his use of the relative autonomy thesis, Gough
attempts to free himself from functionalist determinism through the
incorporation into his discourse of what he describes as "action"
or "pluralist" theory. Gough, like many Marxists before him,
wishes to acknowledge the successes of the labour movement in the
class struggle. Hather than providing the promised fusion of
functionalist and action perspectives, however. Gcugh inevitably
vacillates (1979:10). In place of the "erroneous view" that
"working-class struggle for welfare reforms always ultimately works
in the interest of capital" (ibid.:65), Gough suggests that "... it
is the threat of a powerful working-class movement which galvanises
the ruling class to think more cohesively and strategically, and to
restructure the state apparatus to this end" (ibid.). It is past
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such conspiratorial and hegemonic restructuring of the state
which leads to "... the steady incorporation of the working class,
via their trade unions and parties ..." (ibid.:67). The
"autonomous dynamic of capitalism" does, then, ultimately have its
way. As Burton and Carlen record:
"It is significant that the relative autonomy causality
must see practices "both as the effect of class
struggles and as the effect of structures" (1979; 39).
The relative autonomy perspective is, however, as they move on to
suggest, "ultimately economistic". Despite the "mediating- processes
of class struggle", there is a "knowingness within the state
apparatuses that is ultimately given to it "by the logic of capital
accumulation" (ibid.).
Goughss thesis begins and ends in dogma. 'Capitalism1 is
inherently crisis-ridden and that will be its downfall. Gough, then,
closes his 1979 text with the declaration that "The welfare state is
a product of the contradictory development- of capitalist society and
in turn it has generated new contradictions which every day become
more apparent" (1979:152).
The relative autonomy thesis is, then, simply a more complex
version of economism (Burton and Carlen, 1979:39; Hirst, 1979:53)*
Hie essence unifying state apparatuses is the unity of their function -
the reproduction of the relations of production - which is characterised
by the unity of the 'ruling class*. Thus, as Hirst says, that which
unites the ideological state apparatuses is both their cause and their
effect; the unity of the 'ruling class* (1979:50)* Such a position,
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within a rationalist empiricist epistemology, maintains that
classes exist as social forces "independently of their
representation by the political and ideological instances" (Hirst,
1979:51). But, as was suggested in the opening chapter, this
entails the "... appeal to something outside the discourse as a
measure of its correctness ..." (Burton and Carlen, 1979:^42)? a
position which "... entails a dogmatist privileging of a causality
whose determinacy cannot be demonstrated" (ibid.). The amorphous
unity of the 'ruling class' is given representation, and its
effectivity demonstrated, in the unity of the social formation and
its capitalist relations. Anything which serves the function of
maintaining this unity, ipso facto is interpreted as being part of
the state apparatus. But, as Laelau notes, the state can thereby
no longer be characterised as an "instance" tut must be seen as a
"quality", an essence "... which pervades all the levels of a
social formation" (1975:101).
Althusserian structuralism has been likened to Parsons' systems
theory (Giddens, 1979:52, 112): "Parsons's actors are cultural
dopes, but Althusser's agents are structural dopes ..." (ibid.:52).
Parsons, however, sought a. synthesis of 'action' and 'structure'
whereas Althusser's discourse is specifically anti-humanist.
In that sense, Gough is closer to Parsons than to Althusser when he
seeks to "grasp" the "interrelation in the historical process" between
"objective" and "subjective" elements (Gough, 1979:10). He has,
11. See "Marpism and Humanism" in Althusser (1969).
r
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nevertheless, "begun a process of re-examination of welfare discourse
as a contribution to the transformation of the Welfare State from
"welfare capitalism" to "welfare socialism" (ibid.:l53). It is
important, therefore, to appreciate the tensions and. contradictions
in Gout's work because similar Marxist interpretations of welfare
discourse have been presented over recent years. Corrigan and
(l2)
Leonard, for instance, J have had considerable influence on
'radical social work' discourse. Leonard maintains that rigorous
analyses of the Welfare State have been in short supply and the
series - "Critical Texts in Social Work and the Welfare State", of
0 3)
which he is the editor, is designed to fill that gap. x~-'/ The
residual humanism which a number of Marxist interpretations of
welfare discourse retain, however, leads to their easy rejection as
vulgar conspiracy theories and leaves liberal 'allies' not merely
unaffected but often disaffected.
(iv) The Conspiratorial Approach. A so-called conspiracy theory,
by definition, proposes an analysis of class conflict in terms of a
12, Corrigan and Leonard specifically acknowledge "... the work of
Marx and the early Marxists, and also the ... work of Qramsci, and
... the work of Althusser, Poulantzas and Miliband" (1978:92).
13. See Leonard's "Editor's Introduction" to Corrigan and Leonard
(1978) and Gough (1979)• Other texts in the series which will be
referred, to in this thesis are Ginsburg's Class, Capita.1 and Social
Policy (1979) &ftd. Towards Socialist Welfare Work. Working in the
State, by Bolger, Corrigan, Docking and Erost ^1981 J. It is, perhaps,
a register of Leonard's social work eclecticism thai he should feel it
necessary to claim that the series seeks to "... offer some
alternative Marxist perspectives", any more than this apparently being
"... to indulge in sectarian dogmatism" (Corrigan and Leonard, 1978:
xiv).
II4. See the'scathing remarks in Taylor's "Where 'fantasy
radicalism' leads us" (1978).
methodological individualism. As such, it can he very easily
'set-up' by its critics as a crude thesis of voluntarism, the
more readily to knock it down again. Thus, Higgins' view of
conspiracy theory is that "Ruling elites are said to act on the
basis of certain predictable patterns of behaviour, to defend their
self-interest and to assert their superiority" (1978:l5)» At its
most basic level, conspiracy theory postulates a ruling elite with
a coherence of identity and purpose, combined with a pervasiveness
of power, which enables it to neutralise the slightest threat.
That a conspiracy is required, however, suggests that force alone
is not a sufficient instrument of domination. Unfortunately,
analyses such as that offered by Higgins, tend to tackle conspiracy
approaches on their own terms, leaving the way open for empirical
countering. For example, the claim that a conspiracy theory
s
attributes a greater degree of control by the ruling elite than
'the facts' warrant can easily be countered by the argument
that 'conspiracies' may merely help the ruling elite to 'muddle
through'* By emphasising conspiracy theory's implication of "...
a 'grand plan' and a comprehensive strategy ...", Higgins (1978:1?)
draws attention to the theory's endorsement of methodological
individualism. Such a debate, however, is inclined to degenerate
into a contest between forms of individual and structural reductionism.
Ironically, it is Marxist theory which is accused of both an
overemphasis on structural determinism and conspiracy theories. The
accusation, however, does reveal an awkward tension in much Marxist
discourse intent upon seeing the Welfare State as both a subtle form
of social control and a hard won concession by the labour movement.
As Gray laments: "It is extremely difficult to avoid formulations
that suggest a conspiratorial and mechanistic view of the class
struggle" (1977:73). It is, however, no solution to suggest, as
Leonard does in his editor's "Introduction" to Gou^a (l979:ix), that
what is required is a mental dexterity and a pure heart. In fact,
the "sensitive and careful" Marxist who "has to walk a tightrope
between crude functionalism and starry-eyed voluntarism" is likely
to meet the spectre of Richard Titmuss making his way from the
opposite end of the same rope.
History, of course, does provide a wealth of empirical support
for the view that those in elite strata consciously sought to
maintain their supremacy over the acknowledged producers of wealth
and both liberal and radical commentators on the 19th century have
wallowed in its richness. Countering what he saw as the inevitable
dismissive accusation of being a "crude conspiracy" theorist, Jones
argues that such accusations "... sadly miss the point ... in their
search for 'sophistication'" and consequently they "obscure the
consciousness of the ruling classes who 'do think and clan and are
often (mostly) aware of the consequences of their- policies ..."
(l978:70> footnote). That human individuals think and calculate is
no revelation: Jones, however, sees no requirement to explain what
or who "the ruling classes" are and how they 'think' and 'calculate'
Does Jones refer to the sum of individual consciousnesses or to the
idealist conception of the 'spirit' of a class? In fact, it would
seem that Marxist discourse often attempts to incorporate both brand
of essentialism. Empirica.1 material about subjects is read as
representative of the general class position to which they belong.
As Althusser puts it: "... an empiricism of the subject always
corresponds to an idealism of the essence ..." (1969:228).
Empirical material is interpreted in terms of its essential
reflection of class interests but those class interests are to be
known and identified in their empirical manifestations. Human
agency, then, is used to interpret structure: structure is used to
interpret human agency. Despite its circularity, however, this
formulation is grasped by radicals in the welfare field: by
Leonard, who wants to find a happy medium between "crude
functionalism" and "starry-eyed voluntarism": and by Gough, who
juxtaposes the "negative aspects" of the Welfare State (its
"repressive, capital-oriented side") and its "positive aspects"
("the very real gains that a century of conflict has won") (1979:li+) •
And it has its counterparts within liberal discourse.
Eraser's thesis about the "evolution" of the Welfare State
adopts a number of approaches, all broadly illustrating British
pragmatism and good sense. Thus, the "history of social policy is
... the stox-y of individual and collective response to the practical
problems thrown up by an industrial society" (1978:226); the
Welfare State "... was not born - it had evolved" (ibid.:222). The
rational evolution of social policy transformed voluntary enterprise
into state intervention as part of "... a dynamic process of
adjustment between individual and society" (ibid.). Despite the
influence of particular individuals; the need to "compromise between
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individualism and collectivism, between voluntary and state
action" (ibid.:223); and the use of social policy "as a tool of
political expediency" (ibid. :22lj); the British. Welfare State is
ultimately the outcome of "evolutionary forces" (ibid.:226).
Just as Gough wants to build into his discourse an "autonomous
dynamic of capitalism" and considerations of structure and agency,
Eraser wants to talk of "evolutionary forces" and "pragmatic
responses" to the "needs of society". Similarly, Pinker seeks
"accommodation" of "the claims of the social market and those of
the economic market" (1979J 21+9) • Seeking to rid his discourse of
the kinds of "ideological infections" which afflict the disputes
between classical political economy and Marxism, egoism and
altruism, Rigrt and Left, Pinker places his faith in the 'mixed
economy*, mercantile collectivism, and a theoretical eclecticism,
rfhere is, Pinker insists, no inherent conflict between social and
economic policy (1976:102; 1979:2lji). Pinker, no less than Gou£*i,
wants to emphasise voluntarism and determinism: "... the making of
day-to-day policy on social issues ... does operate within a
distinctly pluralist process, but ... the limits of policy-making are
set by elites ..." (1979:2142-3). ^
What we witness in both liberal and radical discourses is the
attempt to identify the force which provides society/history with a
structure ('capitalist dynamic'; 'evolution'; power of an elite)
15>. Pinker adopts the concept of a "bounded pluralism" from a text
by Hall, Land, Parker and Webb - Change. Choice and Conflict in
Social Policy -and commends the authors for their combination of systems
analysis, pluralism and class theories.
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and, at the same moment, to allocate a degree of autonomy to facets
of the superstructure (class struggle; individual enterprise;
social policy). It makes little difference whether the structural
force achieves stability and consensus through the 'incorporation1 of
the 'working class' or through a negotiated compromise. It might
well be asked whether there is any substantial difference between the
Marxist position condemned by Pinker because the logic of that
discourse portrays "the discipline and practice of social policy and
administration ... as a snare ana a delusion ..." (1976:37) and
linker's own view that "... welfare systems contribute in very real
terms to the maintenance of stability and consensus" and that "Social
services receive and reallocate resources in order to ameliorate
social conflict and strengthen the bonds of social solidarity" (1976:
102). Both the radical conspiracy approach and the liberal consensus
model attempt to blend a system determinacy with an 'action'
contingent. But whereas C-ough talks of class conflict, Pinker talks
of the "variety of ends held by groups in different social situations"
(1976:103). nevertheless, both attempt to bridge the "ontological
gulf" between agency and structure and, to avoid the inevitable
tension which results from voluntarism, call upon a class or a
humanist essentialism.
(v) Class, Humanism and Cons-piracy. According to Goldthorpe,
convergence theory offered three main 'explanations' for social policy:
the counteraction of 'diswelfares' resulting from industrialisation;
an economic investment in social capital; and the defusing of class
conflict. That convergence theory represents, rather, a theoretical
convergence is suggested by its parallels with Saviile's position
which is widely quoted in radical texts:
"Tbe Welfare State ... has come about as a result
of the interaction of three main factors: (i) the
struggle of the working class against their
exploitation; (ii) the requirements of industrial
capitalism ... for a more efficient environment in
which to operate and in particular the need for a
highly productive labour force; (iii) recognition
by the property owners of the price that has to be
paid for political security" (1957/8:5-6).
Tbe essential factor for Saville, as he later explains, is the
agitation of the working class (ibid.:9). George and Wilding
characterise the Marxist theory of social policy in exactly the same
way (1976:15). Gougb's approach is also, basically, the same.
The "major determinants of the modern Welfare State", for Cough, ore
the struggle and influence of the working class; the
centralisation of the state; and the influence of the former over
the latter (1979:68). Centralisation of the state is explained, in
part, as the "restructuring" which the ruling class is forced to
implement as the result of working class struggle (ibid.: 65-6). It
is within the terms of this process that Gough explains "periods of
innovation and growth in welfare policies" (ibid.:66). For the
'working class', such policies are "to be welcomed" as mitigations of
hardship. For the 'capitalist class', a welfare policy is also seen
to be in its interests because it reduces 'working class' discontent
and provides "... an added means of integrating and controlling the
working class and offers economic or ideological benefits too" (ibid.).
Saville i^s more direct about his belief that the 'ruling class'
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is able to remove the sting from the tail of ails'- forking clans'
victories. "Normally", he asserts, "the legislative reforms ...
have been fully and carefully calculated ..." (1957/8:10). In
addition, legislative delays can usually be manufactured by "the
vested interests to mobilise themselves" (ibid.:11). George and
Wilding endorse this interpretation; the actual formulation of
social policy, they argue, may well result in the 'upper class'
re-adjusting the balance in its own favour (1976:18-20).
Despite attempts by radical theorists to give voluntarism an
effective role in their work in the form of the class struggle, they
become trapped by the determinism of the "laws of motion of capital"
(Leonard, in Gough, 1979:ix) or the "built-in requirements of the
industrial order" (Saville, 1957/8:11). Hie imperative nature of
these 'laws' is required by the nature of the critique offered in
radical discourses for, as Gough. puts it, without them. "... we would
be back with a Marxist variant of the pluralist theories criticised ..."
(1979:62). Having postulated or presumed ontologLcal statuses for
'agents' and for 'structures' and the relationship between them,
radicals who refuse pluralism face castigation as exude conspiracy
theorists; the only alternative is to produce a system determinacy.
Pendulation between structural and agent causality cannot be sustained:
the result is an uninspiring circularity of discourse. For example:
Gough argues that the state acts in the long term interests of capital
and suggests that "What we wish to discover is the mechanism by which
these ... interests are mediated and articulated by the state" (1979:
62-3). The centralisation ox the state, Gough argues, has assisted
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in this task. In addition, "What ... has increasingly emerged ...
is ... a 'class conscious political directorate' ..." (ibid.:63).
One of the main "interests" to be met by the state is the reproduction
of labour power; that is a "function" to be performed (ibid.:62)
and social policy is an essential aspect of that "function". Social
policy is often the result of class struggle "... adapted to serve
the needs of capital" (ibid.). Consequently there is a"congruence of
interests tending in the direction of developing the welfare state"
(ibid.:65). The restructuring of the state is the result, Goug^i
argues, of "the threat of a powerful working-class movement which
galvanises the ruling class to think more cohesively and
strategically ..." (ibid.). Thus, we find that the centralised and
cohesive state is the result of the 'working class' threat and the
rational action of the 'ruling class' but it is also an imperative of
the 'capitalist mode of production' and its need to reproduce labour
power. Social policy is, in part, a reaction to 'working class'
pressure but social policy is one way in which the state fulfils the
function of reproduction of labour power. To suggest that this
outline ignores Gcugh{s emphasis upon the development of 'capitalism'
and social policy is merely to amplify the essentialism of his
discourse. The action cf the state is reduced, by Gou^i, to the
simple reflection of 'ruling class' requirements. To extend the
analysis historically into what Gough calls the "prior state structure
and origins of capitalist development" is to switch from a class to an
16. See Gough's diagram, for example^ ("Figure ii.l". 1979:68).
>'
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economistic essentialism. In fact, Gough says nothing of these
'origins*.
Early in his text, Gough accuses Titnruss of adopting an
empirical, eclectic, nrolti-disciplinary approach, utilizing "...
technical determinism, class conflict, pluralist group analysis and
a Durkheimian view of social policy as an integrative element in
modern society" (1979:9). for "technical determinism" Gough
substitutes "imperatives created by the capitalist industrialisation
process"; for "pluralist group analysis" Gough substitutes a
"congruence of interests"; Durkheimian social solidarity is
replaced by what Gough calls "an ideology of the welfare state"
(ibid.:66), which assists in the "incorporation of the working class"
and by the functioning of the state in the production of "...
specific patterns of socialisation, behaviour, specific capacities
and personality structures" (ibid.: 1+6). Radical theories are
conspiratorial because they require a manipulated consensus to
replace liberal views of the civilisation of capitalism and yet both
Titnruss and Gough can talk of class conflict.
Again, then, the question must be asked about what it is that
distinguishes radical discourse from the liberal discourse it seeks
to replace. Primarily, differences reside in the ideological and
political, conditions of formation of the respective discourses.
Unfortunately, these distinctions are reflected in radical posturing
rather than a readiness to tackle the implications of the
problematisation of discourse on welfare and the state. All too
often radical .texts are given over to a contest of 'superior facts'
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in which structural arguments are used against individualist
approaches and vice versa. For example, Miliband* s attempt to
demystify the democratic-pluralist interpretation of the state does
not tackle theoretical and methodological weaknesses but, rather,
(17)
seeks to reveal that it is empirically in error (1977s ^ '
Ginsburg produces, according to the "Editor*s Introduction",
"compelling evidence" to show that the state bureaucracy has
"continuously counteracted" 'working class1 gains in welfare-
legislation (l979:2iv)• What seems to distinguish texts such as
Milland's scholarly The State in Capitalist Society from equally
scholarly texts in liberal discourse, for example litmuss* Income
Distribution and Social Change, is the form of chiliasm displayed.
For many liberal theorists, the millennium, has indeed arrived:
"Now that we have it, [the Welfare Statej ... we have not yet
perfected it, what, we may a.sk, are we going to make of it ...?"
(Bruce, 1961:293). For Miliband, "socialist society" will arrive
"Sooner or later", and when it does it will be "... an
authentically democratic social order, a truly free society ..."
(1976:2l|_7). The barriers to "welfare socialism", for Gougi, are
technical and social (false consciousness). In his one page
"Political Postscript", Cough argues: "Once the contradictory
nature of the welfare state and its contradictory impact on capitalism
is appreciated, then the political strategy ... can be defined" (1975:153)*
17. Like Gou^i (1975:61-1;), Miliband also argues that, despite
cultural differences, all capitalist stales are heading in the same
direction (197.6:9)*
Meanwhile, the 'working class1 awaits its moment of revelation on
the road to Damascus. George and Wilding, on the other hand,
retreat into the search for "a value basis for a new radical social
policy" (1976:129), the search for 'superior facts' proving too
onerous a task. "The welfare state", they conclude, "is clearly
not the end of the road of social evolution. What will succeed
it depends on such a complex variety of economic, social and
political factors ... that it makes prediction no more than crystai-
ball gazing" (ibid.:137).
All of the self-styled radical texts discussed in this chapter
seek to found political calculation upon sociological and economic
predictions. They reflect an ever-present tension in Marxist
discourse between an historical determinism, portraying the
inevitable demise of 'capitalism', and a belief in the effectivety of
the class struggle. The tension does, of course, exist in the works
of Marx and Engels, though this is often amplified through the
compounding of their 'scientific' and propaganda texts. Attempts to
produce a synthesis of structure and agency result in the kind of
textual slei^it of hand, evident in a number of radical texts, which
portray classes as embodiments of both human agency and social
Cm)structure.
Both Ginsburg and Gough begin their studies with an outline of
the Marxist conception of the 'capitalist mode of production'. The
basic concepts of capital and labour are discussed as are the concept
of surplus labour and surplus value. In traditional form, Gough and
Ginsburg discuss the realisation of surplus labour as surplus value i
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terms of a relationship of exploitation of the 'working class* by
the 'capitalists'. In effect, these authors provide a.
sociological version of Marxist discourse. They import a humanism
in which human agents fill the social roles of 'labourers' and
'capitalists'. The relationship between labour and capital is,
thereafter, based upon considerations about human motivation,
social interaction, and the exploitation of one social group by
another. Although the point will be taken up more fully in the
next chapter, it should be noted that the reduction of the concept
of economic class to the role and functioning of human agents in the
social dj.vision of labour and the view of 'appropriation of surplus
labour' as expropriaticn, necessitate ontoiogicai presumptions about
agents-as-subjects which cannot be sustained. The general concept
of 'appropriation of surplus labour' describes the mode of
realisation and utilization of the surplus demanded by the concept of
social formation as a viable form of social relations. Even under
conditions in which the means of production are communally owned,
surplus labour will have to be 'appropriated5.
"Writers such as Gougji have a tendency to conflate the discussion
of relations of production, economic- agents and subjects within the
occupation system. for Gough, 'relations of production' are "social
relations between classes" (1979:19)- 'mode of production*
refers to "... the way in which one class extracts surplus labour from
another ..." (ibid.). "Classes ... are groups in antagonistic
relation to the means of production ..." (ibid.). "What characterises
a mode of production, then, is the relations between antagonistic
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groups. Gougft's discourse is a form of class essentialism.
Despite what he describes as "the well-known division between
working class and middle class", Gough notes that "The classes of
the dominant mode leave their stamp on all classes within it ..."
(1979:20); that "stamp" signifies what is essential to the mode of
production. This form of sociological essentialism ignores two
important points made by Hirst: "First, the relations of production
include not only agents but forms of relation between agents". The
conditions of existence of relations of production cannot be reduced
to the consideration of intersubjectivity. Secondly "... not all
economic agents are human subjects" (1979:U7). Economic agents are
defined by their relationship to the means of production. The
effective ownership and control of these means by capital cannot be
reduced to their possession and control by individual capitalists.
As Hirst argues, "... corporate entities may be the social forms pf
effective possession of capital ..." (ibid.).
The form of class essentialism typified by C-ougi, in which human
subjects carry the essential features of their class position and
relations of production are essentially relations between classes,
involves what Poulantzas calls "... the search for finalist
explanations founded on the motivations of conduct of the individual
actors" (1977:21)2). PowLantzas' own attempt to substitute a concept
of agents as "'bearers' of objective instances" (ibid.) merely
replaces humanism by economism. This point will be taken up in trie
next section when Hirst's critique of Althusser's concept of
'ideology' will be discussed. It is sufficient to record here that
writers such as Corrigan and. Leonard who follow Althusser and
Poulantzas, conceive of the Welfare State as a mechanism for the
reproduction of the relations of production through the
reproduction and socialisation of the workforce (Corrigan and
Leonard, 1978:7^-7)• Such a formulation must inevitably take the
shape of an economistic reduction - the 'welfare system' is
essentially a feature of the ' economic system', or a conspiratorial
approach - the 'welfare system* is an adjunct in the exploitation
and subjugation of one social group by another. In the effort to
avoid these forms of reduction, radical theorists turn to the concept
of. ideology.
Marx's concept of commodity fetishism (1977:76-87) is discussed
in very similar terms by both Ginsburg and Gough. Hie exploitative
nature of the relationship between capital and labour is distorted
by the equality of relations apparent in the commodity form. Hie
commodity is 'fetishised' in the sense that it is seen to embody7 the
value of the labour expended by the workers who produced it. Hiis
formal equality in the commodity market disguises the class structure
of 'capitalism' (Gough> 1979:25). Bor both Gough and Ginsburg (1.979:
37) "the state plays a part in the production and maintenance of this
ideological form, endorsing its appearance of neutrality. 'Capitalism*
then, is given legitimation through the commodity form of equality and
it is this legitimation which solves the 'problem of control* in non¬
coercive ways. But again the tension between structure and agency
18. Both Gough and Ginsburg talk of the reproduction of labour power
but also adopt a humanist reduction.
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conies to torment radical discourse. If the 'working class' are
unable to see through this subterfuge it can only be because the
'ruling class' conspire to deceive with the assistance of 'their*
ideological state apparatuses . Alternatively, the very force of
the dynamic autonomy of 'capitalism' is seen to be beyond the control
of any one group of individuals: ideology, as Hirst puts it, is a
"structure effect" (1979:76 et seq.). In either case, the struggle
of the 'working class', so often emphasised, is given no real influence
in radical discourse.
The concept of the 'relative autonomy' of the various levels of
the superstructure used by Gougi and by Corrigan and Leonard explicitly
and by Ginsburg implicitly, is constantly denied by their own
discourses. The state is granted relative autonomy on the condition
that, in the final analysis, it works to the advantage of the 'ruling
class'/'capitalism*. Class struggle is given a degree of autonomy
which is simultaneously denied in conceptions of the incorporation of
the 'working class*. Despite attempts to build into their discourse
a degree of indeterminacy and a space in which political discourse
might calculate the effectivity of the class struggle, the work of
theorists like Corrigan and Leonard, Ginsburg, and Cough collapses
into various strands of essentialism. In the final analysis, the
Welfare State is a reflection of the 'laws of motion' of 'capitalism*.
'Capitalism' produces contradictions which, in turn, 'cause' the
reactions of class struggle and social policy. Thoudi these 'effects'
may, in turn, induce further 'crises', 'capitalism* as a structured
totality merely finds further solutions. Discourse which is premised
on the general concept of the capitalist mode of production as a
structured totality cannot accommodate concepts which allow the
effective disturbance of that structure. Gough writes: "The
autonomous dynamic of capitalism provides the starting point for a
materialist analysis of the welfare state" (1979:32) and in so doing
he denies the discursive possibility of breaking into that "dynamic".
This is not simply a discursive problem for radicals in the welfare
realm, however. As Hirst notes: "Given the concept of social
totality and its movement Marxism has abolished for itself the space
to mutate in relation to new political circumstances ..." (l979s7)«
Radical theorists, then, must come to terms with the contradictions of
their own discourse.
"Either we effectively reduce political and
ideological phenomena to class interests determined
elsewhere (basically in the economy) - i.e. an
economic reductionism coupled with a vague
recognition that things are actually more complicated
and a failure to get to grips with that complication.
Or we must face up to the real autonomy of political
and ideological phenomena and their irreducibility to
manifestations of interests determined by the structure
of the economy" (Hindess, 1977k lOlp).
In the section which follows, this dilemma is given further
consideration. Theorists who adopt, explicitly or implicitly, an
epistemological framevrork which postulates knowing subjects with a
privileged relationship (knowledge) with the objective world are
obliged to identity these very subjects as the objects of their social
analysis. Faculties cannot be denied to the individuals who fill
class positions and encourage social change which are claimed by the
theorists and=social scientists who observe these phenomena.
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Ginsburg's discourse would seem to follow the line of the so-
called 'state derivation theorists' (Eolloway and Picciotto, 1978;
Hirst, 1979:1614 et seq.) in its almost total subordination of the
class struggle to the 'demands' of capital. Gough, as already
discussed, seeks to give effectivity to the class struggle.
Corrigan and Leonard discuss in more detail the implications of
casting this effectivity in terms of subjective consciousness.
Taking their cue from Lenin, Corrigan and Leonard seek to
differentiate between "objective class position" and "the subjective
view of that position" (1978:83). Most 'working class' consciousness
is 'trade union consciousness', that is, it takes the form of an
awareness of conflict with "bosses" in employment. This is not the
'correct' consciousness required for the transformation to socialism
(ibid.:88). For Corrigan and Leonard, social work can play a part in
raising the required political consciousness and Leonard discusses
this fully elsewhere (Leonard, 1975}• What is required is a "Marxist
"psychology" (1978:118) which can provide a micro-sociology to
accompany the macro-sociology they believe Marx, Engels, and Lenin
have provided. What is required, they argue, is an exploration of the
"dialectical" relationship between agency and structure and, in pursuit
of this goal, they adopt Althusser's notion that "... an individual is
always - already a subject, even before he is born" (Althusser, 1971;
Corrigan and Leonard, 1978:121).
Althusser, of course, sought to abandon the historicist and
humanist esseptialist aspects of Marxist discourse by displacing the
Constitutive subject* integral to empiricist and rationalist
epistemologi.es. In so doing, Hirst points out, Althusser had also
to "... displace the classical conception of ideology as a false
recognition of the real" (l979:57)» Corrigan and Leonard, on the
other hand, retain the psychological interpretations of consciousness
which locate their discourse with traditional conceptions such as
anomie, the internalization of norms, and so on. Unfortunately, as
Hirst demonstrates, Althusser does not escape from the protocol of
the subject which he submits to critique and it is understandable,
therefore, how writers such as Corrigan and Leonard are able to import
his discourse into their welfare texts.
For Althusser, subjects are constituted within the social totality.
As aspects of the structure, subjects are constituted by and constitute
the totality, they cannot, therefore, represent to themselves the
conditions of their existence of which they are a part. Subjects,
then, live their existences "as if" they were constitutive subjects.
This is not to suggest that subjects do not have an impact on the
world (Hirst, 1979:3^+)- The "imaginary" relationship that subjects
have with their conditions, is net, Althusser argues, a. false
representation of the real, the position supposed by the notion of
false consciousness. In effect, Althusser moves reality one stage
further away. To be a subject is to live in ideology. What
Althusser describes as "a. first and very schematic outline" (1971 :l50)
Hirst describes as "noidling but an elaborate metaphor" (l979:^U)«
Althusser simply cannot eradicate the concept of the constitutive
subject as a knowing subject. Ideology, he argues, "recruits"
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subjects from amongst individuals through a process of
"interpellation" (1971:163). This "sensationalist theoretical
form" (Hirst, 1979:65), which Althusser argues is simply a function
of his "special mode of exposition", is counteracted by the claim
that "individuals are always - already subjects" (l971:l6i+)- An
infinite regress is, of course, created by such a concept in the
fruitless search for the 'interpellator' who is not already a subject
with the faculties required to form other subjects. "Althusser is
in a circle not unlike that of Descartes' Cogito", argues Hirst,
and like Descartes, Althusser effectively turns to God to terminate
the regression. It is in the "speculary" relationship between
subject and Subject that the relationship between subject and
relations of production can be found (1971:165 et seq.). "Ihere are
no subjects except by and for their subjection. Hiat is why they
'work all by themselves'" (ibid.:l69)• It is the ideological state
apparatuses that ensure that subjects 'work all by themselves',
thereby ensuring the necessary reproduction of the relations of
production. But, given this necessary effect and given the
misrecognition within the imaginary relationship, Althusser's metaphor
disguises a thesis of false consciousness (Althusser, 1971:170; Hirst,
1979:62-3). Althusser's rejection of the humanist perspective and
the ultimate subordination of the superstructure to the demands of the
economic system by his discourse, condemns his work to an economism,
Nevertheless, Althusser has attempted to problematise Marxist
conceptions of ideology and the state in ways which are largely
sidestepped by other radical theorists. As a consequence of this
shortcoming, radical discourse on welfare often provides merely
a parallel humanism to that which is apparent in liberal
concentration on the humanitarian impulse in the evolution of the
Welfare State.
Given the political and ideological conditions of existence of
"both liberal and radical discourses on welfare, it is understandable
that conceptions of freedom, self-determination and respect for the
individual should find their way into theoretical discourse in the
form of an ontology of the subject ('free will1). It is, however,
in the scientific pretensions of these discourses, as they claim to
represent or reflect reality, that inconsistency arises. For a
'free will1 which does not condemn discourse to relativism must be a
bounded freedom: partial freedom, like relative autonomy proves a
difficult compromise to accommodate in a fscientific* discourse.
Liberal humanitarian!sm portrays the Welfare State as a
pragmatic, utilitarian, or noble compromise between the excesses of
an unbridled capitalism and the rigours of a total collectivism.
Hobman makes this point in blunt terms:
"The Welfare State is a compromise between the two
extremes of Communism on the one hand, and
unbridled Individualism on the other ..." (l953:i)«
Mishra also defines contemporary "institutional" models of welfare
policy as understandable in terms of "... a compromise between the
residual and normative conceptions" (1977:13)• Within liberal
discourse, the compromise is the result of "British political genius"
(Hobman, 1953^1)j "khe "awakening of social conscience" (ibid.:7).
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Both Mishra and. Warham describe social administration as a
'normative discipline' because it is "... concerned as much with
questions about what ought to be, as with examining what is ..."
(Warham, 1973:195) • Mishra compares social administration with the
Marxist approach: both are concerned with intervention (1977:5).
Pinker, in effect, endorses the view in his criticism of the belief,
prevalent "... in British social policy and administration", that the
values which support the economic system are antipathetic to the
values which are implicit in welfare matters (1979:257) • She "moral
determinism" (Carrier and Kendall, 1973) ca much liberal, discourse on
social policy has political and ideological conditions of existence in
liberal conceptions of the 'good life', of a 'welfare society' (Robson,
1976} Titmuss, 1968:1214. et sea.). Robson, whose discourse few are
likely to describe as radical, would nevertheless seem to speak for
many radicals when he writes that "... a welfare state, and still more
a welfare society, cannot exist in an atmosphere of pessimism, gloom
and despondency, in which the human predicament evokes feelings of
contempt, hatred and despair" (1976:59). Stac a number of radical
theorists, working on social policy and welfare discourse generally,
the radioalisation of that discourse is seen to require a blending of
liberal humanitarianism and Marxist structural analysis. 'Urns we
find, for example, Mishra's production of a. paper on "Marx and welfare"
in which he aims "... to present an outline of Marx's theory of
welfare ..." (1975:287),
Mishra acknowledges that "Marx's works do not offer an explicit
theory of welfare" (ibid.). Rather than attempting to produce a
Marxist problematisation of welfare discourse baned upon Marxist
concepts, however, Mishra outlines wilat he sees as the "...
essential ingredients of a general theory of welfare: a distinctive
normative orientation with regard to social organisation and social
relationships, and a concern with the relevant 'social facts'"
(ibid,:288). This formulation he then 'applies' to the works of
ClQ")
Marx. v ' ft>r Mishra, welfare is essentially about socialism:
"... welfare as a central social value can be institutionalised
fully only in a classless society". Such a formulation, then,
allows Mishra to present social policy, despite its shortcomings, as
essentially socialist in character. Welfare legislation represents
progress towards a socialist society. "By positing the communist
and capitalist distributive norms as polar types - total welfare and
total diswelfare - Marx dramatises the essence of welfare" (1975:292).
But, if the Marxist position can be characterised as the commitment
to "... a steady expansion of the frontiers of welfare until need-
based distribution becomes the major component in distribution", then
"... the distinction between the Marxian and the 'institutional'
[ liberalj notions of welfare turns out to be one of degree rather than
kind" (1975:30l|). Bespite this comment, however, Mishra's
19. Towards the end of the paper Mishra claims that his intention
has been to draw attention to an aspect of Marx's work which
appeared to have gone largely unnoticed. In a later' work, Mishra
(1977) incorporated this paper into a chapter on "The Marxist
Perspective" in which he discusses Marx's position and the position
of later Marxists which he sees differing mainly in emphasis (1977:75)-
Mishra, in effect, claims to identify a discursive regularity of
welfare within Marxist discourse.
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consideration of the perennial paradox - socialism within
capitalism - leads him to a view which largely parallels the
•relative autonomy' thesis discussed earlier.
"Recent evidence ... shows the difficulty of
institutionalising welfare even partially in a
society whose dominant values and institutions
remain capitalistic. The market forces continually
reassert themselves, eroding the welfare state" (1975:306)•
Mishra draws his ideal of socialist society from Marx's early
humanist texts in which, Mishra maintains, Marx provided "... a
sketch outline of a sociology of needs" (ibid.:29l). What Marx
neglected to analyse, he continues, was the problem of the
"consciousness of need". Like Corrigan and Leonard, Mishra wants to
humanise Marxist discourse through the utilization of sociological
and psychological concepts. It is Mishra's essentialist
interpretation of 'socialism' in terms of the satisfaction of human
needs which allows him to place welfare discourse at the centre of
Marxist discourse and to read its 'neglect' of the phenomenological
perspective as a neglect of the early Marx.
In a similar fashion, the 'essential Marx' is sought by Lubasz in
a paper examining "Marx's initial problematic: the problem of
pcverty" (1976). Although the paper has the virtue of illustrating
the originality of Marx's work in his early days, the aim of the
article is to identity elements which mi^at allow7 for the homogenisation
86.
of Marx's discourse as a whole. ^ '
Lubasz takes Marx's initial problematic to reside in two
articles written by Marx for the German newspaper Rheinische Zeitung
in l8i|2 and l8ii3- Both articles deal with the problem of poverty.
In "taking up the cause of the poor", Lubasz argaes, Marx does so
implicitly on a specific value premise:
"... that every human being, every member of human
and not just of civil society, is entitled to a full-
fledged human existence. This premise functions as
a criterion: if an actually established system denies
any class of human society such human existence, the
system needs to be changed" (1976:30).
Like Mishra, who maintains that "... Marx unwittingly provides ...
a theoretical concept against which the existing welfare arrangements ...
can be measured" (1975;303)? Lubasz identifies Marx's philosophy of
Man as the measure of the 'good life', of socialist social organisation.
Like the noble savage, the poor "... represent humanity in its
elementary form, untainted by the distorting, dehumanizing effect which
exclusive private property has on human beings ..." (Lubasz, 1976:3l)«
In dealing with the "origins of Marxism", Lubasz seeks to link Marx's
early humanist texts with his later political discourse on the
'capitalist mode of production'. To argue that in both problematics
20. There is, of course, a wealth of literature on the contrasts and
similarities between the 'early' and the 'later' Marx. See, for
example, Elliott's discussion of the Grundrisse as a link between the
two 'Marxs' (1978). To search for the common factors in Marx's many
writings is, of course, to search for the 'essential Marx' and is to
confuse the motivations of an author with the discourse of his
writings. To seek for the essence of Marxism in the gospel according
to Marx is to {privilege that discourse and to set it up as a religion
rather than a discursive political formation.
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Marx was concerned to view 'society' as a totality (ibid.;i+1) is
not, however, to show that Marx's humanism is incorporated into his
later work. What Lu"basz does illustrate is that Marx's philosophy
of Man was also a political discourse. The relationship between
the poor and the state is, in Marx's early work, a relationship
between individuals: poor people and government administrators.
The failure of the state to recognise and meet the needs of the poor
is a failure of administrators' to see the world as the poor see it.
This is not the 'fault' of administrators but, rather, an inevitable
consequence of being an administrator. "The result is impasse.
People and state are at odds, and yet are systematically separated
from each other" (ibid.:37). Marx's political 'solution1 is to
present the free press as an intermediary between the private
interest (the poor) and the public interest (the starts). A solution,
then, is to be found in the mediation between subjects: problem and
solution reside in the human consciousness.
Lubasz ends his paper with a "look ahead", to the close of 181+3-
Althusser, however, suggests that soon after this period (18I4.5)
"... Marx broke radically with every theory that based history and
politics on an essence of man" (1969:227). What is particularly
fascinating for Althusser is that Marx begins to define humanism as
an ideology but defines ideology as an integral category in the
understanding of social formations.
"This rupture with every phi10sophical anthropology
or humanism is no secondary detail; it is Marx's
scientific discovery" (1969:227).
(21)The importance of this "epistemological break" v 'to the discussion
of both Mishra5s and Lubasz's attempt to discover the 'essential
Marx5 is, in Althusser5s words:
"... that Marx rejected the problematic of the earlier
philosophy and adopted a new problematic in one and
the same act. The earlier idealist ('bourgeois5)
philosophy depended ... on a problematic of human
nature (or the essence of raan)" (1969:227).
Presentations (George and Wilding, 1976:106 et seq.) and
representations (Mishra, 1975) of radical discourse on social policy
adopt empiricist and rationalist epistemologies in their leap from
humanitarian notions about the essence of Man to the theoretical
formulation of a political problem. If the motor-force of history
is class struggle and if class is defined with reference to the
individuals occupying objective historical positions (peasant;
capitalist), then each individual must be said to carry the essence of
his class. This, in turn, requires an empiricism (real individuals
occupying class positions) and an idealism (class conflict as the
essence of history; individuals as the essential facets of a class):
"If the essence of man is to be a universal attribute,
it is essential that concrete subjects exist as
absolute givers; this implies an empiricism of the
subject. If these empirical individuals are to be
men, it is essential that each carries ... the whole
human essence ... this implies an idealism of the
essence" (Althusser, 1969:228).
21. For Althusser, the "epistemological break" represents Marx's
rejection of Hegelian and Feuerbachian forms of discourse. More
generally, of course, the concept parallels Foucault's discussion of
epistemei ana discontinuities. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to ,-suggest that Marx5 s various texts build upon specific
and often conflicting epistemological. protocols. (See Brewster5s
"Glossary" of terms in his translation of Althusser, 1969.)
Tills is not to deny the authenticity of the humanitarian ideals
held hy commentators on welfare discourse "but merely to question
the consistency of the discourse they develop.
"On this condition it is possible to define humanism's
status, and reject its theoretical pretensions while
recognising its practical function as an ideology"
(Althusser, 1969:229).
Marx's anti-humanism, Althusser strongly emphasises, is a "theoretical
anti-humanism" (ibid.). Its effectivity is not in dispute: its
effectiveness as radical discourse is.
For Foucauit, the search for that Other-ness of Man, the
unthought, the essence, is a feature of the Modern euisteme (1970:326).
Althusser says something similar in recounting Marx's comments on the
notion of human nature as the essence of Man. The notion of human
nature concealed a double value judgement: "... the 'inhuman' as much
as the 'human' is a product of present conditions; it is their
negative side" (Marx quoted by Althusser, 1969:236-7). "Bourgeois
humanism made man the principle of all theory", writes Althusser,
"This luminous essence of man was the visible counterpart io a
shadowy inhumanity" (ibid.:237). For Althusser, as for Foucauit to
some degree, the essentialist characterisation of Man represents a
critical element in discourse. Althusser, in fact, argues that a
"socialist humanism" remains on the agenda for radical theorists as a
substitute for an adequate Marxist interpretation. In terms of what
I have described as the epistemological conditions of formation ox a
discursive regularity, radicals in the welfare realm have tended to
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adopt a humanist ideology and an appropriate epistemological
grounding of their discourse. As already suggested, this
sociological mode of analysis draws an ontolcglcal distinction
between agents and social structure and then proceeds to claim a
degree of autonomy for human agency within the structure by
attempting to bridge the "ontological gulf" between them.
Foucault provides a provocative challenge to the humanistic science
of Man: "Does man really exist?" he asks.
"In order to awaken thought from such a sleep ...
there is no other way than to destroy the
anthropological. 1 quadrilateral' in its very
foundations L• • • 3 It is no longer possible to
think in our day other than in the void left by
man's disappearance. For this void does not
create a deficiency; it does not constitute a
lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more,
and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space
in which it is once more possible to think"
(ibucault, 1970:31^1-2).
In similar terms, Althusser writes of Marx's use of the concept of
(22)'real humanism' v J as being a function of his attempt to direct
discourse away from idealist abstractions about Man and towards Man
(23)
as "the ensemble of the social relations". v
"... it is then that the shocking paradox appears:
once this displacement has really been put into effect,
once the scientific analysis of this real object has
been undertaken, we discover that a knowledge of concrete
(real) man, that is, a knowledge of the ensemble of the
social relations is only possible on condition that we
do completely without the theoretical services of the
concept of man ..." (Althusser, 19^9:2ip3).
22. See, for example, The Holy Family (e.g. French Materialism and
the Origins of- Socialism; reproduced in McLellan, 197^:1^-9-55/•
23. Marx's Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, McLellan (l978:l57)-
*Theoretical arti-humanism' does not, then, imply that
concrete human "beings do not exist, have an awareness of the world
and a real impact on it. Nor does it suggest an attack on
humanitarian ideals or a belief in the subordination of personality
to the demands of the collectivity. The anti-humanism of
Althusser and Tbucault is, however, merely a de-centring of the
subject-within theoretical discourse. Althusser, as has already-
been suggested, fails to rid his discourse of the constitutive
subject: Poucault simply ignores the tensions within his own.
discourse. The knowing subject is a condition of any
epistemological protocol. Writers such as Gough and Corrigan and
Leonard attempt to resolve the tensions between free will and
determinism in their discourses through what they call a dialectical
analysis. This usually means that the discourse contains an equal
treatment of agency and structure in which each determines the other
in a process. Like the theory of evolution, nothing can be said
about which came first and the thin end of the telescope remains
shrouded in mystery: in the beginning there was agency and
structure. Others have identified this as the fundamental problem
facing social theory, whilst for many it simply identifies the chasm
between their version of social analysis and that practised by-
others (Mayh.ew, 1980:35>0)-
2lq. Ontologically, the greatest problem has usually been structure;
after all most people acknowledge their own existence, but what exactly
do we mean by 'structure'? As a consequence, 'the subject' has often
been bracketed-out, as the constant factor, so that structural
features of society (e.g. institutions) could be studied, or else
structure has'been seen as, ultimately, nothing more than reifications
of the products of individual consciousnesses and, consequently, as
explicable in those terms.
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The "ontological gulf" is an effect within discourse. It is,
for example, Althusser's conception of a 'real' realm which knowing
subjects fail to grasp 'correctly' which creates an ontological
distinction between subjects and the structure which determines
them. Within that discourse, denial of the constitutive subject
leaves Althusser open to the charge of structural determinism.
This is the main point of attack of a paper by Layder, "Rroblems in
accounting for the individual in Marxist - rationalist theoretical
discourse" (1979) • Marxist rationalists, including Hindess and
Hirst, are castigated for portraying Man as a "cultural dope" and
for postulating that the "... only valid objects of scientific
inquiry are supra-individual, impersonal social forces or constraints"
(1979:150). It is, of course, a misrepresentation to suggest thai
Hindess and Hirst even aitempt to theorise "... the relation between
(social) individuals and systematic constraints ..." let alone that
they do this in terms of "... behavioural conformity to structural
demands" (ibid.). Layder, in fact, restricts his references to
Hirst's Harkheim, Bernard and Knistemology (1975) an<3- Hindess'
The Use of Official Statistics (197^), ignoring E.indess' and Hirst's
joint publications (l975j 1977) making only a passing reference
to their work with Cutler et al (1977; 1978). These later texts,
however, make Hindess' and Hirst's break with Althusserian
rationalism very plain.
Layder attributes the Marxist - rationalist's error to an
'tmthinking adherence" to Marx's statement in Capital that he was
dealing "with individuals "only in so far as" they were
personifications of economic categories. Layder omits the
remainder of this passage which is from Marx's 1867 "Ereface" and
which continues:
"My standpoint, from which the evolution of the
economic formation of society is viewed as a
process of natural history, can less than any
other make the individual responsible for relations
whose creature he socially remains, however much he
may subjectively raise himself above them" (Marx, 1977:21).
It is understandable, then, if "certain Marxists ... treat individuals
as if they were only personifications of economic categories" (Layder,
1979:151). Layder very rightly hi^ili^ats the contradiction in much
Marxist discourse between individuals who are both determined by
their situation and may rise above it. Working within epistemology -
he advocates "a correspondence theory of scientific knowledge" (1979:
157) - Layder defines the Marxist - rationalist position as
'inadequate*; it fails to do justice to the reality of human agency.
In its place, Layder wants to substitute the notion that "... the
number of 'action' alternatives open to an individual ... is socially
defined ..." but "... within these ... parameters ... the individual
is free to choose amongst the ... alternatives" (l979:lpO). Layder's
subjects are given the same freedom of choice given to the prisoner
allowed to choose the method of his execution. In the section which
follows, the impossibility of bridging the "ontological gulf" created
by a discourse working within epistemological protocols will be
illustrated through a discussion of Layder's paper and the work of
Anthony Giddens.
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1|. Agency, Structure and the "Ontological Gulf"
Layder adopts a rationalist episteroology when he argues that
a distinction must he made between levels of analysis (l979:l!?2).
The "social system or structural level of analysis", argues layder,
does not carry subjective attributes and can, apparently, be
"completely disclosed by rationalistic determinations" (ibid.:lp7-8);
social systems are the products of discourse. At the "action/
system interface", however, one is faced by an "ontological gulf"
(ibid.:158). The veracity of analysis at this level can only be
"revealed by empirical practice" (ibid.:l59)» When it comes to
agency, then, Layder is an agnostic; his social science can never be
certain about how well its concepts correspond with reality.
Having created an ontological gulf - the fundamental question to
be asked in Layder' s discourse is "how individuals or groups of
individuals in situated interaction are affected by or affect the wider
systemic constraints" (ibid.:1^3) - Layder creates a methodological
golf to accompany it. He does net, however, make it clear how the
concepts appropriate to "penetrate ... the action/system interface"
are to be articulated with those which "pertain solely to the social
system" (ibid.:l57)« Despite an interesting flirtation with the
notion that theoretical discourse merely provides the general form of
the conditions of existence of objects in discourse and cannot
legislate the specificity and effectivity of the content of those forms
95.
in determinate situations, v ' Layder* s discourse relies on a
series of very basic sociological notions. Taking Ms cue from
Lockwood's "Social integration and system integration" (1955),
society, for Layder, is "... a structured system ... functionally
independent of specific actors ..." Individuals are born into this
"ongoing system ... whose existence precedes them ..." (Layder, 1979:
159-60). Society, therefore, precedes the individual, determining
Ms world, but it is individuals who reproduce society. The social,
system, then, is "both constraining and facilitative of social
action" (ibid.:l60). With this sociological platitude, Layder takes
his reader into the hermeneutic and epistemological whirlpool of
'first pMlosophy' and the origins of 'sociation'.
The real, concrete world, in Layder's view, is the world of
action and interaction. The real social scientific method of
reflecting this reality is a rationalist approach in which concepts
are "a.n abstract and rational form of the real" (ibid.:l5?). But, as
Hindess says of this process of abstraction recommended by Wilier and
Wilier and followed by Layder, "... if there has to be a correspondence
between concepts and observationals, how does the abstractive relation
between the two differ from the types of relations between observables
25. Layder writes: "Substantively embedded formal concepts can
only be revealed by empirical practice (and not 'empiricist'
practice) ... TMs exhortation ... is an appeal to rationalist
forms of demonstration in the determination of the formal relevance
of concepts describing social action ... on the understanding that
such concepts .are not simply deducible from those that determine their
relevance" (1979:159). Working within epistemology, however, the
relationsMp between concepts and objects of discourse in Layder's
rationalist view is a relationship between "concepts and the concrete
reality to which they refer" (ihid.).
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postulated by empiricism?" (l977b:19U). Despite claiming "a.
modified rationalist epistemology ... not tainted by empiricism
or flawed by reductionism or subjectivism" (l979:lp7)j we find
that the human subject is at the centre of Layder's social world
•end is to be understood, according to the tenets of positivism,
throu^i observation of reality.
Much of Giddens' work over recent years has been dedicated to
the reconciliation of theories about the anting subject and theories
a-bout wider social structures. Through his concept of
"structuration" (1976:120 et seq; 1977:129-3^; 1979:69 et seq.)
Giddens has explored the view that agency and structure ought to be
seen as a "duality" and not a. "dualism". Sociological analysis is
the focus of study on the "... instantiation of structure in the
reproduction of social systems ..." argues Giddens (1979:106).
Nevertheless, claims to the contrary, Giddens' analyses retain a
consistent distinction between action and structure which are not
simply discursive. Like Layd.er, Giddens -wants to avoid the
accusation of producing a subjeotivist theory and yet he insists that
the "... pressing task facing social theory today is ... to promote
a recovery of the subject ..." (1979:Wi). fhe subject, in whatever
form, is at the centre of Giddens1 analyses. Connecting action and
structure requires: "... a theor;/ of the human agent, or of the
subject; an account of the conditions and consequences of action;
and an interpretation of 'structure' as somehow embroiled in both
those conditions and consequences" (ibid.:1|9). fact, however,
1 structure* remains hedged-around by inverted commas throughout
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Giddens' exposition. Fbr whilst subjects have a corporeal
existence and do not demand qualifying inverted commas, structures
are merely "virtual orders" (ibid.:61;) and exist "paradigmatically"
only. Now, whilst Giddens maintains that this does not reduce
structure to the status of a model, it does suggest that it is a
concept which can only be studied through its concrete manifestations
in human agency. Thus: structure is to be regarded as "... a
virtual order of differences produced and reproduced in social
interaction as its medium and outcome" (ibid.;3); structure requires
recognition of "... (a) knowledge - as memory traces - of 'how
things are to be done' ... on the part of social actors; (b) social
practices organized through the recursive mobilisation of that
knowledge; (c) capabilities that the production of those practices
presupposes" (ibid.;61;). Giddens' social theory is, then,
fundamentally an action theory.
"Social systems are systems of social interaction:
as such they involve the situated activities of human
subjects ..." (1979:66).
Giddens' approach adopts an ontological distinction between "the
subject (the actor)" and "the object (society)" which are to be
considered as a duality because "the same structural characteristics
participate" in both (ibid.:70). However, 'social systems are systems
of social interaction' and society is produced and reproduced "as a
skilled performance on the part of its members" (l976;l60; 1979:11^-)•
Trie distinction between system and agency is, then, an intellectual
sleight of hand which seeks to guard against accusations of reification -
systems and institutions axe to be defined in terms of human
behaviour (1979:66, 96), and of methodological individualism -
"Social analysis must be founded neither in the consciousness or
activities of the subject ..." (1979:120). nevertheless, in a
footnote reference to the "idiosyncratic contribution" of Cutler
et al., Giddens acknowledges that a corporation can be a subject in
law but counters - "... laws have to be interpreted and applied;
it takes human agents to do that ..." (1979:272, note 86). Giddens
is forced to universalise one side of his dualism and, in consequence,
adopts a humanist essentialism. His acceptance of the neo-Kantian
separation between social and natural science (1976:lh6) and
adoption of the "... premises and values which science itself
presupposes ..." (ibid. :ll|.0) result in a "realist epistemology" (1979:
63) which must seriously cast doubt upon Giddens5 claim to have
'separated5 action and structure only in discourse, or as Giddens
puts it, through utilization of "a methodological epoche" (1979:80,
95).
Giddens' universaiisation of Man takes the form of a tentative
exploration of a notion of the pre-conscious 'subject' which is not-
yet-a-subject. Like Althusser, Giddens tries to step outside of the
structured totality he has created in discourse by flirting with
"... the theme that being precedes the subject-object relation in
consciousness" (1979:39). -And- like Althusser, he utilizes Lacan's
image of the "Mirror-Stage" in theorising the development of the
26. Burton ^tnd Carlen characterise Lacan's "Mirror-Stage" as "... th
existential, capacity for recognising the specifics of lived experience
as constitutive of reproducible self-identities" (1979:21, 23).
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child (ibid.:120-22) and the formation of "tension-management"
capabilities. Giddens pursues the essence of Man through a
biological reductionism in which "a range of competencies" precede
consciousness (ibid.:123). To avoid a biological determinism,
Giddens argues that consciousness is something which emerges through
the interaction of pre-conscious accomplishments and the social
world. However, Giddens is then faced with the same problem of
regression which met Althusser. Giddens asks, effectively, how do
'beings' become 'subjects'. Such a question demands an essentialist
recitation of what it is to be a subject. That essence must reside
as a programme within the being which is not yet a subject. As
Hirst puts it in the context of Althusser's use of Lacan's metaphor:
"The subject is internal to the speculary structure, he is
presupposed as a subject inside it" (1979:67).
Connecting action and structure, inter alia, through "an account
of the conditions and consequences of action" means, in Giddens'
formulation, "unacknowledged conditions" (1979:42, 70), for example,
(27)
the unconscious and pre-conscious, and unintended consequences v ''
which "chronically escape their initiator's intentions" (ibid.:44)»
Agency and structure are united, then, by concepts arising within the
action system: structure exists only to the degree that the social
world escapes a complete hegemonisation by rational control (the
unconscious: the unpredictable; the Other). Giddens' subject
27. Giddens' discussion parallels what Gerth and Mills describe,
with reference to Weber's social theory, as the "paradox of
unintended consequences". See Gerth and Mills (Eds) From Max
Weber. Essays in Sociology (1964:54)-
attains a privileged status both empirically and theoretically.^ '
Social systems are systems of social interaction; social
integration is "concerned with systemness on "the level of face-to-
face interaction"; system integration is "concerned with
systemness on the level of relations between social systems or
collectivities" (ibid.:76-7). What, then, distinguishes "social
integration" from "system integration"? Nothing; for "... the
systemness of social, integration is fundamental to the systemness
of society as a whole" (ibid.). Society is a totality; subjects
are its atoms.
One consequence of such a formulation is what Mayhew (1981:630)
calls the "appeal to complexity": every social event has a relevance
and a consequence for a theory of social processes and change. Thus,
for Giddens, the importance of his conception of "moment and totality"
lies in the need to tie "... the most minor or trivial forms of
social action to structural properties of the overall society (and,
logically to the development of mankind as a whole)". (1979:71? 7?)'
But this point is stultifying. It relies upon a conceptualisation of
social change which fails to differentiate between its qualities and
magnitudes. This is one consequence of Giddens* empiricist
orientation which tends to view change as what happens as a. contingent
feature of human interaction (ibid.: 11);) rather than as intentional
28. Despite qualified support for the de-centring of the subject
in some theoretical discourses: "The de-centring of the subject
implies an escape from the philosophical standpoints which have taken
consciousness as either a given, or transparent to itself" (Giddens,
1979:147). ;
calculation. Giddens' implicit allegiance to ethnomethodological
principles is revealed in his analogy of language and society
(ibid.:77j HU): "... language only exists in and through its
reproduction ..." (ibid, illl^). Similarly, society exists in and
through its reproduction within social interaction. Thai being the
cane, however, we witness the paradox created by the "ontological gulf""
Despite his defence of the integrity of the "lay actor", systemness
happens behind the backs of it's human agents. It is "practical
consciousness" ("tacit stocks of knowledge") rather than "discursive
consciousness" through which society is produced and reproduced.
Giddens, like Layder, wants to suggest that human agency is free and
yet contingent, but -
"... if it is free then its particular decisions can
have no determinate conditions of existence. On the
other hand if it is free only in the imaginary rea-ims
of consciousness, if in reality it is the creature of
its social relations, then its 'freely made' decisions
in fact dissolve into effects of the structure of the
social formation. The social formation is then
reduced to an expressive totality in which each of its
agents merely express what is given in their
perceptions of the whole. The structure is then a
self-generating spiritual essence ... whose existence
suffices to secure the totality of its conditions of
existence. [... ] Intermediate positions
counterpose the freedom of subjectivity to the
determinism of the structure, thereby taking on some
of the fundamental problems of both polar types"
(Cutler et al, 1977:273-^+).
Giddens' discourse, like Layder's, simply cannot bridge the
"ontclogical gulf" without one side of the equation denying- the
integrity of the other.
5. Summarising1 Discussion
This chapter has been used to illustrate the similarities of
radical and liberal discourses on the Welfare State. Radical texts,
■which might be expected to offer a critical assessment of liberal
discourse, in fact adopt the epistemological frameworks familiar to
r
liberal texts. For both, the Welfare State and its institutions
are events in the real world *to be appropriated through empiricist
or rationalist forms of scientific practice. It is maintained,
however, following Hindess (e.g. 1977b:211 et seq.)„ that the protocol
on which a discursive formation is based and the actual generation of
that discourse must be considered separately. Specific liberal and
radical texts have therefore been examined not simply to be
condemned as empiricist or rationalist but for their internal
consistency. Using the concept of essentialism, it has been
suggested that the disccurses in question adopt a mode of explanation
which supposes a universal form, of which the 'social facts' examined
embody its essence. The universals in question are not, however,
theorised but represent a privileged realm against which 'social facts
are measured.
One form of this reductionism seeks for the essential character
of the Welfare State ihrousji an analysis of its historical origins.
History displays the teleological unfolding of a destiny. In its
liberal form, the Welfare State is nothing but the culmination of a
social evolution whose motor-force may be civilization, the
humanitarian impulse, or utilitarian pragmatism. Radical histories
deny these processes the power claimed by liberal discourse.
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Analysing the same history and the same facts, the radical
interpretations see the unfolding logic of modes of production.
Social policy, then, is nothing more than a reflection of this
process. What distinguishes these interpretations are their
political and ideological conditions of existence. Y/hereas literal
discourse sees 'the facts' as representing a pragmatic compromise
between unbridled 'capitalism' and a complete form of collectivism,
radicals see them as signs of the class struggle and the 'ransom'
. . J
paid by capital for a deradicalised 'working class' . In the event,
however, both approaches endorse what has been called a 'convergence
theory' which suggests that industrial nations tend to converge in
their development as the dysfunctions and diswelfare which result from
industrialisation are compensated for by an interventionist state.
The radical posturing of much discourse on 'capitalist welfare'
seeks to refute the liberal suggestion that the Welfare State is an
exercise in common sense. Far from being the result of healthy
progress and public opinion, social policy arises from the dynamic
force of 'capitalist' development. At its crudest, this economic
reductionism interprets social policy in terms of its benefits to
capital but a number of radical texts which openly challenge this
determinism betray a discursive tension between economic
determinism and the 'relative' free play of the state or of the class
struggLe which inevitably is resolved by a determination in the last
instance by the economy. To the degree that such discourse insists
upon the effectivity of the state and of class activity, however, it
suggests a conspiratorial approach. Such a perspective adopts a
lOif.
subjectivist philosophy in which human individuals represent and
embody the essence of their class position. Social policy can
then be interpreted as the victory won by the 'working class' from
the 'ruling class' and as the instrument of incorporation and
indoctrination of those 'working classes' .
Throughout these reductionist radical discourses we witness an
insistent tension between a mode of analysis which, as social science,
seeks to reflect the universal and generalisable features of the real
world, and a desire to grant autonomy and effectivity to both acting
subjects ana social processes. And, in fact, such tensions are also
obvious in liberal texts. At the same time, however, the radical
pose adopted in many radical texts appears also in liberal
commentaries. 'Capitalism' is often a common and ea.sy target and
liberal theorists legitimately adopt a radical stance when challenging
the 'unacceptable face of cajjitalism' .
Given the ideological aims common to liberals and radicals, for
example, freedom of expression, respect for the individual, and human
rights generally, it is understandable that these ideals find their way
into the epistemological and ontological protocols of both radical and
liberal discourses. This is reflected in radical texts, in the
popularity of the concepts of 'relative autonomy of the sta,tes ana
'ideological state apparatuses', as well as Althusser's work generally.
Some time has, therefore, been spent in suggesting that in his work on
ideology, Althnsser does not rid his discourse of the tension between
subject and object. In fact, Althusser's theory of ideology "...
requires the honcept of subject, a concept moreover which is not
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theorised but simply incorporated as a necessity" (Hindess and Hirst,
1977s29). Althusser's discourse is incoherent because the concepts
of 'structural causality' and 'constitutive subject' ere incompatible.
What we see in a number of radical texts on welfare discourse is
the 'humanising' of Marx; often through a utilization of Marx's early
philosophical work. Radical humanism, then, becomes a parody of
liberal humanitarianism. A radical humanism manifests itself as the
discursive incorporation of 'relatively autonomous' individuals into
a structure determined by the 'laws of capitalist development'. .Once
an ontological distinction, demanded by epistemology and encouraged
by ideological commitment, is drawn between -agency (acting individuals)
and structure (capitalism; society) discourse embarks on the
fruitless endeavour of bridging that "ontological gulf". That agency
and structure cannot be articulated without giving one a determining
role and denying the integrity of the other is illustrated through an
examination of the theoretical discourse of Layder and of Giddens.
The discursive problem of reconciling- agency and structure, free
will and determinism is not peculiar to theoretical discourse on
vrelfare but is a common feature of most social science discourse.
ibr fbucault, it is the particular conception of Man as that "strange
empirico-transcendental doublet" upon which the social sciences are
based. Man is conceived to be both the architect of the social world
%
and yet fashioned within its limits. To understand Man one must
understand Ms determination by his origins: that which he is,
essentially, in his cultural and biological histories. This
"analytic of finitude", as Foucault calls it, this analysis of the dark
corners of Man's history and nature, are required because the
"... contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to him,
and older than his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him with all
their solidity, and traverse him as thou^i he were merely an object
of nature, a face doomed to be erased in the course of history"
(FoucauLt, 1970:313).
In the analysis of Man's nature, the "analytic of finitude"
pursues an empirical search for the genetic essence: it is a search
for the Other which is also an "unveiling of the Same" (ibid.: 3U0).
Ihe analysis of Man's history, in contrast, pursues an essence
external to Man and by which his destiny is set. As an idealist
discourse its project is chiliastic. Sccia! science is the search
"... for the locus of a discourse that would be neither of the order
of reduction nor of the order of promise: a discourse whose tension
would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being
directed at both ..." (ibid.:320). Once Man is conceived as an
object in the world and yet as the -architect and guardian of that
world, an "ontological gulf" is created which the logic of the
discourse must maintain and yet seek to bridge. Man the scientific
creator of the world is condemned to view himself and the world as
11... an unavoidable duality ... readily interpreted as an abyssal
region in man's nature, or a uniquely impregnable fortress in his
history ..." (ibid.:326).
29. Burton and Carlen describe this tension as "... that dichotomy
which has bedevilled social science and which, as 'determinism/free
will* has been the dominating dichotomy of -philosophical debate"
(1979:26). !
Theoretical discourse has its conditions of formation.
Social scientific discourses such as those reviewed in this chapter
have specific ideological, theoretical and political conditions of
existence upon which they base their veracity and effeotivity. for
example, epistemological claims that the discourse appropriates the
objective condition of the 1working class' and can be used to
calculate its destiny. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, these
conditions will be described in this thesis as the epistemological
conditions of existence of discourse. Foucault's description of the
form taken by the social sciences since the beginning of the 19th
century, and the "constituent models" of specific social science
discourses, will be utilized in the analysis of welfare discourses and
their conditions of existence.
Foucault is once said to have expressed regret for neglecting to
undermine the "anti-humanist human sciences", along with their other
forms, when writing The Order of Things (hews, 1979:15>0). For
Burton and. Carlen, one of Foucault's major contributions has been the
displacement of the "... human sciences' idealist and reactionary
concern with the control of subjectivities" (1979:13^). Certainly,
in revealing the scientific pretensions of the social sciences,
Foucault was not simply clearing the way for an anti-humanist analysis
of social structure. Nor is his work "... the preliminary to rigorous
human sciences based on the model of linguistics ... but to a
'liberation' £rom scientific discourse as such " (Dews, 1979:15>0).
The social sciences, Foucault seeks to show, treat "... as their
object what is in fact their condition of possibility" (1970:36k),
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In trying to answer questions such as - what is Man, what is it that
defines subjectivity - the social sciences seek to reveal a Truth
which only ever manifests itself in representations, as essences of
that Until. It is the epistemologLcal presupposition that Man is
both of the world and yet transcends it which provides the "condition
of possibility" of a social science. As a consequence - "Whatever
it touches it immediately causes to move". Analysis of one side of
the equation of the "ontological gulf" results in a revision of premises
formed on the other side which have implications, in turn, for the
original analysis. Thus, borrowing from the empirical science of
biology the notion of "functions", Poucault argues that the social
sciences can view Man's phylogenetic adaptation to his environment.
Generalisation of these "functions" allows average "norms" to be
postulated. Similarly, from economics the social sciences borrow
the notion of "conflict" of interests from which can be surmised the
establishment of general "rules" of conduct. Finally, from the study
of language and ideas Man's artefacts are shown to have meanings which,
in the process of "signification", form "systems" (Pducault, 1970:356-7)<
What it is to be human is to be found in the dark regions represented by
functions, conflict and symbols and yet such a symbolic order requires
an existing organising system; conflict presumes rules which can be
broken; adaptation requires the direction of a normative order.
Social scientific analysis is caug^it in a bottomless whirlpool.
Both the liberal and radical discourses reviewed in this chapter
are caught in this epistemologd.cal impasse. As Giddens records:
v
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"... there are no easy dividing-lines to be drawn
between Marxism and 'bourgeois social theory'.
Whatever differences might exist between these, they
share certain common deficiencies deriving from the
context of their formation ..." (1979:1).
Radical theorists who seek to justify that label by pointing to the
emphasis they give to the fundamentally conflictual nature of
'capitalism' and to their identification of the rules and norms through
which the 'bourgeoisie' maintains its hegemony are led, ironically, to
interpret that hegemony in terms of the functional requirements of
'capitalism', 'Capitalism' then becomes a totality, a system, which
gives meaning to the social relations which form it. Radicals and
liberals take cart in the same debaie over the problem of order and
I
the destiny of Man, they merely enter the debating chamber by different
doors. That true identity of Man, his purity which, for so much 19th(
century thought, was being destroyed or diluted by industrialisation,
was to be found in his nature or, as for Marx, in his relationship
through 'labour' with nature. Discourse, then, was required to work
backwards to uncover origins and forwards in anticipation of the
recovery of Man's purity in his release from alienation. In the chapter
which follows, the critique begun in this chapter will be directed
towards certain fundamental concepts central to Marxist political,
discourse. Radical discourse on the Welfare State rests firmly on
such concepts, for example, Marx's theory of value, the laws of cap!talis
accumulation, and the industrial reserve army, whilst ignoring the
problems and tensions they manifest.
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"In order to awaken thought from such a sleep -
so deep that thought experiences it paradoxically
as vigilance, so wholly does it confuse the
circularity of a dogmatism folded over upon itself
in order to find a basis for itself within itself
with the agility and anxiety of a radically
philosophical thought - order to recall it to
the possibilities of its earliest dawning, there is
no other way than to destroy the anthropological





Social Formation, Form and Content : A Critique
of Marxist Essentialism
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was shown that both liberal and
radical discourses on the Welfare State carried a degree of
fOincoherence and internal tension^ Concepts concerning the
ontological status and effectivity of human subjects, for example,
were incompatible with concepts describing the effectivity of
structural social factors and economic systems. In addition, the
conceptualisation of 'society5 as a structured totality of levels
or sub-systems suggested an organising principle whose universal
character overrides the apparent autonomy of the levels. In
effect, the specificity and effectivity of the state or of the class
struggle were reduced to an essential!st reflection of that
principle. These essentialist interpretations were, it was
suggested, dependent upon specific epistemological conditions of
existence. Both liberal and radical discourses shared
epistemological protocols based upon theoretical discourse as social
science. Both liberal and radical discourses also shared philosophical
premises about the nature of Man and the alienation of that nature
under 'capitalism'. The critique offered in Chapter 2, then, carried
an indictment of failure against radical discourse for its lack of rigour
in the critique of liberal discourse it purported to generate. As
Cutler et al suggest (1977:316-7)j ra(HGai discourse bases its critique
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of liberal discourse on the view that the latter is merely
reformist in contrast to radical discourse which seeks the
overthrow of what it is that is essential to 'capitalism'.
Radical discourse, then, rides upon an essentialisation of 'mode
of production' . If, as the previous chapter has suggested, such
essentialism cannot be sustained then social formations should not
be conceived of in terms of a determining and essential structure.
The radical nature of discourse on the Welfare State must be a
matter of political calculation within determinate areas of
struggle. Socialists must be concerned with the expansion of
democratic control and cannot relegate such work as being merely
reformist.
It is not, it must be insisted, being argued that radical
discourse on welfare has got the answers wrong. Rather, it is being
suggested that to cast the task as the search for 'answers', is to
treat radical discourse as a scientific exercise. This 'scientific'
analysis of the Welfare State, it is argued, has produced an
incoherence and an intellectual myopia, amongst radical theorists which
has seriously impaired their understanding of, and influence upon,
current political issues in the welfare realm.
Many of those who are seeking to radicalise welfare and social
work (Corrigan and Leonard, 1978; Bolger et al, 1981; Simpkin, 1979)
have drawn upon Marxist conceptions of the 'capitalist mode of
production', the role of the state and the nature of the class struggle.
Consequently, this chapter seeks to extend the critique from Chapter 2
to one or two ^of the fundamental premises of Marxist discourse which
I
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these and other radicals accept without hesitation. Radicals
must seriously question the value of Marxist concepts about
capitalist relations of production and their conditions of
existence for an understanding of welfare discourse.
As Jessop (1980) suggests, a great deal of rethinking has, of
course, been going on in Marxist theoretical circles in recent years.
In reaction to Marxist-Leninist reductionisxa, in which the state was
seen simply as the repressive instrument of the economically dominant
class, recent theorists have sought to emphasise the relative
autonomy of: the state (Miliband, 1976, 1977); "the ideological
'level' of the social formation (Althusser, 1971); an<3. the law
(often based on the work of Pashukanis; see Jessop, 1980:3Ul).
Such work has, however, remained faithful to Marxist liturgy.
Despite attempts to conceive of the superstructural levels of a social
formation in terms of their own specificity and effectivity they have,
inevitably, also been seen as reflections of the dominant 'mode of
production'. The social formation is conceived of as a structured
totality in which the economy always has the role of "determination in
tlje last instance" (Cutler et a.l, 1977:169). As Cutler and his
1. Pashukanis' work has had a significant influence on recent
British Marxist theory (Warrington, 198lj Pine, 1979; Hirst, 1979);
it will not, however, be necessary to review Pashukanis' discourse
here. As Hirst shows, Pashukanis' rejection of the reduction of law
to class oppression is replaced by another, the reduction of the legal
form to the commodity form. Pashukanis' discourse is essentialist:
he seeks the essence of law and finds it in the concept of right borne
by juridic subjects. The "legal form" is coextensive with commodity
exchange and law is reduced to a mere reflection of the requirements
of commodity circulation whilst the juridic subject is reduced to the
individual subject acting intersubjectively.
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colleagues demonstrate, rejection of this mode of formulation of
a social formation necessitates the rejection of many of the basic
tenets of Marxist discourse. One of the most fundamental of these
tenets is Marx's theory of value. Gough, speaking of the
"contradictory" nature of the Welfare State, notes that the roots
of this contradiction "lie within the capitalist mode of production".
"This is a way of organising production", he continues, "whereby all
individuals are subject to ... what Marx called 'the lav.* of value'".
2. The Theory of Value
"Every child knows ... that the masses of products
corresponding to the different needs require
different and quantitatively determined masses of
the total labour of society. That this necessity
of the distribution of social labour in definite
proportions cannot possibly be done away with by a
particular form of social production but can only
change the mode of its appearance, is self-evident.
Ho natural law can be done away with. What can
change in historically different circumstances is
only the form in which these laws assert themselves"
(Marx in correspondence with Kugelmann in 1868.
McLellan, 1978:521+).
In his 1859 "Preface" to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy, Marx makes reference to his evolutionary theory of
the development of modes of production (MoLellan, 1978:388-91). In •
an 1873 "Afterword" to Capital, Marx quotes from a German review of
Pas Kapital in which the reviewer describes the way in which Marx
demonstrates by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity
of successive determinate orders of social conditions ...(Marx,
1977:27) » yyat Marx presents, then, is a "natural law" of economic
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development which works, as Marx says, "with iron necessity"
(Marx's 1867 "Preface", 1977:1°). The inevitability of this
economic progression does not allow for particular "determinate
orders" to be omitted "by bold leaps", or to be "removed by legal
enactments" (ibid.:20). Nevertheless, within each 'order1 there
are specific laws, that is, the natural law of historical development
takes specific historical forms. Marx's analysis of the capitalist
mode of production is the analysis of one specific form of that
natural law and is Marx's -unique contribution to 19th century social
theory. Social laws, unlike the natural laws of physics, do net
remain constant throughout history but are subject to particular
discontinuities. And yet Marx's break with the political economy
he took to task is clearly not complete for, if natural laws of
historical development cannot "be done away with", if they merely
change their "form", then they must retain an essential presence
throughout their history. Marx rejects any reduction of historical
development to the will and consciousness of subjects - "It is not
the consciousness of man that determines their being, but ... their
social being that determines their consciousness" (l859 "Preface"),
however, as Cutler et al suggest:
"Only the supposition of a trans-historical subject
can ground or provide the origin for this trans-
historical process. The process ... requires the
supposition that the successive associations of
producers (economic systems) are in some way united ...
that it is the process of development of something.
That something is humanity ..." (1977:139-^+0).
Foucault uses changes in economic discourse to illustrate the
discontinuity which he maintains occurred towards the end of the l8th
century and, in particular, draws attention to the originality of
Adam Smith's work on 'value'. Throughout what Foucault terms the
Classical episteme, 'labour expended' represented human need for
nourishment, shelter and satisfaction, that is, value was measured
in terms of utility. Smith, however, identified the absolute
nature of labour as a measure of the 'toil and trouble' invested in
production (Foucault, 1970:222-3', Cutler et al, 1977:21}). In terms
of the epistemological conditions Foucault sets down for the
Classical period, however, Smitil's measure of value was a convention,
a social agreement to bring order and standardisation to utility,
toil and trouble. Labour had a universal character because it had
been "present at the rude beginnings of society" (Cutler et al, 1977:
27). Within the Classical conception, there existed a finite world
of objects which were represented in knowledge; they occupied what
Foucault describes as a "fundamental space of a table which
presented all possibilities in advance ..." (1970:218). Wealth,
'2 ^
then, was not so much produced as discovered. ^ ' For Foucault, it
was Ricardo who made the real break with the epistemological condition
of the Classical conception of value. With Ricardo , labour ceased
merely to be a sign representing- value and became the source of wealth
2. Wealth was whatever was "the object of needs and desires"
(Foucault, 1970:175). Coinage, for example, unlike 'the mediaeval
conception in which it had intrinsic value as precious metal, -was
merely a conventional standard representing value determined
elsewhere.
5he measurement of wealth was no longer to be subjectively based
upon utility but upon the objective reality of the labour expended
to produce commodities (Cutler et al, 1977:21+). The production of
wealth, then, could also be conceived of in terms of its historical
accumulation and development.
It was Marx who explored the implications of this historicism.
Marx asks of Ricarao why it is that commodities exchange according
to the labour time invested in them. "Political Economy wrote
Marx, "has never once asked the question why labour is represented
by the value of its product ..." (l977:81+-5). What Marx challenged
was the belief that this commodity form of equivalence, based upon
labour time, was a universal historical form. For Marx, every
social formation must divide labour in such a way as to guarantee its
reproduction. Equivalence in exchange was the form this 'general
law* took under simple commodity production (Cutler et al, 1977:26-7).
Exchange value is the phenomenal form of a universal law: exchange
value guarantees a specific division of labour. Eoucault
characterises the epistemological protocol of the Modern episteme
as the mode of discovery of the internal laws of "organic structure"
(1970:218). Marx's conception of the relation between exchange value
and universal law takes this epistemological form, for "exchange value
cannot be anything other than the mode of expression, the 'form of
appearance' ... of a content distinguishable from it" (Marx, quoted
by Cutler et al, 1977:13)-
Marx viewed exchange as an. equation. If shoes could be exchange
for coal, the£ a common factor was required to make these different
objects equivalent. That common factor was labour time. It is
not the objects which are equivalent but that which is essential
to both. Butj as Cutler et al point out, there is nothing inevitable
about this conceptualisation (1977:13-1J+)j for example marginalist
theory suggests that value is relative (subjective). Maxx, then,
produces an essentialist theory of exchange on which are based a
number of conceptions fundamental to his critique of political
economy and capitalist relations of production. Rejection of these
essentialist premises does, then, have serious implications for
Marxist discourse generally and for radical critiques of welfare and
social work which utilize that discourse. For example, the
hegemonisation of value by the concept of labour time provides
Marxist discourse with its explanation of the origin of profit.
The 'capitalist1 adds no labour time to the commodities produced (Marx,
1977:189 et see.). The 'capitalist' buys labour power as a commodity
at the price of its production (the labourer's basic needs) and,
thereby, exercises full control of ownership of thai commodity. By,
for example, extending working hours, the 'capitalist' exploits the
labour power he has purchased and from this surplus labour is able to
generate surplus value. It is from this surplus value that profit
arises, for the labourer has generated more value than the amount for
which he was paid.
"... the past labour that is embodied in the labour-
power, and the living labour that it can call into
action ... are two totally different things. The
former determines the exchange-value of the labour
power, the latter is its use-value" (Marx, 1977:i88).
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Rejection of this essentialist conception of a 'capitalism' "based
on the exchange of equivalents measured in terms of labour time is
to reject the view that: profit has only one source; wages are
dictated by the cost of reproducing labour power; labour is
necessarily exploited throug^i the extraction of surplus labour;
production can be reduced entirely to the efforts of labour.
Marx's thesis on the specificity of the forms taken by general
laws of historical development challenges the view that the content
of history can simply be read off from the generai laws.
Nevertheless, the thesis is merely a more complex conception of
socio-economic evolution. Political intervention within such a
process can merely "shorten and lessen the birth-pangs" (Marx, 1977?
20) in any transition to a new mode of production.
"Marxism is threatened by any radical accommodation
to new conditions of calculation precisely because
it has claimed to have established the "possible
conditions and determined at the most general level
the necessary states of affairs" (Hirst, 1979?7).
3. Capitalist Accumulation and the Industrial Reserve Army
"The more extensive ... the Lazarus-layers of the
working-class, and the industrial reserve army, the
greater is official pauperism. This is the
absolute general law of capitalist accumulation"
(Marx, 1977?603). ~
"The industrial reserve army ... exerts downward
pressure on wages and prevents the value of labour
power rising to absorb the whole of surplus value"
(Gou^a, 1979?29-6).
In Chapters 25 and 32 01 Capital, Volume One, Marx outlines
the process of the transition from the capitalist to the socialist
mode of production. Central to the process is the accumulation of
capital as one manifestation of the inevitably increasing productivity
of labour. As capital accumulates, constant capital (machinery;
factoriesjetc.) increases at the expense of variable capital (wages)
because of growing efficiency in the utilization of labour power and
technological innovation. Production on such a large scale puts
smaller enterprises out of business and, as a consequence,
accumulation and centralisation go hand in hand. In addition, fewer
labourers are required and a "relative surplus-population" is produced
"to an always increasing extent" (Marx, 1977:591) - Phis surplus
forms the 'industrial reserve army' as a "condition of existence of
the capitalist mode of production" (ibid.:592). Che reserve fulfills
a number of functions for capital: it provides a reserve of labour
which is required as capital opens up new areas for investment; and it
acts as a buffer against pressure from organised labour to increase
wages. Certain consequences also flow from the existence of this
surplus, in particular, a "stagnant" pool of labour, characterised by
irregular employment, and three categories of paupers; the able-bodied
unemployed; pauper and orphan children-, and "the demoralised and ragged
and those unable to work". Pauperism, then, "... forms a condition of
capitalist production ... It enters into the faux frais of capitalist
production ..." (ibid.:600-3).
'Capitalist' accumulation represents 'capitalism' in evolution.
Accumulation produces and requires an 'industrial reserve army' of
labour which, in turn, swells the ranks of paupers. "This is the
absolute general law of capitalist accumulation", insists Marx, who
presents us with the mechanism between whose folds lies the
immanent contradiction between forces and relations of production
under 'capitalist' production. The final moments, the "negation
of the negation", however, remain unclear. Socialist production is
to arise through the metamorphosis of 'capitalism' . Like the
butterfly struggling to escape from its caterpillar form, socialism
will burst its "capitalist integument". The final moments are
swift. 'Capitalist' accumulation has "socialised production" in
terms of the centralisation and concentration of production and it
has created a new, mass, ruling class in the proletariat (Kara:, 1977'
715).
To theorise a contradiction between forces and relations of
production is to distinguish between the concept of forces and fiat of
relations. As the mechanism of change, Marx subordinates relations
(r>)
to forces of production. As Cutler and his colleagues record,
to this presumption, Marx adds the proposition: that centralisation
and concentration of production occurs in all branches of the economy;
that such a condition results in a situation which is incompatible with
private property, that is, the "socialisation" of production; and that,
as a consequence, a unity of purpose is effected amongst the working
population (Cutler et al, 1977:1^-7-53) • These propositions depend
3. In his 1859 "Preface" Marx writes that "... higher relations
of production never appear before the material conditions of their*
existence hav^ matured in the womb of the old society itself".
(See McLellan, 1978:390). "
■upon Marx's essentialist characterisation of history as a trans-
historical process of production within which Man evolves in his
social relations. As Foucault puts it, the Modern episteme
represents history in terms of "fixed forms of a succession which
proceeds from analogy to analogy" (1970:218). Marx's "analytic of
finitude", to use Foucault's expression, portrays Man's subjugation
to History. Marx's eschatology reveals what Foucault terms the
"immobilization of History" (ibid.:259)« The law of 'capitalist'
accumulation leads, ■ultimately, to Man's recognition of his finitude;
to the proletariat's recognition of its role as a class "for itself".
"This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human
society to a close" declares Marx (l859 "Hreface", McLeilam, 1978:
390). Hut, as Cutler et al argue, Marx's concepts do not
necessarily dictate the course his discourse takes and can be shown
to lead to quite different conclusions. By seeking universal laws
of social evolution, Marx's discourse enters the realm of prophecy.
Rejection of Marx's trans-historical laws means the rejection of
a number of basic premises which many radical theorists have accepted
unquestioningly. The concept of contradiction cannot be accepted in
its essentialist form. The form of separation of labour-power from
the means of production (as labour and capital within 'capitalism')
should not he conceived of as a universal and constant contradiction
i|. If this is the radical form throu^i which the "immobilization
of History" is portrayed, Foucault also gives us the liberal form
according to Hicardo. Under this form, the evolution of society
leads ultimately to a state in which production and population are
in equilibrium; production can be taken no further and an increased
population caimot be maintained.
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"breaking out, occasionally, here as an economic crisis, there as
class conflict and, ultimately, bursting forth in a final
confrontation (as revolution; the negation of the negation; or as
the final contradiction between the capitalist integument and the
socialist relations of production). Such thinking leads to what
Hirst calls "The withdrawal into the prediction of crises" (1979:
x (9)
7). Social analysis should not be condemned to the increasingly
subtle, and yet fruitless, search for tell-tale signs of the
' fundamental contradiction8: the search for the feme through a
revelation of the Other.
Hie traditional conception of the transformation of 'capital!sm-
in-general' into 'socialism-in-general1 a,s an historical necessity,
condemns radical discourse to the perpetual exegesis of Marxist texts
in the search for 'explanations' for the delay in the demise of
determinate 'capitalist' social formations. Similarly, it is
fruitless to view the 'working class' as the inevitable embodiment of
the 'fundamental contradiction' and the catalyst of revolution and
(6)change.
5. Habermas' Legitimation Crisis adopts a subjectivist definition of
'crisis'. Structurally inherent contradictions must be experienced as
contradictions by members of society before they can be treated as
crises (1976:2-3). This dual role of structural contradiction and human
recognition plays an active part in radical welfare and social work
discourse. Taylor, for example, speaks of "the deepening crisis of
capitalism" but also of the need for an "alternative socialist
consciousness" (fritchard and Taylor, 1978:126).
6. Corrigan and Leonard note that the success of the Marxist approach
to social work outlined in their book depends on how closely it is "tied
to the major forces within the British working class"." Those "...
gooups who want to create any large-scale change must ally themselves •
with one of the two major classes ... the ruling class or the working
class" (I978:ll|2).
12i|.
b• Economic Classes and the Class Struggle
"With me ... the ideal is nothing else than the
material world reflected try the human mind, and
translated into forms of thought" (Marx, 1873,
"Afterword" to Capital).
"Individuals are born into a world which they ...
did not make and which is presented to them as a
'natural' existence ... life chances and
opportunities are assigned to them by ... their
class ..." (Corrigan and Leonard, 1978:120).
"... man is governed by labour, life, and language:
his concrete existence finds its determinations in
them ... he, a-s soon as he thinks, merely unveils
himself to his own necessarily subjacent density ..."
(ibucault, 1970:313).
Marx* s scientific method, his emphasis on examination of the
'materialist basis' (Bottomore and Rubel, 1971:38), is very much a
reflection of the epistemological condition which Foucault ascribes
to the Modern episteme. To say with Bottomore and Rubel that Marx
was not concerned with the theory of knowledge (ibid.) is not to say
that he did not work within specific epistemological conditions.
Roth Cutler et al (1977:107 et sea.) ana Althusser (1969:182 et seq.)
spend some time dealing with Marx's explicit epistemological discussion
in his 1857 "Introduction" to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy. Cutler et al, for example, maintain that A
Contribution. Gruncrisse and Capital were written under the sign of
the same epistemology (ibid.:107). Within such a framework,
knowledge is not a process in which the mind represents to itself the
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objective world as an ordered "taxinomia" (Foucault, 1970:218), a
tabulation of identities and differences, but rather it is a
process of direct acquisition of that world. The material reality
is a world of organic structures. Rather than, a finite tableau of
the known and the knowable, it is an organic whole of unknown
dimensions linked by analogy and succession (Foucault, ibid.).
Marx's episteraology has been described as the 'appropriation of the
(7)
concrete in thought'. v 7
Within any epistemology, separate ontological status is given
to the object and the subject. Within Marx's analysis, no
distortion arises in the process of appropriation by the subject of
the object: there is no problem of representation. As Cutler et al
put it: "It is the products which correspond and not the processes;
the process of reasoning ... does not mirror the history of the
concrete. The concrete '["that3 thought appropriates is a totality ..."
(1977:HO). It is Marx's conception of the real world as a
structured totality, an ordered whole, which allows him to appropriate
it in thought. The concrete that Marx appropriates in abstraction in
his analysis of 'capitalism' is not, for example, English 'capitalism',
7. Marx writes: "It would appear to be correct to start with the
real and concrete ... However, a closer look reveals that this is
false ... The concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis of
many determinations ... That is why it appears in thought as a
process of synthesis ... (in scientific method) abstract
determinations lead to the reproduction of the concrete via the path
of thought ... the method which consists of rising from the abstract
to the concrete is merely the way thought appropriates the concrete
and reproduces it as a concrete in thought" (introduction"to A
Contribution, quoted by Althusser, 1969:185-6, footnote 2.2).
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it is 'capitalism-in-general' . To "be otherwise, Marx's method
would he merely a comparative empiricism. 'Capitalism-in-
general1 is a "concrete-reality" (Althusser) which thought
appropriates as a "concrete-in-thought".
Layder (l979:l5l) has argued that Marx's statement in the 1867
"Erefaoe" to Capital that "... individuals are dealt with only in so
far as they are the personifications of economic categories,
embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests" does
not imply that individuals were to be treated as if they were only
personifications. For Layder, Marx is describing "an analytic
strategy adopted on purely pragmatic grounds" (ibid.). As was
mentioned in the previous chapter, Layder ignores the remainder of
the passage £eom Marx, whose theory of historical causality -
historical materialism - requires a view of human subjects as beings
constituted by the economic system into which they are born. In
The German Ideology, Marx and Engels wrote:
"The first premiss of all human history is, of course,
the existence of living human individuals. Thus
the first fact to be established is the physical
organization of these individuals and their
consequent relation to the rest of nature" (Mclellar,
1978:160).
Marx's interest is in social relations which are determined in their




"In the social production of their life, men enter
into definite relations that are indispensable
and independent of their will ... Hie sum total
of these relations of production constitutes the
economic structure of society, the real foundation >
on which rises a legal and political superstructure
and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness" (l859 "Preface" to A Contribution,
McLellan, 1978:389). " "
These "definite forms" are ideological, but they are not mere
phantoms because, determined by the economy, they are perceived as
•the sum-total of reality. Nevertheless, Marx seeks to show that
these forms are the phenomenal appearances of natural laws:
fetishism of trie commodity, for example, hides from men the social
character- of their labour. Marx's many criticisms of bourgeois
economists, then, is a criticism of their Classical episteiaolcgy:
they mistake representations (forms) for constant aspects of a
universal order. They fail to delve into the organic depths of
history: the limits of their knowledge is the limit of the
.phenomenal form.
As with Althusser's conception of the human subject discussed in
the previous chapter, Marx's subject must have the capacity to
experience phenomenal forms. "Ibr capitalism thus to impose itself
in general men must be conceivable in general ..." (Cutler et s.l, 1977:
118). Given the conception of the subject as constituted by the
economic system, which is always determinant in the last instance, how
can this be reconciled with the Marxist conception of the effectivity
of class struggle?
Eirst of;all, classes are defined in terms of the relations of
j;
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production within specific modes of production. Secondly, the
"basic antagonism, defined by these relations of production, between
categories of economic agents (proletariat and bourgeoisie, for
example) is reflected as conflict at the superstructural level
(culturally; politically; legally). But, as Cutler et al make
very clear, if the superstructural level is merely epiphenomenal,
if it is determined in the last instance by the economic base, then
the class struggle has no real effectivity and can be reduced to the
working-out of the class relations at the level of the economy.
If, however, political and cultural forces do have real effects, then
the relation between classes qua economic agents and classes qua
political forces must be clearly theorised (Cutler et. al, 1977:l8i+)-
The theoretical tensions this mode of analysis has engendered, the
problem of reconciling structure and agency, the forces and relations
of production, and so on, have already been illustrated in the
previous chapter. For Cutler and his co-authors, "The difficulty
here is endemic to the Marxist theory of classes and of class-
relations" (ibid.). Marxists, they note, have attempted to avoid
economic reductionism by suggesting that political forces represent
the class interests of economic agents (ibid.:233). Class
essentialism is substituted for an economic essentialism. To
Represent' class interests is to necessarily partake of the essence
of the fundamental antagonism which is a feature of all cla.ss
societies.
Essentialisation of classes and class struggle creates an
additional problem for Marxist discourse which has a particular
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relevance for theorists concerned to understand the public realm of
welfare services. Ultimately, the logic of 'capitalist1
accumulation will lead to the polarisation of class antagonism. In
the meantime, classes such as the petty-bourgeoisie must, in some
sense, embody the essence of the class struggle; if they do not, then
they must have a political effectivity separate from the dictates of
the economy. If the latter is true, Marxist discourse does not
provide any theorisation of this effectivity. In fact, within radical
discourse on social work and welfare generally we find solutions to
this dilemma being sought through both channels. Utilization of the
concept of "proletarianisation" has allowed radical discourse to equate
the lot of the basic-grade welfare worker- with that of the 'working
class' (Bolger et_al, 1981:67 et sea.). On the other hand, strong
emphasis is placed in all radical weifare texts on the necessity of
an alliance between welfare workers and the organs of the labour
, movement. These are issues that will be taken up in the filial chapters
of this thesis when 'radical social work' will be examined as a
political force for social change. Ibr the moment, it is sufficient
to notice the conflict between Marxist interpretations of class
interests determined by the economy and Marxist interpretations of these
interests as reflections of the motivations and desires of human
subjects. Along with the rejection of economism must go the refusal
to accept simplistic formulae which glorify the '"working class' as
productive labour and as the inevitable force of progressive change.
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5. A Conspectus
The critique of Marxist essentialism, briefly outlined in
earlier sections, has sought to concentrate upon fundamental
inconsistencies and cannot be dismissed simply as hair-splitting.
In terms of what Hindess calls the 'hierarchy of concepts' (1977&:
22l| et seq.), attention has been directed towards the logical
consistency of Marxist discourse and the location of its
inconsistencies within its fundamental concepts. This is not to
argue that such concepts are the essential nature of the discourse,
merely that they are its logical cornerstones. "There is a
hierarchy of concepts to the extent that the formation of certain
concepts of a discourse depends on, or 'presupposes', certain other
concepts" (Hindess, 1977^:225; and see Hindess and Hirst, 1977s30~33)»
What are the implications for a radical discourse on welfare of the
rejection of these basic concepts?
(i) Historical Analysis. With the rejection of the analysis of
history as linear, evolutionary or necessarily progressive, the forms
of appearance of determinate economic, legal, cultural, or political
conditions cannot simply be read as being representative of universal,
trans-historical constants (laws). The circumstances of the
labouring population and of paupers in the 17th and l8th centuries
cannot, therefore, be interpreted teleologically as being determined
by the future needs of 'capitalist' production,
(ii) haws of Tendency. The various tendential laws (operating
generally through history and specifically in forms appropriate to
individual modes of production), which Marx describes, must be rejected.
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There can be no inevitable progression of social formations from
'feudal' to 'capitalist' to 'socialist' modes-in-general, nor can
'capitalism-in-general' be usefully conceived as destined to
progress from, say, 'primitive accumulation1 to 'advanced
capitalism' (Ginsburg, 1979:29-30). To say, as Gough does, that
"The tendencies towards ever-greater concentration and centralisation
of capital are among the most prescient of Marx's predictions. The
... multinational corporations spanning the globe represent the
latest stage of this process" (l979:27)5 is to endorse dogmatism.
Either such 'tendencies' specify the future and make all else
redundant or they are merely one set of logical predictions amongst
others and carry no privileged status.
In offering Marxist critiques of the Welfare State, many of the
theorists reviewed in this thesis glorify the labour process as the
v
essence of production. In so doing they also accept uncritically
that within capitalist relations of production this centrality is
denied, resulting in a 'fundamental contradiction' and endemic 'crisis' .
"That the welfare state in Britain is in a condition of profound crisis
is no longer to be seriously questioned", asserts Leonard (Corrigan and
Leonard, 1978:vii). Acceptance of this 'fundamental contradiction'
leads to the question - "Does not capitalism beget its own
Ecankenstein - the modern working class - which can raise wages ...?"
(Gougpi, 1979:25). An answer to the question is found in the concept
of the 'industrial reserve army' which "... exerts downward pressure
on wages". This 'reserve' is continually recreated, argues Gough, by
technological^.innovation (ibid.:26). 'Capitalist' accumulation, then,
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creates a surplus population which is functionally demanded anyway.
The Welfare State maintains and reproduces this surplus population
(ibid. :l48). 'Capitalist'accumulation, then, produces and requires
a Welfare State. Gough's thesis endorses economism. Ginsburg's
position is similar. Ibr Ginsburg, the social security system
reproduces the reserve army (1979:2); for example, between the wars
"an inflated labour reserve army ... performed the classic function
of holding down wages and dividing the working class" (ibid.: 33).
The identity of the 'working class1 as a class 'for itself is, then,
a process frustrated by the existence of the 'reserve army'.
To refuse the essentialisation of the labour process is to
deconstruct the series of concepts which Marxists build on its
foundation. To also question Marx's scientistic laws of tendency is
to threaten a number of radical, analyses of the Welfare. State, whether
they adopt a 'capitalist accumulation' or a 'value theory of labour'
trajectory. ^^
(iii) Glass and Class Conflict
"Many contemporary justifications of the law of
value are at bottom philosophical/anthropological.
8. Cottrell (l98l) has rebuked Cutler et al on the ground that,
despite their claim that disccurse cannot be reduced to the protocol
which purports to organise it, they appear to dismiss all that Marx
had to say on value because its essentialist basis cannot be
accepted. Cottrell argues for Marx's value theory on "the basis of
"its ideological effects at the time" (ibid. :2i|0). Initially, of
course, the critique is directed against the consistency or otherwise
of the discourse. Marx's value theory is net rejected merely as
essentialist but as being incoherent with other concepts within the
discourse. Besides, as Cutler et al argae, economic determinism
"... is a weapon from a conflict long since resolved, a conflict
against spiritualistic philosophies of history" (1977:132).
133.
They entail the conception of human labour in the
l81)l|. Manuscript5. They refer us back to the
notion of man as his own product, and to labour as
an activity which is ontologically unique ..."
(Cutler et al., 1977:^3).
Rejection of the law of value, of the oncological privileging of
productive labour and its consequent glorification of the 'working
class', entails rejection of the dogmatic notion of exploitation
of labour power. As Cutler and his colleagues argue, production is
a process in which labour, machinery and knowledge can all play a part
and to which the 'capitalist' can contribute direction and
coordination (l977:^f5). To question the ontological primacy of
'labour' and the 'working class' is to question the basis upon which
a, number of radicals build a conception of social work as a process
for raising 'socialist consciousness' amongst the 'industrial reserve
army' and, thereby, furthering the cause of 'socialism'.
Marxism has always been faced with the tension of a proletariat,
as the inheritors of socialism, whose dictatorship "... only
constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes end
the laws of 'capitalist accumulation' which determine that 'working
class' revolt must await the moment when "The monopoly of capital
becomes a fetter upon the mode of production ..." (Capital, 1977:715).
Rejection of the strictures of such 'laws', a rejection implicit, in
fact, in much of Marx's own vrork on the effectivity of 'working class'
struggle to improve working conditions, has led a number of theorists
to argue that the 'working class' can, indeed, vrork towards
'socialism' but only if its members gain a consciousness of their
^im¬
position which is not merely one of a class "'in itself1 "brut as a class
(9)'for itself1 . v ' For some, social work can provide guidance and
act as a catalyst in the formation of 'working class1 consciousness
of its historic mission. Leonard spells this out in his
discussion of Friere's use of 'conscientization' and its applicability
to social work practice. The "key task of radical practice",
Leonard argues, "is an educational one" (1975:57)- 'Conscientization',
or liberating education, as pract-i sed by social workers would
contribute towards developing in clients "a. critical consciousness
of their oppression, and of their potential, with others, of
combating this oppression" (ibid.). With Corrigan, Leonard is more
specific about the target for 'conscientization': it is members of
the working class who, like the bourgoisie, "actually create history;
they maize revolutions and in the last analysis create socialism" (l97'8:
I4). Corrigan and Leonard move on to describe working class
consciousness, on the basis of Lenin's What is to be Lone?, as
"subordinate" consciousness. The task for social work becomes one of
working within this limited awareness, with the hope, presumably, of
raising it to "political class consciousness" (Corrigan and Leonard,
1978:87-8). Corrigan1s and Leonard's "Marxist Approach" to social
work, then, offers words of encouragement to the radical social worker:
"What seems a long six months' period to Pauline is a very short time
9. Giddens, for example, distinguishes between "class-awareness"
and "class consciousness" and divides the latter into: the awareness
of class differentiation; the awareness of opposition of interests
("class conflict"); and the recognition of "the possibility of an
overall reorganisation in the institutional mediation of power ...
through class "action" ("revolutionary class consciousness") (Giddens,
1973:112-3)-
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in the transformation of capitalism" (ibid.:22); "... there are
no short cuts for political struggle ... The working class
understand this ..." (ibid.:30). In the face of economic
determinism, all that such radical discourse can offer is chiliasm
and eschatology.
Class essentialism portrays a 'working class' with a common
identity - its essence; an identity which is reflected in the
activities and motivations of 'working class' movements. This is also
an identity which can be shared by "allies" of the 'working class'
(Rritchard and Taylor, 1978:105) ana by welfare claimants'
organisations (Ginsburg, 1979:106). But, to argue that the
effectivity of this political force cannot be reduced to determination
by the economic level is to argue either that economic class interests
can be represented by parties, unions or whatever (they partake of the
essence), or that there is no intrinsic link between class and
organisation. Rejection of class essentialism requires acceptance of
this latter proposition. As Cutler et al observe, "the notion of
representation merely involves a complicated economism" (1977:235).
They continue:
"Either political and ideological forces are reducible
to classes or fractions of classes or they are not.
To deny economism is to reject the classical conception
of the economic-political-ideological unity of classes.
It is to maintain that political and ideological
struggles cannot be conceived as the struggles of
economic classes. There is no middle way" (ibid.;236).
As Marxist commentators frequently emphasise, of course, although
Marx was intent upon revealing the ideological character of bourgeois
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political economy, which fetishised phenomenal forms into laws of
nature, he did not seek merely to expose these forms as
mystifications: bourgeois ideological forms had specific and potent
effects. Thus, the 'fundamental contradiction' between the
socialised nature of production and the privatised ownership of the
means and conditions of production, is said to be disguised within
'capitalism' by a vacuous ideology of freedom and equality (the
labourer enters 'freely' into a contract with the 'capitalist' in an
open market) and through the fetishization of the product as commodity
(the 'capitalist' appears to make his profit from the sale of an
object - the commodity, whereas he actually makes it through exploitation
of surplus, unpaid labour). Given the tendency for Marxists to see the
social formation as a 'structured totality' which contains the necessary
conditions for its existence, and given the corollary condition that
"The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas", it
is clear that the labourer is either simply the bearer of certain social
forms or he is a consciousness to whom the 'truth' of his situation can
be revealed. If the latter, then there must be a mechanism which
maintains the labourer in his 'false consciousness'; a mechanism which
has been variously discerned in the lav;, culture, religion, the state
and, generically in the 'ideological state apparatuses'. Within this
mechanism, welfare work easily becomes identified as an agency of
'capitalist control', a point which has been made by sociologists, and
particularly sociologists of deviance, for a number of years (Cohen, 1975)*
10. As Ellen Meiksins Wood has it: Marx adopted the categories of
bourgeois political economy "... as his point of departure precisely
because they expressed, not a universal truth, but a historical reality
in capitalist society, at least a 'real appearance1. The point was
to decipher the real meaning of the 'appearance' ..." (1981:69).
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The conspiracy thus perpetrated is often described in Marxist
discourse as the separation of the economic from the political. ^
The task for the radical becomes one of making the 'working class'
aware of this ideological separation.
Despite the gesture to voluntarism in radical discourse, and
particularly that in the welfare realm, it is the economic
contradiction which really gives motion to history. For Habermas,
for example, it is the nature of the economic crisis which forces a
recoupling of the economic and political realms as the state takes
an ever increasing role in steering the national economy; only then
is there a legitimation crisis (1976:36).
At best, then, the effectivity of the class struggle is allocated
a residual role in much Marxist discourse. The apotheosis of the
proletariat is denied by a conspiracy which neutralises and
deradicalises. For Hearn, "the historical roots of one-dimensionality"
and "the conditions which led to the depoliticization ... of the
English working class" are to be found in the conspiracy of a
"systematic blockage of the capacities found in culture and
consciousness" (1978:8; and see Gray, 1977:87). Similarly, for
Ginsburg, "the demands of the working class" which are reflected in
social policy legislation "... have been processed and responded to in
such a form that, far from posing a. threat to capital, they have
11. Giddens, for example, notes that "... the stability of
capitalist society depends upon the maintenance of an insulation of
economy and polity, such that questions of industrial organization
appear as 'non-political' " (1973'H^) • George and Wilding (1976:26)
provide a quotation from Friedman's Capitalism and freedom in which
he glorifies uhe removal of economic decision-making from political
authority as a means of checking the power of the latter by the former.
deepened its acceptance and extended its survival" (1979:19).
To conceive of 'capitalist® production as a. ®structured
totality® is inevitably to deny effectivity to political struggle.
Class essentialism is no solution to this problem. If political
struggle is to be conceived of in terms of its specific conditions
of existence and its own effectivity it is also necessary to question
the tendency to reduce political struggle to the struggle between
individuals or groups of individuals. To adopt such a humanistic
perspective is to plunge discourse into an irreconcilable dichotomy,
characterised in the previous chapter by the notion of the
"ontological gulf".
"Whether they are conceived as free or a.s the more or
less unfree creatures of their social relations the
conceptualisation of agents in terms of universal
subjective attributes can provide no means of
conceptualising the effectivity and conditions of
existence of particular agents and the particular
actions they undertake" (Cutler et al., 1977:273).
6. A Prospectus
Marx's critique of political econony has epistemological
conditions described by Foucault through his conception of the Modern
episteme. Man, as that "strange empirico-transcendental doublet", is
the Alpha and Omega of Marx's discourse. History begins with Man the
'species-being® who enters into social relations of production. As
he transforms the world through labour, Man transforms himself. Marx
utilized this materialist conception of Man and historical progress tc
develop the Hegelian theme of the Absolute, transferring the motor-
force of history from the universal character of consciousness to the
f
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universal character ox labour. Each stage of material development
took a specific form, determining the characteristics of social
relations, but each form was the phenomenal aspect of a universal
law of societal evolution.
Bob line has expressed the view that Marxists have all too
often concentrated upon the content of social institutions to the
serious neglect of their forms (1979a-.passim). Recent interest
amongst Marxists in the works of Pashukanis reflects a new desire to
understand . the form taken by law, the sta/fce and so on. Pashukanis
rejected the crude Marxist-Leninist portrayal of the law as the
instrument of ruling class oppression and asked: !rWhy does the
dominance of a class not continue to be that which it is ... the
subordination of one part of the population to another part? Why
does it take on the form of official state domins/tion?" (1951:185).
However, given Marx's own subordination of 'forms1 to the universal
laws which determine them, it is perhaps understandable that Marxists
have concentrated upon the empirical features of these 'forms'.
For, what does it matter why particular institutions are what they are
if they are merely epiphenomenal? And, in fact, we see that
Pashukanis must reduce the form of law to the status of a reflection
of the commodity form which, in turn, reflects the labour theory of
t
value. Law is an ideological mystification of real social relations.
Similarly, Fine accepts "the imperatives of capital accumulation and
the class struggle" (l979s-:3-) and he endorses Marx's view that,
during the transition to socialist production, distribution will, for
a while, still be based on the commodity form and must, therefore, be
i
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supported "by 'bourgeois1 conceptions ox 'right'. Pine, then,
accepts the view that 'bourgeois' lav; is essentially bound to "the
objective commodity relation" (ibid.:39). Despite an interest in
the specificity of social forms, Pine, like Pashukanis, ignores the
specific conditions of existence of these forms and turns, instead,
to eeonomism. Pine, like those from the German 'state-
derivationist' camp (see Holloway and Picciotto, 1978; Eirst, 1979:
161| et seq. ), argues that the derivation of the form of law from the
commodity form, when applied not to simple commodity production but
to capitalist relations, reveals its ideological character as a
"surface appearance" (Blanke et al, see Hirst, ibid.) and as
t
"illusory" (Pine). The specific form of law, then, "is a functional
requirement of capitalism" (Blanke et al.): it is "crucial" but
nevertheless "spurious" (pine). As Hirst notes in his critique of
Blanke et al, the process of legislation and legal definition becomes
merely the form through which economic imperatives are realised (1979:
169-70).
Fine's paper on "Law and Class" is contained in a National
Deviancy Conference, Conference of Socialist Economists joint
publication (Pine et al., 1979) in which much is made about the real.it;,r
of concepts such as 'right' ana 'freedom' within 'bourgeois' law.
Contributors struggle for a theoretically legitimate way to say that
'bourgeois' legality provides genuine legality and is yet a sham.
Jock Young argues against "left idealism" that formal equality is not a
sham but that it "obfuscates" (obscures?) and legitimates real
inequalities. ; Progressive law, he argues, "... can make a real
impact on the world, although its aims are always undermined by the
class society of which it is a part" (1979:23. Emphasis added.).
A "real impact", then, is an irrelevant impact in terms of the
transformation of society. Fine looks particularly at this paradox
(1979a:UU). On the one hand, he notes, Marx called for the bourgeois®
state to be 'smashed®, whilst on the other he acknowledged its necessity
in the transition to communism. This paradox, Eine notes, has usually
been 'resolved' by ignoring one side or the other. Fine's resolution
is extremely cryptic. 'Bourgois' and 'socialist' lav/ may both
reflect the fetishism of commodity exchange, nevertheless, the change
from the former to the latter is "a change in form and content".
Such a formula can only mean a change from 'bourgeois® class relations
to 'socialist® class relations: class relations, then, dictate the
form of the lav/.
There can be no grand solutions to the political problems
developed within Marxist.discourse. As long as radicals accept
unquestiom.ngly the trans-historical laws of development of society
developed by Marx their discourse will continue to revolve in
reductionist circles. The search for a privileged discourse which
will predict crises and the overthrow of 'capitalism® must be
abandoned.
(i) Vfay Tneorise?
"... if theories 'only exist as discourse' then
what is the relevance of theory? i.e. why theorise?"
(Burton and Carlen, 1979:3-25).
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Burton and Carlen, influenced "by the work of Hindess and Hirst
and their co-workers, reached a point in their study of 'official
discourse' when they felt they were in an intellectual cul-de-sac.
After all, as they remind us Hindess and colleagues had "... (l)
denied ... any privilege for their own theorising; (2) reaffirmed the
existence of an extra-discursive realm of objects; (3) denied that
any specified relationships between the discursive and the extra-
discursive could be theorised; (it) denied that they are
epistemological agnostics; and (5) denied that they are pragmatists"
(1979:126). What, then, for Hindess et al is the relation between
political theory and political practice? Hirst offers an answer:
"A 'political theory' serves calculation in two ways: it provides
criteria of appropriateness of political actions (objectives,
principles, 'ideology-') and it provides discursive means for
/") 2)
characterising the situation of action" (1979:3)- Burton and
Carlen, however, already-have a further question, for "... if
theoretical work proceeds ... by 'probiematising' and 'reconstruction'
then how is such work done outside of an epistemology which, even if
not guaranteeing a theory at least provides conditional criteria for
the recognition (and usage) of reconstructed theories ...?" (1979:125)-
Theories, of course, are reconstructed according to logical demands
for consistency between their concepts. The theories chosen for
12. As already briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, "... the conditions
of calculation of effectivity and of the production of effect are not
separable" (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:59). Theory does not provide
solutions to problems. The relation is not as that between pure
science and technological practice.
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reconstruction, however, are chosen for political and ideological
reasons. The "conditional criteria" are not determined by
privileged methodological formulas but by the terms of social i nt
discourse which, of course, has a "definite political ideology and
a definite political objective, namely, the ... socialist
transformation of capitalist relations of production" (Cutler et al.,
1977:315). Socialist theorising begins with "the already there-ness"
of socialist concepts and is a continuous process because there is no
privileged form of closure and because each political problem must be
considered in terms of the specificity of its 'form1 and the
effectivity of its 'content'. "To deny theory the role of 'knowledge'
... is not to deny the crucial organising and directing role that
political discourse can ... have ..." (Hirst, 1979:3-9).
Habermas has written that "The idea of truth can be unpacked
only in relation to the discursive redemption of validity claims" and
that "... truth belongs categorically to the world of thoughts ... and
(13)not to that of perceptions". x ' Given the premise that theory only
exists as discourse, the question should not be - why theorise, but -
why discuss. The answer to that question must be linked to notions
about the value of open discussion free from bias and privilege of
any kind, that is, to a notion of the ideal communication situation.
The conditions of such a forum deny 'theory' any privileges which might
13. Quoted by McCarthy (1978:303; 307) from Habermas' Wahrheitstheorien
(1973). making reference here and in Chapter 1 to Habermas1 notion
of the 'ideal speech situation', Habermas' theory of universal
pragmatics is not being endorsed. Such a theory produces an
essentialisation of human characteristics dependent upon psychological
and phylogene^ic categories.
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seek to set it apart from discourse in general. The criterion
of "cogency" rather than "the logical modality of necessity"
(McCarthy, 1973:313) oust not, however, "itself become a legislative
criterion, a substitute for epistemology" (liindess and Hirst, 1977:73)-
That criterion has its conditions of existence within ideological
notions about the advantages of Socialist' forms of social relations.
Theory cannot claim appropriateness through an epistemological theory
of adequacy without also claiming privilege: appropriateness can only
be claimed through the discursive redemption of its own validity
claims.
(ii) Capitalist Relations of Production : Some General Concents. The
political aim of socialism is the transformation of existing relations
of production into socialist relations. To discuss relations of
production is to discuss the forms of possession of the means and
conditions of production. These means and conditions are "... all the
conditions necessary to the operation of a particular labour process
which are combined in the units of production in which that process
takes place" (Cutler et al., 1977:251)- In the event that any of
these conditions are effectively in the possession and control of one
category of economic agents such that others in the production process
are separated from their possession and control, then this is the basis
for a class relationship. Thus, within capitalist relations of
production, capitals (individual capitalists; partnerships; .joint-
1);. In which case there is no substance to Eabermas, distinction
between theoretical and practical discourse beyond his essentialist
notion of 'human interests'.
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stock companies) possess commodities (property: raw materials;
land) and workers have to sell their labour power to capitals in
order to work these commodities. The control exercised by capitals
also means that the distribution of the product is not within the
control of those workers who have helped to produce it.
So far we have a determinate set of relations of production
(e.g. 'capitalism1). To be determinate they must have certain
conditions of existence, but as a concept, "relations of production"
can only specify, within its own terms, its general conditions of
existence; a concept cannot specify the form those conditions are
likely to take and it cannot legislate for their inevitability
(Cutler et al., 1977:209). For example, capitalist relations of
production require formal modes of defining and. sanctioning forms of
property and their ownership and forms of contract to buy and sell.
But the concept of capitalist relations of production does net
designate specific forms of legality, their application or
interpretation.
The term 'economic agent' has been used. Cutler and his
colleagues characterise the concept of 'agent' as being contingent
upon a conception of 'social relations' (1977:267). An 'agent' is
defined as "... an entity capable of occupying the position of a, locus
of decision in a social relation ..." (ibid.). The concept of agent
does not, however, specify the form an agent may take within a
determinate social formation. Within the concept of a social, formation
with capitalist relations of production, the production and
distribution of commodities requires agents recognised culturally or
legally as the owners of property; the parties to a contract, the
possessors of certain skills of calculation and techniques of work.
Without doubt, such agents would usually be identified with human
individuals but the concept of capitalist relations of production does
not demand this.' For example, as Cutler et a.l suggest, the joint-
stock company is, for legal purposes, an economic agent entitled to
enter into contracts and is the locus of decisions (ibid.;276—7; anl
see Hirst, 1979:127 et seq.).
Given the stipulation that relations of production are economic
class relations wherein certain agents are the possessors and others
the non-possessors of the means of production, this does not imply
that all agents within a social formation are economic agents. This
is an important point, for if class relations are restricted to the
possession of, or separation from, the means of production, the
position of those agents whom Marxists have termed the 'petty
bourgeoisie', and those increasing numbers of agents involved as
functionaries of the state, is problematised. Agents employed by a
capital for 'wages' are separated from the means and conditions of
production and are, therefore, 'workers' whether they be directors,
managers or labourers. This necessarily includes those employed in
service industries (hotels; banks; shops) whenever their means and
conditions of work are in the effective possession of_a capital. To
consider industrial capital to be the sine qua non of capitalist
relations of production is an essentialist dogma. Other agents then,
for example those employed by the state, form part of the division of
social labour sand are not economic agents. Such a notion, it must be
clear, has important implications for those conspiratorial approaches
and for theories about the 'ideological state apparatuses' which
seek to define state employees as agents or representatives of
capital. Gough, for example, provides a detailed analysis of the
economic relevance of welfare investment within a capitalist economy.
Gou^i's "primary question" is: has the "extensive growth of state
expenditure on the social services ... benefited or harmed the
capitalist sector ...?" (1979:102). To answer this question, Gough
turns to the Marxist essentialisation of labour power and the law of
capitalist accumulation.
Gough begins with a paradox which reflects 'capitalisms' inherent
location within contradictions: welfare expenditure is "necessary to
sustain the accumulation and reproduction of capital" and yet it
diverts capital from investment to pay for welfare services (1979:105)•
Gough then suggests a refinement to this interpretation. first, he
defines state employees as performing surplus labour - "they will work
for a greater amount of time than the labour time embodied" in their
wages (ibid.:119). This 'surplus' may then be appropriated by
capital through the treatment of welfare services as an augmentation
of wages and the effective reduction of wages at the next round of
pay bargaining. Secondly, Gough defines social services as either
"reproductive" or "non-reproductive", depending upon whether they
contribute to the reproduction of labour. One aspect of "the
contemporary economic crisis", which is "brought about by the very
nature of capitalist growth and development" (ibid.:127), is the
conflict over ;Vho pays for the welfare services - labour or capital.
llj.8.
This conflict is conducted by the "labour movement" on behalf of
"idle working class, broadly conceived", that is, including those in
the state sector. Having incorporated state employees as members
of the 'working class' they can then be finally determined according
to the dictates of the law of capitalist accumulation. For Marxists
like Gough, agents can only be given theoretical significance to the
degree that they be located either with labour or capital but, in
that very act, their effectivity is immediately undermined by
determining factors at the level of the economy.
In a similar fashion, Corrigan and Leonard, adopt intellectual
contortions to answer the question: what is "the structural position
of state employees"? (l978:10l>). In effect they are asking: how
does the economic structure determine the role of state employees?
Welfare workers are not, they insist, "simply henchmen of the ruling
class" because to say so would offend the doctrine of the "semi-
autonomous nature of the State". nevertheless, they are not "neutral",
as such a claim would endorse "an essential feature of bourgeois
ideologies" (ibid.). "Historically, the link between State employees
and the ruling class can be identified in terms of common social
origins ..." (ibid.: 105. Miliband is cited as the authority for this
statement.). "This, however, is not the whole story..." The rest of
the story carries the now familiar ambivalence. "State employees
perform a central social function in relation to the ruling class ..."
because of their location within the 'ideological state apparatuses'.
But this ought not to be seen in "too functionalist a manner" because
state employees are "... especially exposed to counter-ideological
I
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influences "both from the working class ... and from intellectual
struggles within State organisations ..." (ibid.:105-6). Welfare
workers, then, are "spokesmen and representatives of the bourgeois
class" because of their objective location within the state but, by-
being a "... part of a labour movement which exposes them to the
power of the material reality and ideology of the working class",
welfare workers can attain a subjective location with the 'working
class' (ibid. 183-^4).
Class essentialism dictates that everyone has a class position,
either objectively through origins or the nature of employment
('proletarianisation') or subjectively through conscious choice or
experience:
"The expansion of social work ... has absorbed a stratum
of the middle class who, themselves, have been displaced
Horn direct production into the service sector and who
not only look and dress like their clients, but have a
significant overlap of real interests and experiences"
(Matthews, 1979:115).
Hie political relevance of groups of workers such as welfare
employees cannot be determined according to the strength of 'working
class' essence they can claim for themselves. Hie economic classes of
labour and capital are determined by socialist discourse on the relations
of production. Radicals must begin to turn their attention to the
production of concepts appropriate to other agents within the division
of social labour and their political relevance to the struggle to
democratise and socialise social relations outside of the 'capitalist'
sector. Socialist practice is not any the less 'socialist' simply
f
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because it cannot show how its actions will overthrow 'capitalism'.
'Sloganeering' claims that 'capitalism' will only be overcome
"throu^i the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat" (Young, 1979:28;
and. see Rritchard and Taylor, 1978:67) or that it is 'capitalism's'
"internal contradiction" that will lead to its transformation (Kinsey,
1979:61).) must be rejected as of little benefit to the radical cause,
particularly in the attempt to gain political support both from
welfare workers and their clients.
7. Summarising Discussion
This chapter has continued the critique of essentialisms begun
in the previous chapter and has extended that analysis into some of the
basic concepts of Marxist theoretical discourse. It has been argued
ana illustrated that such a critique is demanded because of the growing
application of such basic concepts in the radical problematising of
welfare discourse. In their attempts to radicalise the welfare realm,
theorists such as Corrigan and Leonard, Gough, and Ginsburg have sought
to identify the political issues of that discourse through the
restatement of a body of Marxist theory which is essentialist and
scientistic. Unfortunately, it is this kind of loyalty to the formulae
of Marxism which elicits the response from many welfare practitioners -
'It's All Right for You to Talk' (Cohen, 1975).
Given the political aim of transforming 'capitalist relations'
into 'socialist relations', Marxist discourse has all too often sought
to identify the essential nature of 'capitalism'. Seen as a
structured totality in a state of homeostasis, the 'capitalist mode of
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production' is portrayed as governed by 'laws of nature' which propel
it through time. The dialectical force of the 'inherent
contradictions' of 'capitalist relations' both guarantee their
reproduction and eventual metamorphosis. Universal laws of social
evolution are manifested in the specificity of their form within
determinate 'modes of production'. One such law is the requirement
for Men to organise their labour to ensure their reproduction. Marxist
discourse gives pride of place to the labour process and endorses it
through the 'theory of value*. The value of a product is measured by
the labour invested in its production. It is on the basis of this
essentialisation of the notions of labour and value that Marxist
discourse reasons that labour power is expropriated from direct
producers by 'capitalists' who monopolise the means of production. The
total value of a commodity is attributable to labour time invested in
its production, and the difference between the cost of reproducing that-
labour power (wages) and the value in exchange of the commodity
represents the profit which the 'capitalist' expropriates.
To increase profits 'capitalists' mast exploit greater proportions
of surplus labour by extending working hours and by the more efficient
use of that labour. This process leads to accumulation of capital in
the form of bigger and more efficient enterprises and the supersession
of labour power by machinery. This process, according to Marxist
discourse, results in a surplus population of labour which is rea uired
both a,s casual labour and as a reserve pool which effectively keeps
down wages through competition for jobs. It is on the basis of the
essentialisatjpn of labour and the inevitability of the accumulation of
capital that most other Marxist concepts are erected. This can he
seen in the obligatory recounting of the labour theory of value, the
inherently contradictory nature of capitalist development and capital
accumulation, in radical texts whose substantive topic is welfare
discourse. Such essentialism and scientism allows radical 'theorists
to propose an inevitable struggle between the ruling class of
'capitalists' and the exploited 'working class', a struggle which will,
ultimately, only be resolved by the logic of 'capitalist' development
which ends in crisis and the transformation to 'socialism'.
Compelled by loyalty to the liturgy of Marxist concepts, radicals
in the welfare realm struggle to resolve a desire to acknowledge the
reality and relevance of class struggle and a Marxist pessimism which
portrays 'capitalist society' as hegemonised by 'bourgeois' ideology.
The result is recourse to a series of notions about the 'relative
autonomy' of the state, the law, the class struggle and so on, which
cannot be compatible with notions about 'laws of capitalist
development' and determination by the economy 'in the last instance'.
Loyalty to the basic essentialist concepts of Marxist discourse
leads to an incoherence and tension between conceptions of class
subjects cast in experiential and existentialist terms and conceptions
the 'laws' which dictate the form and content of the 'capitalist mode o
production'. The controversy over how 'capitalism' is to be
overthrown and whether this will occur through revolution or through
gradual reform, is simply a reflection of the tensions built into Marxi
discourse. 'This has a particular relevance in the welfare realm which
for many Marxists, symbolises the failure of the class struggle and the
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'incorporation1 of the working class.
"If the social formation is not conceived as
governed by the essential structure of a mode
of production end its corresponding forms of
State, politics, and ideology then the options
facing socialist politics can no longer be
reduced to a matter of confronting this essential
structure [revolution^ or else refusing to do so
(reform3 " (Cutler et al., 1977:317).
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, a reworking of
discourse on welfare will be offered which utilizes the critiques of
epistemology and essentialism developed in this and earlier chapters.
Yfelfare discourses will be analysed in terms of what has been called,
in this thesis, the epistemological conditions of existence of those
discourses. It is argued that a deconstruction of welfare discourses
has a particular value in the current situation, illustrating as it
shall the continuity which radical discourse maintains with modes of
analysis it purports to supersede. Using the concept of the
•policing p.f-idleness5, it will be argued that within determinate
relations of production the definition of a national, labour force and
its supervision, and the definition and supervision of those agents
not forming part of the labour force, have specific conditions of
existence but that the form and content of these conditions cannot
simply be read as determined by the relations of production in question.




The Regulation of Labour and the Policing
of Idleness
1. Introduction
As has already been indicated, the point of emphasis in this
thesis is not historical {facts' but a series of specific concepts,
that is, welfare discourse and the policing of idleness within the
framework of a determinate social formation. That social formation
is the concept of the British national economy. This mode of
specification rejects the treatment of the British Welfare State as
a 'capitalist1 economy ultimately determined in its forms, if net
its details, by generalising features peculiar to all 'caoitalist'
&economies. To specify in discourse a determinate social formation
is to specify relations of production, economic class relations and
their political, cultural, legal and ideological conditions of
&existence. The British national economy is conceived of an terms of
capitalist relations of production in which the means and conditions
of production are effectively possessed by one class of economic
agents thereby separating other economic agents from these essential
prerequisites of production. Economic agents, whether possessors or
non-possessors, require specific modes of recognition of their status
either through custom or law, that is, they require what Hirst calls
"an instance of regulation" (1980:62). The "instance of regulation"
must be publicly acknowledge to carry the authority to regulate and
adjudicate over definitions concerning the role and status of agents.
The "instance-of regulation" v/ill be conceived of as the state but, as
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Hirst emphasises, this does not imply a single agency of domination,
for the state may well he a complex of agencies (ibid.:66), A
condition of existence of capitalist relations of production, for
example, is a 'sovereign' state which must create, legitimate and
regulate a complex network of public laws defining, inter alia,
commercial relations between fractions of capital and labour.
Hie Marxist conception of the social formation as a structured
totality with a dominant mode of production determines the form and
guarantees the effectivity of the conditions of existence of the
social formation. As such it becomes, in Althusser's words, an
"eternity in Spinoza's sense"; it guarantees its own reproduction,
©lis conceptualisation, deriving its authority from Marx, was
utilized by Althusser in his analysis of the 'ideological state
apparatuses' and their function in the reproduction of the relations
of production and it has been followed by numerous other Marxist
theorists. transition from one mode of production to another was
conceived by Marx as the result of the non-correspondence between the
forces and relations of production and the class struggle which
finally overthrows the outmoded structure. Marxist theorisations
of the transformation of capitalist relations tend, consequently, to
resolve themselves into functionalist interpretations with associated
dysfunctions ('crises'), or into conspiratorial approaches which
demand the kindling of a 'revolutionary consciousness' of their
1. "Capitalist production ... under its aspect of a continuous
connected process, of a process of reproduction, produces not only
commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and
reproduces the capitalist relation ..." (Capital, Yol.I, 1977:55-2)
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exploited status by 'the proletariat'. Rejection of such
interpretations as essentialist and scientistic requires
(2)
acceptance that there can be no general theory of transition. v '
As Cutler et al point out, Marx's own discourse on the transition
( 3)from feudalism to capitalism, does not remain true to the
theoretical protocol of transition established in Capital (Cutler et
al., 1977:1113 et seq.).
Transition can only be conceived of in terms of specific
transformations of definite political, cultural and ideological
conditions and their associated social relations. But this is a
Q
matter of political practice and calculation. Socialists must
specify and problematise areas for political struggle within the
limits of a determinate social formation. This issue will be
discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis under a discussion of
radical discourse in the welfare realm. For the moment it is
important to note the limitations within which a radical analysis of
the period of transition of the British national economy from feudal
to capitalist relations must work. Hindess and Hirst, in a work
2. See in this context Hindess' and Hirst's discussion of the problem
of theorising transition (l975:Chapter 6). As the authors note, what
Marx describes as the classical form of the transition from feudalism to
capitalism, found in the history of England, is rather a polemic against
bourgeois accounts of the process of primitive accumulation (1975:288:
and see Cutler et al., 1977:lWl)«
3. See in Capital, Yol.I the chapters'on "The So-Called Primitive
Accumulation"; "Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the
Land"; "Bloody Legislation Against the Expropriated"; "Genesis of the
Capitalist Parmer"; "Reaction of the Agricultural Revolution on
Industry"; "Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist" (1977:667-712).
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more heavily indebted to Althusser than their later texts, saw the
analysis of transition from 'feudalism1 to 'capitalism' as decidedly
'non-scientific'. Such an analysis, they suggested, had a merely
critical and polemical value, being "... nothing but more or less
sophisticated ideology" (1975:287). The analysis presented in this
thesis does not, however, attempt to find or apply a universal theory
of such transition, rather it utilizes a series of concepts in terms
of their contribution to an understanding of the conditions of
existence of the British national economy under feudal and capitalist
relations of production and the transition from one to the ether.
This is polemical in the sense that liberal and radical histories of
welfare are deconstructed and shown to have disregarded the specificity
of the discourses they portray in terms of the evolution or
development of the Welfare State.
2. Bpisteme and Social Formation
A constant theme, running through the works of Foucault ^is the
identification of fundamental discursive discontinuities. In Madness
and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things and, to
a less obvious degree, in Disciuline and Punish, Foucault identifies
specific discursive discontinuities where others have sought to form
continuities. It is a mode of analysis which allows Foucault to talk
of "the birth" of the clinic and of the prison, but also of the rupture
between the Classical analysis of wealth and modern economic theory.
Although Foucault's own discourse does offend his protocol from time to
time, it was not Foucault's intention in using the concept of the
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episteme to allow it to hegemonise discourse. It is important to
see each of Foucault!s studies as separate archaeologies of
specific discursive regularities. In general, Foucault's studies
all suggest decisive fractures occurring within specific discursive
formations at some point "between the mid l8th and mid 19th centuries;
these he characterises as contrasts between the Classical, and the
Modern episteme. Foueault's concept of the episteme will be
adopted within this thesis to designate what are to be called the
epistemological conditions of existence of specific discursive
regularities.
The Archaeology of Knowledge is Foucault's most theoretical work
on the theme of discourse analysis in which what he attempts to
provide is not so much a theory of discourse formation as a
"description of discursive events" (1972:27). Foucault's method is
to begin with the accepted unities which traditionally are supposed
to construct a specific bod;/ of discourse (psychopathology; medicine;
social work) and then to systematically deconstruct them so that they
appear in their "non-synthetic purity". It is the specificity and
effectivity of determinate discourses which will be emphasised in this
thesis. In attempting to specify certain of the legal and
epistemological conditions of existence of discourse on welfare and the
policing of idleness, this does not imply the search for an identifiable
and eternal object of discourse, an essence bearing a message down the
long corridor of history.
(i) The Regulation of the Labour Force. Whether conceptualising a
social formation as characterised by feudal or by capitalist relations
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of production, such relations have, as a condition of their
existence, specific cultural and legal modes of recognition.
Feudal relations of production entail the effective possession of
land by one class of economic agents and the effective separation
from its possession of another class, the peasantry. Many histories
of the Welfare State see the Poor Laws, and the repressive measures
against vagabondage which are their necessary reverse side, as the
common thread pulling together the centuries of history. It will be
argued in this chapter that there are specific and identifiable
discontinuities in the modalities of labour regulation and the control
of idleness and that these disunities identify a break in the
discursive conditions of formation of these modalities.
Foucault's Discipline and Punish has had a, considerable impact
upon radical theorists who have seen in its concept of 'discipline'
the insidious unity of care and control: it is through 'discipline', and
its incorporation in the state apparatuses, that 'capitalist' class
hegemony is guaranteed. For Hirst, the one critical lesson to be
learned from Discipline and Punish is the specificity of forms of
'government' (1980:92); a message which is ultimately negated by
Foucault in his homogenisation of power as a single oppressive
'discipline'. At the theoretical level, Discipline and Punish remains
true to Foucault's earlier emphasis upon discontinuity and upon the
specificity and effectivity of particular discursive events. For
I).. See, for example, the papers in Fine et al (1979) by Lea and by
Melossi; and "The birth of the welfare sanction" by David Garland
(1981). As Sob Fine puts it: "The writings of Michel Foucault are
gaining increasing currency within the left" (l979b:75); see
Hirst (1979": 3).
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example, foucault emphasises the "multiform" nature of power and the
fact that struggles for change must "be conducted on a number of
fronts rather than being directed simplistically towards the
monolithic notion of 'the state' (1977:26-7). In his notion of
•discipline', however, Eoucault's target is not, fine notes in his
critique of Foucault, a determinate form of social organisation but,
rather, rational organisation per se (fine, 1979b:88). Whilst
concepts derived from Discipline and Punish will be adopted in what
follows, the hegemonisation by 'discipline' of the conditions of
existence of the social relations in question will be avoided.
feudal relations of production within a determinate social
formation have specific political, legal, cultural and ideological
conditions of existence. for instance, the English peasant as
economic agent was not so defined solely in terms of his political
subordination, to the power and will of the feudal landlord. feudal
relations of production entail a degree of autonomy for the peasant
to put his limited means of production to good use to supply his own
needs as well as to produce a surplus for his landlord. As Nicholls
notes: "Our Saxon ancestors required every peasant who had not a
domicile of his own, to reside with some householder, without whose
surety he would not be regarded as a member of the community, nor be
entitled to its protection" (1898:13). As Hicholls perceptively
observes, such laws "... were no doubt chiefly intended as measures
of police ... But they had likewise the effect of establishing
reciprocal relations between the landless-man and the landowner ..."
(ibia.:l!;). ;Marx records thai by the end of the llith century serfdom
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had virtually disappeared in England (1977:671). A £ree
peasantry does not, however, effectively alter the economic
relationship between lord and peasant. Feudal relations cf
production require the effective ownership of the principal means
of production, land, by one economic class and the effective
subordination of the productive class and such a relationship does
rot demand a political dominance equivalent to slavery. Specific
legal regulation of the free peasantry may well be a condition of
existence of feudal relations. In the English context, we find laws
(Z)
to prevent robbery and murder on the highways between marret towns x -
and the "Statute of Labourers" (13I49) which specifically sought to
control the labour supply by outlawing the giving of alms or pity to
"valiant beggars". ^^ This latter statute was passed following the
ravages of the plague in 13^8 and in reaction to the dramatic reduction
in the labour suppljr which resulted in pressure upon landowners to
(7^
pay higher wages. Ki' The statute defined a specific economic class
of labourers (those not "living in merchandise", "exercising any craft"
or having "of his own whereof he may live, nor proper land") and sought
5. Hie "Statute of Winchester" (1285): the "Statute of Northampton"
(1328) (Nicholls, 1898:22-36).
6. The Statute of Labourers thus forbad the giving of assistance to
these "giving themselves to idleness and vice" wrho might otherwise earn
their living through labour, "so that thereby they may be compelled to
labour for their necessary living" (Quoted by Nicholls, 1898:36).
7. As the preamble to the Act records: "Because a great part of the
people ... late died of the pestilence, many, seeing the necessity of
masters and great scarcity of servants, will not serve unless they may
receive excessive wages, and some rather willing to beg in idleness than
by labour to ggt their living ..." (Quoted by Nicholis, 1898:37)-
r
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to bind them "to serve him -which him shall require". In addition,
it sought to control contractual agreements between the labourer
and employer by making it an offence to leave employment "without
reasonable cause or licence before the time agreed" (ilicholls, 1898:
37-8), and by controlling wages offered and prices demanded for
articles and food. This legislation cannot be interpreted as the
formal sanction for a reality of political domination. Less than
two years later, further legislation appeared attempting to
specifically determine the wage rates of mowers of meadows; reapers
of corn; threshers; carpenters; masons; and others (iTicholls, 1898:
39-1+1).
Numerous Acts thereafter sought to define, control and direct the
English peasantry. It is such legislation which reflects, for
Corrigan and Corrigan "... the problem of a labour force that has to be
mobile but which must not be allowed to wander out of the labour market
altogether" (1979:3)* Nothing within the concept of feudal relations
of production, however, necessitates a highly mobile labour force:
this reflects the Corrigans' belief that within feudalism the seeds of
the 'capitalist1 market are being sown (ibid.). Nothing within the
concept suggests that vast numbers of peasants could exclude themselves
from the labour market: this reflects the Corrigans' belief that
labourers are essentially rebellious. Hie legislation in question
sought: to define and to regulate the labour force; to control
necessary labour mobility; and to inhibit idleness. As Cutler
8. For example: an Act of 1350-1 (25 Edward III, Statute 2(e))
specifically allowed for seasonal migration south for the harvest.
CAll further references to specific statutes are taken from the
Chronological Table of the Statutes published each year by KMSOj
163.
et al note, the definition and control of a labour force always
implies "as a counterpart of the regulation of labour the regulation
of idleness and poverty" (1978:250).
(ii) "An Act, so disgraceful . The relation between landlords
and tenants/labourers within feudal relations of production cannot be
seen simply as dominator/dominated. The antagonistic nature of the
relationship plays itself out as class struggle. Landlords, in a
position to influence the state, can obtain state support through-
legislation to control the conditions of labour. Class antagonism
has, of course, other conditions of existence, for example, modalities
of definition and control of vagrancy depend upon determinate beliefs
and forms of knowledge.
In describing an Act of l5^-7» passed "for the punishment of
(9)
vagabonds and for the relief of the poor and impotent persons", v ' as
"An Act, ... disgraceful to the Legislature", Sir Frederic Eden marked,
in 1797, "the limits of an age of what Foucault has described as the
"art of unbearable sensations" (l977:ll)« ®ie Act in question
condemns those responsible for failing to put earlier legislation
against vagabonds into effect. Defining "idle vagabonds" as those
"loitering", idly wandering and refusing to work or running away having
9. I Edward VI, Cap.3, preamble (see Nicholls, 1898:129).
10. "... idleness and vagabondage is the mother and root of all thefts,
robberies and other evil acts and mischiefs, which the king and
parliament hath often with great travail endeavoured to repress; but
owing to the foolish pity of them which should have seen the laws
executed, •the said goodlie statutes have hitherto had small effect ..."
(Preamble quoted by Nicholls, 1896:129-30; and see Eden, 1928:10).
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agreed to work, the Act also defines those legitimately to he
exempted from employment, that is, the "lame, impotent or so aged
or diseased with sickness" as to he unahle to work. Those convicted
as vagabonds were to he "branded with the letter 'V* and were to serve
as slaves for two years for anyone demanding their services. Runaway
•slaves', when apprehended, were to he "branded with • S' and adjudged
a slave for life. Convicted vagabonds not required as 'slaves' were
to he returned to their birthplace and held in chains to labour on
the highways. Failure to put the vagabond to such work attracted a
heavy fine against the city, borough ox town authorities (Richolls,
1898:130-1). Such mutilation was not, of course, new to legislation ^
and it did not end when the Act of 1557 was repealed soon after in
151*9. ^
Power, Foucault argues, implies a correlative field of knowledge
(1977:26-8). The exercise of power implies certain epistemological
conditions. The epistemological conditions which Foucault describes as
the episteme of the Middle Ages defined the art of generalisation as the
art of identifying similitudes (1970:17 et seq.). It was resemblance
which linked sign and signified. Within the limitations of the concept
of feudal relations of production, the struggle of the landowning class
11. An Act of I36O (35 Edward III, cap.10) for "The Punishment of
Labourers ... departing from their service into another County" had
ordered that such culprits were to be imprisoned and, if the employer
so desired, branded on the forehead with the letter 'F' "in Token of
Falsity".
12. In repealing the Act, 3 end 5 Edward 71, cap.l6 notes "that the
good and wholesome laws of the realm had not been put in execution
because of the extremity of some of them" (Quoted by Nicholls, 1898:132).
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to subsume the direct producers (peasants; tenants; labourers)
had specific conditions of existence which gave legitimation to
the traditional nature of that relationship. The Church, for
example, was a large and powerful economic agent holding vast
amounts of land in England until Henry VIII's dissolution of the
religious houses in the mid l6th century. But the Church was also
a powerful force legitimating the status quo. Made by God, the
world contained nysteries towards whose solution God had left signs.
As fbucault puts it: "The world is covered with signs that must be
deciphered ... To know must ... be to interpret: to find a way
from the visible mark to that which is being said by it and which,
without that mark, would lie like unspoken speech ..." (1970:32).
The forcible wearing of a sign, signifying a status not immediately
visible, is common in mediaeval history. Legislation which sought
to distinguish between the idle vagabond and the legitimately idle
often applied a mark either to the body or the clothing. Such a mark
signified the status of the body in question whilst symbolising the
power of the agent who applied it. ' Legislation and its
supervision, then, might be said to work through specific and limited
13- The semiology of the l6th century witch finder was the art of
identifying body markings as the sign left by the devil. (See
Szasz's The Manufacture of Madness, Paladin, 1973j especially Chapter
2: "Tiie Malefactor Identified" ) .
lU. In 1215 the Pope decreed that Jews were to wear a yellow badge
to identify themselves (Szasz, 1973:3^-)« Legislation to protect
consumers from inferior woollen caps being sold as "Leesynster wool" or
"Coteswold wool" provided for caps made from these wools to be marked
with the letters 'L5 or !C' (3 Henry VIII, cap.l5;l5ll)•
"power-knowledge relations" (Eoucault, 1977:27), that is, it has
determinate political, ideological and epistemological conditions
of existence. In terms of the specificity and effectivity of these
epistemological conditions, Foucault argues that knowledge in the
Kiddle Ages was "absolutely poverty-stricken" (1970:30)• It was a
form of knowledge which registered the spare cf history not as a
process, or an accumulation, but as an endless repetition of
similitudes; "... sixteenth century knowledge condemned itself to
never knowing anything but the same thing ..." (ibid.). It is
wi thin such an epistemo logical framework that the ideological
endorsement of traditional social relations may be understood.
If the statuses of the vagabond and the unfaithful servant were
to be branded on the body, various statutes sought to signify the
relative statuses of other orders of men by legislating for the nature
of the clothing to be worn by grooms and servants of lords;
handicraftsmen and yeomen; esquires and gentlemen; merchants ana
citizens; knights and clergy; carters, ploughmen, oxherds, cowherds,
shepherds and "... all other people that have not forty shillings of
goods and chattels" (quoted by ITicholls, 1898:7-J-3, from an Act of 1363)
"The only possible form of link between the elements of this knowledge
is addition. Hence those immense columns of compilation, hence their
monotony" (Foucault, 1970:30)*
l5- Commenting on a later Act of II4.63 (4 Edward IV), Nicholls record
his surprise that such matters should have occupied the legislature at
such a time, "... the nation being then hardly freed from the turmoil
of rebellion ..." (1898:8!+). The Act sought to regulate spending on
clothing but it also sought a means of identification for a
heterogeneous and volatile population. Further 'ordinances of
clothing' appeared in lli82 and 15>09*
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Feudal relations of production do not require a peasant
class tied in feudal slavery to the soil. What is required by the
concept is the subsumption of the direct producers through the
l
effective control of the land by another economic class. Marx
describes one way in which the English landowners consolidated this
subsumption through force rather than, for example, through their
influence with the state. By driving the peasantry from the land by .
force and by expropriating common land, the great land lords were able
to establish large sheep farms. As Marx notes, state antion was
often, in fact, directed towards reversing this process (1977:673).
Whilst this process might well have prepared the English economy for
the development of capitalist social relations, it is simply
teleological and necessarily unhelpful to argue, as Marx does, that
"What the capitalist system demanded was ... a degraded and almost
servile condition of the mass of the people ..." (1977:67^-) • It is
a reification which does, however, readily inform the discourse of
(17)Marxist historians of social policy. v ' There is, working within
the empirical process described by Marx in Capital, Vol.1, a
16. U Henry VII, cap. 19 (1I489) reads: "The king, having singular
pleasure above all things to avoid such enormities and mischiefs as
be hurtful ... to the common weal, remembereth that great inconveniences
daily doth increase by desolation and pulling down and wilful waste of
houses and towns, and laying to pasture lands which customably have been
used for tilth ..." (Hicholls, 1898:95).
17. Corrigan and Sayer (1981:22) write: "The conditions in which the
•natural laws' of political economy could operate had to be forcibly
constructed". Hindess and Hirst in Ere-Capitalist Modes of Production
outline one possible variant form of the feudal mode within whose
concepts it is possible to theorise conditions suitable for transformation
into capitalist relations (1975:256-8),
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combination of class struggles: between peasantry and lord, between
lords and the state, between lords and merchant capital within the
expanding cities and towns. Separation of the peasantry from all
means of production, including common-land, results in an economic
agent suitable for employment by merchant farmers renting land from
landowners (Marx, 1977:678) or by merchant capital. Within the
space created by this combination of class struggle a problem of
control is formed, the problem of a mobile labour force, whether
driven from the land or attracted to expanding towns and cities by
the rumour of employment.
If vagabondage was to be distinguished both from legitimate
mobility and from warrantable idleness, then conditions of recognition
had to be established and methods for their utilization and enforcement
instituted. Within the limiting epistemological conditions of a
knowledge form bound to tradition, the vagabond could be identified by
the outward signs of his status: the peculiarity of his speech and of
his clothing, for example. Vagabonds, of course, mi^dit well have
disabilities or be of such an age as to he unable to work; certainly
many would feign such impotence. Legislation attempted to confine
18. Thomas Harman, in his A Caveat or Warning for Common Cursetors
Vulgarly Called Vagabonds (l$66j. provided the loth century with a
detailed and precise description of 23 orders of vagrants: the
ruffler; the upright man: a hooker or angler; a prigger of
prancer; palliards; and so on. His book also provides descriptions
of: clothing - "commonly go in frieze jerkins"; "commonly in jerkins
of leather"; "these go with patched cloaks"; the deceipts practised -
"These Abraham men be those that feign themselves to have been mad";
and their argot - 'Pedlar's Erench' (Eaxman, 1871).
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impotent beggars to their present domiciles or to the place of their
birth ("*"9) 0f. i^O ordered justices to register the
"names in a bill or roll indented" of those who, through age or
impotence, were to be allowed to beg (hichoils, 1898:119). Hie
power of the word, then, was paramount. By the Act of 1388,
servants and labourers were allowed to leave their home areas (hundred;
rape etc.) only if in possession of 'a letter-patent1 under the king's
seal (ibid.:56); the Act of 1530 provided legitimate beggars with a
(21)
letter of authorisation to beg. Those nor so registered, or
those registered found begging outside the prescribed area were to
feel "the power of the mark of the sovereign not as a sign on paper but
(22)
as a stigmata cn their bodies. x ' Hence, the episteme of the Middle
Apes acted through the accumulation of similitudes and the compilation
of names and markings.
It is just such a basic epistemological framework which informed
the threefold, classification of Juan Luis Vives, adviser on poor law
matters to the immiciple authorities of Bruges, and acquaintance of
19. Mor example: 12 Richard II, caps.3-9 (1388); 11 Henry VII,
cap.2 (1I4.95).
20. 22 Henry VII, cap. 12.
21. By the Act 2 and 3 Hiilip and Mary, cap.5 (l555) parishes which
could not relieve their poor were to provide them with !,a lie erne to
go abroad to beg". Such beggars were to wear openly on the breast
and bank of their garments, some notable badge or token (iTicholls, 1898;
li|l-2).
22. 27 Henry VIII, cap.25 (1535) consolidated this power of the mark.
Those already whipped under direction of the 1530 -Act returned to a
district to beg were to have the "upper part of the gristle of the
right ear electa, cut off, so that it may appear as a perpetual, token ...".
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Henry VIII. In 1526, Vives published a report ("He subventione
pauperum sive de human!s necessitatibus") in which he divided
destitute persons into: those sheltering in hospitals and almshouses;
homeless beggars; and honest and shamefaced poor abiding in their own
houses (Webb and Webb, 1927:37)* A quarter of a century later, in
1553) a scheme for dealing with all classes of the poor in London was
devised. Utilizing the ternary classification used by Vives and
implicit in much earlier legislation for the punishment of vagabonds
and valiant beggars and for the relief of the impotent, sick and aged
poor, each class was, in turn, subdivided into three further
(23)
categories: v ' monotonous compilation indeed. In 1555? the king's
palace at Bridewell was granted to the Corporation of the city of London
to house idle and lewd people; the poor, sick and weak; and the poor
wayfarer (Webb and Webb, 1927:50). Running parallel with the "art of
unbearable sensations" we see "an economy of suspended rights"
(Foucault, 1977:11)* Whilst the mark, as the significant, remained
for several years to designate the signified through the conjuncture of
23. Hie poor by impotency were subdivided into: the fatherless
poor man's child; the aged, blind and lame; the diseased by
leprosy, dropsy etc. The poor by casualty were divided into: the
wounded soldier; the decayed householder; the visited by grievous
disease. Finally, the thriftless poor were broken down into:
the rioter that consumeth all: the vagabond that will abide in no
place; the idle person, as the strumpet. (Quoted by the Webbs,
1927:h9) from a work by Eolinshed published in 1577* Hie
classification was found worthy of repetition in l6l5 and 1638 and
was cited again in the Ninth Annual Report of the Poor Law
Commissioners in I8I4.3.)
resemblance ("V" for vagabondage, "P" for pauperism), ^ ^
legislation entered upon what Eoucault calls, elsewhere, 'the
gceat confinement' (1967). In 1572, legislation ordered justices
of the peace to register the poor and to provide "convenient places
to settle the same poor people for their habitation and abidings"
(quoted by Nicholls, 1898:159-60). The poor who were able to,
were to be set to work. This Act introduced the function of the
overseer of the poor and assessment and collection of poor rates.
It also began that "economy of suspended rights". Poor persons,
sufficiently able to be given work, who refused such employment in
"their said abiding-place" were to be treated, as vagabonds and
appropriately punished.
That there was major concern over the number of unemployable,
unemployed and. deliberately idle people living by begging cannot be
doubted. The 1572 Act included amongst "rogues, vagabonds, and
sturdy beggars", those using subtle craft and unlawful games; those
able in body but without land or master who were not able to give a
satisfactory account of how they earned a living; and those who
(25)
refused to work for wages commonly given. v ' There had, in
addition, been statutory discrimination against gipsies ('Egyptians')
21;. By the Act I James I, cap.7 O-603), dangerous rogues were to be
branded on the left shoulder with a Roman ,!R" that it "may be seen and
remain for a perpetual mark upon such rogue during his or her life"
(Quoted by Kichoils, l&98:21l).
25. lh Elizabeth I, cap.5; see Nicholls (l898:l59)« According to
Eden (1928:16-7) the 1572 Act actually outlined nine categories of
rogues, vagabonds and beggars. As Eoucault says, the epistemological




since 1530• That such legislation represented but one aspect
of the conditions of existence of one economic class must not,
however, be overlooked. In 15U8, legislation sought to outlaw
trading agreements amongst "sellers of victuals" who, "not contented
with moderate and reasonable gain, have conspired and covenanted
together to sell their victuals at unreasonable prices". The same
Act also outlawed combinations amongst artificers, handicraftsmen
and labourers who sought thereby to regulate the division of labour
f27)between their various trades and the length of their working day. K 'J
Three years later, legislation sought both to maintain and increase
the amount of land put to tillage and to prohibit the use of "gigg-
mills" in the production of cloth. Legislation, then, reflected the
influence of a variety of economic and class pressures which cannot
simplistically be described in terms of the inexorable march of
advancing capitalism. Every determinate social formation, seen in
terms of specific relations of production and their legal, political,
ideological etc. conditions of existence, requires cultural or legal
regulation and determination of the status, role and scope of economic
agents. Thus we find 5 Elizabeth I, cap.lp (1562) seeking to
consolidate earlier legislation by: defining those who had to work
26. 22 Eenry VIII, cap.10: "An Act concerning Egyptians".
27. 2 and 3 Edward VI, cap.l5. Nicholls (i898:135)> writing in
the l850s, notes that "a free and open market" was all that was
required to adjust prices, whereas the combination of artisans "was
an. unwarrantable interference with the freedom to which every man is
entitled". Whereas combination amongst those selling goods would,
then, simply be overriden by the logic of the market (unreasonably
high prices eijcouraging further competition), combination amongst
the labour force 'required' formal control.
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(unmarried persons; married persons under 30 with a trade not
having I4O shillings per annum; and everyone between 12 and 60} who
Was to be compelled to serve in husbandry); limiting movement in
search of work to those carrying a testimonial signed by a. constable;
outlawing the employment of those without such a testimonial; and by
defining the number of hours to be worked, meal times and wages.
The 'interventionist state' is certainly not limited to 'welfare-
capitalism' or to aberrant forms of state socialism.
"Law is an instance of regulation: an institutionally
specific complex of organizations and agents, discourses
and practices, which operates to define (whether in
codified rules or not) the form and limits of other
organizations, agents and practices" (Hirst, 1980:62).
Laws have their own conditions of existence and this chapter1 has
demonstrated some of the economic, ideological and epistemological
conditions of English legislation regulating the labour force within
feudal relations of production. The effectivity of such legislation
is not, of course, computed in advance by any logic of economic or
class forces. Effectivity depends upon specific calculations of the
impact of legislation, the agencies created to enforce legislation and
the play of political and social forces. 18 Elisabeth I, cap.3 0-575)*
for example, legislated "needful Addition to the Statute concerning the
Punishment of Vagabonds and Relief of the Poor" (the Act of 1572).
Justices were specifically authorised to obtain stocks (wool; hemp;
iron etc.) to be worked by the poor and 'houses of correction' were to
be set aside for those refusing such work. This necessitated the
creation of agents to supervise such houses and powers to define their
m-
duties (powers given to the justices, in this case). finally,
a regular source of financing 'houses' and 'stocks' had to be
legislated for (collectors of taxes, for example).
Discourses on labour, idleness and welfare within feudal
relations of production appear as partial conditions of existence of
those relations. Such discourses have determinate ideological and
cultural conditions which have been termed, in this chapter,
epistemological conditions and have been identified in their general
form with fbucauit's episteme of the Middle Ages. Such
epistemological conditions are not, however, determined in their form
by the relations of production and their influence on the content of
discourses (legislation, for example) and their effactivity is not
guaranteed in advance.
Erom the beginning of the 17th century, Eoucault suggests, "...
thought ceases to move in the element of resemblance. Similitude is
no longer the form of knowledge but rather the occasion of error, the
danger to which one exposes oneself when one does not examine the
obscure region of confusions" (1970:5l)- In contrast to a mode of
discourse which accumulated similitudes, reacting through legislation
to existing signs and through "an art of unbearable sensations", the
discourse of the Classical episteme begins to order the world.
"Erom now on, every resemblance must be subjected to
proof by comparison ... The activity of the mind ...
will therefore no longer consist in drawing things
together, in setting out on a quest for everything that
might revea.1 some sort of kinship, attraction, or
secretly shared nature within them, but, on the contrary,
in discriminating ..." (Eoucault, 1970:55)-
I
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3. Bpisteme and Social Transformation
Discussion so far in this chapter has sought to emphasise the
necessity for considering the specificity of determinate discursive
formations, such as discourse on the regulation of labour and the
control of idleness, within the limits of a hierarchy of concepts
concerning the social formation and its relations of production and
conditions of existence. Illustrative material from English
legislation on the control and punishment of vagabondage and begging
has been provided and attempts have been made to relate such
discursive formations to the conditions of existence of feudal
relations of production. In the present section, this mode of
analysis will be applied to what mif^it be termed the moment of
transition of the British national economy from feudal to capitalist
relations. This is not to suggest, however, that 'feudalism' ended
at a particular moment in British history and that 'capitalism'
appeared. for is it to suggest that 'feudalism' was laying the
foundations for 'capitalism' . The transformation of social relations
is a matter of specific calculation and political practice on a number
of fronts: 'advances' are made in some contexts whilst struggles are
lost or reversed in others. Given the specific set of concepts by
which feudal and capitalist relations of production are
circumscribed, it is possible to argue that within that period which
Eoucault calls the Classical episteme certain discourses on labour and
idleness can be more appropriately located with feudal rather than
capitalist relations, and vice versa.
'Social formation' is a concept and has theoretical conditions
I
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of existence. Within the flexibility of these conditions it is
possible to suggest that some may be more conducive to change in
specific directions than others. For example, Hindess and Hirst
discuss specific forms of feudalism which are more likely to give
rise to capitalism than others (1975:256-9). This does not imply
any inevitability and it does not suggest that forms of relations
taken in one social, formation will necessarily not be conducive to
another social formation. fbucau.lt's concept of the episteme
will once again be used, then, heuristically whilst denying the
(29)incrementalism which slips into Foucault's discourse. J
(i) The Settlement Act and Labour Mobility. Two statutes,
instituted in the 17th century, were to remain the legal cornerstones
in discourse on the poor until well into the 20th century. The Act
of 1|3 Elizabeth I, cap.2 (l60l) "... was destined to remain on the
statute book, much modified in practice but with its basic wording
unaltered ... until 19^8 ..." (Bruce, 1973:l)« The other Act,
described by Adam Smith as "this ill-contrived law of settlements"
28. Capitalist relations of production tolerate a large degree of
interference in the basic commodity form of social relations. In
the British national economy, for example, health, education end
welfare services have largely been socialised bur this does not imply
that the British formation is 'nearer' to being a social formation
with socialist relations of production than, say, the USA.
29. At one point, fbucault describes the shift from mediaeval to
Classical episteme as "... an immense reorganisation of culture ...
of which the Classical age was the first and perhaps the most
important stage, since it was responsible for the new arrangement in
which we are still caught ..." (1970:^-3)' The "we" in question, of




(Webb and Webb, 1927:33i)> although similarly much amended, was
also to remain into the present century. In addition, as Rose
suggests, both Acts were "... merely a codification of existing
practice" (1971:12). The power of the legal word should not be
minimised: it provides conditions of existence of practices caught
within its purview. Although additional legislation may alter its
scope and case law its interpretation, it remains as much a
conditions of their existence as they do an instance of its
modification. Nevertheless, laws have determinate conditions within
which they are applied, interpreted and modified. It would be a
serious error, therefore, to presume that the 'welfare' which
commentators note as a facet of modern social policy, and which they
trace to the Poor Laws (as either its positive or its negative origin),
is the same concern for 'welfare' which instituted those Acts.
"The notion that each man 'belonged' to a certain place
Poynter has written, "... can be traced back in English society ..."
(l969:ii-). English feudal relations of production undoubtedly
witnessed a period in which the majority of the population was effectively
bound to the land. Legislation against vagabondage often ordered
the return of the culprit to his place of birth or last permanent
domicile in an effort to maintain the status quo ante. Hie "Act for
the better Relief of the Poor", known more commonly as the Settlement
Act of 1662 (3®) jjjgy -De seen as the mere codification of existing
practices but it also illustrates a moment of epistemological
30. ll| Charges II, cap. 12.
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discontinuity. The Act created specific definitions of settlement:
residence in a parish for forty days as a householder, sojourner,
apprentice, or servant; the renting of a tenement of ten pounds or
more; the giving of security not to become liable to poor relief.
By I James II, cap.17 (l685) the forty days rule was to begin not
from the moment when the newcomer settled in the parish but from the
moment when he or she had. delivered written notice to the Poor Law
officials (overseers or church' wardens) of place of abode and size of
(31)
family. v ' Given that poor relief was based upon a system of
public taxation, it is understandable that parishes attracting migrant
workers should wish to control the definition of who should qualify
for poor relief. Importantly, then, the Act did not simply confirm
or re-establish existing 'natural' settlements but, rather, created
settlement. The power of the word aid not reside in the duplication
of an existing order, as was characteristic of the mediaeval episterna,
rather, it sought to order the world through processes of
discrimination. Thus, by an Act of 1691, registers of the poor were
to be regularly reviewed so that those no longer entitled to relief
could be removed from the list and, in 1722, legislation ordered that
those refusing to be lodged in poor law property for the purpose of
being set to work were to be "... put out of the book in which the
names of persons who ought to receive relief are registered, and shall
31. By 3 William and Mary, cap. 11 (l69l) such notice was to be
publicly displayed in church. In addition, this Act gave settlement
to: anyone holding public office in the parish for one year; anyone
paying public taxes; and those being hired in the parish for a year.
f
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not be entitled to a,sk or receive relief ..." (quoted by ITicholls,
1901;:ll|). Discourse, then, no longer signified a status established
elsewhere (by God, for example), it established that status.
In the transition from feudal to capitalist relations within the
British national economy, the contrast and conflict between town and
(?2)
country becomes acute. v J Towns were sites of formations existing
within feudal relations but often in antagonism with them. Guilds
of craftsmen and merchant capital represented forms of production with
their own conditions of existence. Poor Law legislation can be seen
to reflect, in part and in varying ways, this class antagonism.
Poynter, for example, sees the Law of Settlement as a victory for
entrenched localism over central state control (1969:1+) • Phe Webbs
are more specific and see the Act as a victory for the farmers who
gained, in effect, a captive labour force. By creating what might be
described as an agricultural 'reserve army1, the Settlement Act
effectively kept agricultural wages low (1927:330). But as the Webbs
note themselves, the Act did not prevent mobility of the workforce:
it regulated it. Workers migrating from country areas where
employment opportunities were restricted because of the rationalization
of production (enclosures; impirovements in husbandry); the emphasis
upon animal husbandry rather than agriculture; and the seasonal nature
of the work, either found work and lodgings in the towns and cities or
32. Marx and Engels wrote:
"The division of labour inside a nation leads at first
to the separation of industrial and commercial from
agricultural labour, and hence to the separation of town
an$ country and to the conflict of their interests".
(Trie German Ideology, in. MbLellan, 1973:l6l).
were 'removed' to their place of settlement lest they made claims
for poor relief. Because of the seasonal, nature of the work,
labour brought into an area could be 'removed' before qualifications
to settlement in that parish were achieved (that is, after 1691, not
having been hired for more than one year). The argument that the
Settlement Laws were an affront to the freedom of labour mobility is
( 33)
an argument from another time. The concepts of settlement and
removal existed in law into the 20th century and it is unlikely that
they seriously interfered with the availability of labour under
capitalist relations. As Bruce notes (1973'5)? those removed were
more likely to be the least able-bodied, those fit to work often being
given certificates by their parishes of settlement to indemnify
receiving parishes against any claim to relief (and see Webb and Webb,
1927:336-7).
Rose (1976), like Boynter, suggests that the Settlement Laws
reflected the protection of local autonony and control over poor relief
Legislation, however, has conditions of existence which determine "the
33* Pitt, for example in 1796, felt that the-law had. "... contributed
to fetter the circulation of labour ha.d "... prevented the
workman from going to the market where he could dispose of his industry
to the greatest advantage, and the capitalist from employing the person
qualified to procure him the best return for his advances" (Quoted by
Nicholls, 190^:118-9).
3I4. Rose (1976) describes the use of transfer payments between
parishes. Ashforth (l976:li|ii) records that, in 1837? one-fifth of
Sheffield's and almost half of Kottingiam's paupers were non-settled.
The law was gradually modified throughout the 19th century: by 1795 a
person had to be actually chargeable on the parish before removal
occurred; in l81;6, legislation made removal illegal after 5 years of
residence; in l86l this was reduced to 3 years and in 1865 to one year
Prohibition o£ removal did not, however, necessarily confer' settlement
and a 'right':to relief.
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legitimacy and. authority of the "instance of regulation" and the
relative influence of other agents over the state. The effectivity
of legislation similarly has conditions determined by the level of
recognition of the authority of the "instance of regulation" and
the agencies formed to enforce it. Under the absolute monarchy of
Charles I, for example, a Commission was created in I63O "... for
putting in execution the laws for the relief of the poor" (llicholls,
1898:252-7). Justices of the Peace and poor law officials were
blamed for neglecting the various Poor Laws and the commissioners
were given authority by the king to make enquiries and to enforce the
various statutes. By the establishment of the Commission, the
sovereign attempted to institute a hierarchy of control. Justices of
the Peace, for example, were to meet every month to enquire of
overseers, churchwardens and constables how they were performing' their
duties. Where neglect of duties was discovered, justices were to
inflict punishments according to the law. Every quarter, the justices
were to report the results of these enquiries to the high sheriff, who,
within fourteen days, was to deliver the information to the justices of
( 85
assize. They, in their turn, were to report to the commissioners.
35- ihe Webbs note that from 1590 to l6iiQ there was "... an almost
continuous series of letters, instructions and orders, emanating from ...
the Privy Council or some members of it ... insisting that the statutes
for the relief of the poor Ls"tc«l ... be put in operation" (1927:76).
For the Webbs, this period witnessed the establishment of "... a highly
organised system of Local Government ..." (ibid.:79). Tt is clear that
the effective implementation of the various Poor Laws depended upon their
supervision by local magistrates. The effectiveness of Charles I!s
attempted control can be glimpsed in the evidence given by the Webbs:
in 1632 tlae hi^i sheriffs were adjured to obtain outstanding reports from
justices; by :the end of 1633 Judges were being asked to find out which
justices had defaulted; by mid 1635 Judges are again being reminded that
they must ihsist upon j-ostices making returns (ibid.:78).
The Settlement Act of 1662, however, cites as one cause of the
ever increasing body of the poor "... the neglect of the faithful
execution of ... laws and statutes ..." (Nicholls, 1898:280).
The Settlement Act may well have had important consequences for
local autonomy; nevertheless, the interests it served and its
impact cannot simply be read-off from the struggle between local and
central governance. George Coode, for instance, noted in 1851 that
the Bill had been chiefly framed and supported in Parliament by MPs
from the metropolis, who, following the restoration of the monarchy in
1660, were anxious about the increasing pauper population in the
capital. The ten pound rental qualification could have had relevance
only in that city (iTicholls, l898:28i). In addition, however, the
Act specifically declared "... that it shall be lawful ... for any
person ... to go into any county, parish, or place, to work in time
of harvest, or at any time to work at any other work, so that he carry
with him a certificate from the minister ... the churchwarden and ...
the overseer ... that he ha,s a dwelling and is declared an inhabitant
there". In that respect, the labour needs both of farmers and
manufacturers were, ostensibly at least, catered, for by the Act.
What property owners clearly did not want was to have to meet excessive
poor rates during trade fluctuations or because of the seasonal nature
of the enterprise. There was also the danger of double payment of
relief as workers made their way from the towns during a period of
unemployment and moved back to their rural settlement.
(ii) An Economy of Suspended Rights
"Analyse punitive methods not simply as consequences of
legislation or as indicators of social structures, but
'as techniques possessing their own specificity in the
more general field of other ways of exercising power"
(ibucault, 1977:23).
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Vagabondage, in the 16th century, was seen as the cause of all
manner of "heinous offences and great enormities, to the high
displeasure of God, the unquietation and damage of the king's people,
and to the marvellous disturbance of the common weal". (3&) j^-s
punishment required a suitably visible form: "... men will remember
public exhibition, the pillory, torture and pain duly observed"
(Foucault, 1977:3^)• Hence vagabonds were to be taken to the local
market town, tied naked to a cart, and beaten with whips throughout
tiie town. Some three hundred years later, we witness the statutory
(37)demolition of punishment as spectacle. w,/ As Foucault records,
punishment is "... an aspect of the sovereign's right to make war on
his enemies ..." (ibid.; i+8) . Punishment was the legal reaction of
sovereign power and, as such, left its perpetual mark as the surface
sign of its perpetual existence and authority. The 17th century was
a period of dynastic insecurity after the death of James I in 1625.
Appropriately, the Classical episteme stamped order upon the world.
Knowledge no longer simply reacted to an already existing order, it
questioned the relationship between sign and signified. In the l6th
century, "... the value of language lay in the fact that it was the
36. Preamble to 22 Henry VIII, cap.12 (l530)j quoted by Hichoils,
(1898:115).
37. The use of the pillory was abolished for most offences in l8l6
and for all in 1837; in 1817 the public whipping cf female offenders
was abolished; the hanging of the bodies of criminals in chains ended
in I83I4, as did the branding of criminals. Other statutes: reduced
the penalty for concealment of birth from death to 2 years imprisonment
(1809); reduced penalties for the delivery of bastard children (l8l0);
and removed theisquirement that families in receipt of poor relief were
to wear a "lapge Roman ? together with the first letter of the name of
the Parish'' oh their clothing (l8l0).
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sign of things" (Foucault, 1970:33)* 1° "brand, the body ("Y" for
Classical age, however, "The profound, kinship of language with the
world was ... dissolved" (ibid.; i+3) . Prom that moment, language
In 1696, 8 and 9 William III, cap.30 ordered that the families
of those legitimately receiving relief were to wear a large letter
"P" and the initial letter of their parish upon their clothing in order
that money "... may not be misapplied and consumed by the idle, sturdy,
and disorderly beggars" (Nicholls, 1898:3Ul)- Language as sign
thereby discriminates and categorizes. In 1698, 11 William III,
cap.18 sought to legislate against those using "counterfeit passes,
testimonials, or characters" to abuse the "charitable intentions" of
others (ibid.: 3^47) • Language as sign is interrogated as to the
veracity of its significations. Punishment for the crimes of failing
to wear the 'badge1 of poverty and for using counterfeit documents was
committal to a house of correction.
If the l6th century witnessed harsh legisla/tion against indolence
as the means of restoring vagrants to their natural work environment,
the 17th century saw an increasing emphasis upon the productive value
of all idle bodies. ^8) p0or rates were seen as increasingly
burdensome and it seemed to many an illogical practice to give money
in relief to those able to work in some capacity. In 1698, Kicholls
records, the king's speech to Parliament spoke of the desirability of
38. The Webbs note that "What the writers of the latter part of the
seventeenth century had in view was largely, and even mainly, making
the labour of the poor into a source of actual profit to the nation"
(1927:102).
vagabond) was merely to make a status indelible. With the
organized,
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employing the poor, thereby both increasing manufactures and
reducing poor rates. In the following year the king expressed
the view that it was "... extremely desirable that such as are able
and willing should not want employment, and such as are obstinate
and unwilling should be compelled to labour" (Nicholls, 1898:351).
In fact, around 1660 Sir Matthew Hale was lamenting the failure of
parishes to supply stocks to be worked by the poor (Webb and Webb,
19275 97). Hale5s remedy was the suggestion that parishes might unite
to build workhouses for the housing and employment of the poor and for
instructing children in trade (Wichclls, 1898:287-90; Webb and Webb,
1927:103-^). 'Expert* opinion certainly endorsed this approach.
Richard Haines, described by the Webbs as an "indefatigable
pamphleteer", advocated in 1678 the uniting of parishes in the
enterprise of profitable workhouse labour. ^ Ho less an individual
■than John Locke, in a report for his employer, the Board of Iraae,
39* Ihe king's speech in 1700 emphasised that the regulation and
improvement of trade was "so public a concern" that it required
serious thought. This included "setting the poor at work", thereby
adding "so many useful hands to be employed in our manufactures and
other public occasions" (Quoted by Wicholls, l898:35l)»
J4O. 39 Elisabeth I, cap.5 (l597) had authorised the building, by-
private donors, of "working houses for the poor". Actual buildings in
which "the poor" might be set to work varied considerably, from isolated,
small 'poor houses' to large houses of correction. (See Webb and Webb,
1927:215-6).
1+1. Haines, who suggested the invention of a "spinning engine" for the
employment of children, based his notions on the work of one John
Gressot who, in 1673j had complained that the poor relief was "employed
only to maintain idle persons". He urged, the Webbs record, that all
poor persons, young and old, should be employed in spinning and knitting




argued in 1697 that everyone must eat, drink and have shelter and
that "... so much goes out of the stock of the kingdom whether
they work or no" (Webb and Vebb, 1927:111-2). Locke, however,
fell back on the standard view that stock ought to be provided to be
worked by the poor.
There was, of course, strong and influential feeling against
such *make-work' schemes, illustrated well by Daniel De Doe's pamphlet
of 170lj. - Giving 11ms no Charity, and Employing the Poor a Grievance
to the Nation (Webb and Webb, 1927:11^-6; Eden, 1928:^3-6). De Eoe
argued: it is "... a regulation of the poor that is wanted in England,
not a setting them to work". There was, De Foe believed, sufficient
work available and the artificial creation of employment would merely
divert work fcom those willingly undertaking it. Discourse on the
economic value of marginal labour, during the Classical period, was
divided: it did. however, work within a common set of epistemolcgical
conditions of existence.
In the l6th century every man, had his rightful domicile. To
wander the country without good cause was both unnatural and a, source
of danger to legitimate travellers. The vagabond, then, was to be
whipped and returned "... to the place where he was horn ... and there
put ... t-o labour like as a true man oweth to do" (22 Henry VIII,
cap.12; l530) ♦ Labour, as the book of "Genesis" proclaimed, was the
() ON
lot of man. ^ Discourse on wealth in the loth century similarly
Ij2. "Because you have listened to your wife and have
eaten fcom the "tree which I forbade you, accursed
shrill be the ground on your account. With labour
. you shall win your food from it all the days of
your life" ("Genesis"; 3? 17)•
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worked within a world created in its completeness by God. Wealth,
then, was finite; limited by the supply of precious metals residing
within the earth. The epistemological configuration of the
Classical episteme. however, was quite different. As Foucault notes,
"... wealth becomes whatever is the object of needs and desires ..."
(1970:175). Coinage merely represented wealth and allowed it to be
circulated and augmented, for example by moving into areas of high
employment.
•Feudal relations of production5 is a concept which pre-supposes
a hierarchy of other concepts, forming the conditions of existence of
those relations. Amongst those conditions are discursive regularities
which provide an endorsement, whether political, cultural or
ideological, of those relations. This thesis is particularly concerned
with epistemological conditions of existence of specific bodies of
discourse, that is, with the grounds on which they claim veracity as
identifiable discursive regularities. Feudal relations of production
presumes a body of discourse defining the role of labour and the control
of idleness hut it does not dictate the form of that discourse or its
effectivity. Hence, two discursive regularities are found working in
opposition, which we might term the Hhysiocratic approach and the
utilitarian approach following Foucault (1970:189 et seq.). The
I4.3. Rubin writes of "Fully-fledge mercantilism", as "... above all a
policy of protectionism" (1979:31): one nation's gains in wealth were
another's losses. Later mercantilism, within the Classical period,
sought to manipulate this flow of money net merely to hoard it hut to
control its supply in relation to prices, wages and population.
I4J4. Physiocracy, or the rule of nature.
r
188.
concept of feudal, relations does not dictate to this conflict, nor
does it decide its outcome.
The epistemological conditions for the formation of discourse
on wealth within the Classical eoisteme characterise Man's relationship
with the world as an active, ordering and productive one. Man no
longer reads through the sign for the order contained within the
signified, rather he orders and arranges the world through signs.
Classical discourse on wealth emphasised Man's capacity to augment it
through time and progress. Biysiocratic discourse, however, located
(l.t)the source of that augmentation in the fecundity of the earth, v J
whilst the utilitarian emphasis lay with the satisfaction of human need
through the industrial production process. Both bodies of
discourse valued labour as the medium through which wealth was
realised, that is, labour was a necessary element in the production of
wealth. Relatively speaking, then, the utilitarian valued labour
more highly to the extent that industrial production was more labour
intensive than agricultural production.
Marxist discourse usually portrays this period (classified here as
the Classical age) as the moment of 'primitive accumulation' and, in
The fhysiocratic movement, though- occurring in Erance, based its
ontological primacy of the land on the work of the English theorist
Cantillon. Cantillon did not believe that industrial production
created value: the apparent increase was nothing more than value
consumed by the worker (in subsistence) and the entrepreneur (in profit)
and paid for out of ground rent (Foucault, 1970:193)«
h6. "'The value of all commodities derives from their usefulness'
(that is, their ability to 'satisfy human wants and needs'), and it
changes with changes in the 'humour and the whims of the people who
make use of them'" (Rubin, 1979:66-7, quoting Nicholas Barbon, an
English contemporary of Locke).
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the British context, it witnesses the expansion of merchant and
industrial capital and the development of the capitalist farmer.
But we have not stepped outside the concept of feudal relations
for it is simply the wisdom of hindsight which demands that we seek
in every twist and turn of this period the untangling of a form
which is already and inevitably that of 'capitalism*.
Speaking of Hiysiocratic and utilitarian discourse, Foucault
insists: "There is no difference between these two modes of analysis
other than the point of origin and the direction chosen to traverse
a network of necessity that remains identical in both" (l970:19l).
Having identified the general epistemological conditions of existence
of the discourses, Foucault chooses to undermine their individual
and specific effects. Foucault's concept of the episteme hegemonises
all discourse every bit as much as the Marxist concept of mode of
production. It is being suggested here that, within the concept of
feudal relations of production, two discourses on wealth can be
accommodated in terms of their epistemological conditions. This is
not to pronounce on their ideological and political conditions of
fjrmation. Foucault writes: "Perhaps it would have been simpler to
say that the fhysiocrats represented the landowners and the
•utilitarians' the merchants and entrepreneurs". But, Foucault
reminds his readers, his enterprise is 'archaeological' and is concerned
to define "... the conditions on the basis of which it was possible to
conceive of both 'physiocratic' and 'utilitarian' knowledge ..." (l9?0:
200. ). Foucault is interested in the specificity of discursive
formations which cannot be reduced to mere reflections of economic
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relations. Riysiocratic and utilitarian discourse emphasised
the importance of labour in the realisation of wealth; they
disagreed over how this labour should be used. Within this shared
principle of the nature of wealth and the relevance of labour the
problem of idleness had to be solved. The principle was stated
thus by Josiah Child, chairman of the East India Company, in 1670:
"The radical error I esteem to be leaving it to the
care of every parish to maintain their own poor only
£... ^ 'the conflux of poor to a city or nation well
managed, is in effect the conflux of riches to that
city or nation; and therefore the subtle Dutch
receive and relieve, or employ, all that come to
them ..." (hew Discourse of Trade, quoted by Webb
and Webb, 1927:103; and Eden, 1928:31-2).
If, like De Foe, you believed there was work available for all who
wanted it then there might well be advantages in a regulation of the
poor which was also a means of having them work for their keep. In
the compulsory employment of the idle we see that "economy of
suspended rights" spoken of by Foucault (1977:11 )• In. a free market,
()i7)
it was believed, wages would settle at subsistence level; 1' it
was only fluctuations in trade and the supply of labour which caused
wages to rise. Marginal labour, whether reluctant or substandard
could automatically be remunerated at the lowest level possible. In
1676 we find Thomas Firmin instituting employment for 1700 poor people
to work as flax dressers, carders, combers, spinners and weavers.
I4.7» Foucault (1970:222), referring to the work of Cantilion, who
died in 173^4* notes: "A man's labour was ... equal to the value of
the quantity of nourishment necessary to maintain him and his family
for as long as a given task lasted".
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The Webbs describe his establishment as "at once school and factory,
■wholesale warehouse and retail shop" (1927:106-7). Children, from
the age of three, were taught to read and to spin and a number
of "ancients" and "nearly blind" persons were also employed.
Earnings were said to be near subsistence level. Eden describes
Pirmi n1 s establishment as a workhouse and explains something of the
economic pressures at work. Legislation throughout the 17th century
had sought to encourage the domestic manufacture of woollen goods and
protect the home market from imported goods (see Eicholls, 1898:290-
313)» Pirmin, however, still found problems in selling his cloth
manufactured so cheaply in his workhouse because, he believed, "...
hie commodity is brought over so cheap that you will never be able to
sell without much loss" (quoted by Eden, 1928:314). This loss could,
however, be viewed as a national investment in labour: "... it is
better to lose something in a way that will make our poor people
better and skilful, than to suffer them to live in idleness, to their
utter ruin and a greater damage to the Kingdom" (ibid.). That this
was a national and not just a personal investment is evident from
Pirminfs suggestion for an import duty: "... our people will neither
work so hard nor live so cheap as generally the Poor of other places
do" he adds (ibid.). The economy of suspended rightsj then, was to
apply only to the idle.
I48. Andrew Yarranton, in his writings on the employment of the poor-,
drew inspiration from industrial schools observed in German:/ which
trained and employed girls, from the age ox 6, "sometimes 200 in a
single room, for spinning linen yarn" (quoted by Webb and Webb, 1927:
105, footnote^.
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In 1696, the city of Bristol applied to Parliament for a
Local Act under which parishes united for poor relief matters.
Based on the ideas of John Cary, it was intended to build a large
workhouse to employ all the poor and relieve those unable to work.
Its governor was to have power to force all the unemployed poor to
work in the 'house1 and to take in children unable to be maintained
by their parents and there to breed them to labour and principles of
virtue. The Corporation of the Poor thus established is said by
commentators to have been sufficiently successful to have led to
imitation by seven other tovms in 1693, and others later (v/ebb
and Webb, 1927:120-1; Nicholls, 1898:35k)• And yet, as the Webbs
and Eden record, Cary's plan for employing the poor was an economic
failure. The economy of suspended rights was not a mere replication
of the mediaeval plan to control idleness through fear but neither was
it simply a way of utilizing marginal labour. Centra,! to discourse
on labour is the manipulation of its quality in terms of skills and
application. Within the conditions of Classical discourse on wealth,
the fecundity of nature was immense but not infinite and, even within
utilitarian discourse, the satisfaction of changing needs was achieved
through an augmentation of wealth which was primarily a re-ordering of
that body of values. It was Man's particular ability that he could
manipulate wealth. The quality of labour was an important aspect of
24.9. The preamble to 2 and 3 Anne, cap.8 (1703) which allowed for
the erecting of a workhouse in Worcester notes "the good success of
several workhouses lately erected" (see Nicholls, 1898:361j-5) •
f
that manipulation "but it was not the sole or primary condition of
the production of wealth. Cary, then, eventually resorted to
'farming out' the poor to contractors. As the Webbs put it, a
"workhouse test" was effectively established under which relief was
offered at the price either of confinement in the workhouse or of
being farmed out to a contractor empowered to give each worker "a
small gratuity as he thought fit" (1927:120). To attempt to make
a profit out of reluctant or inadequate labour was like taking the
(5l)
proverbial horse to water. x ' Running parallel with such attempt
then, we see the threat of incarceration in the workhouse being used
(<X2)to deter claims to poor relief, x ' and the use of imprisonment
50. This is a. condition which will be associated with the Modem
episteme and the concept of capitalist relations of production in
the next chapter. In this context, see the discussion of Smith and
Ricardo in Chapter 3? section 2, above.
51. As John Sellers put it in 1695: "The best materials for
building, put together without order or method, are little better
than rubbish, until they are regularly placed ... and the same are
mankind until they are regularly and usefully employed" (quoted by
the Webbs, 1927:108). Having failed economically, the Bristol
authorities seem to have turned again to terror. Joshua Gee, in
1728, wrote: "... the magistrates of Bristol have that city under
such excellent regulation that foreign beggars dare not appear ...
for as soon as any of them are espied ... they are taken up and
whipped" (quoted by Eden, 1928:52).
52. Eden writes: "... at Beverley, Oxford and Maidstone a notice
that all applicants for relief would be sent into the Workhouse




Rights, then, were suspended in two ways. Bristol's Act of
incorporation made entry of the idle into a workhouse compulsory
and similar Acts, Worcester's for example, gave guardians of the
poor powers to punish misbehaviour within the workhouse. Secondly,
in certain areas, receipt of Poor Law relief was made conditional on
entry to a workhouse or to being farmed out to contractors. If
profits could not be made, then at lea.st rates could be held down.
Rights were suspended, it was argued, because such Acts offended what
was seen as the spirit of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 which, it
was believed, gave those in need a right to parish assistance. In
1722, 'Knatchbull's Act' consolidated this encroachment by giving'
general authority to parishes to unite to hire or purchase property as
a workhouse and to make entitlement to relief dependent upon entry to
(59)such an establishment.
Most Acts of incorporation were associated with England's major
trading and manufacturing towns and cities which had to cope with
53. The Act of 1703 permitting Worcester' to erect a workhouse
(footnote k9 above) also allowed for rogues, vagabonds, sturdy beggars
and idle or disorderly persons to be held for up to 6 months. In 1711;
10 Anne, cap.l5 gave Norwich corporate status and the power to detain
rogues, vagrants etc. for up to 3 years.
Sh' "... the advantage of the workhouse to the parish does
not arise from what the poor people can do towards their
own subsistence, but from the apprehensions the poor have
of it. These prompt them to exert and do their utmost
to keep themselves off the parish and render them
exceedingly averse to submit to come into the house until
extreme necessity compels them" (Matthew Marryott, writing
in 1725 and quoted by Webb and Webb, 1927:2iiij.).
y
i*
55- 9 Georgl I, cap.7.
96. The City of London, in 16U7; Bristol in 1696; Norwich in 1711.
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the paradox that it was often cheaper to maintain the -unemployed.
and the -unemployable through poor rates than to institute compulsory
employment schemes. This legislation cannot be read simply in terms
of the capitalist class investing in a permanent pool of surplus
labour. Such legislation identifies the powers and duties of
local authorities in relation to those unable or unwilling to work;
it does not empower capital to retain a labour supply. Interestingly,
what can. be identified is a subsidiary economy developing around the
contracting out of the maintenance of the poor on the basis of tenders
(57)
and the conveying of vagabonds to their rightful settlement area. N
As De Foe warned, it was a regulation of the poor that was wanted.
Along with countless schemes to employ the idle (llichoils, 1904;55)»
the Hanoverian succession was accompanied by a wave of repressive
legislation. The Riot Act of 1714 sought to control combinations
gathered together for "tumultuous assembly" and the "disturbance of the
public peace". "An Act for Regulating Journeymen Tailors" (1720), on
the other hand, sought to control combinations designed "to advance . ..
fdQ ^
wages to unreasonable prices and lessen ... usual hours of work", ^
In 1717} the declaration that penalties against robbery, larceny and
other felonies had proved ineffectual was linked to shortages of
57* There is a length;/ discussion of this method of contracting
out the relief of the poor in Webb and Webb (1927:277-313) and of
farming out the work of detaining, conveying and maintaining vagrants,
at pages 383-7*
58. See liichoils (1904:2-3, 10-12). The Act of 1720 was extended
to workers employed in woollen manufactures in 1725 (ibid.:19) and,
effectively, against such combinations in any trade in 174-9 (ibid.:46).
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labour in the American colonies and. the solution to both problems
sought by making commission of the former punishable through penal
servitude for seven years in the latter (Nicholls, I90I4.:U)« Hie
(69)
same period witnessed the infamous Black Acts. v ' The policing
of idleness, then, took a number- of economic and political forms,
working within a knowledge-power configuration which sought to
discriminate in the creation of economic and social order,
(iii) The Natural History of Control
"Natural history did net become possible because men
looked harder and more closely. One might say>
strictly speaking, that the Classical age used its
ingenuity, if not to see as little as possible, at
least to restrict deliberately the area of its
experience" (Foucault, 1970:132).
Within the Classical episteme, the epistemological conditions of
formation of discourse on wealth create an evaluation of labour which
must compete with political apprehension of a national and mobile
workforce. Discourse on wealth is interwoven with political
discourse. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault discusses one of
the more visible reasons for the gradual demise of "the sovereign's
vengeance" 'which had been known to induce a catharsis in which 'the
59* 7b prevent the theft of deer, 1718; to prevent the cutting of
wood and the destruction of fences and hedges, 1719; and consolidated
by further legislation in 1722. See the discussion of these Acts,
and their political and economic background, by E.P. Thompson (1975)•
In addition to the legislation mentioned it also is worth noting that
in 17lU an oath of allegiance was instituted and habeas corpus was
suspended in 171a, 1715 and 1722.
60. Foucault writes: "Wealth is a system of signs that are created,
multiplied, and modified by men; the theory of wealth is linked
throughout to'politics" (1976:205).
mob* took sides against authority and with the offender. Within
the episteme of the l6th century, punishment was a signifying- practice
in which the spectacular and ritualised marking of the body made
visible the nature of the crime. It therefore required a popular
audience in which catharsis would produce a fervour and a violence
which was also a sign of allegiance (Eoucault, 1977:59)• Popular
reaction could, however, turn against authority, particularly if the
offence had, at one time, been what Foucault calls a "tolerated
illegality" (ibid.:82). The Black Acts, for example, interfered with
activities which the English peasant had once seen as his birthright
to gather wood and to use common-land. Thompson writes thai, "It was
community support which made it difficult to effect the arrest of
William Shorter, which led to the fear of rescues when the heavily
guarded convoys of prisoners moved to and from London ..." (1975:191)•
The passing of a law never, of course, guarantees its exercise.
Justices of the Peace may have formed a network of control and local,
governance throughout Britain but allegiances were never certain.
The preamblesof many of the statutes discussed in this chapter tell of
the filures of enforcing legislation seen as unjust or as too harsh.
'Knatchbull' s Act' interfered with the magistracy's power to grant
61. Thompson is discussing the support given to 'The Blacks' by
forest communities. Elsewhere, Thompson writes: "Certain crimes
were outlawed by both codes: a wife or child murderer would be
pelted and execrated on the way to Tyburn. jh. . J But other crimes
were actively condoned by whole communities - coining, poaching, the
evasion of taxes ... or excise or the press-gang. Smuggling
communities lived in a state of constant war with authority ..."
(Thompson, 1977:6U)•
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relief to the poor v 'by making relief dependent upon entry to
a workhouse, in parishes which had incorporated, and by amending 3
William and Mary, cap.11 so that justices could grant relief only if
"oath be made of some reasonable cause for having relief", it having
been refused by poor law officials, and upon examination of these
officials (Nicholls, 190ij.:13). But, as the Webbs recount, many
justices simply refused to abandon their practices and continued to
order 'outdoor relief (1927:281), It is as well to remember, then,
that whilst law provides specific conditions of existence of certain
discursive regularities, the effectivity of these conditions depend,
to a degree, upon the calculations of agents in the processes in
question.
'Knatchbull' s Act' can be seen as a rational reaction to the
apparent success obtained by incorporations in reducing the cost of the
poor by the double action of discouraging claims and setting the
residuum to work. This 'workhouse test' left no (legal) room for
discrimination, however. In pointing to the contrast between
punishment as the sovereign's vengeance and punishment as it came to be
practised in the l8th century, Foucault notes that although both sought
general deterrence, the l8th century jurist sought a finer calculation
of effects:
62. 3 William and Mary, cap.11 (l69l), which made it necessary
for those to be relieved to be registered, rna.de provision for relief
to be ordered by justices for those not so registered.
£
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"example must refer "back to the crime, but in
the most discreet way possible and with the greatest
possible economy indicate the intervention of power"
(1977:93).
An economy of suspended rights which is to balance economic gain
against political danger must have room to discriminate and to
individualise. It must balance inducement with deterrence. In
Discipline and Punish, Foucault suggests that this process of
discrimination, this "semio-technique" in which the penal code is
linked to processes of inddvidualisation, "was sought in the scientific
models of the period. Natural history", he writes, "no doubt offered
the most adequate schema-: the taxonomy of species according to an
uninterrupted gradation" (ibid.:99). The Order of Things spells out
the epistemological configuration of the Classical science of natural
history.
"... natural history has as a condition of its
possibility the common affinity of things and
language with representation; but it exists as a
task only in so far as things and language happen
to be separate. It must therefore reduce this
distance between them so as to bring language as
close as possible to the observing gaze, and the
things observed as close as possible to words" (1970:132).
Natural history is a science of discrimination and class.ifica.tion.
"What characterised an object was what distinguished it from others.
It is important to note, however, that the significance of a
characteristic, and. its classification, depended, upon human intervention.
Natural history, then, supplied a set of major rules in forming the
"code-individualization link" (1977:9U—9)• First, the rule of minimum
quantity which dictated that a penalty must he of just sufficient
a discomfort to outweigh the advantages of the offence; secondly,
the rule of sufficient ideality by which it is observed that it is the
idea of the discomfort of the penalty rather than its corporal reality
which produces its effect; thirdly, and relatedly, a penalty must
influence the decisions of others, it must have "lateral effects";
fourthly, the rule of perfect certainty dictated that each crime must
be associated with a particular penalty; the rule of common truth,
demanded that a crime be completely proven; and finally, the rule of
optimal specification dictated that all offences be "classified and
collected into species from which none of them can escape" (1977:93).
By an Act of 1597» exhaustive list of those to be punished as
(6°)
rogues, vagabonds and sturdy beggars was provided. v J But the three
terms were virtually synonymous and their punishment uniform (iTicholls,
1898:182-3). In 1713, however, a consolidating Act, which again
exhaustively listed those species of idlers to be apprehended as rogues,
vagabonds, sturdy beggars and vagrants, also begins to discriminate.
By the rule of optimal specification, the occasional vagrant must be
discriminated from the recidivist vagrant. The Act therefore seeks to
identify the "dangerous and incorrigible rogue" and those who have
"used the trade or life of a common beggar or vagabond for the space of
two years last past" and provides a harsher punishment. And by the rule
of lateral effects, the penalty as sign must represent the disadvantage
63.
64.
39 Elizabeth I, cap.!;.
13 Amne^ cap.26.
And see footnote 25 above.
201.
of crime to the offender and the retribution it demands for the
society that has been wronged.
"The ideal would be for the convict to appear as a
sort of rentable property: a slave at the service
of all" (ibucault, 1977:109). (65)
In 17W+j a- further Act of consolidation made discrimination
much more explicit. Three distinct classes of offender were
identified: the idle and disorderly; the rogue and vagabond; and
the incorrigible rogue. As the Webbs note, each category was
distinguished from the next according to an ascending scale of
punishment (1927:35^4-) • idle and disorderly person, for example,
had a stability to his life which made him less dangerous and less
difficult to control. The idle and disorderly man merely threatens
to leave his family to the care of the parish or insists upon returning
to a, parish from which he or she has been legally removed. Other idle
and disorderly persons live idly, refusing to work "for the usual
wages", or else go begging from door to door. Such offenders ware to
be committed to a house of correction to carry out hard labour for up
to a month. Rogues and vagabonds, however, actually run away and
leave their families1 care to the parish. Rogues and vagabonds are
decidedly peripatetic: they indulge in fraudulent claims to be
65. The punishment for the dangerous and incorrigible rogue and the
seasoned vagabond was to be bound to any person or body politic or
corporate as an apprentice or servant for employment in Britain or in
the colonies for a period of seven years (Nicholls, 1898:379-80).
66. 17 George II, cap.5«
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gatherers of alms; occupy themselves in street entertainment
(bearwards; minstrels; jugglers; actors); practise the dubious
arts of physiognomy, palmistry, and fortune-telling, or pretend to be
gypsies, to be seeking work for the harvest or to be soldiers or
mariners. finally, any recidivist rogue and vagabond, or anyone
apprehended as a rogue and vagabond who escapes from custody, is to
be punished as an incorrigible rogue. Having been whipped, the rogue
and vagabond was to be given hard labour for up to six months; the
incorrigible rogue for a period not to exceed two yeans and not less
than six months. Should the latter escape from custody or repeat the
offence he was to be transported for seven yeans (Nicholls, 1901+:3^4-—7)•
The rule of optimal specification, then, demands an explicit
codification of offences; that of minimum quantity requires the
penalties to maintain a certain ratio of severity with the offences.
But, in addition, the rule of perfect certainty demands that "... no
crime committed must escape the gaze of those whose task it is to
dispense justice" (fbucault, 1977:96). ^^ The Act of 17^j then,
provided a series of rewards for those apprehending certain classes of
these offenders and presenting them to a justice of the peace, a
practice begun in 1662 by the Settlement and Removal Act (Webb and Webb,
67. Foucault continues: "Nothing' so weakens the machinery of the law
than the hope of going unpunished; how could one establish in the minds
of the public a strict link between the offence and a penalty if it were
affected by a certain coefficient of improbability?" (ibid,). This was
a chronic problem for those framing and executing laws on vagrancy. A
statistician of the period estimated that there were 60,000 vagrant
families in England in 1688 (Webb and Webb, 1927:356. The Webbs
provide details of reports from the 17th and l8th centuries which
complain of tlpe "great increase of rogues ana sturdy beggars", "swarms
of beggars", "overrunning" the highways , "infesting the streets" and so on).
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1927:3^9): "... the machinery of justice must he duplicated by
an organ of surveillance that would work side by side with it ..."
(Poucault, 1977:96). Once punished, the offender was to be passed
on to his or her place of settlement. Hie Act notes that at the
parish of settlement, the offender was to be employed or placed in a
workhouse until employment was obtained and, should the offender refuse
to work, the overseer was to take him before a justice in order that he
could once again be committed to hard labour. Hie rule of sufficient
ideality, then, demands a punishment as a signifying- practice in which
the transparency of the punishment as sign creates an immediate link
with the offence that is signified.
"Behind the offences of the vagabond, there is laziness;
that is what one must fight against. "One will not
succeed by locking beggars up in filthy prisons ...'
they will have to be forced to work. 'The best way
of punishing them is to employ them1..." (poucault, 1977:106).
Hie •economy of suspended rights' interweaves discourse on wealth with
discourse on power and control: such legislation represents what
Poucault calls a knowledge-power relation.
(iv) Discontinuity : Prom Control to 'Discipline' . Discourse on
idleness and poverty was conducted through a natural histor'y of control
during the l8th century. As a period of transition which we can.
describe, teleologically, as the transformation from feudal to capitalist
relations of production, discourse on wealth and labour in the 17th and
l8th centuries worked within epistemological conditions which were
consistent with both the concept of feudal and capitalist relations of
production. ^Labour was an important factor in the realisation of
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wealth and indolence could not be tolerated. It is likely,
however, that it v/as in the growing industrial centres that the
unemployed, unemployable and the vagabond were experienced as a
problem in both financial and socio-political terms. Here there would
be both a glut of casual work to attract marginal labour and dramatic
swings in fortune creating more work in one area and unemployment in
another. The richness of the cities and towns would, of course,
attract both criminal and mendicant activity. Fluctuations in
employment in rural areas, on the other hand, were more likely to be
dictated by the seasons and would vary less from year to year. In that
sense, the rural working population would be more stable, working at
harvest time and at casual labour out of season; growing and nurturing
their own produce; and, when times were 'hard', being maintained from
the rates. 'Knatchbull's Act', then, is unlikely to have been utilized
in rural areas where it would have been unrealistic to expect families
to leave their cottages for seasonal residence in a workhouse.
'Gilbert's Act' of 1782 emphasises the notion that 'Knatchbull's
Act' had been intended as a measure to provide employment and not
punishment. The preamble to 'Gilbert's Act' attributes the 'failure5
of the earlier Act to improper management of workhouses, noting that
"... the poor in many places, instead of finding protection and relief,
have been much oppressed thereby" (quoted by Nicholls, 1901+: 8>10.
Writing of the food riots of the l8th century, Thompson has noted:





"... the final years of the eighteenth century saw a
last desperate effort hy the people to reiiapose the
older moral economy as against the economy of the
free market. In this they received some support from
old-fashioned J.Ps ..." (1977:73)-
Thomas Gilbert was, himself, a 'country gentleman' and a justice of the
peace. The Act of 1782, which he introduced, sought to encourage
parish incorporation but it specifically legislated that the workhouses
controlled by such 'unions' were to be used only for the "indigent by
old age, sickness, or infirmities" who were unable to maintain
themselves. The able-bodied who could not find employment were to be
found work and were to be maintained until such employment was found
190l).:86). According to the Webbs, the Act was not
particularly successful. By 183O, only 67 'unions' of some 92i|
parishes had taken place and nearly all of these were in rural areas
(l927:275). However?, the Act did provide a legitimacy to the practice
of paying 'outdoor' relief, that is, not insisting upon entry to a
workhouse and it very effectively gave the initiative back to the
justices. The Act was, of course, an enabling statute only and its
adoption depended upon the consent of two-thirds of those paying rates
on property valued at £5 or over per annum. But once adopted,
control was taken out of the hands of the much maligned overseers and
church-wardens. Hie justices were empowered, to appoint a guardi.an of
the poor, who was to receive a salary, and a visitor who was to be
"respectable in character and fortune, and fit to be put in nomination




united parishes was under the control of the visitor and, as
Nicholls comments, "... the governing machinery was devised with the
view of excluding the ordinary parochial authorities from taking
part in it, the whole power being placed in the hand of a higgler
class" (l90i|:88). It might "be argaed, then, that 'Gilbert's Act'
was particularly appropriate for rural pariahes and that it
effectively created two methods of relieving poverty. Rural
conditions demanded a flexible system which would allow, in effect,
the seasonal supplementing of wages from the poor rates, a large
proportion of which was undoubtedly paid by the landowners and
capitalist farmers.
"Not wages, but the cost of bread", writes 'Thompson, "was the
most sensitive indicator of popular discontent" (1977:68). In the
middle of the l8th century, the Ihysiocrat Quesnay was writing:
"The daily wage of a labourer is fixed more or less naturally on the
basis of the price of corn" (quoted in Rubin, 1979:122). Competition
for employment kept wages at subsistence level, at least according to
the 'iron law of wages'. Wages are, in fact, the outcome of negotiation
and struggle between employer and employed and mention has already been
made of legal attempts to restrict combinations of craftsmen and
labourers. Such legal conditions, however, merely determine the
parameters within which struggle for wage rates is conducted. The
preamble to 8 George III, cap.17 (17&8), for example, makes it clear
what the dissonance might be between legislative intention and
determinate circumstances when it records that doubts and difficulties
had arisen over prosecutions under the 1720 Act designed to restrict
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combinations of journeymen tailors. It is likely that in the
industrial centres, skilled labour was sufficiently in demand to
keep wages above basic levels. In rural areas, however, subsistence
wages were common. That 'moral economy* mentioned by Thompson
endorsed a traditional relation between landlord and peasant which
guaranteed subsistence in good times and bad. Marx has written:
"As soon as capitalist production takes possession of
agriculture, and in proportion to the extent to which
it does so, the demand for an agricultural labouring
population falls absolutely, while the accumulation of
the capital employed in agriculture advances, without
this repulsion being, as in non-agricultural industries,
compensated by a greater attraction. C «• • 1 But the
constant flow towards the towns pre-supposes, in the
country itself, a constant latent surplus-population
... The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to
the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot
already in the swamp of pauperism" (Marx, 1977; 601-2
and see Thompson, 1977:21(h).
There are, however, no laws dictating the features of this process.
In the British context, the industrial centres experienced a demand
for labour which attracted workers from the agricultural centres. In
terms of the epistemological conditions of relations in the rural areas,
however, it might be said that discourse on labour and wealth dictated
wage rates in line with the price of bread. Corn, the sign of
nature's fecundity ana the 'staff of life', entered into a process of
signification by which wealth ana subsistence might be gauged. The
price of bread was a "sensitive indicator of popular discontent"
precisely because it was linked, in a series of representations, with
wages. It is a mark of the embedded nature of this signification that
'Gilbert's Acijp' facilitated the payment of relief in line with
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fluctuations in the price of bread.
The last decade of the ldth century saw a series of bad
harvests which served to fan the flames of popular discontent. ^^)
In 1795, the price of corn reached such a height that food riots
broke out up and down the country (Thompson, 1977:l56; Webb and Webb,
1927:173)' In 1793s "the Dorsetshire justices formally adopted a
policy for making up wages from the poor rates and, in January 1795»
justices in Buckinghamshire ordered the wages of married men to be
made up to a minimum of six shillings a week, with an additional
shilling for each child (Webb and Webb, 1927:177)- I*1 May 1795s the
now famous meeting of justices occurred in Berkshire in the
Speenhamland district. Those attending, seven clergymen and thirteen
squires, decided against fixing wages by law and adopted a policy
of making up wages from the poor rates according to a. scale relating
family size to the price of a 'gallon loaf (ibid.:177-3)•
One would not wish to deny the variety of concerns in the minds of
those 'country gentlemen' who, in Thompson's words, sought to reimpose
"the old paternalist moral economy" (1977:72). Concern for the health
and welfare of the "poor industrious labourers" there must have been.
69. Thompson notes: "... the agitation of the 1790s, although it
lasted only five years (1792-6) was extraordinarily intensive and
far-reaching. It altered the sub-political attitudes of the people,
affected class alignments, and initiated traditions which stretch
forward into the present century" (1977:111)-
70. In October- 1795» the justices of Bury St Edmunds resolved to
introduce a Bill to Parliament regulating wages by the price of corn
and Arthur Young, following this meeting1, canvassed the views of "the
correspondents of the Board of Agriculture". Most replies, however,
were critical -and even adverse (Webb and Webb, 1927:17^-5)-
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Concern about their potential for retaliatory violence there
undoubtedly was in this period which Thompson has called the period
of formation of the 'working class' (1977:212 and passim).
Interwoven with this discourse on philanthropy and control, however,
is an economic assessment of the value of labour as not merely the
medium through which wealth was realised but the means of its
production. In their Minutes of July 1795} the Hampshire Quarter
Sessions argued for a realistic wage to be paid by the farmer to the
labourer, "requisite to support his frame for its longest continuance
and its best use". The gains from such action were to be manifold:
farmers -
"... would be gaining, not losing by the change; in
short, ... the better support of their labourers is
recommended for their own advantage; immediately, on
a balance of work done, and mediately, by length of
life, sickness prevented, spirit contented, honesty
retained, quiet established, order confirmed and
security gained" (quoted by Webb and Webb, 1927:176).
Ibucault locates the outer-limits which mark the genesis and final
revelation of the pbdern enisteme as the years 1775 and. 1825 but he
situates its epigenesis in the period 1795 to 1800 (1970:22l). It
is Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) which begins, for Foucault,
the discontinuity in the Classical analysis of wealth. In many
respects, Smith's works were an endorsement of the utilitarian
discourse on wealth which provided theoretical and ideological
legitimation for the growing manufacturing sector of the nations.!
economy. Value was expressed through men's needs: labour, as a
measure of this value, was a convention which brought order to the
chaos of human desire. Smith, however, made labour a focus
of attention for wealth could be augmented either by increasing
(71)the productivity of labour or increasing its supply. v '
Despite the 'obvious1 benefits to farmers of a marginal increase
in the wages of farm labourers, the ' Speenhamland System' represents
a failure to pursuade farmers of these gains. Farmers argued that
any emergency increase in wages would be difficult to reduce later when
the emergency was over (Webb and Webb, 1927:173) besides, "...
labourers became saucy if they had resources ..." (Poynter, 1969:xviii).
Hogg has maintained that the defence of the poor laws became the
principle mode "of resistance to the consolidation of industrial
capitalism" (1979:11) and- Thompson has described them as "the
labourer's last 'inheritance'" (1977:21+7) • And. yet, for the country
labourer they were both friend and foe. The original Speenhamland
decision is a model of Classical precision in which taxinomia and
(72)
mathesis are finely interwoven. ' For every rise or fall by one
penny in the price of a gallon loaf, the minimum income of a labourer
was to rise or fall by three pence for himself and by one penny for
each of his dependents. The Gloucestershire magistrates, in their
turn, produced a table of minimum wages for families of ten different
sizes and bread at fifteen different prices (Webb and Webb, 1927:179)
71. Smith's major economic treatise is accordingly divided into
an analysis of the division of labour and the analysis of capital and
productive labour (Rubin, 1979:177)-
72. "The arithmetical precision with which it seemed to regulate
the relief gave almost the glamour of science to its policy of making
up wages cut <^f the rates" (Webb and Webb, 1927:179).
footnote). In effect, wages at the subsistence level were
maintained which avoided irreversible wage increases. Little
wonder that Maithus - defender of the landed interest, opponent
of the Poor Laws - could not "see what else could have been done"
(Vebb and Webb, 1927:179)« Ironically, the system was supported by
Pitt for its encouragement of large families (Bruce, 1961:1l2). As
Pitt argued in 1796, in opposition to Whithread's proposal for a
minimum wages bill, the ancient statutes regulating wages had been
enacted to protect the industry of the country against combinations
of labourers and not to remedy any disproportion between wages and
prices. "Hade, industry, and barter would always find their own
level, and be impeded by regulations which violated their natural
operation" he argued (Nicholls, 1904:118). The ' Speenhamland System'
may, then, have been an endorsement of the farm labourer's right to a
(71)
living wage s ' and it may represent the defiant gesture of tne landed
aristocracy against the encroachment of capitalist relations of
production but it received its sanction from within the confines of a
political econony promulgating a doctrine of laissez faire. In 1796,
the system received formal, legislative endorsement. By 36 George III,
cap. 10, guardians of incorporated parishes were enabled to base their
73- For Mishra, 'Speenhamland' "... represents a sort of high water
mark in the recognition of social right within a pre-modern framework
of welfare" (1977:23)• 'Natural right* within Physiocratic discourse
was the driving force of economic development. For Smith and later
political economists, however, 'natural right' is substituted by
'natural law': it is human nature - homo economicus - which leads to
progress (Rubin, 1979:167-9). In 1830, Nassau Senior was to denounce
the 'allowance system' because it condemned men to pauperism and
slavery. "Qhfe instance the labourer is paid, not according to his
value, but ...'"his wants, he ceases to be a free man" (quoted by Poynter
1969:301*).
allowances to the poor on the price of wheat and by 36 George III,
cap.23, 'Knatchbull's Act' was amended to allow the payment of
•outdoor' relief (Nicholls, 190l|.:ll5). Subsequently, the system
of making up wages spread to most counties in England and Wales,
primarily in rural parishes but also in the woollen manufacturing
Midland counties (Webb and Webb, 1927:l8l).
As Thompson points out, the agricultural labourers formed the
largest group of workers in any industry, even at this moment of
transformation (1977:233)* fhe mobilisation of such a rural workforce
and the policing of idleness clearly rested less on the enforcement
imposed by a penality of the house of industry and the workhouse and
more upon a network of supervision based upon a 'paternalistic- moral
economy' . The rural worker had a sense of fa.talism, Thompson believes,
which inhibited the open expression of grievances (1977:21+9)* If this
period is a moment of discontinuity which was reflected in deep-seated
changes in the natural history of control, in a new political economy
of production and labour, and in a new penality of 'discipline'
(fbucault, 1977:137)} then it is probable that it became most apparent
in the industrialised urban centres.
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault's discourse noticeably 'frees'
itself from his theoretical protocol of historical analysis. His
earlier discussions of epistemei and discontinuity struggled to control
a latent Weberian teleology of rationalisation as historical progress.
In Discipline and Punish, fbucault develops an essentialist and
ambiguous concept of 'discipline' as the outcome of a cumulative history
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of penality ^ ' (Pine, 1979b). The excavation of discourses on
wealth, labour, and the policing of idleness offered in this chapter
has attempted to remain true to the protocol set down in earlier
chapters. The definition and supervision of a national labour force,
and the consequent supervision of those unable or unwilling to work,
has been examined, within the confines of the concept of feudal
relations of production. In particular, the epistemological
conditions of existence of discourses on labour, wealth and idleness
have been examined and their specificity and effectivity within the
determinate social formation of the British national economy have been
illustrated. Paul Hirst has suggested that Foucault's attempt to fuse
the aims, form, content and effectivity of the various 'disciplines',
rests upon "two dubious devices: the model of the Panopticon as the
essence of all disciplinary power, and the 'body' an the common
referent of all disciplinary surveillance and action" (1980:91).
That Foucault should attempt to offer what amounts to another 'one-
dimensional man' thesis is, perhaps, even more disappointing than the
weak foundation on which it is built. Foucault's concept of the
episteme, in fact, merely defined the form within which 'the order of
things' could be arranged. In arguing that discourse on language,
7I4. For example, in discussing "models of punitive imprisonment"
he notes that the Rasphuis of Amsterdam formed the historical "....link
between the theory, so characteristic of the sixteenth century, of a
pedagogical and spiritual transformation of individuals .... and the
penitentiary techniques conceived in the second half of the eighteenth,
century" (1977:120-1). Later, when discussing "the utilitarian
rationalization of detail" we learn that '"The classical age did not
initiate it; rather it accelerated it, changed its scale, gave it
precise instruments ..." (ibid.:139;emphasis added).
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living things, and wealth in the l8th century had the same
epistemological conditions of existence, Foucault was not saying,
ipso facto, that they shared a common identity. Unfortunately, this
is precisely what he does argue in Discipline and Punish. Ignoring
his own injunction to see power not simply in negative terms but also
as that which "produces reality" (1977:23, 19U)» Foucault transforms
his essentially neutral dualism of "knowledge-power" into an
insidious 'rational-manipulation1. Much as Luke's 'third-dimension'
of power, Foucault's "micro-physics of power" permeates every facet of
existence "right down into the depths of society" (1977:27). Thus,
as Bob Fine has noted, Pcucault does not write a critique of "a
determinate form of social organisation "but of all rational
organisation (l979h:88). As such, Discipline and Parish, like
Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man "breeds a deep pessimism about the
possibilities of historical transformation" (Fine, ibid.:9^-).
What we can best learn from Disc inline and Punish is that there are
"... innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each
of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at
least temporary inversion of ... power relations" (1977:27). It is
clear from the few direct references made by Foucault in.Discipline and
Punish that the emergence of capitalist relations of production was of
relevance to his studies (1977:I°r example; and see 1970:3U5)•
In allowing the concepts of episteme and 'discipline' to hegemonise
discourse Foucault, like Althusser, portrays the social formation as a
structured totality and offers a functionalist interpretation 'whose
terms demand both that the structure determine the nature of social
i
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relations and that social relations be an essentia.! condition of
(75)existence of the structure. v J However, whereas Althusser's
target of analysis is capitalist relations of production, Foucault
appears to be dealing with an hypostasized notion of power.
Nevertheless, ultimately boHi encourage a conspiratorial view of the
consolidation of capitalist social relations. w ' It will be
suggested in this thesis that the specificity of Foucault's discourse
on penology can be rescued from the essentialism with which it is
intertwined and brought in line with the protocol of The Order of Things.
That the industrialisation of a national economy requires a more
carefully regimented workforce than is necessary under feudal relations
is something of a truism. Thompson® s The Making of the English
Working Class discusses just such a process and his paper on the
discipline of time (1967) is acknowledged as a major contribution to
such a debate. Foucault's Discipline and Punish appeals to radical
75. Foucault writes that "Discipline makes possible the operation of
a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism ..." (1977:
177) and that "Discipline 'makes® individuals; it is the specific
technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as
instruments of its exercise" (1977:170). And see Dews, 1979:152; the
parallels with Althusser's notion of "interpellation" are clear.
76. This is apparent in the purposive vocabulary used by Foucault
who describes the "new micro-physics" of power as "small acts of
cunning" which adopt "a tactic" characterised by "attentive
'malevolence1 that turns everything to account" (1977:139). This
vocabulary which nevertheless fails to identify the acting subject is
often adopted by followers of Foucault; see for example Dews'
discussion of the "Nouvelle Fhilosophie" (1979); Garland®s
discussion of the "task" of the disciplines who must "... ensure that
the ... threat posed to the system of class domination by the conditions
of 'advanced democracy® [_areJ ... counterbalanced by an equally
extensive and thoroughgoing regulation and discipline" (l9Sl:37).
{
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theorists interested in social control under 'capitalist' relations.
Ibucau.lt's 'disciplines', however, are not mere agencies of social
control; like Althusser's ideological state apparatuses, they are
involved in the formation of disciplined subjects (Dews, 1979:152).
This insidious progress of rational despotism is made possible in
Foucault's discourse by ignoring a basic tenet of his earlier work
which warned against 'placing the present at the origin' .
"Disciplinary methods", then, are said to have been long in existence,
becoming "general formulas of domination" only by the 17th and l8th
centuries (1977:137)- Throughout his text, Foucault elides any
distinction between 'the disciplines' (what, in earlier works, he
termed discursive regularities) and 'discipline' and, consequently,
"disciplinary methods" are allowed to play the role of pre-history
for 'the disciplines'. What is important about Foucault's
discussion of 'discipline' is the notion that "... there can be no
system of 'discipline' .... without definite forms of subjectivication"
(Hirst, 1980:90). As Foucault was at pains to show in The Order of
Things, the Modern episteme is characterised by a radically new mode of
conceptualisation of Man. This represents a definite and distinct
form of subjectivication to which must correspond a definite and
distinct form of 'discipline'. Foucault's excursion into materialism
leads him to over-emphasise the body "as the common referent of all
disciplinary surveillance and action" (Hirst, 1980:91). That
"economy of suspended rights", which sought a solution to idleness
through confinement and enforced productive labour, must be seen as a
solution conditioned, in part, by epistemological considerations
r
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appropriate to an age in which capitalist relations of production
had to coexist with feudal relations within the social formation.
Whilst the control of idleness in the 17th and l8th centuries
required a subjectivication in terms of a natural history of
classification and manipulation of 'bodies', it did not define
constitutive subjects. This is a, configuration which shall be
considered in the remaining chapters of this thesis, working within
the concepts of capitalist relations of production and the Modern
episteme.
Some commentators have argued somewhat vacuously that Foucauit's
use of Bentham's notion of panopticism is misguided simply because his
plan was never adopted by the British government. But, as Dews notes,
the Panopticon symbolised for Foucault the transformation in the
modality of social control consequent upon industrial capitalism (1979:
l5l). The Panopticon represents the outer-limits of a new
discursive formation: a science of welfare which is also a science of
Man as the primary producer of wealth.
]+. Summarising Discussion
The concept of relations of production and national economy require
allied conceptions of labour and national workforce along with their
political, legal, ideological (etc. conditions of existence. A concept
such as feudal relations of production does not determine the form of
its conditions of existence nor their effectivity. These general
concepts have been used as the basis for an analysis of discourses on
wealth, labour- and the control and supervision of idleness ana, in
f
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particular, the epistemological conditions of formation of these
discourses have been considered. Whilst it is argued that discourses
on wealth and on labour and idleness provide certain of the conditions
of existence of feudal relations in the determinate formation of the
British national economy, the specificity and particular effectivity
of these discourses have been emphasised. Such discourses are not to
be relegated as merely determined by the logic of the 'mode of
production' and they do not guarantee the reproduction of that economic
system. . v
In examining the British national economy from the l6th century
it has to be acknowledged with Hindess and Birst that "The concept of
the result can serve to specify, at most, what effects must have been
produced if this given result is indeed to appear" (1975:287). But
it has not been the intention here to produce a general theory of
socio-economic development. Specific pieces of legislation and bodies
of discourse have been used to illustrate the argument against such
general theories.
^ /v /' 6 ' > < '
/
Some attempt has been made to coincide Foucault's epistemei with
feudal relations of production and the period of transition, in the
British context, from feudad to capitalist relations. It has been
suggested that the concept of the episteme can be used to problematise
the epistemological conditions of formation of discourses within
determinate relations of production. Ibr example, the Mediaeval
episteme casts knowledge as the reading of signs which identify the
series of similarities by which the world is formed. That world is
formed by God,- Man's only task is to read through the sign. The world,
i
219.
then, is unchangeable and to offend its God-given laws is to offend
against Man and God. The Classical episteme, on the other hand,
casts knowledge as the art of discrimination. Identities and
differences are the signs by which Man orders the world. This
contrast can be illustrated by considering the list of 23 different
(77 )varieties of vagabond described by Thomas Harman in 1566 w '' and
the list of 2,300 men, women and children recorded in 1570 in a survey
of the poor of Norwich (Pound, 1975:26, 100). Barman's list,
prepared so "... that thereby the Justices and Sheriffs may in their
circuits be more vigilant to punish these malefactors ..." (l87i:iv),
provides descriptions of the clothing, demeanour, practices and
secret language of the various kinds of vagabonds, along with a list
of names of approximately 150 members of this "unruly rabbiement of
rascals" (many of whom are to be recognised by their stigmata - "Harry
Smith, he drivelleth when he speaketh"; "John Eumfrey with the lame
hand"; "John Stradiing with the shaking head"; "John Crew with one
arm"; "John Brown a great stammerer"; "'Thomas Smith with the scalded
skin"). The so-called Norwich census also provides names of the poor,
their ages and occupations. Some tiro hundred years later, we find the
central government attempting to produce accurate statistics about the
poor rates, the number receiving relief and the workhouse
accommodation. These returns, sought by Acts of Parliament in 1776
and again in 1786 (both Bills were introduced by Thomas Gilbert), were
no longer attempting to cope with the world by assimilating the variety
of its species of poor and idle into a comprehensive, yet infinite
list; rather:they are attempts to arm the government with sufficient
77« See footnote 18 above.
and accurate information so that it might, as the preamble puts
it, "... enable parliament to judge of proper remedies to redress ...
grievances " (notably "the great and increasing expenses of
maintaining and providing for the poor") (Nicholls, 190l±:93). A
further Act of 1786 sou^it details "of all charitable donations for
the benefit of poor persons" (Nicholls, 190k:9S)- Whereas discourse
on labour and idleness in the l6th century sought to police the
workforce in terms of traditional and eternal categories, discourse
in the 17th and l8th centuries categorised in order to police.
Legislation, then, turned from brutal, suppression towards an "economy
of suspended rights".
In the Middle Ages, charity was the symbol of a Christian's love
for fellow man and provided a source of relief for the poor which was
given a level of guarantee by the churchwarden who policed the moral
standing of parishioners and ensured that these who were able gave
generously (Webb and Webb, 1927:7) • Those sinners who wandered idly
and dangerously around the countryside had a status whose inner nature
had to be registered by surface signs: 'F1 for falsehood; 'V* for
vagabond. The policing of idleness is the art of distinguishing the
legitimate traveller and the impotent from the idle beggar and the
imposter. In the l6th century, this was the art of reading through
the signs - "Thoma,s Smith with the scalded skin". Harman warned his
readers of the many tricks practised by vagabonds to feign disability,
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sickness, madness and ill-fortune. 1 By the 17th century,
however, the policing of idleness adopts a different mode of
subjectivication as an art of classification and discrimination.
An "economy of suspended rights" identifies indolence in economic
as well as political terms. Idleness is policed to turn marginal
labour into wealth through enforced employment. As a natural history
of control, legal rules enter into a process of signification which
classify degrees of recidivism and register the power of the law.
Discourses on wealth and labour, which had overlapped within the
Classical episteme, finally merge under the epistemological terms of
the Modern episteme.
"All labour gives a result which, in one form or
another, is applied to a further labour whose cost
it defines; acid this new labour participates in
turn in the creation of a value, etc. This
accumulation in series breaks for the first time
with the reciprocal determinations that were the sole
active factors in the Classical analysis of wealth.
It introduces, by its very existence, the possibility
of a continuous historical time ... 'wealth', instead
of being distributed over a table and thereby
constituting a system of equivalences, is organised
and accumulated in a temporal sequence: all value
is determined, not according to the instruments that
permit its analysis, but according to the conditions
of production ..." (Poucault, 1970:255-6).
78. A l6th/l7th century ballad illustrates the common image of the
artful vagabond:
"I am a lusty beggar,
And live by others giving:
I scorn to work,
But by the highway lurk,
And beg to get my living".
"The Cunning Northern Beggar", reprinted in Charles Hindley's The Old
Book Collector's Miscellany, Vol.1 (Reeves and Turner, London, 1871).
As Foucault was later to observe, the close of the Classical age
witnessed "the reversal of the political axis of individualisation"
(1977s192). Under feudal relations "... individualisation is
greatest where sovereignty is exercised and in the higher echelons
of power" (ibid.). Thus, rogues and vagabonds were known through the
signifying system of their practices and the marks branded upon their
(79)
bodies. w ' Even in the Classical transition, individualisation of
the idle was limited to "the process of taxonomic classification
according to a system of representations (identities and contrasts).
It is the mark of a "disciplinary regime", Foucault maintains, that
power is anonymous whilst those on whom it is exercised are
specifically individualised (1977=192-3). But the individualisation
of the Ibdern episteme is not simply a more subtle form of
discrimination and classification: the epist-emological conditions of
existence of such discourse have changed. Man is not merely a body-
to be categorised and manipulated but rather a complex "empirico-
transcendental doublet" (Foucault, 1970=322). A being with a history
and a determinable future: an organism which may facilitate a finer
technology- of control but which also threatens an anarchy of self-
development .
79- Those named by Harman, one might say, had attained a certain
notoriety (Harrison estimated 1.0,000 beggars and vagabonds in 15775
Pound, 1975:27). It was this very possibility that those who
practised "popular illegalities" could achieve fame and identity
(individualisation) that contributed to the reform movement against
harsh and spectacular punishments, Foucault argues in Disci pline
and Punish (and see Thompson, 1977=614.).
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The closing years of the l8th century bear witness, through
discourse on poverty and idleness, to a conflation of
discrimination and individualisation through the art of the
examination. In 1783? "the Shrewsbury Local Act established
guardians of the poor and a House of Industry with a farm, corn mill
and woollen manufactory with the aim of furnishing "employment for the
poor [to J compel them to earn their own support". Most importantly,
however, the directors of the system believed, we are told, that
"indiscriminate allowances and indiscriminate confinement to a Poor
House are equally absurd and injurious ... We discriminate. This is
the grand hinge upon which every plan of parochial reform ought to
turn". One aspect of such discrimination was "the proper examination
of each respective case before a weekly board of respectable
Directors ..." (quotations .from Isaac Wood's descriptions given in
Webb and Webb, 1927:123-4)• We should, however, note two things.
First, such examination has specific legal as well as epistemological
conditions of existence. Secondly, these conditions did not guarantee
the effectivity of that process. In 1801, its enthusiastic promoter
Isaac Wood died and support for the system died with him in Shrewsbury.
80. Ibucault writes of "the examination":
"The examination combines the techniques of an observing
hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement . [_ . . • 1
It establishes over individuals a visibility through
which one differentiates them and judges them .
In it are combined the ceremony of power and the form
of the experiment, the deployment of force and the
establishment of truth. [_•••!. The superimposition
of the power relations and knowledge relations assumes




Welfare, 'Discipline' and. Capitalist Relations of
Production ; Towards a Science of Welfare
1. Introduction
The Elizabethan Poor Law reflects a concern for the position of
those "having no means to maintain them, and who use no ordinary and
daily trade of life to get their living by". In the same year as
i+3 Elizabeth I, cap.2 (l60l) the Statute of Charitable Uses gave
legal recognition to those charitable bequests made from
philanthropic rather than purely religious motives. Such legislation
illustrates the form and content, in a specific instance, of the legal
conditions of what has been generally termed, in this thesis, welfare
discourse. It has been argued that "... the creation of a 'labour
force5 always implied as a counterpart of the regulation of labour the
regulation of idleness and poverty" (Cutler et al., 1978:250). The
policing of idleness has legal, cultural, political, etc. conditions of
existence. The Elizabethan Poor Lav; is an instance of legal conditions
within the theoretical concept of the national economy of Britain and
its feudal relations of production. Such legal conditions, and the
epistemological conditions of their formation discussed in the previous
chapter, have not been identified as signposts for the developing
capitalist relations of the British Welfare State.
For those intent upon tracing the 'source' of the Welfare State
there are countless clues to be found. In 1?86, a Mr Acland proposed
1. k3 Elizabeth I, cap.h. Owen mentions the statute en -passant
(1965:70-1)' and refers his readers to Jordan's Philanthropy in England,
lli&0-l660 (1959) Tor greater detail.
225.
a scheme of national insurance which was to afford: a guaranteed
income to those who were subsequently unable to work because of
sickness; a child allowance; and an old age pension (Eden, 1928:
75-7). In similar vein, Thomas Paine suggested a graduated income
tax which would make the poor laws obsolete and would provide family
allowances, public education, maternity benefits, pensions, and
funeral expenses (Thompson, 1977:101-2). Whilst not wishing to
deny that welfare discourse registers concern for the plight of the
•less fortunate', within the terms of the concepts of social
formation and relations of production emphasis is placed upon the
relationship between welfare disccurse and the policing of idleness.
Concern for the 'less fortunate' has specifiable conditions of
existence within determinate relations of production. It is only
with the epistemological conditions which portray Man as both subject
and object of knowledge that we find a science of welfare derived from
the human sciences of Man and Society. It is within such a matrix
of concepts that one must search for the 'birth' cf social work
discourse, for example. In this chapter, certain of the conditions
of formation of a science of welfare within capitalist relations of
production are to be discussed whilst Chapter 6 will illustrate the
theoretical view, emphasised in this thesis, that such conditions
cannot determine the trajectories cf all discourses on welfare. In
Chapter 7> those lines of continuity defining the discursive formation
which we know as social work and which will be traced in this and the
next chapter, will be taken up and examined for their relevance to a




social formation and its relations of production.
In the previous chapter, that body of legislation which is
the source of both liberal and radical historiography on the
Welfare State, was examined within the terms of the concepts of
national economy; feudal relations of production; and the
transition from feudal to capitalist relations. It was suggested
that discourse on wealth, labour and idleness provided certain of
the conditions of existence of' the relations of production within
the British national economy, for example, by providing ideological,
legal or theoretical legitimation of the 'effective separation' of
direct producers from control of the means and conditions of
production. In no sense, however, was it argued that such
legislation guaranteed the reproduction of the relations of production
or that 'the state' was the mere executive of the 'ruling class1.
5he state is neither monolithic nor omnipresent; it is a concept
consisting of "... a complex of differentiated agencies of decision"
(Hirst, 1980:66). Statutes have their own conditions of existence,
amongst which mi^it be numbered class struggle between economic
(2)
agents and the balance of power within the legislative agency. '
In addition, statutes do not guarantee the rules of conduct they seek
to define, regardless of the agencies and machinery of enforcement
2. Parliamentary 'representatives' cannot simply be treated as
personifications of the interests of economic agents. Members of
Parliament, democratically elected or not, must be seen as agents of
decision with specific conditions of calculation. Although economic
conditions will form an element of greater or lesser influence in





The previous chapter sought to analyse the moment of transition of
the British national economy from feudal to capitalist relations in
terms of epistemologicai conditions of formation of discourse on wealth,
labour and idleness. Differences in certain conditions, such as the
requirement of a pool of labour to meet seasonal demands in the rural
areas and the increasing demand for labour in the industrial centres
coupled with the greater danger of crime and unrest from large
accumulations of vagabonds and unemployed workers generally, can be seen
to have been compatible with the epistemological conditions defined by
the concept of the Classical episteme but to have resulted in different
forms of control: a paternalistic 'moral economy' in the countryside
(the 'allowance system') and an "economy of suspended rights" in the
industrial centres (enforced labour; re-settlement of paupers). The
present chapter seeks to coincide the concept of the Modern episteme and
certain of the conditions of existence of discourse on welfare within
capitalist relations of production in the British national economy.
Lines of discursive continuity will be traced in the attempt to link
discourse on welfare and idleness from the early 19th century with
contemporary social work discourse.
3. Hirst notes that "... state apparatuses and practices are not
reducible in their practices and effects to law or in their action to
the limits of their own legal form. Public law constructs
administration and state activity as a realm of differential agencies
of decision, agencies that it purports to define and regulate. But it
cannot subsume them, precisely because they must be assigned a definite
autonomy of action in order that the state's activities be organized"
(1980:o8). Perhaps the most obvious example of the failure of
legislation to guarantee enforcement, in the context of this thesis, is
the apparent failure of the law to prevent vagabondage.
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2* The Growth of the State
The exponential growth of the state in the 19th century,
following centuries of relative insignificance, is a widely accepted
phenomenon among historians. The more conservative historian sees
such growth as ad hoc; the Whiggish see it as the triumph of the
rational statemen and administrators of the day; the Marxist sees
it, ambiguously, as both the tightening of the hold of capital over
labour and as a response to 'working class' pressure for social
change. Eiilip Corrigan is keen to emphasise the complexity of
what he calls "state formation" but his various writings, in the
final analysis, amount to a consideration of how the "ruling class"
("an alliance, a set of groups unified at a strategic level", 1980;l4l)
has induced conformity through "moral regulation" (Corrigan, January
1977; Corrigan and Corrigan, 1979)* A phrase such as "state
formation" does, in fact, suggest either an over-allegiance to
voluntarism - the state is the result of the efforts of bourgeois
reformers such as Bentham and Chadwick, or to an evolutionary
historiography in which the state is shown to have been forming from
some unidentified origin lost in history (Corrigan often begins with what
he sees as a revolution in government in 1530)-
h. Corrigan's BiD thesis provides an exhaustive review of works
on the so-called 'revolution in government' and of Marx and Engels,
Weber, and Spencer on the role of the state. Central to the thesis,
however, is the study of four "state servants" - Eorner, Kay,
Tremenheere and Chadwick; there is also a chapter on the "Influence
of T.H. Green on Liberal Reforms" and Appendix II is about S.T.
Coleridge. In that sense it has its own flavour of 'VJhiggishness':





Habermas provides a clearer statement of the classical
Marxist view of the role of the state in what he terms a "liberal-
capitalist" social formation (1976). Once the capitalist mode of
production has been established, Habermas argues, "the exercise of
the state's power ... can be limited" to: the protection of commerce
through the machinery of justice; the avoidance of self-destructive
side-effects (e.g. regulation of the hours of work); the
satisfaction of the "prerequisites of production" (e.g. transport;
communications); and the administration of the legal requirements of
capitalism (e.g. tax law; banking) (1976:21). But it is surely
perverse to describe such state functions as "limited". fhey can, in
fact, cover the entire field of activity of the so-called
interventionist state, including what Habermas later calls "market-
replacing actions of the state" (1976:53)*
Habermas utilizes the standard Marxist thesis that under feudal
relations the separation of the direct producers from the means of
production and the distribution of the product is effected through. a
(6^
process of legitimation which is "other than economic". 1 ' (Habermas,
1976:19-20). As Cutler et al have suggested, "... the contrast Marx
5. By accepting the 'bourgeois' ideological view that the state in
early capitalism was merely the watchman and the neutral arbiter-,
credibility is given to the conspiratorial view that every instance of
state 'intervention' (the improvement of working conditions; to provide
assistance to the sick, disabled and aged; to support 'lame-ducks' in
industry) is really a counter-balancing of dysfunctions which must
inevitably favour capital and the 'ruling class' .




draws, which has been taken over "by a majority of Marxist
historians ... is seriously inadequate" (i977i2lf5)« Habermas
wants to contrast the traditional "world-views and ideologies" which
he sees legitimating the class structure of "traditional social
formations" with the relative separation of the "economic system
from the political" under capitalism (197^:21). In effect,
Habermas endorses the view that legitimation of the class structure
under capitalism is achieved through the institution of the market
system which is "founded on the justice inherent in the exchange of
equivalents" (ibid.:22). This enables Habermas to build his theory
of potential legitimation crises on the tendency for "market-
replacing actions of the state" to negate the separation of the economic
and political systems in "advanced capitalism" (ibid.:33 et seq.).
Habermas, however, is committed to an evolutionary view of social
development.
There is nothing in the concept of feudal relations of production
which requires the relationship between landlord and peasant to be one
of total political domination. First and foremost the relationship
is an economic one based upon the effective possession of, separation
from, an integral means of production, land. Nor does this
relationship have to be seen as one of simple exploitation. Landlords,
in fact, can play essential roles in production both by using
organisational skills and by utilizing capital for large-scale
enterprises such as land irrigation (Cutler et al., 1977s2I4.S) .
Conversely, it should be apparent that the concept of capitalist
relations of production cannot be defined essentially in terms of its
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basis in economic equality (real or otherwise). Capitalist
relations imply the effective possession by capitals of essential
means of production (raw materials; machinery; factories;
hotels) and the effective separation of workers from such commodities.
Workers sell their labour as a commodity to capitals. This clearly
implies a degree of state involvement in the legal definition and
supervision of contracts between capitals and between capitals and
labour, both at the moments of'production and commodity distribution.
Y/e must take care, then, not to under-estimate the degree of direct
involvement of the state in the definition of economic and social
relationships within feudal relations and capitalist relations of
production. A national economy requires an "instance of regulation"
which has acknowledged authority to produce and enforce a body of
public law.
Roberts has suggested that up to 1833, the central administration
did little beyond "... administer justice, collect taxes, and defend
the realm". Its influence on -the individual was minimal, continues
Roberts, showing "... little concern for his well-being. It failed
even to supervise these local authorities and voluntary institutions
that did concern themselves with the individual's welfare" (1969:13)*
The previous chapter sought to illustrate the many instances when
state regulation through public law was very apparent ana drew
attention to the Commission created by Charles I to supervise the
enforcement of those statutes which policed idleness. It is interesting
to note that this Commission sought merely to enforce existing
regulations by. ensuring that those who neglected their duties were
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punished as the law provided. This may, in part, explain the
failure of the Commission. Although time and again statutes
blamed those charged with the execution of such laws for their
failure, the powers and duties of agents such as overseers were
defined by these statutes. Justices of the peace were usually given
general powers to supervise the administration of the Poor Laws and
laws controlling vagabondage. But it must be remembered that in
their own localities such magistrates were usually the most economically
and politically influential residents. Local power was granted, but
it was also expected. What must be considered, then, is not simply
the degree of central supervision envisaged by those who sought it but
the conditions under which it was being suggested.
3. The Modern Bpisteme
"... since Kant science has no longer been seriously
comprehended by philosophy f..-l
... the philosophy of science that has emerged ...
as the heir of the theory of knowledge is
methodology pursued with a scientistic self-
understanding of the sciences. ' Scierotism' means
science's ... conviction that we can. no longer
understand science as one form of possible knowledge,
but rather mast identify knowledge with science"
(Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 1978:3_U)-
"Modern thought, then, will contest even its own
metaphysical impulses, ana show that reflections upon
life, labour, and language, in so far as they have
value as analytics of finituae, express the end of
metaphysics: the philosophy of life denounces
metaphysics as a veil of illusion, that of labour
denounces it as an alienated form of thought and an
ideology, that of language as a cultural episode"
(ibucault, The Order of Things. 1970:317)-
r
233.
Modern thought turned those series of signs which Classical
discourse took 3.s representations of identities and differences
into superficial surface features. Knowledge no longer consisted
of the art of taxonomic classification on the basis of shared
characteristics (for example, the degree of recidivism of the
vagabond) but required analysis of organic structures and internal
relations. With the end of the l8th and the beginning of the 19th
centuries changes can be identified in the discourse on wealth, poverty,
welfare and idleness. We can begin to see changes in that
relationship which Fcucault has called "power-knowledge relations".
The demand for a centralised control of the Poor Laws, which was
an important feature of the 183I1 Report of the Royal Commission, was
clearly seen as the most efficient way of controlling 'undesirable1
local deviations from the 'pure' intentions of the original
Elizabethan legislation, particularly the 'pernicious* use of poor
rates in aid of wages. Nassau Senior, an eminent member of the Royal
Commission, was very open about the benefits of the Act of I83I1. and its
control of the 'excesses' of the magistrates. In a letter to George
Yilliers in 1835 he wrote:
"... our domestic revolution is going on in the most
peaceful and prosperous way possible. The Poor Law
Act is covering England and Wales with a network of
small aristocracies, in which the guardians elected
by owners and rate-payers are succeeding to the power
and influence of the magistrates" (quoted by Lubenow,
1971=39).
In contrast to the Commission created by Charles I, the Royal Commission
of 1832-i; utilized a quite different body of knowledge. The Royal
23k-
Commissioners did not obediently respond to the dominating views of
any one 'class' or 'interest' and it can be argaed that their emphasis
upon central government control was seen as an unnecessary encroachment
by 'capitalists', labourers and Tories alike (McCord, 1976:99). Eor
Chadwick, the important features of the 'New Poor Law' were its bases
/r.\ /O \
in democracy ^ ' and empirical knowledge. ^ This power-knowledge
relation, Chadwick felt, would "... be found to be the best protection
of minorities, and the independent labourer's best safeguard against
any tampering with the labour market" (1S36:530-1) • Throughout his
article, Chadwick emphasised to his predominantly ''Whig' readership the
empiriceh evidence gathered by the Commissioners which, he argued,
refuted a number of existing "principal doctrines" (ibid. :l+9l).
Initially, the Commissioners had felt that the smaller the area of
administration the greater the control over ascertaining and meeting
particular and individual needs. In fact, enquiry had shown that
(9)
proximity was no guarantor of an efficient examination. Local
7. "The power of the Central Board", wrote Chadwick in 1836, "... is
the TKDWer of the public at large, the power of an instructed democracy,
as against all local oligarchies or petty and adverse interests". (Erom
an article in the 'Whig' periodical - Edinburgh Review, reprinted in
Coats, 1973:530 and cited hereafter as Chadwick, 1836).
8. Burton and Garden write that "The concerns, of what is in many ways
the Chadwickian era, are to institutionalise new and efficient state
apparatuses notwithstanding the prevalence of the doctrine of economic
laissez-faire. The apparatuses were to be founded upon empirical
knowledge ..." (l979:U).
9. "But when instances are now of frequent occurrence where a pauper
is found to have saved large sums of money, without the fact having been
known or suspected by the members of the same family ... how should a
neighbour, much less a parish officer, be expected to have a better
knowledge (Report of the 1832 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws,
quoted by Chaawick, 1836:509).
discretion was, perhaps "unavoidable almost" in the "application
of the rules to the hundreds of ever-varying cases of the paupers".
Such discretion was, however, founded merely "on impressions derived
from a few individual cases". A truer picture could only be
gained "by extensive induction, or general rules derived from large
classes of cases, which the annual officer has no means of observing"
(Chadwick, 1836:529? 532). As Foucault writes in contrasting the
form of Classical, knowledge with that of the Modern age:
"Henceforth, the table, ceasing to be the ground of
all possible orders, the matrix of all relations,
the form in accordance with which all beings are
distributed in their singular individuality, forms
no more than a thin surface film of knowledge ...
The visible order, with its permanent grid of
distinctions, is now only a superficial glitter
above an abyss" (Foucault, 1970:251).
Chadwick sought, through the social survey, to direct attention
not simply at the characteristics of the individual pauper but
towards the pauper class. Knowledge did not seek to identify*
characteristics in order to arrange a taxonomy, rather it analysed
pauperdom as an organic whole with a density and structure which
described a relationship between its elements and the functions they
performed. Amongst those "principal doctrines" refuted by this form
of knowledge, argued Chadwick, was the "aphorism" - 'poverty is the
10. "How, admitting the general proposition or principle, that a, man.
will seek that condition which is the most pleasurable to him;
yet without staying to enquire how large a mass of facts are included
under [_ thi s proposition we may ask how extensive an enquiry do
it not require to determine what is the relative condition of a whole
class of the people ..." (Chadwick, 1836:1490).
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mother of crime'. Not "want" but misconduct ("indolence,
inattention or dissipation, or habitual drunkenness, or association
with bad females"), was the cause of crime (1836:14.93) - Similarly,
bankruptcy was not the result of the vicissitudes of trade and the
burden of taxation, but, rather, personal failing (reckless
speculations; "neglected book-keeping"; trading beyond means;
allowing expenses to far exceed expected profits) (ibid.:I4.9U) •
Even old age could no longer be taken as a competent representation
of innocent need. As Ghadwick makes clear, "helplessness" does not
automatically signify "desert". Sympathy stands as "an obstacle to
the ascertainment of truth". Aged inmates of workhouses, far from
being "... the parents of meritorious and industrious labourers ..."
were found to be "... the parents of the worst part of the population,
of the felon, the prostitute, the poacher, or the smuggler ..."
(ibid. :1|95) • On the basis of this kind of evidence, Ghadwick reminds
his readers, the Commissioners were encouraged to find that most cf
the pauperism studied arose from "fraud, indolence, or improvidence1*.
Eloquently, the Commissioners recorded that pauperism was not "an
organic disease". Given the ease with which public assistance could
be obtained, the Commissioners were surprised "at the number of those
who have escaped the contagion". Hie diagnosis then: "the disease
was ... not disease of structure, but disorder of the functions"
(quoted by Chadwick, 1836:1498).
*
The Royal Commission of 1832 marks the forceful arrival of the
Modern episteme although, as already discussed, its effects can be
seen in earlier discourse on poverty and idleness. It was clearly the
237.
r
most exhaustive enquiry of its kind at that time. But the aim of
thoroughness was not the Classical aim of finally completing the
table of classification of pauperism and its relief, bat the Modern
aim of treating the Poor Laws as a system. The organ was found
not to be suffering a terminal illness but merely to be in need of a
strengthening tonic.
To refuse the explanatory structure of a conspiracy theory is
not to deny the force of such 'conspiracies'. Empirical 'evidence'
is easily found that certain sections of a social formation have
feared other sections and plotted their subjugation or sought their
exploitation. Political opponents of Whig reforms in the early
19th century had their own notions of the 'real' intentions hidden
beneath such reforms. Cobbett ana other radicals, Poynter tells us,
criticised Rose's Savings Bank Act of 1817 as "... an artful device for
getting the poor to pay off the national debt or an even more artful
one for making them fundholders and thereby ensuring their allegiance
11. Clearly the kinds of theoretical,ideological or political bias
apparent in discourses have a theoretical and political importance which
should not be ignored. When the chairman of the CBI in Scotland is
reported to have suggested that the inherent abilities of children ought
to be identified so that greater emphasis could be placed upon
"preparation for careers in industry", and that it should be made
apparent to young people that it was not only socially desirable to go
into industry but was "possibly the most patriotic career available"
(Edinburgh Evening News, June 26, 1981), radicals ought not to allow the
theoretical and political orientation of such a statement to stand in
the way of recognising the very real problem which it tries to tackle.
Decisions have to be made within a national economy about the allocation
of tasks and this is as much of a problem given socialist relations of
production as it is given so-called market-freedom under 'capitalism' .
In fact, most 'conspiracies' are simply the calculations and decisions
made by one agent with which others disagree. As Mishra says of
Bismarck's soqiial policy: "... the 'conspiracy' was all too evident.
Bismarck's avo'wed aim was to crush revolutionary socialism ..." (1977:
72).
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to the existing system" (1969:2914). Anxiety amongst the
'respectable classes' that political opponents at home and. abroad
mi^it engender a revolution is easily -understood. Thompson's The
Making of the English Working Class is an immense catalogue of such
anxieties and the political reactions they often induced, for example,
the planting of government spies within 'dangerous' organisations or
communities. The Corrigans tell us that the New Poor Law created a
knowledge-power relation which'facilitated the formation of "... a
national data-gathering network via boards of guardians, their
medical officers and relieving officers ..." (Corrigan and Corrigan,
1979:1*0. Confidential correspondence, maintain the Corrigans, was
forwarded to London providing information about Chartist strengths,
about wages, rents and prices (ibid.). No doubt justices had
(13)
performed similar roles in earlier days. v The important point is
less the fact that local state officials make useful if obvious 'spies3
12. The Savings Bank Acts (57 George III, cap.130; 58 George III,
cap. {48) did make provision for deposits to be lodged, with the National
Debt Office. Nicholls, writing in the early l850s, felt that such
accumulation by the "industrious class" must have given them "a large
interest in the stability of our institutions, as well as affording
evidence of a marked improvement in their habits and social position"
(19014:1910. Evidence of an. emerging 'labour aristocracy' it may
have been; the contribution to the National Debt fund was, however,
minimal. The national debt in 1817 was £758,6I46,G$h with an annual
charge of £27,652,012 by l833» total deposits in savings banks amounted
to £ll45 33U» 393-
13. Poster (l97li-3l8l-3) provides an interesting account of the way in
which a 'revolutionary' organisation - the Oldham United Englishmen -
controlled the vestry at Oldham and thereby provided us with a \tfelcome
respite from stories of'ruling class1 hegemony. Through 'manipulation'
of local shopkeepers who depended upon 'working class' patronage,
control of the vestry and thereby control over constables and poor law
officials was wrested from the 'ruling class'. Only with the 1839
County ConstaUhlary Act and the new voting system introduced in the I8I47
Poor Law was this 'working class' hegemony reversed.
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than the modality of knowledge which is implied. In fact in 1306
Colquhoun had described in his Treatise on Indigence just such a
system of national police. A Board of Commissioners should, he
felt, be created to collect information which would be published by
Parliament. Statistics on all paupers relieved would become available
along with information on rents and rates; the wages and expenses of
labourers; employment opportunities; schools; and "... in what
degree and proportion ... the inferior classes are generally sober
and industrious or the reverse" (quoted by Poynter, 1969:205).
Within the new modality of knowledge in the 19th century, labour
takes on an added importance as the source of wealth. As a
consequence, the policing of idleness must also take on a new and
distinct relevance.
"... as labour is the source of wealth, so is poverty
of labour. Banish poverty, you banish wealth ..."
(Chadwick, 1336 s 501).
Idleness, then, is not merely a problem of quantity (one unit of labour
realises one unit of wealth) but of quality (the division of labour and
its rational use augments the production of wealth). The particular
combination of conditions within capitalist relations of production
which, conceptually speaking, requires the effective separation of
labour from the means and conditions of production, the technical
division of labour and the wage-form, clearly requires legal, cultural,
and ideological endorsement of the dependent position of labour within
the social division of labour. The wage-form underlines labour as a
commodity sol^ to capital and thereafter controlled by capital. The
technical division of labour strengthens the social division between
possessor and non-possessor of the means of production. Bach
labourer as economic agent is dependent upon capital to bring
together a work force which can work as a unit or enterprise (labour
having no other means of production) but, in addition, enterprises
are also separated. In that sense, labour experiences a double
separation (Cutler et al., 1977:49) • 'Whilst such conditions
are sustained legally, politically and culturally, they do not dictate
the form or the effectivity of such legal and cultural, institutions.
David Owen has suggested that d.espite a higji level of
philanthropic activity, early British industrial society produced
"no memorable theory of charity" (1965:101+). As has been suggested,
however, to appreciate discourse on welfare in the British 19th
century context, it is necessary to understand the epistemological
conditions of that discourse as well as the economic, political and
legal conditions of British capitalist relations of production.
k. Welfare Discourse and 'Panoptic Discipline1
"Let us follow the categories which Boucault draws out ...
These are the elements of discipline ... But at the
same time they are the elements of the capitalist
organization of labour and the pattern they follow is
that of the production of variable capital, of the worker.
Their object is the production of the individual as a ...
part of the complex capitalist machine" (Melossi, 1979:92).
Ik. It is worth re-emphasising that this is not a discussion about
collectivities of personalities, one of which is destined by the nature
of 'capitalism1 to exploit the other. What are being outlined are the
basic economic concepts which form the concept of a determinate form
of relations qf production.
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"It follows from Marx's analysis that 'co-operation
is a necessary concomitant of all production on a large
scale', and that the form it takes under capital's rule,
the form that Foucault calls 'disciplinary power', is a
feature not of co-operation itself ... "but of the
antagonisms of capitalist production" (fine, 1979b:90).
"Foucault does not derive the forms of government
entailed in the 'microphysics of power' or the strategies
these powers embody from a prior social origin. They
are not an emanation of capitalism. Nor is there a
single social support behind the disciplinary 'eye', an
interest or agent whose servant these powers and
strategies are. They are specific constructions in
discourse and entail discrete techniques and practices.
The 'solutions' to problems of social organization are
neither given nor homogeneous" (Hirst, 1980:91).
The first two quotations above illustrate the standard
utilization of Foucault's concept of 'discipline' by Marxist theorists.
Whilst "the categories which Foucault draws out" will be used in this
chapter to analyse welfare discourse, it is Hirst's injunction to
respect the specificity of that discourse which will be followed.
Both Melossi and Lea (l979)j his translator, underestimate their
dependence on Foucault's portrayal of 'discipline' as omnipotent by
overemphasising panopticism as architectonic in the architectural
sense and underemphasising its systematisation of knowledge. Both
Melossi (1979:95) and Lea (1979:87) allow 'discipline' to hegemonise
social relations and incorporate the 'working class' . Whilst Fine (1979°)
delivers a strong critique of Foucault's theory of disciplinary power,
in a later essay (1980) he utilizes Bentham's Panopticon in precisely
the terms of Foucault's Discinline and Punish. Despite his claim
that the lesson to be drawn "is one quite opposed" to Foucault1s, we
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find fine describing the contemporary prison as an expression of
"bourgeois-democratic power" (1980:25), whose "form is directly
determined by the capitalist mode of production" (ibid.:26). In line
with his interest in Pashukanis, fine gives his reader the final
reduction: "Bourgeois punishment is predicated on the abstraction of
a legal subject [which"] ... is a direct reflection of the
abstracted individual of commodity production ..." (ibid.).
An author does not have sovereign possession of his works and it
is this aleatory aspect of discourse which serves to make a nonsense
of idealism. It is nevertheless ironic that fbucault's Disc inline
and Punish may have served to reawaken the old controversies
surrounding the influence of Bentham. In arguing against the idealist
view that it was Bentham and his ideas which were responsible for
humanising English criminal lav; in the 19th century, Rustigan
substitutes its group equivalent: reform was, in fact, "prompted
essentially by middle-class demands for effective crime control
legislation" (1980:205). Bentham's panopticism is the quintessential
representation of the utilitarian calculus. Poucault, unfortunately,
sees it as "an indefinitely generalizable mechanism" (1977:215) which
characterises "the disciplinary society". Foucault effectively
igiores his own injunction - "Seek in the discourse not its laws of
construction ... but its conditions of existence" (1978:15)- As
Hirst and his colleagues never tire of telling us, for Marx a process
was a "synthesis of many determinations"; Foucault examines one of




(i) The Panopticon Poor Plan
"The Panopticon Penitentiary may have "been the
project closest to Bentham's heart, hut the
Panopticon Poor Plan wan the more elaborate and
the more original" (Poynter, 1969:109).
Bentham's writings on poor law management date from the mid-
17903. The Panopticon "industry houses" represent Bentham's
(l6)
application of panopticism to the issue of welfare and idleness. v '
Pauper management, Bentham piaimed, would be under the control of a
joint-stock company, the National Charity Company. The management
of pauperism, then, was to be a capitalistic enterprise. Capital
would be raised through the sale of shares, along with a government
subsidy equivalent to the poor rates currently levied. Bentham's
plan was that initially half-a^miliion people would be accommodated in
(l6)250 'houses1 v ' and that each 'house' would be under the complete
control of a governor. Profit was to be the primary motivating- force
ensuring that governors performed their duties, although the 'cash
nexus' operated also to ensure certain ether matters (a regular sum of
money would be received by the 'house' for every year of a child's
life, whilst money would be forfeited for every woman who died in
childbirth). Boynter has suggested that Bentham was uncertain of the
15. Himmelfarb (1970) provides a great deal of detail a,bout the
industry houses and Bentham's notion of a National Charity Company
and there is an interesting discussion in Poynter (l969:117-U+) •
16. Bentham estimated that after 21 years a million persons would be
held in 5>00 houses (Himmelfarb, 1970:83).
r
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ability of a government department to run such a scheme (1969:131)
and Eimmelfarb quotes Bentham to the effect that whilst the
government migftt be in a position to run his scheme in 5>0 years time,
joint-stock management was clearly superior having improved and
learned from its earlier errors (1970:814).
Evidently, for Bentham, the only way to solve the problems of
idleness (the burden of poor rates; the dangers from wandering
vagabonds; the wasted labour) was to ensure that anyone who could
(l7)not earn a subsistence entered an industry house. The arena, of
knowledge in the 19'th century was occupied by organic structures whose
elements were linked through analogy and succession. Bentham
utilized analogy in his determination of who should occupy his
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industry houses. " ' If the pauper who applied for relief had to
enter a 'house' then, analogously, those who were paupers yet did not ask
for public assistance should also be forced to enter. Governors, then,
were to apprehend those who were able-bodied (could work) and who
appeared to be propertyless yet did not seem to have "honest and
sufficient means of livelihood" (employment) (quoted by Himmelfarb,
17. At the turn of the century, critics of the Poor Laws felt that
the intentions of the Elizabethan statutes had been perverted by giving
relief to those who were in a position to earn their own subsistence
(able-bodied). Bentham drew a distinction between the state of
poverty (which was the normal state for those who had to sell their
labour for subsistence) and indigence (the inability to maintain oneself
through labour). The distinction was one later promulgated by a
collaborator of Bentham's, Patrick Coiquhoun, and by the Poor Law
Commissioners of 1832.
18. Himmelfarb refers to the process as "the logic of extension - if
one, why not another?" (1970:91-2).
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1970:88). Clearly, those found "begging were to be sent to a 'house'
but, by analogy, those who were "depredators" must also be forced to
enter. A depredator could be recognised from the fact that he did
not work yet did not beg. For Bentham, the fact that he may have been
"a smuggler, a sharper, a coiner, a thief, a highwayman, or an incendiary"
was of little theoretical consequence, the basis of the analogy being
lack of employment. On the same grounds, those who had once been
depredators or had been acquitted of such a charge, were to be sent to an
industry house. As Himmelfarb notes, paraphrasing Bentham, "the
genuinely reformed man or the genuinely innocent one would not be wanting
for legitimate employment" (1970:90). "What Bentham1 s scheme does is to
endorse the analogue - propertylessness/labour, and provides coercive
powers to maintain this fundamental relationship of capitalist relations
of production. But what concerns Bentham is a knowledge-power relation
which does not seek for taxonomic classification of the idle but rather
seeks to ensure the efficient functioning of a system. For Bentham,
indigence could only be turned to profit on the basis that no loophole
existed for the prcpertyless to gain subsistence without labour.
But if Bentham adopted a principle of coercion through analooy
he also sought to manipulate through succession. Discussing the
emergence of the social sciences, Foucault (1970:357) identifies a
set of constituent models, borrowed from biology, economics and
philology, which structure the social sciences. These models can be
seen in operation in Bentham's work. From biology: Man has a set
of functions. The xitilitarian calculus suggests that Man seeks
f
pleasure and avoids pain and this was the "basis of Bentham's plans.
In seeking to balance his functions, Man adopts norms of behaviour.
To satisfy the bodily functions of subsistence most men are prepared
to sell their labour. "Where that norm is artificially disturbed
(through charity; poor relief etc.) it has to be artificially
repaired (coercion throus^i analogy). From economics: Man has needs
and desires and their satisfaction leads to conflict. In seeking to
resolve conflict, Man establishes rules. Foucault notes that although
the social sciences interact, in general, psychology is fundamentally
the study of Man in terms of functions and norms, whilst sociology is
the study of Man in terms of conflict and rules (1970:357-8). Whilst
Bentham adopted a psychology to explain motivation, much of his pauper
plan is informed by a sociology and by an orientation towards what
Foucault calls the "analytic of finitude" (ibid.:312 et seq.). For
Bentham, human needs and desires were, to a large extent, socially
determined. Diet, he recognised, was governed by custom. In the
industry houses, inmates would receive no meat, and bread would be
replaced by cheaper substitutes. In addition, experiments would be
conducted to ascertain the minimum quantity and quality of food
consonant with good health (Himmelfarb, 1970s95).
To interfere with desires would, of course, produce conflict and
coercive powers would be required as well as the discipline implicit
19. Recognising the interaction between desires and functions Bentham
intended that provision be made for "old-stagers", transferred from the
existing poorhouses, to receive slightly better meals on the basis that
their bodily systems would find the new regime's meals too rigorous.
This, Bentham called the "habit-respecting principle" (Himmelfarb, 1970
9k~S, footnote).
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in the very concept of panoptic!sin. But Bentham was adamant that
what he proposed was not a form of punishment hut rather a finely
tuned balance between general and particular needs (again, the
utilitarian calculus). "Subjection, subjection not liberty, be it
remembered, is the natural state of man", wrote Bentham. But
these are not the words of the political dictator but of the social
scientist. For Bentham, Man as the object of knowledge, was
kuowable in his limitations, his finitude. Man already and always
must suffer subjection: of a body imposed by evolution (with organic
functions that must be met); of desires, which he must toil to
satisfy; of a language that imposes an historically determined mode
of thought (Foucault, 1970:312-1;), Bentham viewed his pauper plan
(21 ;
as a necessary "measure of simple precaution and security, v
opera-ting indirectly to the benefit of him who is the subject of it,
taken for the benefit of the community at large" (quoted by Eimmelfarb,
1970:91+).
Bentham used psychological notions to establish coercion through
analogy. Those who were to enter his industry houses were in need
of "wardship" every bit as much as children and the insane because:
20. "Every child during his period of weakness, every man for the
first 16 or 18 years of his life, is a slave. Every family is by
nature an absolute monarchy" (Bentham, quoted by Eimmelfarb, 1970:
107).
21. "As security is increased, liberty is diminished" (Bentham,
quoted by Himmelfarb, 1970:93).
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"Trie persons in question are a sort of forward
children - a set of persons not altogether sound
in mind - not altogether possessed of that moral
sanity without which a man can not in justice to
himself any more than to the community be intrusted
with the -uncontrolled management of his ovm conduct
and affairs" (Bentham, quoted by Himmelfarb, 1970:9U)«
But Bentham* s coercion was merely preparatory to manipulation through
succession. The historicism which the Modern episteme witnessed
dictated, in the realm of desires, the search for origins: but it
also suggested that the future must be searched for gratification of
desires. The sociology of desires suggested, to Bentham, the
requirement of coercion where norms were abused. But the future
could and should be manipulated. "It is", wrote Bentham, "by
diminishing wants not by multiplying them that the capacity of
population is increased. Of increasing wants there is no end"
(Himmelfarb, 1970:113? footnote). Bentham's plan for the
manipulation of desire depended upon exploitation of the fact that it
was culturally determined. The major source of the increase in
(22)
inmates over time v J was to be pauper children, both those taken in
and those born in the industry houses. 'Education' 'was to comprise
"the whole of the individual's time". Children ware, in effect, to
be conditioned to specific diets, emotions and labour. Rights were
no longer to be suspended, they were to be replaced by desires
designed to suit the lot of the pauper. Knowing no better, pauper
apprentices would believe they were in paradise. "In withholding
22. See footnote 16 above.
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the means of gratification there can be no hardship where there
is no desire" (ibid.).
Bentham's panoptic poor plan confronts Man not merely as a living
being but as a new object of knowledge. Bentham's discourse occupies
that space in the Modern episteme which we care to call the social
sciences and, as such, it is concerned with Man as an element within
a wider system - society. Conflict between these elements was
avoided through recognition of the rules of the utilitarian calculus.
For "the refuse" of the social stock, however, it was necessary to
devise a system of rules which would avoid conflict whilst maximising
the marginal labour of "the national stock of industry and ability"
(quoted by Himmelfarb, 1970:98). "Charity is the end, economy but the
means" argued Bentham (Poynter, 1969:138); nevertheless, nothing was
to be allowed which did not contribute to the production of profit in
the houses of industry. For those radical theorists who must see in
every act of philanthropy and in every piece of social legislation its
potential for increasing or for maintaining profits, Bentham's pauper
plan provides every justification. And yet we learn that his early
works aroused little interest (Rustigan, 1980:206; Himmelfarb, 1970:
119) and that his panopticism was officially rejected by Parliament in
l8ll (Annette, 1979:7^)• Bentham's work, rather, serves to define
the outer limit of discourse on idleness and welfare in the Modern
episteme. Though it represents his own thinking about capitalist
relations of production it cannot be said to typify such discourse.
Capital was to be raised through the sale of shares and the direct
producers in fhe industry houses were to have no effective control over
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production or distribution. Bentham' s plan could be seen by
theorists to be non-functional to capital in two respects. First,
"the labour used could not be said to have been freely sold and,
secondly, the pauper scheme would effectively remove the industrial
reserve army.
As already discussed in Chapter 3, eternal laws of 'capitalism'
must be rejected. Bentham's pauper plan was not automatically
negated because it offended laws of 'capitalist1 development.
Although Bentham played down the involvement of able-bodied labour
in his plan (Himmelfarb, 1970:97)j not alb of the available labour was
forced-labour. She plan required that "dross fbej converted into
sterling" (ibid.:98) but much of this dross was what Bentham called
"ccming-and-going stock". That Bentham also envisaged a large and
increasing supply of "longer staying" and "permanent" stock is,
however, of some importance. The Settlement Act, as discussed in the
previous chapter, provided a legal framework within which the demand
for labour mobility could respect personal and national security.
It is likely that Bentham's plan drew little support because it sought
the solution to the problems of idleness in a realm which was rapidly
becoming discredited - the house of industry. Empirically, the
evidence suggested that in the long term pauper labour was
unprofitable. Theoretically, the plan interfered too extensively in
the circulation of labour and in the commodity consumption market. At
a time of high demand from cotton manufactories for pauper child-
labour (Webb and Webb, 1927:201-6), Bentham's plan required that all
pauper children be apprenticed in the industry house until aged 21.
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In 1812, Eentham's Pauper Management Improved was reprinted.
Bentham was of the opinion that four was the mi n.i mum age at which
child-labour could be made profitable. By 1816, however, 58
George III, cap. 139 set the minimum age at which a child could be
apprenticed at nine years and the Factory Act of 1819 placed
(23)restrictions on the employment of those under 16 in cotton mills. v 1
Bentham's plan to interfere in the freedom of the labour market does
not offend a universal law of 'capitalist' production, legal contracts
often bind employees to capitals for lengthy periods. It may,
however, have influenced the specific effectivity of his general plan
for pauper management. In addition, the plan would have set aside
the wage-form as the mechanism for the production and reproduction of
labour within the industry houses, an effect with implications for the
commodity market more generally.
Hie previous chapter identified the legal and economic conditions
for the maintenance of a pool of reserve labour through the 'allowance
system'. Bentham's plan would not have abused the so-called lav/ of
capital accumulation and the mystery of the industrial reserve army.
By demanding a privileged control over marginal labour the plan would,
however, have interfered with the supply and the price of labour.
As Poynter argues, the plan "... did not meet in detail the
objections to all make-work schemes, that they would compete with free
23. As Marx noted, such legislation v/as very much "a dead letter"
without the requisite machinery to ensure that it was adhered to
(197?:261j.). The concern here, however, is to consider the impact of
Bentham's plan at a time when concern was being expressed about child-
labour . f
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labour ..." (1969:135)- Boynter would seem to be of the opinion
that to the extent that the industry houses were self-sufficient
economies, they v/ould not have interfered in the national economy
generally (ibid.). On the contrary, however, it was their level
of autonomy from the wider system which made them such a threat to
the free market. Bentham's interference in the utilitarian calculus
abused the very principles on which his plan was based. Nevertheless,
an. interesting consideration is raised. The deeper Bentham became
involved with the conditioning of desires and the control of conflict
the more his "... scheme for relief began to take on the aspect of a
blue-print for a new society" (Poynter, 1969:135)- By attempting to
legislate the terms on which the freedom of utilitarianism might-
operate, Bentham flew in the face of a body of discourse which was
being popularised by Mai thus - the relationship between population,
wages and subsistence.
In 1798, in his Essay on 'the Principle of Population, Halthus
provided the theoretical and empirical confirmation of the belief that
poverty was the inevitable condition of the mass of the population.
Population, he maintained increased geometrically, whereas production
increased arithmetically (Boynter, 1969:lU5)- Anything which served
to artificially maintain those who were destitute (poor relief;
charity) would merely have the effect of exacerbating the situation:
population would be increased without any corresponding increase in
production. Population increases were controlled, Malthas maintained,
by 'positive checks' (mortality due to poor diet etc.) and 'preventive
checks' (restraint from marriage and procreation). Inevitably,
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Maithus' ideas became popular amongst those who wished to abolish
all forms of public welfare. Like many another of his time,
Maithus began his analysis from a position of supposed equilibrium
between production and population, with wages at subsistence level.
Any increase in incomes (wages; poor relief) would encourage am
increase in population which could not be immediately met by an
increase in production (Poynter, 1969:152). As a consequence,
Malthus not only opposed the Boor Law but was suspicious of any
suggestion that the economy of the nation should be expanded.
Bentham, on the other hand, felt he had devised a system "Which
dreads no longer the multiplication of man" (Himmelfarb, 1970:111).
The only limit to the expansion of the population, Bentham felt, was
the limit implied by the available land and its produce. In seeking
to manipulate desire, however, Bentham moved beyond the political
(25)
economy of someone such as Ricardo, v / contributing to that new
2I4. Marx suggested that Malthus1 theories were "... greeted with
jubilance by the English oligarchy as the great destroyer of all
hankerings after human development" (1977:578, footnote). Malthus
was an undoubted champion of the 'landed interest', the only economic-
expansion he could tolerate being agricultural. We do well to recall
that the early 19th century saw continuing economic and political power
for those with investments in land. It is interesting to see that the
Report from the Select Committee on the Boor Laws (1817), which was
notably 'Malthusian', could suggest that parish farms might prove a
successful substitute for 'allowances'.
25. Ricardo's Rrincinles of Bolitical Economy (1817) reveals Benthamite
influence. The cost of labour was, in part, dependent upon "the habits
and customs of the people", noted Ricardo (Boynter, 1969:21^2). Ricardo
however, had no suggestions to make tc resolve the problems of the Poor
Laws. Against Malthus, he advocated industrial expansion and saw labour
as playing a major role through the production and consumption of luxury
goods (ibid.). Ultimately, believed Ricardo, the economy would reach a
point of complete equilibrium beyond which production could not increase;
prices, pro fills and wages and population would stand still. As Foucault
puts it, History is immobilised (1970:259).
discursive regularity - the social sciences. Considered as a blue¬
print for the national economy and not simply for industry houses,
Bentham's panopticism can be seen as one solution to the problem of
how to augment production through increased labour productivity without
increasing the costs of labour. It is this interpretation which
appeals to a number of radical, theorists but it is one which owes
little to the concept of capitalist relations of production.
In his discussion of the development of 'capitalism', Lea
tangentially suggests that the 'modes of existence' of 'discipline'
outlined by fbucault are actually those requirements of co-ordination
which are "necessary in any complex organization requiring collective
activities" (1979:8l). This important observation seems, however, to
have little consequence for Lea's later discussion which limits analyst
to 'capitalist' organisation. Much of Ibucault's popularity with
radical theorists arises from the way in which the concept of
'discipline' appears to cope with what Marxists see as the paradox of
'capitalist' class rule which is both democratic and coercive.
Lea argues that it is no longer the coercive control exercised by the
factory which maintains the subordination of labour but the
"monetization" of class struggle, that is, wage bargaining (1979:86-7).
This compromise between capital and labour nevertheless establishes the
26. One aspect of the interest amongst Marxist "theorists in things
superstructural (the state; the law) is the renewed interest in
Gramsci who drew a distinction between 'dominio' and 'egemonia' in
his writings on class rule (Williams, i960). Whereas 'dominio' was
associated with force and coercion, 'hegemony' implied persuasion and
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hegemony of capital. Lea rejects Pouoault's 'physics of power1 v
because it refuses "... location in distinct institutions or
particular structures of social relations" (1979:89). Instead, he
appears to opt for a view of class hegemony, in Gramsci's terms, as
power obtained through persuasion and negotiation. In which event,
it is worth noting the following passage from Gramsci's Prison
Notebooks;
"Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that
account be taken of the interests and tendencies of
the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised,
and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be
formed ... But there is also no doubt that such ♦. .
a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though
hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be
economic- ..." (*1978:161. Emphasis addedJ7~
Despite leaning heavily upon Foucaul£, Lea nevertheless decides
to trade the uncertainty of the anonymous 'discipline' for the security
of Marxist economism. Lea refuses the opportunities opened up by his
own discourse; why does Poucault interpret 'discipline' as a coercive
force? Despite his plea that 'power' be seen in positive rather than
negative terms (l977:19U)> Poucault emphasises that 'discipline' is
"a mechanism that coerces by means of observation" (ibid.:170). "Why
does Poucault treat 'discipline' as "a homogeneous, continuous power"
(ibid.;173) and a "multiple, automatic and anonymous power" (ibid.;176)?
Ben.th.am combined a belief in the socio-historical basis of human
27. Well, almost. Whilst casting "monetization" as the "new
relationship"between capital and labour. Lea nevertheless notes; "At
the same time the perfection of the techniques of mass surveillance
of the working population gathers pace ..." (1979:87).
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desires with an ambition to both improve the lot of the pauper '
and make pauper labour-power profitable. He questioned a History
which could allow the pauper in a poorhouse to be fed on meat and,
in seeking "... towards that ever-to-be-accomplished unveiling of the
Same" (ibucault, 1970:3^+0), towards his "Utopia", pentham
questioned the Other: why, given the basic principle of self-interest,
did some become indigent? He found his answer in the pathological
development of "persons not altogether sound in mind". What he did
not do was question the historical basis of those desires which he
accepted as the norm.
'With the driest naivete he takes the modern shopkeeper,
especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man.
Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, and to
his world, is absolutely useful" (Marx, endorsing a
description of Bentham as "a genius in the way of
bourgeois stupidity", 1977:571, footnote).
Whilst, then, one might want to characterise that particular
relation of knowledge and power embodied in Bentham's panopticism as a
coercive force, its homogeneity and ubiquity resides merely in the
28. Bentham* s embarrassment about the severity of his attitudes
towards the profitability of the indigent is well illustrated by
Himmelfarb (1970:especially pp.122-5) and yet he seemed to delight in
seeing his ultimate aim as being entirely philanthropic. Poynter
writes: "Harsh and repellant though much of Bentham®s plan must always
appear, the sincere exaltation with which he wrote the section on Pauper
Comforts is undeniable ..." (1969:138)* Of himself Bentham mote:
"J.B. the most philanthropic of the philanthropic: philanthropy the end
and instrument of his ambition" (quoted by Eimmelfarb, 1970:125).
29. Bentham described his pauper plan as "Utopian", as a romance 'which
v.Tas nevertheless realisable (Himmelfarb, 1970:113).
257.
epistemological framework (as social science) and in the mind of its
creator, Bentham. It does not reside in the 'needs' of 'capitalism'
which 'call it into being'. Juxtaposed with the esoteric tone of
much that Foucault writes, his linking of 'discipline' and 'capitalism'
is hackneyed: "The growth of a capitalist econon^y gave rise to the
specific modality of disciplinary power ..." (1977:221). Common
epistamological conditions of existence do not guarantee homogeneity
to discourses, whether in terms of some conception of an identity of
purpose or a unified effectivity. This chapter examines the
epistemological conditions of formation of discourses on indolence and
welfare in the 19th century and their relevance for an understanding of
the conditions of existence of capitalist relations of production.
Homogeneity and effectivity are issues to be resolved through the
examination of the specificity of determinate discursive formations and
not by theoretical fiat.
(ii) Labour Discipline; The Owenite Alternative
"In the first instance, discipline proceeds from the
distribution of individuals in space" (Foucault, 1977:1^1)•
The attempts made in the Classical age to police idleness through
confinement and forced labour were discussed in the previous chapter.
I5y 1796, however, legislation acknowledged the failure of this
"economy of suspended rights" by allowing payments of poor relief to be
made to those not confined in 'poor houses'. Marxist theorists,
however, have sought to apply the general concept of 'discipline5 to the
factory. Lea has made some interesting qualifications in this context.
f:
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First, he notes that in the early phases of 'capitalism', capital
could exploit labour to the full by keeping wages down, hours long
and, as a consequence, workers spent a great deal of time within the
factory. Adding to this the existence of 'company towns', it could
be suggested that workers were subject to what Foucault calls
"enclosure". However, Lea suggests, 'capitalists' would be unlikely
to want to bear the cost of policing their workforce once outside the
factory. Secondly, the amount of autonomy which the worker had
within the factory provided a degree of opportunity for industrial
sabotage, Lea argues (l979:83-U). How, whilst not wishing to
overlook the inhumane exploitation of labour by many 'capitalist'
enterprises in the 19th century[one must] conceptually, see wage-
rates, hours worked and working conditions in terms of their conditions
of existence. Factories, in a competitive market, (30) for eSample,
had. to attract labour and keep it. Such a condition would apply,
to a modified degree perhaps, to the 'company town'. The mill built
by David Dele in Hew Lanark was worked, to a large extent, by labour
30. In Manchester, for example, in 1800, there were some 50
spinning mills (Harrison, 1969:152).
31. Marx illustrated this point well in a footnote in Canital when he
noted that in 1863 a number of firms petitioned for legislation to
restrict the working hours of children. Suoh firms found it
impossible to operate such restrictions voluntarily because their
competitors who did not follow this examnle would gain an advantage
(1977:257).
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(r>2)attracted from the Ei^ilands of Scotland. w ' Once in New Lanark,
of course, workers were less free to move to alternative
employment because of its relative geographical isolation. Much
later, Dale's successor, Robert Owen was to confess that "The people
were slaves at my mercy; liable at any time to be dismissed ..."
(quoted by Harrison, 1969:158, footnote).
Owen, of course, appears as a prominent milestone in many
histories: British socialism: educational enlightenment; capitalist
paternalism; personnel management; and the trade union movement,
for example. Though he gained fame for his philanthropic management
of the mills at New Lanark, that fame resided firmly in the economic
success that his methods had apparently achieved. There are, in
fact, interesting parallels between Owen's discourse on the economy of
( °3)
philanthropy and Bentham's Utopian pauper management. yjJJ Owen's
own account of his early days at New Lanark show him attempting "to
make the old superintendents of the different departments my agents"
(1967:57). According to Owen, Dale's workers were "idle, intemperate,
32. According to Robert Owen's account of the mill "... it was then
most difficult to induce any sober well-doing family to leave home to
go into cotton mills ..." (1967:58). Dale specifically advertised for
labour from the Western Highlands and offered as attractions "a house
at a moderate rent, and the women and children provided with work"
(Harrison, 1969:52). Dale did, however, also use the. more exploitable
labour of pauper children on a large scale.
33. The visitor to Owen's community in New Lanark, which is being
renovated by the New Lanark Conservation and Civic Trust, can still see
the Counting House built by Owen with its rounded side elevation.
"Erom this office the whole village could be surveyed ..." S3ys the
Trust's booklet on the village (New Lanark Heritage Trail). A




dishonest, devoid of truth, and pretenders to religion". Owen
established a more rigid system of controls over stock and
equipment "to render theft impracticable" (ibid.:80). But, as he
estimated, the most efficient "check upon inferior conduct" was the
* silent monitor', a system by which daily behaviour was graded, by
colours and in public display, into bad, indifferent, good, and
excellent (ibid.:80-l). The daily grade of each worker (when Owen
took over the mill there were 1,300 people in the village and over
2|00 pauper children) was recorded in a register by the superintendent
of each department. Greatly averse to punishment, Owen devised the
silent monitor or telegraph "to render punishment unnecessary" (ibid.:
136). Owen, in fact, daily inspected his workshops, and the
(3U)monitors.
"No cessation of inspection, no transgression, no
transgression, no punishment" (Bentham, quoted by
Himmelfarb, 1970:109).
For Foucault, discipline distributes individuals in order to
"... transform the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into
ordered multiplicities" (1977:lU8). Such a formula clearly can be
applied both to Bentham's pauper plan and Owen's industrial
establishment. Linked with the "art of distributions" is the
"control of activity" (Foucault, 1977:lU9).
3U. "... the workers observed me always to look at these telegraphs",
he writes in his autobiography, and when black I merely looked at th
person and then at tie colour, - but never said a word ..." (1967:137)•
I
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In an Address "To the Superintendents of Manufactories and to
Those Individuals Generally, Vino, hy Giving Employment to an
Aggregated Population, May Easily Adopt the Means to Form the
Sentiments and Manners of Such a Population", Owen outlined, in 1813,
the approach he had adopted at New Lanark. His description conforms
both to those epistemological conditions which have been described as
the Modern episteme, and particularly that discursive configuration -
the social sciences, and to Tbucault's disciplinary control of
activity. Poucault notes that the control of activity is elaborated
(36)
as the productive use of time, w ' gesture and articulation bexween
body and object (1977=159-56). 0wen encapsulates this elaboration.
"... from the commencement of my management I
viewed the population, with the mechanism and
every other part of the establishment, as a
system composed of many parts, and which it was
my duty and interest so to combine, as that every
hand, as well as every spring, lever, and wheel,
should effectually co-operate to produce the
greatest pecuniary gain to the proprietors"
(1967:250. Emphasis added.)
Owen then proceeds to remind his manufacturing audience of the obvious
benefits to be gained from maintaining machinery in good working order
and asks "... what may not be expected if you devote equal attention
to your vital machines, which are far more wonderfully constructed?"
(ibid.). It would, however, he an injustice to the subtlety of Owen's
35. Bentham wrote that "no portion of time ought to be directed
exclusively to the single purpose of comfort". Exercise was best
when "infused into the mass of occupation". And, in discussing
sleep, recommended "the least that can be made sufficient for health
ana strength"; (quoted by Himraelfarb, 1970=105) .
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persuasive skills to simply treat this Address as representing the
ultimate in the alienation of human labour. Owen is working in
the realm of analogy rather than homology. The Address prefaced
Owen1 s "Third Essay On The Formation of Character" which, together
with three others, would comprise his A New Yiew of Society. We
must consider the conditions of existence of Owen's discourse and his
work at hew Lanark. The enterprise at hew Lanark was based upon
capitalist relations of production. Owen was not 'the capitalist'.
The capital in question, as the economic agency of decision and
calculation, was a partnership of capitalists of whom Owen was one
partner. Following opposition from his partners to plans for further
developments at the mills Owen bought his partners' share of the
establishment and, in 1809, began a new five-man partnership. Under
the new partnership Owen started building his "schools for the formation
of character" (1967:87) but again met with opposition from partners.
"They ... said they were cotton spinners and commercial men carrying on
business for profit, and had nothing to do with educating children;
nobody did it in manufactories ..." (ibid.). It was at this time that
Owen wrote and circulated his pamphlet outlining the work he had done at
New Lanark (1813) and he thereby obtained yet another set of partners
(ibid.:89). Under the new partnership (four Quakers, an Anglican and
Jeremy Bentham) Owen was again able to proceed with his experimental
work until he left New Lanark in 1821)..
Owen's Address was, then, directed towards a less than amenable
audience. As mentioned earlier, Lea makes the point that those
responsible fqr the direction and control of capital were not
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sympathetic to the suggestion that capital he invested in the
policing of their workforces. Owen, in effect, was telling his
audience that humanity demanded better treatment of workers; the
fact that such improvements would also augment profits meant that
there was absolutely no excuse for neglecting them. ^ '
Nevertheless, Owen was running an industrial establishment which
required supervision of the workforce. "It was life in a factory
colony which the Quaker visitor, James Smith of Liverpool, described
in 1820" writes Harrison (1969:155)- The form of discipline imposed
by Owen - to avert theft, to maintain good time-keeping and to promote
efficiency - should not be seen in any sense as essentially capitalist.
Capitalist relations of production did, however, imply that the labour
force had no effective control over- the means of production. Owen
was aware of this and it could he said that it was a contributory
factor in his realisation that New Lanark could not provide the
environmental conditions for his 5 new moral world5 . Harrison reminds
us, in fact, that Owen was later to maintain that it had been his
intention to transfer the mills at New Lanark to the workforce before
he left hut that his partners would not agree ("1969:158, footnote).
36. "... let us not perpetuate the really unnecessary evils which
our present practices inflict cn this proportion of our fellow-
subjects. Should your pecuniary interests somewhat suffer by adopting
the line of conduct now urged, many of you are so wealthy that the
expense ... would not be felt. But when you may have ocular
demonstration that, instead of ... loss, a well-directed attention to
form the character and increase the comforts of those ... at your
mercy, will essentially add to your gains ... no reasons ... can ...
prevent you from bestowing your ... care ..." (Owen, 1967:262).
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There are undoubted parallels between the discourse of Bentham
and the discourse of Owen. Both sought a conjunction between a
knowledge of Man and Society and the production of profit. Both
worked within specific epistereo logical conditions. That 'constituent
model' which the human sciences 'borrowed' from the study of language
declared all human behaviour to have a meaning and to "constitute a
coherent whole and a system of signs" (ibucault, 1970'357). Both
Owen and Bentham linked "the geneses of individuals" and "the progress
of societies" (Poucault, 1977'l60). However, although Bentham was
interested in organic functions and conflicting desires their
significance resided in the norms they endorsed, the rules that they
constituted and the system that they formed. History, for Bentham,
explained why life differed from the norm and the rule in specific
instances. History showed Bentham how Society might progress given
the ability to control functions and desires. Poynter notes that for
Bentham "... prosperity was a fragile plant ... and progress an
uncertain good hedged about with risk. Most men would always be
poor ..." (l969:119)' Iri contrast, Owen viewed the norms and roles
by which the social system was organised as being based upon ignorance.
He saw norms which restrained the potential of human development and
rules which restricted social progress. For Owen, poverty in Britain
was a paradox: "... in the midst of the most ample means to create
wealth, all are in poverty, or in imminent danger from the effects of
poverty upon others ; Industrialised production, for Owen,
37. Owen in his Report to the County of Lanark of a Plan for
Relieving Public Distress and Removing Discontent (ltfel"), quoted by
Harrison (1969:68).
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made poverty unnecessary. w ' It was the competitive,
individualist and irrational nature of 'capitalist' production which
could lead to over-production in certain "branches of the economy and
unemployment and hardship elsewhere.
Owen, in typically patronising tone, described Bentham as a man
"... who spent a long life in an endeavour to amend laws, all based
on a fundamental error, without discovering this error; and
therefore was his life", continues Owen, "... occupied in showing
and attempting to remedy the evils of individual laws, but never
attempting to dive to the foundation of all laws ..." (1967:95).
At regular intervals throughout his autobiography Owen reminds his
readers of his intellectual limitations and of the fart that it was
practical experience which led him to the awareness of that belief
which was the fundamental error of the world - that Man determined his
(39)
own character. v y Ultimately, Owen saw "the geneses of individuals"
as being dependent upon "the progress of societies" whereas, for
Bentham, "the progress of societies" depended upon "the geneses of
individuals". Both built their theories on the moral premise that
38. "Mr Maithus ... says that the population of the world is ever
adapting to the quantity of food raised for its support; but he has
not told us how much more food an intelligent and industrious people
will create from the same soil, than will be produced by one ignorant
and ill-governed. It is, however, as one to infinity" (Owen's
"Fourth Essay", 1967:327-8).
39- "This error cannot much longer exist; for every day will make
it more and more evident that the character of man, is, without a
single exception, always formed for him; thai it may be, and is,
chiefly, created by his -predecessors, that they give him, or may give
him, his ideas and habits, which are the "powers that govern and direct
his conduct. Man, therefore, never did, nor is it 'possible he ever1
can, form his own character" (Owen's "Third Essay", in Owen, 1967:292).
'the happiness of the greatest number is the only legitimate
object of society' but whereas Bentham sought its achievement through
the exploitation of the "paramount, if not exclusive, motive of man" -
"his personal interest" (quoted by Himmelfarb, 1970:81j.), Owen sou^it
it through a fostering of the principle that man should live for the
happiness of others (Harrison, 1969:^9)• contrast to Bentham,
then, we find Owen advocating the provision of employment for those
unable to find work. Owen believed the hi£*i -unemployment following
the Napoleonic war was the result of over-production and a fall in
demand, in association with the tendency for mechanical-power to
replace labour-power. In 1817, he presented his plans for "villages
of unity and mutual co-operation" to the Sturges-Bourne Select
Committee on the Poor Laws. Owen believed that society had passed
beyond "... the regions of poverty arising from necessity and entered
those of permanent abundance". What was required was the
rational organisation of labour and production based not upon
competition and individualism but upon co-operation and communal
living.
Bentham's panopticon and Owen's parallelogram both fit very
well within fbucault's parameters of 'discipline' and yet they must
be acknowledged to be, in many respects, conflicting bodies of
discourse. Hie one based within capitalist relations of production
I4.O. Written in 1827 and quoted in Harrison (1969:68).
ijl. Owenite communities were arranged, ideally, in a parallelogram
of buildings. (See the illustration facing page 116 in Harrison,
I.969, for one?;such design.) It was Cobbett who wrote of "Mr Owen's
Parallelograms of Paupers" (Grant, 1958:33U).
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sou^it to utilize idleness in the struggle against scarcity. The
other sought to supersede capitalist relations and the contradiction
between idleness and abundance. Fbr Bentham, the panoptic
industry house would remove the disadvantages associated with family
life and its lack of discipline. "The government of the natural
Father", he wrote, "is screened from observation and ... without
appeal C-3 The management of the appointed Father [in the
industry house J is laid open purposely ..." (Himmelfarb, 1970:110).
Fbr Owen, family life was the mainstay of private property and a
source of individualism and self-interest. The family was also
an instrument of tyranny "by which the wife was subjected to, and ...
made the property of her husband. She was condemned, to a life of
petty domestic drudgery and endless child-bearing" (Harrison, 1969:60).
Within Bentham's industry houses early marriages would be allowed:
they satisfied the utilitarian calculus but they aJLso rapidly expanded
the population of apprentices. Owenite communitarianism endorsed
earlier marriages and easier divorces as means towards the eradication
of isolation, privateness and the encouragement of an open and natural
system of relationships (Earrison, 1969:60-2), When it came to
education, Bentham suggested that "instruction" should begin "before
the body is fit for profit-yielding occupations" (Himmelfarb, 1970105).
i|2. Owen undoubtedly refused to acknowledge the power which the
labour movement embodied, ana the changes it might have been instrumental
in forcing upon the state. (See, for example, Miliband, 195U). But
in seeing the family rather than 'class' as the primary divisive force
in society Owen directed attention towards an institution which was
identified in law and custom and which could be rationally criticised
and dismantled (see Harrison, 1969:60).
Thereafter, it should be relegated to the Sabbath. Erofit-
yielding ability, in Bentham's calculations, began at age four. The
arts were not, generally speaking, felt to be beneficial and induced
"pain and pain only". Useful subjects were to be taught for their
practical value ("the art of making the most of everything") and music
because it filled the mind and left no room for pernicious thoughts
(Himmelfarb, 1970:106-8). At Hew Lanark, Owen provided day schools
for children up to the age of twelve (Owen, 1967:135)« Emphasis,
within Owenite education, was placed not upon the reproduction of
useful labourers but rather upon the production of happy, confident and
sociable comiiiunity members.
Given the fit between Owen5 s ideal of the 'new moral world' and
ibucault's concept of 'discipline', Foucauit's emphasis upon the
coercive nature of this 'micro-physics of power' and its identification
with industrial capitalism must be seriously questioned. It must be
granted that Owen viewed the mass of the labouring population from the
supterior position of one who had discovered the world's most
fundamental error. (^3) jn a speech made in Glasgow in 1812 in honour
of the educationalist Joseph Lancaster, Owen saw the benefits of a
system of rational education as being the inculcation of "the habits of
obedience, order, regularity, industry, and constant attention, which
are to them Hhose in "the lower walks of life" 1 of more importance
1+3. Owen viewed the working classes, as Kiliband puts it, "in pity
and not in anger, as an ignorant and debased mass" (195^+:238). But
he served the same dish to their 'capitalist' masters, noting" in his
autobiography that "Hie rapid accumulation of wealth ... created
capitalists wipj were among the most ignorant and injurious of the
population", (1967:128 ) .
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than merely learning to read, write and account" (l967:25i). But
it becomes clearer from later writings, and from Owendte practices
in their experimental communities, that such education was not
designed to produce contentment through, ignorance but "a just,
open, sincere, and benevolent conduct" (Owen, 1967:288). Within
any social formation social relations have to be organised and
problems of discipline and social control tackled. Owen wanted to
see self-sufficient communities cultivating the land and utilizing
industrial practices to reduce labour and increase leisure.
Property was to be owned communally and the communities were to be run
democratically. But for 0wen these were ideals to be worked towards
through the gradual eradication of such 'old world' pernicious habits
as personal property, social rank and so on. Marx's view that such
experimental communities "By deed instead of by argument, ... have
shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests
of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class
of masters employing a class of hands',' was ^G0 generous. Capital
to begin the various communities was generally raised by the
contributions of one or more wealthy benefactors or by the pooling of
the members' funds and, as Harrison observes, "Each constitution reflected
2p?.j.. Bentham wrote that "The grand object of the instructions to be
delivered ... to ... pupils ... should be the practical one of
disposing them to peace and quietness". Two propositions were to be
established: "That the condition they are doomed to is as good a one ...
as any other" and "That if it were not, no effort which they could use by
the display of collective force would have any tendency to improve it ..."
(quoted by Himmelfarb, 1970:107).
ijp. Inaugural Address of the Working Men's Association, quoted by
irow (1958:298).
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the particular community's financial basis" (l969:l80). Even
Owen's 'utopian' communities have to be considered in terms of
their political, legal and cultural conditions of existence. Owen's
first community in the USA cost him 200,000 dollars to buy. Orbiston
in Lanarkshire was created on land mortgaged for the purpose. When
that community began to experience problems the mortgagees pressed
for repayment and the community was wound up. A "class of masters"
was invariably what the communities could not avoid, with consequent
problems over government and control. But even within a social
formation based upon socialisation of production and distribution,
effective control of the means and conditions of production and
distribution must be invested in a communal agency.
"To conceive of communal possession as representing
a state of non-separation on the part of human
individuals is to suppose that those individuals
are not separated from the communal agents of which
they are a part: human subjects are submerged in
an intersubjective communion in which the will of
each is the will of all" (Cutler et al., 1977:322).
This "absurd romanticism" was clearly implied in Owenite
communitarian hopes, as well as appearing in the writings of Marx and,
particularly, Ergels (Cutler et al., ibid.). But, given the
fact that any conceptualisation of a social formation has, as conditions
J46. Such romanticism is not, of course, confined to the 19th century.
It appears, for example, in the intellectual marriage of Marx and Ereud.
For example, according to Plant, Frcmm has advocated "... control by the
people of the commanding heights of the economy, worker participation, a
reformation of education so that educational processes can generate the
spiritual renewal required, and a rediscovery of ritual and corporate
arts in order drat men may come together again as human beings" (1970:
82-3).
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of its existence, "... economic class-relations and the possession-
in-separation of certain of the means and conditions of production
"by a definite category of economic agents" (ibid.: 322-3), Foucault's
discussion of 1 discipline' only in terms of the anonymous and
homogeneous exercise of coercive power is equally absurd. Bentham's
scheme sought to provide the political and cultural conditions for his
industry houses throu^i a system of psychological socialisation and
conditioning which would make political, debate and conflict
redundant. Owen's plans sought to produce their political and
cultural conditions through the application of a rational education
based upon a social science (Harrison, 1969:78 et sea.). Political
debate would be based upon facts ("Can man, when possessing the full
vigour of his faculties, form a rational judgement on any subject,
until he has first collected all the facts respecting it which are
known", Owen, 1967:295) j and. upon their validity as scientific
knowledge ("It is ... important that the mind ... receive those ideas
only which are consistent with each other, which are in unison with,
all the known facts ... and which are therefore true", ibid.:296).
Under Foucault's formulation, however, political debate/conflict does
not become simply redundant. Disciplinary mechanisms are the "dark
side" of the rule of law and democracy which characterise 'capitalism'
(1977:222) and we must presume, then, that there is capacity for
dissent. But by what medium can dissent be expressed; towards which
agencies and institutions can debate/conflict be directed? How can
there be "innumerable points of confrontation" and an "at least
temporary inversion of the power relations" when each "micro-power" is
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part of an "entire network"? (ibid.: 27). Disciplinary mechanisms
must be considered in terms of their cultural, legal, political etc
conditions of existence and in terms of their own specificity and
effectivity within a determinate social, formation.
5. Towards a Science of Welfare
"Discipline 'makes' individuals" (Foucault, 1977:170)
The previous section has utilized some of the categories which
define Foucault's concept of 'discipline' and applied them to an
analysis of Bentham's and Owen's plans designed to solve the 'Poor Law
problem'. It has been argued that although Bentham's and Owen's
discourses had the same epistemological conditions of existence and
that althou^i they both attempted to use basically the same categories
of a social science, they produced significantly different forms of
solutions to the 'problem' in question. Both Owen and Bentham sought
a scientific manipulation of what they saw as the plasticity of human
nature. But for Bentham this was a necessary control of needs and
desires which would otherwise know no bounds and would ruin the
nation. Bentham's fear of that 'Other' which resided inhuman
desires demanded the scientific exploitation of that which was
general!sable. Bentham desired to individualise not to facilitate
the realisation of human potential (that unknown 'Other') but to




"In a sense, the power of normalisation imposes
homogeneity; but it individualises by making it
possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to
fix specialities and to render the differences
useful by fitting them one to another. £ ... 3
the norm introduces as a useful imperative and as
a result of measurement. all the shading of
individual differences" (1977:l81|).
Owen, on the other hand, believed that civilisation had progressed
to a point at which human potential could be freed from Bentham's
fear of scarcity. Owen's 'education' was not designed to
individualise but to allow for individuality. For Owen, 'education'
would do two things: teach useful ha.bits of mind ('always seek to
promote the happiness of others'); and shelter plastic minds from
dangerous influences (parents, for example). In effect, Owen sought
homogeneity to facilitate individuality: Bentham sought to
individualise to facilitate homogeneity.
Bentham and Owen seem to reflect without refraction those models
outlined by Ibucauit in The Order of Things and which he calls
"Ricardo's 'pessimism' and Marx's revolutionary promise" (l970'26l).
"Such a system of options", he writes:
"represents nothing more than the two possible ways
of examining the relations of anthropology and
History as they are established by economics through
the notions of scarcity and labour. For Ricardo,
History fills the void produced by anthropological
finitude and expressed in a perpetual scarcity, until
the moment when a point of definitive stabilisation is
attained; according to the Marxist interpretation,
History, by dispossessing man of his labour, causes
the positive form of his finitude to spring into
relief - his materia,! truth is finally liberated" (ibid.).
f
271*.
Ibucault argues that both discourses, at the archaeological level,
depend upon the same epistemological conditions of existence and
that, consequently, they are part of the same historical continuity.
This, however, is an empirical observation. Epistemological
conditions do not determine the effectivity of discourses. Clearly,
in setting down the conditions of existence of a social formation, one
cannot legislate for those conditions which would contribute towards a
transformation of that formation. At the most basic level, however,
one might offer the view that a contributory factor in the failure of
Owenism to effect any lasting socialist changes within 19th century
capitalist relations was its refusal to acknowledge the political
conditions of existence of those relations. Owenism relied heavily
on the view that the self-evident truth of its historical and social
scientific propositions would eventually lead to a socialisation and
democratisation of production relations. This faith in its own
scientific destiny led to a refusal by Owen and many of his followers
to enter into political debate or conflict (Thompson, 1977^885).
Nevertheless, it is also of value to note that Owen was probably more
aware than many of his radical opponents of the fact that effective
h7. So strong was Owen's belief in the ultimate power of commonsense
facts to "peaceably and quietly" supersede "the existing ignorant,
false, wicked and insane system" (l9o7:iv) that, at the age of 87, he
was still writing: "It is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, that can save society from the effects of its fatal and
gross ignorant fundamental error". And: "... without destroying or
injuring the old system of society, the new, with its new divine
surroundings, will in every division of it be commenced on new sites,
and be ready to receive willing passengers from the old ... until the
new shall gradually increase to become sufficient to accommodate in a
very superior ,-manner the population of the world" (ibid. :xxxii).
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changes could not be guaranteed by piecemeal reforms and an
extension of the franchise.
Neither Bentham nor Owen had his scheme to solve the ever-
present problems of the Poor Laws accepted by the government of the
day. Both schemes present us with a view of the outer-limits of
discourse on wealth and labour, idleness and welfare. It is between
these outer-limits that we must trace the form of that discursive
p>ositivity that is here termed the science of welfare.
(i) "Functions" and "Norms". The science of welfare has its
beginning at that moment when Man became both the subject and object of
scientific study. There is, of course, a concern with welfare before
the 19th century. Legislation such as Eanway' s Act of 1767. for example,
which obliged poor law officials in London to send all pauper children
under the age of six into the country rather than take them into poor
houses where so many were, otherwise, destined to die in infancy
(iTicholls, 190i4:63), was undoubtedly based upon a 'scientific'
calculation of the causes and risks of mortality. But not until the 19th
century would welfare become a science of human functions and desires and
a calculation of their finitude.
ip8. Thompson notes: "So far from being backward-looking in its
outlook, Owenism was the first of the great social doctrines to grip
the imagination of the masses ... What was at issue was ... not the
size of the industrial enterprise but the control of the social
capital behind it. The building craftsmen ... who resented control
and ... profits passing to master-builders ... did not suppose that
the solution lay in a multitude of petty entrepreneurs. Rather, they
wished the co-operation of skills involved in building to be reflected





The year 1796 saw the foundation of The Society for Bettering
the Condition and Increasing the Comforts of the Poor. In a
letter to friends, William Wilberforce, Sir Thomas Bernard, the
Bishop of Durham and the Hon. E.J. Eliot suggested the formation
of the Society - "Joint labours have produced inventions etc. in
other fields; why not in the science of promoting welfare?" (quoted
by Poynter, 1969:91). Emphasis was given to encouraging self-help.
The poor were corrupted by their circumstances but, given guidance
and encouragement, they could learn to stand on their own feet.
The Society, then, concerned itself with the collection of
information and its distribution to the poor. Clearly, if it was
the lot of the poor to remain in poverty then they must use every
means to rationalise their spending, living and eating habits.
Following the lead of Count Rumford, who had made a reputation, in
Munich as a reformer and who prepared detailed redesigns of fireplaces,
stoves and kettles for greater efficiency and various cheap and easily
prepared recipes for the poor, the Society gave emphasis in its reports
to dietary economies and efficiency in the use ox stoves and the
cooking of meals (David Owen, 1969:106).
k9. Bernard, notes Poynter, wished to appeal to the ambitions of the
poor. "Let us give effect to that master spring of action, on which
equally depends the prosperity of individuals and of empires - THE DESIRE
IMPLANTED IN THE HUMAN BREAST OF BETTERING ITS CONDITION" (Bernard, quoted
by Poynter, 1969:92).
50. In his "First Essay", Robert Owen cited Rumford's work in Munich as
proof that his own work in New Lanark was not merely visionary (Owen, 1967:
271). Later, in the "Third Essay" he notes that although he had done
much for the workers of New Lanark - "They had not been taught the most
valuable domestic and social habits: such as the most economical method
of preparing iood; how to arrange their dwellings with neatness, and to
keep them always clean and in order" (ibid.:287).
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Bernard and his colleagues adhered to that 'moral economy'
which dictated that the wealthier classes ought to assist the poor
in their moments of need.- As always, the problem was one of
balancing assistance given against the danger of thereby encouraging
idleness: one had to ensure the less-eligibility principle. As
"injudicious or misapplied liberality" could discourage self-help
it was necessary to make "the inquiry into all that concerns the
POOR ... a SCIESCE" by investigating "practically, and upon system"
(Bernard, quoted by Poynter, 1969:93)* ^he Society, then, issued
"Twelve Golden Rules" which testify to its blending of 'moral economy'
and a science of welfare. Sitting comfortably alongside purely
moral rules ('Idolatry of the gin bottle is most disgraceful*; 'The
government taxes us, so why tax ourselves with drunkenness and
laziness') are those which mix economic and moral considerations
('Industry and frugality are the best masters'; 'Time is our most
valuable property') and those more purely economic in nature ('The
best bargain is found in the open market'). Slipped in between them
all, however, are Rumford-inspired statements of practical science:
'Roasting and broiling waste meat, and the good wife makes stews';
'Stoves should be covered and fires burned in narrow chimneys'
(Poynter's paraphrasing of the rules, 1969:9^)* To a knowledge of
the body which defines minimum requirements for bodily functioning,
scientific welfare adds a sociology of the cultural norm. If the
poor waste money in inefficient eating habits, those norms must be
redefined within the natural limitations of functions. As an approach
to the problem of 'income maintenance' it is not without contemporary
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relevance. Any policy of income maintenance requires a base-line.
The previous chapter outlined that adopted by l8th century magistrates
who used a bread-scale of allowances. The concept of a guaranteed
minimum income embodied in national systems of social security are
attempts to compromise between the demands of simple survival
(absolute poverty) and the demands of fairness and egalitarian!sm
(relative poverty). ^ 1937} a Political and Economic Planning
publication was able to note that in "... practice both the
Unemployment Assistance Board and the public assistance committee
allowances compare not unfavourably with the B.M.A. standards (of
minimum diets J in households with no children or only one child, but
much less favourably in households with two or more children" (P.E.P.,
1937:153).
Given the anarchic nature of production and. distribution under
capitalist relations of production, which have, as conditions of their
existence, the effective separation of labour from control of the means
and conditions of production and circulation and the separation of the
agencies of production and distribution (enterprises), there are a
number of consequences. First, unemployment: capitalist relations of
production do not imply the existence of an agency to centrally control
the demand and supply of labour. Secondly, those without property who
have no labour to sell (the disabled; sick; old) cannot earn wages
and cannot buy necessary commodities. For support they must rely on
51. See the "Introduction" to Poverty (Selected Readings), edited by
Roach and Roach (1972). The interest shown by British social
scientists in .the incidence of poverty has produced a large body of
literature which agonises over the problem of balancing absolute and
relative measuresof poverty.
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the assistance of family or friends (who may have little or no
surplus income); the charity of oiliers; or the legal transfer
of wealth from those v/ho have a surplus over their basic needs.
Thirdly, the production of commodities is not governed by criteria
of social usefulness and, consequently, there are likely to be
shortages of commodities required by those with low income (homes;
medical care; etc). For the most convinced supporter of laissez-
faire, these consequences implied that the unemployed person must
•get on his bike1 and search for a job; whilst in employment,
spending must be regulated to allow a surplus to be saved in case
(92)
of sickness or for old age. v ' It was the view of Sir Frederic
Eden, in 1797> that "The capital stock of every society, if left to
its free course, will be divided among different employments, in the
proportion that is most agreeable to the public interest, by the
private views of individuals" (quoted by Poynter, 1969:113). But,
as Poynter notes, Eden also saw the economic advantages of rescuing
the infant poor (augmentation of labour supply) and curing the sick
52. A good deal of "Book II" of Eden's The State of the Poor is given
over to describing the diet, dress, fuel and habitation of the
'labouring classes'. It was Eden's belief that the reason why "the
labourer does not have more for his shilling" lay in his adherence to
"improvident systems in dress, diet, and in other branches of private
expenditure" (written in 1797; Eden, 1928:100).
93« Amongst those who had no hesitation in demanding the complete
abolition of the Poor Laws a more ruthless line was taken. John
Davidson, a follower of the Malthusian theory of population, could find
in his heart 110 grounds on which a right to relief could be based.
Even disability could be foreseen and prepared for: "if a person has
given no proof of a desire to provide at ail for himself against such
seasons, the fault and the suffering ought to go together" (Considerations
on the Poor Lffirs, 1817; quoted in Poynter, 1969:233),
(maintaining a healthy labour supply) (ibid.: 112) and Eden began
"Book II" of his famous study of the state of the poor by endorsing
the view "That it is the duty of every man, according to his
abilities and opportunities, to relieve his fellow creatures in
distress ..." (1928:85). Such a conglomerate of views demanded, of
course, a process of calculation which would allow assistance to be
given without encouraging idleness (the principle of less-eligibility)
and a process of supervision to police the giving of assistance. But
the science of welfare did not simply entail a normative regulation of
the "geneses of individuals": it also implied the regulation of
conflict arising from the antagonistic nature of economic class
relations within capitalist relations of production.
(ii) "Conflict" and "Rules". It takes no great feat of imagination
to appreciate the anxiety felt by the srespectable classes* at the
knowledge that within their- cities and towns swarmed a growing body of
the 1 dangerous classes* who, at times of economic depression, might
take the law into their own hands. During the economic crises of the
mid and late 1790s, "Both London andthe provinces broke out into
something of a rash of food charities ..." (David Owen, 1965:108). As
David Owen notes, The Society for Bettering the Condition ... of the Poor
set up a soup kitchen in London in 1797 immediately found itself
feeding ten thousand people twice a week (ibid.). It would be
churlish to deny that the support given to such schemes was
5U« The Society attracted donations totalling £10,000 in 1799 - l800
from 23 commercial and corporate bodies and 51±0 individuals (David Owen,
1965:108). And see the discussion of the use of soup kitchens during
this period as a means of social control, in Stevenson (1977)•
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motivated, to some degree, by a fear of the 'dangerous classes'.
Richolls adorned the frontispiece of his History of the English
Poor Law with the following quotation from Babbage:
"Whenever, for the purposes of government, we
arrive, in any state of society, at a class so
miserable as to be in the want of the common
necessaries of life, a new principle comes into
action. The usual restraints which are sufficient
for the well-fed, are often useless in checking the
demands of hungry stomaehes. Other and more
powerful means must then be employed; a larger
array of military or police force must be maintained.
Under such circumstances, it may be considerably
cheaper to fill empty stomaches to the point of
ready obedience, than to compel starving wretches to
respect the roast beef of their more industrious
neighbours ..."
There is little sign here of that 'bourgeois' hypocrisy which
conducted "the social war" "under the disguise of peace and
philanthropy" of which Engels wrote in lQkS (quoted by Poster, 197k-
178). Rather, we witness a political decision based on economic
expediency and an economic expediency dependent for success upon
application of the less-eligibility principle. The quotation
continues: "... and it may be expedient, in a mere economical point
of view, to supply gratuitously the wants even of able-bodied persons,
if it can be done without creating crowds of additional applicants".
In 1775, Jonas Hanway, that "most effective of eighteenth
century philanthropists" (Webb and Webb, 1927:298), wrote in his
The Defects of Police that "coercive power and the fear of punishment
are the grand preservatives of order and the guardians of human
happiness" (quoted by Coates, 1960:1+3)« If the l8th century
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discriminated in order to control more efficiently it might, however,
be said that the 19th century controlled in order to discriminate
more efficiently. Given the relationship between wage rates and rates
of public and charitable relief to the destitute which the less-
eligibility principle polices, rates of public relief clearly cannot
become the subject of negotiation through political debate because of
(99)the implications this would have on wage negotiation. v ' If relief
is to be given, then, it must either be administered
(96)
surrepticiously ^ 1 or it must be finely tailored to the precise 'needs'
of the recipient. The means for attaining such exactitude was, in
fact, suggested by Hanway as early as 1780 in his The Citizen's Monitor.
Towards the end of the previous chapter, attention was drawn to the
apparent conflation of ' discrimination' and 'individuals.sation' which
was occurring in legislation on welfare and in welfare discourse more
99- Wages are the result of conflict and struggle between capitals and
labour. A facet of the ideological conditions of existence of this
struggle are theories as to the source and form of wages, for example,
the wage-fund "theory. Mai thus, in his earlier works, crudely defined
demand for labour in terms of the fund available for its maintenance
(Poynter, 1969:l9l)> and Ms influence is evident in the 1817 Select
Committee's Report: "... whoever ... is maintained by the law as a
labouring pauper, is maintained only instead of some other individual,
who would, otherwise have earned by his own industry, the money bestowed
on the pauper" (l8l7:17)»
96. The phenomenon of the failure of a percentage of those entitled to
state benefits to take up the benefit reflects ambiguities and tensions
in their provision. Perhaps, it could be argued, failure to accept
benefits reflects the fact that they really are not needed. To what
extent should positive efforts be made to publicise benefits? In 1886,
Chamberlain issued a circular from the Local Government Soard in which he
noted: "It is not desirable that the working classes should he
familiarised with poor law relief, and if once the honourable sentiment
which now leads them to avoid it is broken down, it is probable that
recourse will /be had to this provision on the slightest occasion" (quoted
by Rru.ce, 1979:13^)•
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widely towards the end of the l8th and the beginning of the 19th
centuries. As the Webbs record: "'Visiting the Poor1 - that is,
investigating the circumstances of the applicants for outdoor relief -
... begins to be insisted on in the better governed Vestries from
the beginning of the nineteenth century" (l927:l61|).
In 1819, the Select Vestry Act empowered the inhabitants of any
parish to establish a select vestry of substantial householders or
occupiers who would meet once a fortnight, at least, "... to determine
upon the proper objects of relief, and the nature and amount ... to be
given; 'and in each case shall take into consideration the character
and conduct of the poor person to be relieved, and shall be at liberty
to distinguish ... between the deserving and the idle, extravagant, or
( 97 ^
profligate poor'". K y Both this Act and the l8l8 Parish Vestry Act
were introduced by Sturges Bourne, chairman of the 1817 Select
Committee on the Poor Laws, who hoped to improve the operation of the
Poor Laws by vesting their control in the hands of "persons of
property and intelligence". Both Acts emphasised the necessity
for preserving parish records and the later Act instituted the
requirement of keeping vestry minutes of all proceedings which were then
to he "laid before the inhabitants in general vestry assembled" twice a
57* 59 George III, cap. 12, quoted by Kicholls (1901+:l8l).
58. See Richolls (l90l+: 179)• 'The 1817 Report noted that where
success had been achieved by the use of workhouses this had been as a
result of their superintendence by the principal inhabitants of the
district (Nieholis, 190l+:173)- Sturges Bourne was later to become a
member of the I83I1 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. The Act of l8l8
introduced a voting system for vestries which related the number of
votes to the nates raid, up to a maximum of six votes.
f
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year (Nicholls, I90l;:l82). Baring the Classical period, the names
(do)of those receiving relief were to be entered into a parish book;
refusal to enter a poor house resulted in removal from the book: the
power of the word as sign was its power to represent the status of
'deserving pauper1. Hie Acts of l8l8 and 1819, however, displayed
a new form of the power of language, for it now provided access not
merely to those classified as worthy or not for relief but also made
visible the process of such investigation: the investigators could
also be investigated.
Whereas Gilbert's Act of 1782 had attempted to tighten up the
management of the Poor Laws by investing control in justices of the
peace through the power to select guardians and visitors, the Act of
1819 clearly attempted to widen the influence of ratepayers. Should
anyone who was refused relief make complaint to a justice, he was to
make an order for relief only after examining the overseers, and such
an order was to last for one month only (iTicholis, 190l|.:l82). As
Nicholls comments, this was ,:... a considerable curtailment of the power
in ordering relief" which had earlier been conferred upon justices in
l8l5. Phe 1817 Select Committee had made a point of recording
that justices were not in a position to judge the merits of claimants,
a view endorsed by Hicholls who felt that "... their social position and
59* See 3 William and Mars'-, cap.il (1691) and 9 George I, cap.7
(1722).




habits of life place them at a distance £rom the poorest class,
and prevent their seeing or knowing so much of it as is seen and
known by persons in the usual grade of overseers . As a
consequence, justices were "... more likely to have their sympathies
excited and their minds influenced by a tale of distress, real or
fictitious; and they have not the same ready means of ascertaining
the truth which persons in a less elevated rank of life -possess ..."
(l90l+: 1^1+. Emphasis added). Sturges Bourne clearly agreed. The
Act of 1819 made provision for paid overseers to be elected by select
vestries.
VJhat we have, then, is a further reminder that capitalist
relations of production cannot be understood in terms of the 'rule of
industrial capital' or other equally simplistic homilies. Rather,
we must acknowledge that a variety of capitals may exist, and may be
in conflict. The obvious conflict in British history is that between
industrial capital and the landed interest, its most obvious
manifestation being the Corn Laws. Justices of the peace, as Hogg
(1979:7) emphasises, were "... tied very strongly to the landed gentry
and the traditional pattern of social relations ...". But rather "than
cast the scene as Hogg suggests it, one must see legislation in
terms of its political conditions of existence. There is no homogeneous
"ruling bloc" - if there were, why would it have to 'advance'? A facet
61. Hogg sees the local/centre dichotomy as the major axis around
which political and other conflicts of the late l8th, early 19th
centuries revolved and notes: "The ruling bloc in this period advanced
only at the expense of, and only insofar as it could subjugate, [thej ...
surviving bases of power and privilege" (1979:7)♦
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of the political conditions was the class struggle between capitals
and aristocracy and labour: justices were one element in that
struggle. As Hogg says, the justices were admirably placed to
frustrate the effective execution of certain pieces of legislation.
But what is frustrated is not "... the efforts of central power to
mould conditions favourable to their own economic and political
advancement" (ibid.). This is to suggest either that Parliament is
filled with economic and political opportunists who have agreed to
share the spoils or that Parliamentary members represent class interests
without remainder. The Report of the I83U Royal Commission on the Poor
Laws readily endorsed the views of the 1817 Report on the
inappropriateness of the justices to the task of deciding whether or not
relief should be allowed with, of course, empirical evidence from
(62)
Commissioners' reports. ' ' But it is likely that Whig and Tory
could accept, in general, the plea made by the Commissioners that their
remarks were directed less against magistrates personally and, rather,
(63)
against "the jurisdiction exercised oy them respecting relief". x
62. The I83I1 Report quotes from Chadwick's account of how he
endeavoured to "... ascertain from several of the magistrates who are
advocates for the allowance system or for the regulation of wages, in
what way the labouring man within their districts expends for his
maintenance the sum which they have declared to be the minimum
expenditure, to sustain life". Chadwick challenged magistrates to
declare how they could possibly set aside the decision of a, parish
officer if they aid not know "... how many commodities were absolute
necessaries for Cthe labourer 1 .. . and the exact quantity and the
price of each". Chadwiek then provides "the rule" (the correctness of
which is attested by statements cf witnesses "who have had much
experience in maintaining considerable numbers"): "by adding rent and
20 per cent as the retailer's profit on commodities, an estimate may be
made of the expense at which a single person may live, in the same manner
that a number (are kept in a workhouse ..." (Penguin edition, Checkiand ana
Checkland, editors, 197^:221-2).
63. Checkland's and Checkland's Penguin edition of the I83J4. Report,
cited hereafter as "I83U Report".
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The three or four decades prior to the enquiry were dominated by
disturbances which threatened revolution and the tenuous security
of life and property of the landed aristocracy, capitalist farmer
and industrialist alike. The period was one of "acute social
disturbance", to quote Thompson (1977:13) who sees the period 1780 to
1832 as the moment of the 'making' of the English 'working class*.
It is understandable, then, that both conservative and liberal
factions in Parliament supported the New Poor Law. After all,
it held out hope of rationalising an increasingly confusing system:
it sou^it to abolish allowances in aid of wages ^ "belief
that this would effectively raise agricultural wages and reduce rates
(I83I+ Report:3^6); and it sought to discipline the reckless demands
of labour such as "that paroxysm" of 1830 which had forced farmers
and gentry to "bribe" their way out of conflict with labourers by
raising wages (ibid.:llj.8—9).
6J7. Lubenow (l971'UO-l) where reference is made to Parliamentary
'division lists'.
65. The intention to tackle this issue was firmly registered by the
passing of 2 and 3 William IV, cap.96 in 1832, a temporary Act
expressly forbidding the use of rates to make up wages.
66. The so-called "Last Labourers' Revolt", see Thompson (1967:
21*9-53 )•
67. Lubenow maintains that Poor Law reform was presented as a non¬
partisan national issue and that it is "... a major problem to
determine the class in whose interest this legislation was intended"
(1971:^2). This is a familiar scenario.
Legislation, of course, is not "intended" for the "interest" of
an economic class. It is a synthesis of a number of conditions and
it would be naive to overlook the political struggles involved and as




We can see in legislation prior to the Royal Commission some
attempt being made to change the structure of control over the
implementation of the Boor Laws: the Parish Vestry Act and the
Select Vestry Act sought to involve "substantial property" owners
more generally in local poor relief and to encourage the use of
more permanent, paid overseers. But in welfare discourse more
generally can be seen the epistemological conditions for a science of
welfare which the Hew Foor Law embodied and which begins to trace
the trajectory of that positivity which we know as social work,
(iii) "Signification" and "System" : The Examination
"... on the projected surface of language, man's
behaviour appears as an attempt to say something;
his slightest gestures, even their involuntary
mechanisms and their failures, have a meaning;
and everything he arranges around him by way of
objects, rites, customs ... constitute a coherent
whole and a system of signs" (FOucault, The Order of
Things: 357)•
"... the examination is the technique by which power,
instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead
cf imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in
a mechanism of objectification" (Foucault, Discipline and
Punish:IS7).
It is all too easy, when considering the Hew Poor Law, to
concentrate upon the Commissioners' Report to the neglect of the Act.
But as the Webbs point out, the Act abolished no local authority,
68. Hobhouse's Act (l and 2 William iv, cap.60) of I83I, an enabling




removed 110 local officials and did not interfere in the jurisdiction
of the magistracy (1929:100). The Report had recommended the
outlawing of all outdoor relief to the able-bodied and their
.families (183U Report:375), whereas Section 52 of the Act empowered
the Commissioners to regulate the use of relief to the able-bodied
by rules and orders "as difficulties may arise in case any immediate
and universal, remedy is attempted to be applied" (Hicholls, 190ij.:277).
The theory behind the recommendation to abolish outdoor relief demanded
a. "well-regulated" workhouse With which to 'test' the applicant.
How, although the theory and the empirical evidence adduced suggested
that most such applicants would fail the test (that is, refuse to enter
the workhouse), such a test would be a. dead letter if there was no
workhouse or there were insufficient places available. In fact, the
variations in kind and practice of workhouses, houses of industry,
poor houses, alms houses etc. throughout the nation made uniformity of
practice into a pipedream. Eden's State of the Poor (179?) provides
69. Tie concept of a "well-regulated" workhouse provides an example
of the marriage between a sociology of the cultural norm and minimum
requirements for human functioning. The 183!+ Report makes clear
that the workhouse did not have to "approach the lowest point at
which existence may be maintained" in order to make the "pauper's
situation irksome". What was required was, rather, "strict discipline"
and the removal of "acknowledged luxuries, such as fermented liquors
and tobacco" (l83h Report:338). Tie Webbs provide for us a,
description of a, "well-regulated" workhouse: "... appalling strictness
of classification, order, regularity, cleanliness, confinement and
discipline. 'The man goes to one part of the house, the wife to the
other, and the children into the schoolroom. Separation is strictly
enforced. Their own clothes are taken off, and the uniform of the
workhouse put on. Ho beer, tobacco or snuff is allowed. Regular
hours kept, or meals forfeited. Everyone must appear in a state of
cleanliness. Ho access to bedrooms during the day. Ho communication
with friends opt of doors'" (1927:255; quoting from the report of an
Assistant Commissioner, 1833).
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numerous 'parochial reports' which reflect these variations and
give some idea of the number of persons in workhouses (thougi not
the number of available places) and the number of inhabitants in
the parish. In general, where a workhouse was available its
occupants (usually women, children and the aged) comprised something
less than one per cent of the parish population. Figures available
from Returns made to Parliament show that there were less than Lj.,000
workhouses in England and Wales in 1802-3 with less than 814,000
inhabitants (Poynter, 1969:189). The ratio of available planes
to total inhabitants is unlikely to have changed dramatically following
the advent of the hew Poor Law. Ashforth found that in iSLil the
population of Ashton-uader-Lyne was 102,000 and the workhouse could
accommodate 1^5 (1976:133). As Ashforth says, the workhouses were
simply not capable of coping with massive temporary unemployment
(n-) \
(ibid.:13'-+)• We have to be cautious, then, in our estimation of
the workhouse of the 19th century. Hiere is little doubt of its
symbolic power. Ibr the poor of the 19th century it was the 'Bastille5
(Eicholls, 1901;;3H): for the poor of the 20th century, there still
remain the occasional architectural links, with hospitals that were once
70. By l8l9, these figures were estimated at 14,000 ana 100,000
(Webb and Webb, 1927:215).
71. Hie Leicester workhouse held 500 paupers: in l8L|.7-85 17,000
claims to relief were made (Ashfoxth, 1976:131+)- Figures from Hanson
(1971:116) show that in 18I49 there were 1,088,659 claims for relief of
which 133,513 were relieved 'indoor' . Figures for other years were:
1862 - 917,11+2: 132,236; 1882 - 788,289: 183,371+5 1892 - 7i+l+,757:
186,607. These figures suggest a relatively constant 'indoor'
population of,presumably, mainly the non able-bodied (the insane, sick,
aged). Figures cf 'indoor' paupers were generally higjier in the
'hungry forties', however (Table in Rose, 1971:128-9).
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workhouses and social work departments that were once those of the
relieving officer (see Rees, 1978, for example). But the workhouse
did not 'divert the threat' of the 'dangerous classes' to the
"legitimacy of the social order" "by "removing those human elements
who proved unable to accept" the terms of "the market" (Garland,
(72)1931:33). As a means of defining and policing idleness, the
Poor Law was one element within a wider: body of welfare discourse:
ihe workhouse coped with the detritus of a system of production based
upon capitalist relations and held out a threat to the able-bodied
vrho might be tempted into idleness or who might prepare for
unemployment, sickness and old age.
The workhouse test was to have been the instrument of the less-
eligibility principle. It was to have been the means of achieving a
perfect balance between culturally defined needs and individual
functions. "Ihe bane of all pauper legislation has been the legislating
for extreme cases" argued the I83U Report: it was the loophole through
which slipped all fraudulent claims to relief (i834 Report: 376-7). Yet
to attempt to prepare "rules" and "tests" by which each claimant might
be investigated would not be foolproof and could lead not only to the
fraudulent being relieved but also to the deserving being rejected; an
event "at variance with the popular sentiment" (ibid.:386-7). Ihe
workhouse test was seen as "a self-acting- test of the claim of the
72. Garland actually talks about the "prison" and the "poorhouse"
but his argument seems more appropriate to the former (following
Ibucault). Eraser (1976:5) quotes Local Government Board figures for
the years 1859, 1864, 1869 and 1874 which show the adult able-bodied
as being less .than l8'/o of all 'indoor' paupers and the adult male
able-bodied as less than "]% (i.e. less than 10,000 for IBI4.9; less
than 1^,000 for 1892).
292.
applicant". It would draw a perfect "line "between those who do
and those who do not need relief" (ibid.:378). The claimant, in
effect, defined his own needs by accepting: or rejecting the 'offer
of the house'. But, as Rose indicates, large scale unemployment and
the "determined resistance" in manufacturing areas, particularly in
Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire, meant that the workhouse
/ rj
test could not be enforced by the new Poor Law Commission (1971:lUO).
Thus, although in I8I4I4 the Commission isstied a General Order - the
"Outdoor Relief Prohibitory Order" - which made relief dependent upon
entry to a workhouse, it was not made universal. Unions such as those
in industrial areas subject to phases of heavy unemployment were issued
with the "Outdoor Labour Test Order" (l8I|2) which insisted that able-
bodied males, relieved 'outdoor', were to receive at least half of their
relief in kind rather than in cash ana were to be set to work (the
labour 'test'). Such work was to be monotonous and unpleasant in
order to act as a less-eligibility test (Rose, 1971li+0)« Rose notes
that on talcing over from the Commission in I8L7, the new Poor Law Board
found that many Unions were providing relief with few strictures ana,
consequently, issued a further General Order in 1852 - the "Outdoor
Relief Regulation Order". It was, says Rose, greeted by a
"storm of protest" from guardians who felt the Order was an unwarranted
interference with their discretion (l971:li+l)» Board quickly
73- According to Young and Ashton (1956:48) "not a single Union in
Lancashire or the Vest Riding had discontinued out-relief to able-
bodied men" by 184I.
7U. Rose provides extracts from all three orders (1971:1^3—3)•
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amended the Order to cover, primarily, able-bodied males rather than
all paupers in general. The amended Order, ana the "Instructional
Letter" accompanying it, provided so many 'exceptions to the rule',
however, that guardians were left with a large degree of scope for
interpretation. It is particularly ironical that the aims of the
New Poor Law, the eradication 'at a stroke' of the morass of Poor Law
legislation, should have ultimately led to an equally tortuous set of
administrative rules. In trying to enforce the less-eligibility
principle under circumstances which so obviously contradicted its
(73)
premises, the Central Authority was forced to compromise itself.
If public relief was to be given and if it was not possible to
ensure eligibility through a universal and uniform workhouse or labour
'test', then methods of policing relief given in the community had to
be instituted. The I83I1 Report discussed one such alternative and
rejected it. The investigation of each and every claim was, the
Commissioners felt, "cumbrous and expensive", "inefficient" and
"unpopular" (183U Report:386-7). The most efficient system of
investigation that the Commissioners had found was that operated by
those administering Friendly Societies (ibid.:388). But even "Tie
labouring classes themselves Q"found j ... these daily visits and strict
regulations inadequate substitutes for the means of supervision and
75- In a Minute issued by the Local Government Board of Scotland in
1878, it is emphasised that the Parochial Boards had no power to expend
funds on the able-bodied but only on the wholly or partially disabled
destitute. Tie Minute, however, adds: "... it is obvious that if a
person is really destitute, no long period would elapse before he also
became disabled from want of food" (Tie Local Government. Board for
Scotland, 189^:9U).
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prevention which well-regulated workhouses afford ..." (ibid.:390).
We shall see, however, that although for the framers and
administrators of the Hew Poor Law, panopticism was, ideally,
examination through incarceration, in practical terms the
investigation of signs (was the claimant trying to better his
position; what is his moral standing; is he a diligent worker?)
had little significance when divorced from The system which gave them
meaning (the home; the community; the labour market). It must be
borne in mind that the concept of the examination describes a relation
of knowledge and power. Hie workhouse and labour 'tests' were
essentially coercive instruments. They were based upon a sociology
and a psychology of need but, in their practice, they were coercive.
Given that some unemployment was the .inevitable consequence of the
anarchy of competition under capitalist relations of production, it
was important to leave the able-bodied within the community where they
might again find employment. It is in such circumstances that the
knowledge-power relation becomes a science of welfare through the
process of examination.
There were, of course, other models for the 'citizen's monitor',
the visitor of the poor, available to the Poor Law Commissioners. In
76. Prior to the infamous Andover Case in 181+5» there had been
numerous rumours of cruelty in workhouses and several had appeared in
the press (there was, of course, much opposition to the Hew Poor Law
from Tory Radicals - see Rose, 1971:109-20). In effect, the Andover
Case was used to amplify concern over the lack of accountability to
Parliament of the Commissioners for the Poor Law and resulted, in l81f7,
in the creation of the Poor Law Board Act. nevertheless, the cause
of the original complaint (that workhouse inmates, employed on bone-
crushing for fertiliser, had been so hungry as to eat "the half-putrid
gristle and marrow") served to highlight the inevitable tendencies of a
thorough application of the less-eligibility principle. (See
discussion of the Andover Case by Webb and Webb, 1929:179-32).
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1796, the Baron von Voght had published his Account of the
Management 01 the Poor in Hamburgh in which he described "an
elaborate system of district 'visiting' to test claims for relief".
"Vomit's 'principle' of relief - 'to reduce ... support lower than
what any industrious man or woman ... could earn' - anticipated less
eligibility" (Poynter, 1969:87 and footnote). By 1817, Thomas
Chalmers was contributing his own brand of Malthusian condemnation
of the very concept of a Poor Law to the pages of the influential
f77 ^
Edinburgh Review (Poynter, 1969:235). Por Chalmers, it was the
Poor Laws which indueed pauperism by destroying independence and
neighbourly assistance. In 1819, Chalmers began to put his ideas into
practice in a poor parish of Glasgow, Outdoor relief was prohibited
in the parish. The population of 10,000 was divided into 25 districts
each under the supervision of a deacon. The deacon had the task of
investigating the circumstances of those who asked for relief and of
easing the flow of the "Pour- Fountains": self-help; the assistance
of relatives; "the sympathy of the wealthier for the poorer class";
and ("greatly more productive than the last"), "the sympathy of the
poor for one another" (quoted by Woodroofe, 1975:55-6 j and see Young
and Ashton, 1956:95-6). Chalmers' visitors were to be trained to
understand the parishioners, to "feel a kind of property in families"
and to act not as an almoner but as a friend (Woodroofe, 1975:57).
The science of welfare and the examination were clearly advocated in
Chalmers' approach:
77- Discussing criticisms of the Old Poor Law, Rose notes: "Many
people, influenced by the writings of a Glasgow minister, the Rev. Thomas
Chalmers, advocated the adoption of the Scottish system of relief, which
relied mainly on private charity" (1971:21). Hie 1817 Select Committee
specifically sought evidence from Scotland (prior to Chalmers' work, of
course).
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"It is not enough that you give money, you must
give it with judgement. You must give your time
and attention. You must descend to the trouble
of examination: for instance, will charity corrupt
him into slothfullness? What is his particular
necessity? ... You must go to the poor man's
sick bed. You must lend your hand to the work of
assistance. You must examine his accounts. You
must try to recover those wages which are detained
by the injustice or the rapacity of the master.
You must employ your mediation with his superiors,
ana represent to them the necessities of the
situation" (quoted by Young and Ashton, 1956:?S).
Within the process of the giving of relief there is a process of
examination and judgement which individualises and objectifies. This
is a process which operates from a position of authority based upon
specialised knowledge. It is this authority and this knowledge
which allow the visitor, the 'social' worker, to act as mediator not
in the name of justice but in the name of economic 'good sense'. As
fbucault notes, the examination "makes each individual a. 'ca.se'"
(1977:19].). Hie examination constituted "... the individual, as a
describable, analysable object, not in order to reduce him to
'specific' features, as did the naturalist in relation to living beings,
but in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his
particular evolution ... under the gaze of a permanent corpus of
knowledge ...". But, in addition, the examination constituted "... a
comparative system that made possible the measurement of over-all
phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of collective
facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their
distribution in a given 'population' (Foucault, 1977:190).
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Writers such as Woodroofe are right to draw attention to that
line of continuity which links Chalmers' views to the aims and
methods of contemporary social work. But it is not within the
empty shell of Chalmers' "emphasis on the necessity to select and
train ... visitors to understand and handle effectively all
applications" (Voodroofe, ~±37h-hl) that continuity resides, such an
emphasis might be expected of any scheme of organised public relief and
would rest comfortably within socialist relations of production. It is
the discursive regularity which is termed here scientific welfare, and
within which Chalmers finds a place, which forms the line of continuity.
It is what Donzelot calls "investigatory knowledge" -- the social
enquiry (1980:117) - which signifies what is common to the 19th century
visitor of the poor and the contemporary social worker.
Social enquiry was being practised at "the time of the 1817 Select
Committee on the Poor Laws and, as the I83J4 Report records,
Rriendly Societies often adopted what Tidd Piatt called, in his evidence,
(79)
the "domiciliary visit". v y Pratt advised the Commissioners thai such
precautions were ineffectual and the Commissioners, convinced that
78. Mr John Heaves giving evidence to the Committee: "Is every
individual who is relieved out of the house, relieved at a specific
rate?" - "We relieve them as near as possible, according to the
situation of their families". "You endeavour to make up the sum.
necessary for their relief?" - "Yes; and there is no case relieved but
what has been often visited by the officer of the parish, and no fresh
case is taken without visitation". "And you inquire into the earnings?"
"We go into the habitation of the pauper" (l8i7:32).
79. Such visits were, according to Pcatt, made every day at random
times, to "increase the chances of detection" (1S3I4 Report:389)»
fraudulent claims were the major drain on poor relief, knew that
parish officers were no more effective. In addition, they rejected
the suggestion of subdividing parishes and the appointment of
officers to enquire into claims (183U Report:392). Section 3 above
has already described those "doctrines" which Chadwick believed had
been refuted by the empirical evidence obtained by the Commissioners.
Hie IS3U Report argued that "destitution, not merit, is the only safe
ground of relief" (ibid.:392). Chadwick explains this view: "one
thing established was that the parish vestry was not a tribunal where
moral, conduct could be well investigated". Either judgements were
made by those who were not a part of the community life and who thereby
did not understand the character of the labouring classes and did not
witness the claimant in his daily life, or they were made by those
within the community and were, therefore, subject to both imfair
influence and bias (see Chadwick, 1836:501-2). The Commissioners,
then, discounted the hope of basing relief on worth. Only the
workhouse test could, they felt, offer- any guarantee of success.
Much like Owen and Eentham, then, the Poor Law Commissioners placed
their faith in the unswerving application of a principle. It would
seem that the Commissioners felt there was nothing- to be learned from.
Chalmers* "emphasis on the necessity to select and train ... visitors".
And yet they were aware of the very obvious loopholes in their scheme.
80. Chadwick writes: "Rot only every prevalent doctrine as to the
condition of the labouring classes, but every prevalent doctrine as to
the measures to be adopted as specifics for the disease of pauperism, ver
upon close examination, proved to be unsound" (1836:503).
81. Chalmers supervised his scheme in Glasgow only until 1823 snd it
apparently continued its operation thereafter until 1837.
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In the final pages of the I83J+ Report, for example, reference is
made to the 'waste' and 'mischief* caused by the administration of
charitable funds (18314. Report:L.95-6). "Ihese charities", notes 'the
Report, "in the districts where they abound, may inter-fere with the
efficacy of the measures we have recommended, and on this ground,
... we beg to suggest that they call for the attention of the
Legislature" (ibid.: 1+96) . Chadwick was less reticent. By 1836, he
was claiming the machinery available to the Central Board to be
-"extremely imperfect". Because of "absurd prejudices and jealousies",
the "requisite means" to achieve "the prevention of all but
uninsurable cases of pauperism" had been denied to the Commission (1836:
533')- What Chadwick wanted were "powers for stopping up indirect
sources of pauperism. 'Hie jurisdiction of any such authority", he
wrote, "should extend over all the means for the relief of indigence,
as well a,s over the main causes of indigence" (ibid.). One of the
greatest of these sources of pauperism was "misapplied charity";
another was the inability of the constabulary forces to cope with
vagrancy.
It may have been true that what Chadwick and Senior sought "beside
economy, was a system of social police which would open up the labour
market and render the labour factor of production mobile and docile,
that is, disciplined and as nearly rational and predictable as may be"
(H.Ii. Beales in 1958, quoted by Corrigan and Corrigan. 1979:12). What
they achieved in the 1835 Act were limited powers: a Commission
82. 5 and 5-William iv, cap.76.
t
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with a life-span limited, to five years; the power to issue general
rules forty days after having them accepted by a Secretary of State
(rules which could later be overridden by the Secretary of State);
the power to order a workhouse to be built or enlarged provided a
majority of guardians of a union or a majority of ratepayers and
owners agreed; the power to order unions of parishes; the power to
set the qualifications and supervise the election of guardians and to
make rules and regulations for workhouses; the power to set the
qualifications and direct the appointment of paid officers who were
subject to dismissal by the Commissioners; the power to regulate
relief to the able-bodied; the power to call for, and publish, the
accounts of trust and charity estates. Persons wilfully disobeying
rules, orders and regulations issued by the Commissioners could, on
conviction before two justices, forfeit up to £5 for a first offence,
up to £20 for a second and be imprisoned for a third offence (see
Mcholls, 190U: 272~8l). Hie policing cf idleness has certain legal
conditions of existence. The Poor Lav? Amendment Act may have been
innovative but it placed severe limitations on the scope of the new
Central Beard.
On the issue of "misapplied charity", Chadwick had hoped for an
amendment to the doctrine of cy-ures which protected the original
intentions of a charitable benefactor, on the creation of a trust, from
83. Speaking to the Prison Bill of l835j Viscount Hawick suggested
to the Commons that it resembled the Poor Lav/ Amendment Act intending,
as it did, to leave the detailed administration to local authorities,
subject only to supervision and control by a central authority
empowered to ensure such duties were efficiently performed. Hie three
Poor Law Commissioners were, however, only entitled to appoint nine
Assistant Commissioners without consent of the Treasury.
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subsequent amendment. "¥e should have no right to expect of
posterity that our mischievous mistakes should be immortalized",
■wrote Chadwick (1836:535). Although he was far from alone in this
view, the tenacity of the legal conditions of existence of charitable
trusts has frustrated reformers up to the present day. In 1853
attempts were made in the Charitable Trusts Bill to empower Charity
Commissioners to alter trust purposes but the clause was deleted.
The New Poor Law was designed to rationalise and discipline the
distribution of public poor relief. The powers of the Commission,
however, effectively left untouched the distribution of private poor
relief - both organised (charitable trusts) and casual (eleemosynary
relief, seen as a major cause of vagrancy).
6. Summarising Discussion
This chapter has been concerned to explicate the epistemological
conditions of existence of welfare discourse within the social
formation of the British national economy of the early 19th century.
Using Poucaultts concept of the Modern episteme, it has been suggested
81).. See the Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating
to Charitable Trusts (1932)7 The clause sought the power to amend
trusts when: the original charitable purpose had failed; the
original purpose was seen to create or increase pauperism or immorality
the fund was insufficient to meet the original intention but could, if
combined with other charitable funds, achieve the intention (1952:
para.92 and footnote). It is, perhaps, an indication of the force of
tiie cultural and political conditions of existence of organised
N (J education that, in 1869, the cy-rtres doctrine was breached for
educational trusts (ibid.:para. 93) * For a discussion of the anomalies
arising from the law on charity, see the Charity Law Reform Committee
publication. Charity Lav; - Only a New Start Will Ito (London, 1975)-
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that 19th century welfare discourse is characterised by a specific
conception of Man. Man is at once the condition of History (the
genesis of his individuality and the progress of societies) and its
primary mover. This conception had consequences for discourse on
the body, on wealth and on language, which formed the matrix for the
social sciences and for a science of welfare.
Histories of the developmental kind tend to relate the provisi.on
of welfare and social work facilities to the progress of society and
the widening of state intervention. It has been suggested that the
concept of capitalist relations of production, which defines the
national economy of 19th century Britain, implies a certain level of
state intervention as part of its conditions of existence. Legal
definition and supervision of the ownership and control of the means
and conditions of production and distribution, for example, require
legislative and executive state activity. Labour sells its power to
capital, as a commodity, for money wages. This contract forms part
of the conditions of existence of labour and the state is instrumental
in forming these legal conditions end in their specific effectivity.
*
As a consequence, state involvement in defining and policing 'trie
workforce entails state involvement in the definition and policing of
idleness. The form taken by this state involvement (the definition of
pauperism; the means of raising money for relief; the means of
distributing relief and avoiding fraudulent claims etc.) is not
dictated by the concept of capitalist relations of production and its




Discourse on welfare, in the early part of the 19th century,
is a scientific discourse which seeks for the causes of pauperism
in historical, cultural and psychological empirical evidence and
offers solutions for this abberant form of behaviour. One noteworthy
example of this new science of idleness and welfare is the 18314. Report
of the Roya.1 Commission on the Poor Laws. The Report illustrates a
specific conjunction of knowledge and power in which emphasis is given
to knowledge at the level of "the individual in order both to objectify
the claimant for poor relief and to generalise about the claimant
population. That this knowledge-power relation must be understood
in terms of capitalist relations of production is emphasised in this
chapter: the anarchic nature of the production and distribution of
wealth in the form of commodities emphasises reward on the basis of
contribution and not need. Idleness (through unemployment, sickness
or age) of necessity creates problems within a social formation a,bout
the maintenance of those.who cannot or will not maintain themselves.
But it is also emphasised that this knowledge-power relation cannot
be understood, simply and crudely as an instrument of coercion and control
in the hands of capital. Although, then, Foucault's parameters for
his concept of 'discipline' are utilised in this chapter to link
epistemological conditions and specific forms, Fou.ca.ult' s emphasis upon
the necessarily coercive and homogeneous nature of 'discipline' is
rejected.
As a means both of examining this link and of supporting -(his
rejection, this chapter has examined Bentham's panoptic pauper plan and
Robert Owen's ^communitarian socialism. Both can be shown to have the
i
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same "basic epistemological conditions: both produce a scientific
discourse on labour and welfare. Their shared knowledge-power
relation, however, produces different 'solutions1 to the problem of
idleness in the British national economy, Bentham's plan follows the
line drawn by Foucault's portrayal of the application of 'discipline'
and represents an endorsement of capitalist relations of production.
Paupers are to be provided by capital with the means and conditions of
realising their labour power. In this way, Bentham hoped to reinstate
the relationship between propertylessness and the need to labour for
maintenance which was effectively fractured by the system of poor relief.
Even the residuum of society could be made self-sustaining through a
knowledge of human functioning and its relationship to cultural norms
and the exploitation of that knowledge would provide a scientific basis
for rules to counteract the conflicts between individuals' needs and
desires. Although Bentham undoubtedly had an influence on many of his
contemporaries, his plan "was rejected by the government. Its
effectivity did not reside simply in its functionality for capitalist
relations of production and its rejection does not confirm its lack of
functionality in the eyes of those who opposed it. Legislation has
many determinants: Bentham was opposed theoretically, pragmatically,
politically and ideologically. There are those who maintain a
continuity exists between Bentham's ideas and the ideas of the Poor Law
Commissioners of I83U and after. ^ Certainly, as Poynter maintains,
85. Poynter notes that: "The Amendment Act of 183k has been
described, loosely enough, as a Malthusian or a Benthamite measure"
(1969:32k)• ,;Praser calls the Act "Part Malthusian, part Benthamite"
(1976:1). . ~
305.
"the relationship between opinion, legislation and administration"
is "truly complex" (1969:325). What this chapter has sought to
emphasise are the common epistemological conditions of existence
which Bertham and the framers of the New Poor Law shared.
Owenism can also be shown to have parallels with Foucanlt's
parameters of 'discipline' and yet it gave rise to a plan which
offered a critique of capitalist social relations and a blue-print
for socialist relations. Owen's plan was not given governmental
endorsement, it did, however, result in a number of attempts to create
socialist communities and a socialist form of exchange of the products
of labour. Owen's science of welfare, though embodying the
characteristics of 'discipline', did not imply the coercive separation
of labour from the conditions and means of production and distribution:
on the contrary, it sought to induce a democratised and socialised
economic order. Owenism, however, placed too much reliance upon a
scientistic analysis of social change to the almost complete disregard
of political conditions of change. For Owenites, change would occur:
political action was pointless and potentially retrogressive.
Owenism, then, contested "even its own metaphysical impulses".
Socialist theory since that time, and particularly since Marx, has
endorsed the tendency to "identify knowledge with science".
"It has thereby solved problems of the criteria of
appropriateness of action and "the means for
characterising the situation of action in one and
the same operation, knowledge. In its claim to be
a science it has been able to eschew questions about
the objectives of its practice and the content of its
political programme. Both are drawn from the
necessities of social development and the realities
of -the class struggle" (Hirst, 1979:6, speaking of Marxism).
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The chapter which follows seeks to highlight those lines of
continuity which link the early 19th century scientific discourse
on welfare with that "new series of professions" which "assemble
under a common banner: social work" (Bonzelot, 1980:96). The
development of social work within the technical division of labour
of the British national econony provides an interesting case study
in the analysis of the more general relation between the concept of
welfare and that of capitalist relations of production. Both liberal
and radical theorists see social work as one form of refinement of
the Welfare State, providing social services which, at one level,
represent the gains both of 'working class1 demands and social progress
and, at another level, embody characteristics which are functional to
'capitalism'. For both radical and liberal, social work is immanently
critical of 'capitalism': for the latter, social workers are the
social conscience of the nation; for the former they are a potential,
source for the intellectual vanguard of a socialist transformation.
Social work, however, is not a homogeneous force for good or evil, for
amelioration or revolutionary change. Social work is a practice with
legal, cultural, epistemological etc. conditions of existence, Social
work is a discursive formation with conditions of existence formed in
the matrix of the social sciences and the conception of Man as that
"strange empirico-transcendental doublet". Chapters 7 and 8 will
examine the consequences of these conditions of existence for the
conception of a. 'radical social 'work' and will look at the relevance of





Social Work Discourse and the Science of Welfare :
lines of Continuity and I&scontirraity
1. Introduction
The two preceding chapters have taken as the "broad unit of their
analysis the concept of the social formation, along with its specific
relations of production. Thus, the British national econony under
feudal and capitalist relations of production has "been considered.
As Cutler and his colleagues emphasise, according discursive primacy
to relations of production is not a reaction to their ontological
status in the 'real world1, it is, rather, a political and ideological
decision (l977i3l5)« But, if the discourse of a thesis has political
and ideological conditions of existence, it also has as other each
conditions the material to which it refers. The two previous chapters
have relied upon secondary historical material which has formed the
basis for most accounts, whether liberal or radical in orientation, of
the so-called development of the Welfare State. Rie purpose has been
to re-present this material, to illustrate the conditions of existence
(primarily, the epistemological conditions) of the processes described
in these histories and to explore their relevance for an analysis ox
welfare in terms of relations of production. In thus proceeding,
these chapters have treated the material in its chronological order.
The concepts of social formation and relations of production in no way
suggest historical analysis as a movement through time: the available
materia], about a determinate social formation does. It must be
emphasised, however, that whilst a politically relevant analysis cannot
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ignore time and space (it is the- current situation within which
political action works and which supplies political problems) analysis
must work within specific concepts (e.g. social formation; capitalist
relations of production). In one sense, what is being reiterated is
the distinction between concepts and their conditions of existence on
the one hand, and the specificity of the forms taken by these concepts
and conditions on the other. In another sense, what are being
reinforced are earlier disclaimers. This thesis is not another
description of the progress/development/evolution/origin of the Welfare
State. This chapter, then, will utilize the protocol developed and
illustrated in earlier chapters, in a re-analysis of one specific
aspect of welfare discourse, social work. It is, one might say, a
case study. It should not be necessary, then, to apologise for any
neglect of certain events which most historians of the Welfare State,
and social policy generally, see as important milestones in, if not
the very origins of, the Welfare State. For writers such as Cormack,
the Liberal government in the decade before the First World War
fp )
provided the foundations of the Welfare State. v ' Bruce, on the other
(2)
hand, maintains that the Welfare State was "inaugurated" in 19^+3,
(Bruce, 1978). But, interesting though these 'milestones* may be, and
1. TJ. Cormack, "The Welfare State, the formative years, 1903-9" (1953)-
Eraser, in his The Evolution of the British Welfare State has a section
headed "Lloyd George and The Origins of the Welfare State" (l973*lhU)-
2. Handler finds a way of compromising by talking of the foundations
of the modern Welfare State as residing in the Second World War




though their analysis can have important implications for socialist
theory and practice, it is suggested that the analysis offered in
the previous chapter provides a framework for analysis of welfare
discourse set within the British economy and its capitalist relations
of production. Analysis of the Liberal reforms and the reforms of
the 1940s would therefore, in this thesis, be an expensive luxury.
Cutler et al write that the determination of a workforce always has,
as a corollary, the determination and regulation of idleness and
poverty. Within these terms, "The 'welfare1 state reflects a change
in policy objectives, not a change in the economic parameters to
which policy is directed" (1978:250. Emphasis added.). Rather than
providing an examination of the changes in content of these "policy
objectives", this chapter will look at social work as one aspect of
policy.
Social work, in fact, provides an interesting and important
political problem. The advent of a 'radical1 social work, informed
by socialist and, specifically, Marxist political theory and ideology
raises a series of problems about the potential within the social worl
profession for effecting socialist forms in Britain and about the
nature of 'need.1 and 'welfare' within a socialist social formation.
These are issues which will be pursued in the final chapters, for the
moment, the intention is to explore lines of continuity between 19th
century practices in 'visiting' the poor and contemporary social work
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2. Lines of Continuity
Social work is a concept with certain conditions of existence.
For example, social work in Scotland has specific legal conditions
of existence. Local Authorities have a. statutory duty to execute
the provisions of the Social Work (Scotland) Act, 1968. In pursuit
of this duty each Local Authority must appoint a director of social
work and adequate numbers of staff to assist the director. These
are some of the legal conditions of social work practice in Scotland.
Voluntary organisations pursuing similar functions and employing
similarly qualified staff have other legal conditions, their status
as a charity for example. Other conditions may be cultural or
ideological. Most Local Authorities in Scotland, for example, will
(?\
only employ social workers holding a professional qualification. 1
In proposing to discuss social work in terms of its relevance as
a case study of welfare discourse more generally, this chapter once
again works with a realm of concepts which are readily endorsed, by
liberal and radical theorists alike. Young and Ashton suggest that
"Hie nineteenth century Poor Lav;, though the aid it- gave was public,
and it was operated by statutory authority, is of great importance in
the history of social work" (1956:1+3) • l^ an appendix to a discussion
paper - Education and Training for Social Work - a "brief chronology of
3. To obtain a Certificate of Qualification in Social Work (CQSW)
students must attend a course recognised by the Central Council for
Education and Training in Social Work (CCETSW) which is an independent
body financed by the state and carrying statutory powers to promote
social, work education and training ana to set standards for such courses.
These standards, in their turn, depend on definitions cf social work
existing within the profession ana on the balance of professional and
ideological opinion amongst CCETSW members (amongst other things).
social work education and training" begins in I83U with, the Poor
Law Amendment Act (CCET3W, 1975)- Young, on the other hand, in
providing an account of "the origins of probation" acknowledges that
his work is "... an excursion into that familiar historical realm
which is concerned with explaining how social work grew from diffuse
charitable beginnings ..." (l976:14|). Shared epistemological
conditions of existence of welfare discourses, whether radical or
liberal, and the forms they take are to be examined in this chapter as
continuities. The discussion is, therefore, linked to the previous
chapter and again utilizes the concepts of 'discipline', 'the
examination' and 'the social enquiry' .
(i) The Geneses of Individuals and the Making of 'Gases' . The
examination, as Foucault has it, "introduces individuality into the
field of documentation" (1977:189)• At the point of intersection of
'discipline' as "a field of surveillance" and as a 'documentary record'
there is a 'case'. A case is a subject objectified: it is both a
'client' and a 'file'5 an aspect of a knowledge-power relationship.
Towards the end of the l8th century, Thomas Bernard, co-founder
of the Society for Bettering the Conditions ... of the Poor, had begun
a system of poor relief in Stoke in which careful recording of
biographical facts about applicants was combined with a system of what
Poyntcr calls "upper-class visiting" (1969:97)• 1799? in Clapham,
the Reverend John Yenn established a local branch of the Society for
Bettering the Conditions ... of the Poor and divided his parish into
eight districts, each with its own visitor to the poor (Poynter, 1969:
98). The social enquiry and the "field of surveillance" were, then,
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features of the general practice of examining the applicants for
relief which were well established by the time they were criticised
as ineffective by the Poor Law Commissioners.
Within the epistemological conditions of the examination, the
individual has significance only when considered within a wider context
of a system: the home; the family etc. In seeking for the meaning
of the signs revealed through the examination, the visitor sought to
match relief to need and to ascertain the causes of that need.
Prevention is a primary goal of the science of welfare. Owen, for
example, with his belief that Man did not form his own character and
should not, therefore, be held accountable for his actions, placed
great emphasis upon his scheme's potential for preventing crime and
general idleness. The Philanthropic Society expressed this
knowledge-power relation, this decussation of relief and control, in
succinct terms: the Society sought to "unite the purposes of charity
(?)
with those of industry and police". K ' The Society, in fact, sought
to rehabilitate the children of criminal parents as well as children who
h. "... such has been our education, that we hesitate not to devote
years and expend millions in the detection and punishment of crimes, and
in the attainment of objects whose ultimate results are, in comparison
with this, insignificancy itself: and yet we have not moved one step in
the true path to prevent crimes ..." (1967:271). There are many liberal
and radical theorists today who still search for the causes of crime and,
therefore, dream of its prevention. 5br Lord Scarman, for example, one
particular crime (rioting and looting) is to be explained by social and
political deprivation. Many radical theorists would agree, although, they
would describe the causes using the more generic concept of 'capitalism' .
5. Quoted by David Owen from Address to the Public from the
Biilanthropic Society - 1791 (1965:120Bentham was on the Society's
Committee at this time.
i
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had, themselves, turned to crime (David Owen, 1965:120). Its aims
were, then, "both prevention and cure" (Young and Ashton, 1956:163).
And the same decussation is illustrated in the very name of the Bath
Society for the Supression of Common Vagrants and Impostors, Relief
of Occasional Distress, and Encouragement of Industry (l805).
Until the Vagrancy Act of l82i|, the statutory basis for the control
(6)
of vagrancy and mendicity was 17 George II, cap.5 (l7^+U). I*1
(7)
fact, the Act of 1821; w' largely repeated the classification drawn up
in l'Jkky by categorising offenders as "idle and disorderly", "rogues and
vagabonds", or "incorrigible rogues". Nicbolls automatically prefaces
his discussion of the new Act by suggesting that vagrancy was on the
increase and that the new Act "was passed to arrest the growing evil"
(1902-!-:196) . The penalties under the I82I4 Act are, however, less severe
than those from I7I4I4- ^^ As a writer named Scott was able to suggest
in 1773, "The Vagrancy Act, like many other laws, defeats its own
purpose by the severity of its penalties ..." (quoted by Webb and Webb,
1927:375). It is likely, then, that the Act of l82k acknowledged the
reluctance of many magistrates to follow the letter of the law and the
difficulty faced by parish authorities in apprehending vagrants whom, we
are told, aroused the sympathies of the street crowd (ibid.:371-2). In
6. Discussed in Chapter I4., Section 3 (iii)«
7. 5 George IV, cap.83.
8. In 17kk» a rogue and vagabond mi^at receive a maximum sentence of
six months hard labour whilst an incorrigible rogue could receive up to
two years and., should he escape from custody', could be Transported for
seven years (Nicholls, 190I4.:3^—7)- 1321;, the maximum sentence for
the rogue and;vagabond was three months hard labour and for the
.incorrigible rogue twelve months (ibid. :196).
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effect, the lav; was being largely by-passed and the common practice
was simply to keep vagrants on the move (ibid.: 377-8). What we
witness is the failure of the "semio-technique" based upon a 'natural
history of control'. The "code-individualization link" (Foucault,
1977:99) was no longer to be sought ic. the natural history 'scientific
model of the period' but in the social science 'model'.
As early as 1796, Matthew Martin had begun a social enquiry "into
misery in the metropolis" with financial support from the Society for
Bettering the Conditions ... of the Poor and from the government (Young
and Ashton, 1996:7-8). Martin, who interviewed beggars in London,
attracted 'respondents' to his 'research' by offering tickets in
exchange for interviews; the tickets entitled the bearer to "... some
small assistance. In a matter of seven months he examined about two
thousand beggars, together with seme six hundred paupers" (David Owen,
1965:110). Owen notes that Martin's early work had little impact on
the state but that in l8il the Home Secretary was pursuaded to revive
Martin's enquiries. During the period l8ll-l5 a further four-and-a-¬
half thousand cases were investigated. Colquhoun, a supporter of
Martin's work, became a co-founder of the Mendicity Society, "pleading
its cause to government and eventually before the Select Committee on
Mendicity in l8l5-l6" (Poynter, 1969:200-1). It seems clear, then,
that Martin combined the art of the social enquiry and the charitable
relief of the mendicant and that his work had some influence in political
circles.
The Mendicity Society, created in l8l8, policed the metropolis in
the attempt to control begging. With the assistance of eight constables,
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"... who roamed the streets in pairs to apprehend beggars and bring
them to the Society's office ... or turn them over to the magistrates"
(David Owen, 1965:111) the Society dealt with 9 >500 vagrants over a
fourteen years period. As Owen reports, half of those apprehended
were subsequently convicted (ibid.:112). The Society, however, did
not merely set out to supplement the constabulary duties of the parish
authorities. It also attempted to control indiscriminate alms-giving by
the public. The l6th century had witnessed statutory attempts to outlaw
(9)
alms-giving outside organised relief K ' but it is obvious that its
deterrent effect was limited. Thus, Young may be correct in saying
that the Charity Organisation Society of the 1870s saw indiscriminate
alms-giving "as the sole cause of England's social problems" (1976:49)
but it is also clear that it had been viewed for a good while as a
serious loophole in the policing of idleness. The Mendicity Society
sought a solution by encouraging the distribution of relief vouchers in
place of cash. Subscribers to the Society were entitled to an unlimited
supply of vouchers for distribution whilst others could purchase five
for a shilling (David Owen, 1965:112). Paupers presenting vouchers at
the Mendicity Society's office were then subjected to investigation and
individual classification: to be relieved; to be referred to parish
9. 22 Henry Till, cap.12 (l530). Any person giving shelter or money
to able-bodied beggars was subject to a fine (Nicholls, 1898:118).
27 Henry VIII, cap.25 (1535) empowered parish officials to "take such
discreet and convenient order, by gathering and procuring voluntary alms
of the good Christian people ... in such good and discreet wise as the
poor, impotent, sick, and diseased people ... may be provided. ... ana
relieved ..." It also outlawed the giving of common or open doles and
alms otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the Act "upon pain of
forfeiting te^t times the value of all such money" (Uicholls, 1898:121-2).
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authorities for relief; to he refused relief as not being in real
need; or to be prosecuted.
The social enquiry and investigatory knowledge ware features
both of public and private relief organisation. In policing idleness,
both sought to control two populations: the deserving poor and the
undeserving. Hie practice involved less a philosophical individualism
and more a methodological individualism. It is knowledge of the
individual that the enquiry seeks and which constitutes a 'file1 but it
is the generality of these functions and desires, their normative basis,
vhich constitutes a 'case1. Social enquiry is the method (the file,
which describes functions and desires): investigatory knowledge is the
theoretical base (the case, in terms of norms and rules). Care must be
taken not to presume, however, that we have detected the central core of
a homogeneous phenomenon. This is Foucault's error. Social enquiry
may usefully be conceived as the common practice of a more general
condition called 'discipline' but one must be aware of the specificity
of the forms. Social, enquiry by parish officials had, as conditions of
its practice the statutory basis of the collection and distribution of
rates; the cultural, and political framework of the parish (voting
strength and distribution of ratepayers, for example); economic
conditions in the parish and surrounding area; and so on. Social
enquiry by charitable organisations had other conditions of existence,
amongst which might be noted the statutory basis of the charity and the
political and ideological orientations of those who managed it. v '
One mast also be conscious of the effectivity of social enquiry and
investigatory knowledge. In times of high unemployment, for example,
investigation of claims was likely to fail under the additional strain.
The Mendicity Society's voucher scheme, for example, was often simply
boycotted by the indigent and completely broke down during "periods of
geea.test hardship" (David Owen, 1965:112). It has already been
suggested that the workhouse test could not cope with moments of
high unemployment.
(ii) The "infinitely small of TX)litical power" ♦ Foucau.lt
describes "the disciplines" a.s resembling "an infca^-law", extending "...
the general forms defined by law to the infinitesimal level of
individual lives ..." (1977:222). This seems an apt characterisation
of the activities of the Charity Organisation Society. Foueault goes
on to modify this description, suggesting that "the disciplines" are,
rather, "a sort of counter-law". In so doing, he at once over-estimates
both the symmetry of relationships establishable by law and the degree of
10. The founders of the Society for Bettering the Conditions ... of
the Poor were professional men and evangelicals and were as likely to
offer a conservative condemnation of capitalist development for the
misery it caused as they ware to condemn the poor for their idle ways.
The Mendicity Society, which numbered amongst its beard of management
David Ricardo and William Allen, a Quaker business associate of Robert
Owen and Bentham and founder of the journal The Biilanthronist, was




Asymmetry establishable between social agents. ^ ' Foucault never
really gets to the point of saying who it is who gains from this
counter-lav; and who loses, except tautologically as those who have
power and those who do not.
The Charity Organisation Society (COS) endorsed the principles
on which the New Poor Law was based: the pauper probably only had
himself to blame for his predicament; if relief was too easily
obtainable human nature would attract labour away from fruitful
employment and onto public or privs,te relief; relief should be based
upon a scientific calculation of need and should seek to encourage
self-help and independence. As the Poor Law Commissioners noted with
concern, the unscientific distribution of charitable gifts undermined
the principle of less-eligi.bil.ity and its mechanism - the workhouse
test. Hie COS was very much concerned to control this loophole. As
a consequence, radical theorists have been largely concerned to
establish that the COS was yet one more aspect of the 'bourgeoisie's1
control over the 'working class', 'in the interest of capital'.
According to lido, 'character' determined whether an applicant was
assisted by the COS.
12. 'Discipline' as counter-law "... creates between individuals a
'private' link, j_vhichJ ... may be underwritten by contract; the way
in which it is imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the non¬
reversible subordination of one group of people by another, the
'surplus' power that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality
of position of the different 'partners' in relation to the common
regulation, all these distinguish the disciplinary link from the
contractual link, and make it possible to distort the contractual link




"The ideal of character was related to those
attributes which ensure the smooth operation of
market forces in an industrialised economy. Thus
the value of economic independence, foresight, self-
control and sustained effort were stressed" (Fide, 1977:222).
If one might presume that the juxtaposition of "market" and
"industrialised" suggests that Fido is talking of capitalist relations
of production, it is not at all clear why "foresight, self-control and
sustained effort" are 'character traits' desirable under 'capitalism'
alone. It is in emphasising economic independent thai the COS can
be seen to endorse capitalist relations of production. Most persons
during their life time were in the position to sell their labour and
should so organise their spending as to save for sickness, unemployment-
(ll}
and old age. v' ' Loch, secretary to the COS from 1875 to 1913s noted
of the individual "that:
"If he cease to originate and produce, he must as a
rule succumb, unless someone makes good to him the
deficiency that results from his barrenness of
production. In that case he is, socially speaking,
a slave, a, bad economic bargain. To shift the
responsibility of maintenance from the individual to
the state is to sterilise the productive power of the
community as a whole ..." (Loch, in l895s quoted by
Voodroofe, 197U:33)*
By placing emphasis upon economic self-reliance, the COS endorsed
the relationship between labour and capital as one in which the direct
13. Writing of Charles Loch, secretary to the COS, his grandson notes
that Loch was prepared to admit that pauperism had causes other than
indiscriminate charity: "weakness of character or vice; sickness,
poor health, lack of work and incompetence; inability to make provision
against old age. But character is the important thing". And quoting
Loch, he noted;, "By self-maintenance is meant self-support throughout
life in its'ordinary contingencies - sickness, widowhood, old age etc."
(Mowat, 1961:69).
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producers, as economic agents, axe effectively separated from the
means and conditions of production (are propertyless) and sell
their labour power, as a commodity, for wages. There is no room
within the COS ideology for any consideration of the meeting of need
divorced from the ability to contribute. The relationship between
the individual, and the satisfaction of his needs and desires is a
commodity relationship. The COS, in fact, offered a direct and
consistent opposition to what were seen as 'socialist' demands for
state provision in the realms of income maintenance and general
welfare (Mowat, 1961:passim).
The Charity Organisation Society began life under the more explicit
title of the Society for Organising Charitable Relief and Repressing
Mendicity and, at its first meeting in 1370, Lord Derby declared
that the multitude of London charities "... should be made to co-operate
instead of competing, and ... should be brought into co-operation with
the agents through whom the Poor Law is administered" (quoted by
Woodroofe, 197^28). Some measure of success was probahly achieved in
the la-tter aim in the sense that, as RrLdo suggests (1977:213-Jj.),
members of COS district committees were often also Poor Lav; guardians.
But the suggestion for co-operation between charitable organisation and
the state system of relief had also been made in 1869 by the Poor Law
lip. Rose suggests the COS began life as the London Association for the
Prevention of Pauperism and Crime, in 1868 (1971:221).), Mowat provides
a brief review of 'origins' (l96l:ll|.-l8). The important point to note,
however, is the level of concern about indiscriminate charity in the
years prior to the foundation of the COS. In l861p, for example, the
Select Committee on Poor Relief had strongly criticised indiscriminate
charity from yoluntary organisations (Rose, 1971:223).
Board. The so-called Goschen Minute, •which was issued to guardians
in London, attempted to demarcate the separate realms of public and
(i5)
private relief. v ' The Boor Laws were to be -used for those who
were actually destitute. Charity should attempt to prevent such
destitution by supplementing wages; providing material goods such as
clothing and bedding; and assisting in v;ays legally prohibited within
the Poor Laws such as the purchase of tools (Young and Ash ton, 1956:
58,96). The Minute also recommended that a "public registering
office" should be set up in every district to co-ordinate the
activities of the various relieving agencies; that charitable agencies
should not assist those being relieved by the Poor Laws; and should
report on those, assisted through charitable funds, to the relieving
officer (Mowat, 1961:22). The Goschen Minute is the Central Board's
acknowledgement that the state could not monopolise the relief of the
poor as the principle of the workhouse test demanded. If the Poor Law
Board could not extend its jurisdiction to cover supervision of private
charity, as Chadwick had dreamed, it could seek to exert influence over
it. In Scotland, where relief to the able-bodied was, legally though
not in practice, forbidden there had generally been a greater-
acknowledgement of the role of charity. The Local Government Board of
Scotland issued a Minute in December 1878 carrying advice on the
administration of charity to the able-bodied. First, "a strict enquiry
l5« "... it appears to be a matter of essential importance that an
attempt should be made to bring the authorities administering the Poor
Laws and those who administer charitable funds to as clear an
understanding an possible, so as to avoid the double distribution of
relief to the;same persons, and at the same time to secure that the most
effective use'should be made of the large sums habitually contributed by
the public towards relieving such cases as the Poor Law can scarcely
reach" (Reproduced in Rose, 1971:226).
into ... previous history and present circumstances" should he
conducted. Secondly, funds should be refused to a person "on
strike, or who declines ... employment at wages sufficient to maintain
him ..." ana to someone in receipt of relief from another source, or
from begging. Thirdly, assistance should only be granted in return
for "an equivalent in labour ..." and, where no work can be offered
"an artificial labour test" was to be applied. Finally, relief should
H
not be given "in money, but solely in rations, coals etc. Such
rules, it was felt, would discourage "idleness and imposture" (The
Local Government Board for Scotland, 1897:3h~l)- In the following
year (October l879)> the Board found it necessary to refer again to
the Minute of 1878 and to emphasise that it was only in those cases in
which its "essential principles" had been ignored that problems had
arisen. It was, therefore "earnestly" urged that in those instances in
which Parochial Authorities and charities were to co-operate, applicants
should be referred to the Parochial Authority. The Board, however,
adopted a much more dictatorial tone than in the earlier Minute by
insisting that "... no applicant shall, under any circumstances, be
relieved by the administrators of the Relief Fund except on the
recommendation of the Parochial Authority". In its turn the Parochial
Authority was to conduct a "thorough investigation", to be paid for out
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of the fund raised (ibid.:97).
Hie modus operandi of the nascent Charity Organisation Society is
outlined in the first report of the Council of COS (1870). Mowat
provides summary details. In each Poor Law division, a Charity Office
was to he established and was to be in direct communication with the
local relieving officer, the clergy and all charities operating in the
area. Hie Society's charity agent was to maintain a register of
persons given charitable relief and was to "inquire into and investigate,
and, if necessary, in the last resort, assist ... such special cases as
cannot be met by existing agencies ..." (quoted by Mowat, 196l:2l). It
was also intended that printed tickets be issued for the benevolent to
distribute in place of cash. As Mowat records, the ideal of co¬
ordination was never achieved and formal co-operation between relieving
officers and COS district committees seems to have occurred only once
16. Hie Poor Law Amendment Act of 183)4 applied, of course, only to
England and Vales. Hie legal suppression of indolence and the relief
of the impotent poor in Scotland has been chronicled by Sir George
Nicholls (History of Scotch Poor Law, 1856) and Ferguson (19J+8:166-221)
provides a brief outline up to 1863. Hicholls records, in a footnote
in his study of the English Poor Law: "In Scotland, down to 1579» there
was little difference in principle from the practice pursued in this
country ... Thenceforward, however, the two systems tended to diverge ...
Hie Scotch Law permitted ... the raising of money by compulsory
assessment, but only if voluntary contributions should be insufficient ..."
(1898:8). As Micholls says, the collection and distribution of funds was
administered by a "quasi-ecclesiastical machinery" (ibid.:9). Ko major
amendment to that system was made until l8I(.5, following a Commission
report reviewing the system. Hie Act created a Board of Supervision, and
parochial boards who were to prepare rolls of the poor. Hie building of
"poorhouses" was encouraged for the relief of the poor. In time, these
poorhouses were seen as a means of 'testing' the destitution of applicants
"whose disability, or the extent of whose disability was doubtful and
believed to be pretended or exaggerated" (Ferguson, 1948:211). By 1877s
Skelton was claiming "That a judicious but firm and vigilant use of the
poorhouse tesiy has a marked effect in diminishing the amount of pauperism
in a district" (l877:W>).
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under the direction of Ociavia Hill in Marylebone (Miowat, 1961:23).
The COS was, then, constrained to enter the field as yet another
charitable organisation and to seek to influence the welfare realm
through- example and exhortation. "It is desirable", notes the annual
report for l875>» "that it should be distinctly understood that it is
the chief aim of the Society to deal with the causes of pauperism rather
than with its effects ..." (Mowat, 1961:26).
A welfare organisation such as the COS must, then, be considered
in terms of the ideological and cultural conditions of its existence:
the political and social aims of those who founded the organisation and
those who conducted its daily operations, but also the political and
social aims of those in other welfare organisations who jealously
guarded their1 own autonomy from COS interference (Young and Ashton, 19.66:
110). There are ideals and there are practical exigencies. The
Charity Organisation Society exerted a great deal of influence on 'public
opinion'. Gilbert has remarked that "At least until the end of the
eighties, the most influential determinant of serious English middle-
/
class opinion about the care of the poor was ... the Charity
Organisation Society" (l973'5l). And yet, as many commentators record,
by the end of the 19th century, COS opposition to state welfare provision
was reactionary (Young and Ashton, 1956:112; Mowat, 1961:126 et seq. ).
The Charity Organisation Society did, however, also exert a great deal of
influence in terms of its social work practice of social investigation.
It was in its emphasis upon detailed examination of the background to
every claim for relief and the careful recording of such investigatory
knowledge by trained workers, that the COS had a. lasting influence.
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The investigation constituted a scientific collation and analysis
(l7)of the "infinitely small". J But the investigation also worked
within a political realm. The point of contact may have been the
individual, but it was the individual as a worker and as a member of
a family. It was also the individual as a member of an economic
class and of a community and nation. By 1909, Urwick was expressing
this perspective, in what he described as sociological terms, to the
inaugural meeting of the School of Social Economics:
"V/e believe that we have reached a deeper view of
social relationships, and all that they imply.
Society is no longer for us a collection of
individuals grouped together for mutual defence into
an aggregate with just enough form and structure to
hang together, and to ensure to each member the
fullest freedom to seek his own ends. It is seen to
be an organic growth ... More and more our conscious
aim is now to increase the solidarity and cohesion of
this social organism, and, for the individual members
of it to give greater content and greater variety to
the life which each may live within it" (Urwick, 1909:253-9).
The knowledge-power relation of welfare discourse combined notions
of the geneses of individuals and of the progress of societies. The
normative and regulative formulation of individual functions, desires
and conduct was set within an interpretative framework which gave
meaning to the "infinitely small" in terms of its significance for
systems and processes. The inadequate form of social investigation
17. The Council of the COS recommended district committees to record
ail investigations on a 'visiting form' . Each case should be assigned
a number and recorded in a 'Record Book' . A 'Decision Book' was also
suggested. The COS also published manuals such as Suggestions for
Systematic Inquiry into the Cases of Applicants for Relief, ana
Visitors' Handy-Book (Mowat, 196i:29-3^)•
devised "by -the Poor Law Commissioners - the workhouse test - was
"being supplemented and replaced by a refined process of enquiry which
acknowledged the fact that if idleness was to be effectively policed
the claimant had to be understood within the context of his own
peculiar environment. The COS, then, combined the use of voluntary
workers with paid officials - "Collectors, Enquirers, Inquiry Agents" -
who were often, Mowat maintains, "men of the working class" (1961:27-8).
The investigation of a claim for assistance involved extensive enquiry
amongst neighbours, shopkeepers and employers. The home would be
visited, perhaps on a number of occasions, and the worker assigned to
the claim would 'follow through1 the case until its successful closure
(Young and Ashton, 1956:1014.). There can be little doubt that for many
who involved themselves in organisations inaugurated for the relief and
the improvement of the poor, philanthropic motivations were not easily
to be separated from desires to avoid civil disturbance and revolution.
Woodroofe quotes from one writer on 'charity organisation' who, in
I87O, noted that charity "... has its material or political uses ... A
more kindly sentiment grows up which insensibly leavens the intercourse
of classes, and softens, if it does not prevent, the threatened
collision between them" (1975:5l)• The knowledge-power relation
endorsed by such writers implied the negotiation of a peaceful co-
18. As late as 1927, the COS was claiming that "the only real
antidote to Bolshevism is good casework" (quoted by Woodroofe, 1975:55)'
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existence rather than the enforcement of 'apartheid.'. ^ ' It is
evident in the work of Octavia Hill and in the notion of the Settlement.
Both Hill and Canon Barnett, who established the first Settlement
(Toynbee Hall) in I88I4, were intimately connected with the COS, of
course. Hill's work took her directly into the poorer communities and
into the homes of the 'working class'. Though she sought improvements
in the physical environment of 'working class' housing areas her primary
targets were the tenants: "Transplant them tomorrow 'to healthy and
commodious houses and they will pollute them and destroy them", she
wrote in I88I4. (quoted by Jones, 1978:13). Barnett was quite specific
about his fears that rich and poor were dangerously alienated. The
Settlement was one way in which the 'rich' could seek to influence a
poor and deprived area whilst also making them more aware of the life of
the 'working classes' (Young and Ashton, 1956:223-3^5 Woodroofe, 197^4-1
6k~7ii).
For the liberal theorist, the Charity Organisation Society, Octavia
Hill and Toynbee Hall are all stepping-stones in a 'Whiggish' view of
history which casts charitable endeavour "... as a mechanism whereby the
19. Octavia Hill records how, in 1877? she had felt obliged to remind
an audience of clergy and local visitors not to think of the p>oor as a
race apart: "... if we thought of the poor primarily as husbands, wives,
sons and daughters, members of households, as we are ourselves, instead
of contemplating them an a different class, we should recognise better
how the house training and high ideal of home duty was our best
preparation for work among them" (quoted by Woodroofe, 197^:^9).
Despite such a sentiment, however, the COS was ideologically and
intellectually committed to viewing the life of the labourer as
inevitably precarious. In 1876, in fact, the COS had made a point of
publicising the views of one of its district committees, which had
offered the labourer the consolation of knowing that "... those who are
born to easier circumstances sympathise with the severe toil and self-
denial which nis lot inrDoses upon him ..." (Mowat, 196l:ii2-3; Eraser,
1973:2U9-50).
progressive, developmental forces in English society could be
extended to a population - the working class - that did not so
readily share in them" (Young, 1976:5l). For "th® radical theorist,
welfare discourse of the late 19th century represents "... the
perfection of the techniques of mass surveillance of the working
population ... through- the use of increasingly sophisticated
techniques of data-gathering incorporating the welfare institutions ..."
(Lea, 1979:87). What this thesis suggests is that the concept of
welfare discourse is the result of many determinations. Hie needs of
tiie individual within capitalist relations are met through, the purchase
of commodities. Those without wealth who cannot sell their labour-
power, or have none to sell, must be maintained through a
redistribution of wealth. Given the acceptance that some such
redistribution must occur (for reasons of philanthropy but also because
capitalist relations of production have, as concomitants, structural
unemployment and a wage system realised through political struggle
between capital and labour which make even a basic planned subsistence over
time exceedingly precarious) there arise inevitable consequences such as
the fraudulent claiming of such relief and interference with the labour
market. Capitalist relations of production have, then, as a condition of
their existence a welfare discourse which is a discourse about the policing
of idleness. It has to be emphasised that this is not another way of
saying that 'capitalism5 required a ready, willing and healthy workforce
and Chadwick, Hill and Harnett provided it. Welfare discourse is not
dictated, even in the 'final analysis', by the needs of 'capitalism'.
The work of the COS, Hill and Harnett did not contribute, without
remainder, to the maintenance of capitalist relations of production.
The present analysis of welfare discourse utilizes the parameters of
Foueault's concept of 'discipline'. The epistemological conditions
of existence of welfare discourse, and the form taken by these
conditions within the matrix of the social sciences, suggest important
lines of continuity running from the early 19th century. The present
and previous sub-sections have attempted to explicate some of the
features of this welfare 'discipline' and later sections will pick up
again these lines of continuity in an examination of social work in
Britain in the 20th century. For the moment, reinforcement will be
given to the conception of welfare discourse an a discursive regularity
which should be considered in terms of its specificity, Thoug£i welfare
discourse lends itself to an analysis in terms of Foucault's
5disciplinary power', this in no way suggests that welfare discourse is
simply one aspect of a homogeneous and omnipotent machinery of social
control. The 'history' of welfare and social work has discontinuities
which serve to fracture any such suggestion.
3. lines of Discontinuity
For both liberal and radical theorists of the development of British
social work, there is general agreement over the important, milestones of
-that process. Young and Ashton (1956:113-^)> Woodroofe (±97k''h7) "the
much more radical Chris Jones (1978:67) all agree that the Charity
Organisation Society laid the foundation stone of contemporary social
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work. ' The Settlement movement is acknowledged as an important
early contribution to 'group work' (Young and Ashton, 1956:223-35;
Woodroofe, 1975:65) and social work (Parry and Parry, 1979:22+) and
similar agreement is apparent over the 'origins' of that other
companion pursuit - 'community work' (Woodroofe, 1975:56; D. Jones,
1977:166-7; Sriscoe, 1977:182). Throughout these various histories,
Eriendly Societies are referred to as being of relevance in the process
of welfarism, although the references are occasionally merely
gestural. Woodroofe's only indexed reference is to mention that
Eriendly Societies, among many other "groups", "foreshadowed" group
work; Young and Ashton apologise for neglecting the "great deal of
personal social work" which the Societies must have done but note that
records of such work could not be found (1956:2). For others, the
Eriendly Society represented both the desire and. ability of the 'working
class' to 'help themselves' and a medium of incorporation of the so-
called labour aristocracy into the mainstream of 'bourgeois' hegemony
(Gray, 1977; Hearn, 1978).
(i) The Case of the Eriendly Societies
"... as a dynamically expanding system, industrial
capitalism is obliged to encourage amongst its workers
the greatest possible cooperation. Its incentives must
be sufficiently powerful to develop, as far as possible,
a general support of the system as a whole, and this
involves acceptance of the acquisitive motives of
capitalism. Each industrial enterprise and industrial
capitalism as a whole have therefore to assist the workers
to respond positively to the material inducements and
20. Woodroofe's agreement with Young and Ashton suggests she took
more than a lead, from their pioneering, historical account; compare,
for example, Ytoodroofe (1975:57) with Young and Ashton (1956:113-5) •
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incentives they have to offer, and they have to
try to win, if not the political confidence, then
at least the political neutrality of their working
cla.ss" (Saville, "The Welfare State: an historical
approach", 1957/8:7).
In this passage, Saville effectively summarises what is central
to many radical theses of the development of the Welfare State, social
policy and social work: the gradual incorporation/deradicalisation of
the 'working class'; 'bourgeois5 hegemony; one-dimensional society.
Given, it is argued, the fundamental contradiction within 'capitalism5 -
the private ownership of the means of production and the socialised
forces of production - it is necessary fox* capital, to 5 depoliticise5
the working class through "the systematic blockage of the capacities
found in culture and consciousness ..." (Hearn, 1978:8). Gray's
interpretation is more complex: "... the reproduction of dominant
values rested on a more subtle process of negotiated re-definition, in
which the conditional independence of working-class institutions came
to be recognised" (1977:87). However, although the 'bourgeoisie5 did
not have it all its own way (ibid.:88), the effect is broadly the same
because the 5bourgeoisie5 "constituted the hegemonic fraction within the
power bloc - that whose interests preponderate ..." (ibid.:77)« Whilst,
then, Gray attempts to tackle the complexity of the social and
technical division of labour and the relations between these groupings,
he is too inclined, ultimately, to reduce the issue to a two-class
contest. Consequently, for Gray, institutions such as Eriendly Societies
represented the 'working class5 . Containment and control of such
institutions i^as, therefore, containment and control of 'class
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consciousness1 (ibid.:87).
As Hanson says, apart from private charity and public relief,
"the principal agents for the provision of welfare in Britain
before 1908 were the friendly societies" (1972:ll8). And yet "they
have not been greatly studied" (Yeo, 1979:5l)- A glance at the
bibliography in one of the few of such studies, Gosden's The Friendly
Societies in England, l8l5 - 1879 (1961), confirms this: it also
illustrates the degree of interest engendered by Friendly Societies in
(2l)the early 19th century. v ' As Poynter suggests, much of this
interest arose from the hope that "the poor could preserve themselves
from indigence by their own frugality and foresight" (1969:35).
The first general piece of legislation concerning the Friendly
Society did not appear until 1793 (Gosden, 1961:5). 33 George III,
cap. 51+, "For the Encouragement and Relief of Friendly Societies"
(llicholls, 190l+:110), acknowledged hie private and public benefits
arising from the principles of the Friendly Society and, in effect,
gave statutory blessing to the development and registration of such
Societies. It is understandable that the 'purpose' of the Act was often
misunderstood (Poynter, 1969:38) and resented. Registration was not
compulsory and, two years later 35 George III, cap.Ill, in effect,
21. Among some of the works cited by Gosden one might note:
C. Ansell, A Treatise on Friendly Societies in which the Doctrine of
Interest of Money and the .Doctrine of Probability are practically applied
71835)7 J.T. Becher, hie Constitution of Friendly Societies upon legal
and scientific principles .. 7" (182J4): E. Chadwick, An Essay on the
Means of Insurance against the Casualties of Sickness, Decrepitude and
Mortality (1836T; S. Clapham, Friendly Societies substitutes for
Parochial A-ssessments - a sermon (l8l0) . Gosden's work provides a
thorough and relatively recent history of the Friendly Society but ends,
effectively, in 1875. Beveridge (19U9) provides a detailed history up
to 191+8 and includes some discussion of Building Societies which roust
also be registered with the Registrar of Friendly Societies.
extended an invitation to register to those Societies "which have
inadvertently omitted to take the benefit, of the ... Act".
Registration carried with it two main benefits: the legal protection
of funds and exemption from ♦removal1 for members (Nicholls, 1904:111;
Thompson, 1977:460). It is generally accepted, however, that a large
number of Societies declined to register (Thompson, 1977:460),
preferring to maintain control and autonomy over their own dealings.
With the passing of the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, outlawed
trade unions and political organisations utilized the exemption given
to Friendly Societies as 'covers' for their continuing activities
(Hearn, 1978:121; Thompson, 1977:199) and, consequently, those who had
formerly regarded the Societies with paternalistic pleasure began to
express reservations (Woodroofe, 1974:63). This is not, however,
sufficient reason to suggest that Friendly Societies represented 'workin
class' radicalism. Friendly Societies must be considered in terms of
their conditions of existence.
Friendly Societies, considered as 'benefit societies' or 'box
clubs', imply a body of subscribers combining to insure against needs
which will not be met out of available income or capital. Rrior to the
protection afforded by the 1793 Act, money invested in Friendly Soeietie
was protected by informal networks of trust and control and, as such,
would tend to be confined to specific geographic areas (villages;
( 22N)districts) or specific occupations (a trade; a factory). ^ ' "Those
22. "In l8l5 virtually all friendly societies were local in their
organisation ..." (Gosden, 1961:17). "... the local societies can be
divided into tfco broad groups, those whose members followed the same
occupation and' those with a mixed membership" (ibid,:7i).
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who were wealthy enough could purchase annuities for their old age
or for their children (Poynter, 1969:36), Friendly Societies were,
consequently, confined to small tradesmen, labourers and artisans
(Thompson, 1977:^58,^60). The need to ensure security of the funds
and a disciplined membership (to pay subscriptions regularly; to make
only legitimate claims on funds) tended to lead to a secrecy of
governance and a degree of self control which richer and more secure
members of the community often looked upon with trepidation. If
Friendly Societies were not being attacked for their radical potential
(23)
they often came under criticism for their pauperising traditions. v
One could hardly take exception to Thompson's view that the Friendly
Society of the early 19th century presents us with "authentic evidence
of the growth of independent working-class culture and institutions"
(l977:l|60-l). Thompson, however, also wants to argue that the Friendly
Society movement contributed to "the growth in working-class
consciousness" (ibid.; Lj.62) 0
A 'working class' is not 'made', nor does it 'make' itself.
Friendly Societies may well have provided a medium in some places for
the expression of common feelings of identity amongst direct producers
against capital hut such Societies should not be examined in terms of
their reflection or representation of a 'working class consciousness' .
They must be studied in terms of their- own specificity. To reflect
23. Gosaen provides the following quotation from the Board of
Agriculture's General View of the Agriculture of ... Essex (1793):
"... benefit clubs, holden at public houses, increa.se the number of
those houses, and naturally lead to idleness and intemperance; that
they afford commodious opportunities to foment sedition, and form
illegal combinations ... there is not the smallest probability in their
general extensive application, that they ever have, or ever will
diminish our poor rates but just the contrary ..." (1961:3).
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a cultural identity, a degree ox self-help and mutuality or
collectivist values (Thompson, 1977:5-62-3), -is not to reflect a
'working class consciousness'. To build a thesis about opposition
to capitalist relations of production in terms of the cumulative
power of a variety of institutional and cultural reflections of
'working class consciousness', is simply to pave the way for an
analysis of the failure of this opposition in terms of the gradual
and compartmental 'incorporation' of these institutions and cultures.
Eden, in bis Observations on Friendly Societies (l80l), noted
that some 5,117 Societies had registered themselves under the terms
of the 1793 Act arcd he estimated that there were around 2,000
unregistered clubs (and see Gosden, 1961:5- and Poynter, 1969:33).
Although there was a relatively large number of unregistered clubs
and although Eden was of the opinion that the "real object" of any
association should be ascertained and its progress "vigilantly
watched" (quoted by Gosden, 1961:157), it is noteworthy that Eden
believed that the majority of clubs had registered. The Combination
Acts remained in force until 1825/5 and it is understandable that
during this period "there was considerable fear that friendly societies
were revolutionary" (Gosden, 1961:156). As Gosden goes on to record,
even as late as lSJL>.8 a Committee of the House of Lords, appointed to
enquire into the conditions necessary for the registration of the
Manchester Unity of Oddfellows, could record in its Report: "... it is
clear that an. affiliated body with such resources at its command must
become highly dangerous if it should ever be turned from its legitimate
objects" (ibi£.:159)« The "legitimate objects" were, however, hi^aly
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regarded and -whilst one may see in legislation an increasing degree
of state control of Eriendly Societies, the 'discipline' involved
was directed as much or more towards the economic viability of the
Societies as to their political control.
Hie Act of 1793 required the rules and regulations of Societies
wishing to register to be lodged with the quarter sessions for approval
by the justices. No doubt one can view this within the wider picture
of popular unrest and disturbance around the years 1792-6 (Thompson,
1977:111 et seq.). Nevertheless, registration was not compulsory and
any Society exacting seditious oaths fcom its members was '■unlikely to
publish them and pass them on to the quarter sessions. The next major
piece of legislation on Eriendly Societies was 59 George III, cap.128
(1819) which required registered Societies to submit their tables of
(9) ^
contributions and benefits for approval by magistrates. ^ Prom
that time, legislation, and state concern generally, centred on the
economic viability of the. Societies. K
Eriendly Societies, based on a small geographical area, remained
popular throughout the 19th century. They provided some measure of
financia.1 security for local labour during periods of illness and avoided
for many the stigma of a pauper's funeral. It is estimated that in
2lp. The justices were to seek the approval of the tables from "two
persons at the least, known to be professional actuaries or persons
skilled in calculation" (quoted by Gosden, 1961:179).
25. Gosden notes that the Commons Select Committee on the Laws
respecting Eriendly Societies (1825) devoted most of its attention to
discussion of the issue of the financial solvency of the Societies
(1961:176). In 1827 a second Select Committee concluded that the
necessary information for actuarial calculation was incomplete,
10 George IY, fcap.56 (1829) accordingly ordered registered Societies tc
send quinquennial returns of sickness and mortality to the government
(ibid.:177).
1815 there was something less than one million members of such clubs
and that by the 1870s they were still one of the most popular forms
of Eriendly Society (Gosden, 1961:17)- Local Societies often
declined to register. Their convivial activities (meetings in public
houses; feast days) which were important events in their members'
lives and attracted members and subscriptions, were not allowed under
Eriendly Society legislation and, in addition, funds might often be
used for purposes not originally intended (e.g. to finance a strike).
In such circumstances, members valued the degree of personal control
they had over their Society and were not happy to see this eroded by
interference from the state (Gosden, 196l:l8). However, unregistered
local Societies were vulnerable to the possibility of having their
funds misappropriated and all small Societies suffered from the
tendency to have insufficient funds to meet the needs of members. As
a consequence, small Societies often ended in insolvency. When this
happened, older contributors (usually those over kO) were totally
unprotected for the future because many Societies would not accept new
1
members of this age. In addition, local, small Societies ware
inappropriate for a mobile labour force because rights could not be
transferred from one Society to another. Given the economic and legal
(?6^
conditions of existence of these Societies, ^ } autonomy and popular
management often proved to he a dead letter. It is these conditions
of existerne which help to explain the growth in popularity of other
26. The commodity form necessitates insurance against moments of
personal or familial crisis (sickness; unemployment; old age) and
requires actuarial calculation of contributions and benefits.
Non-registration removed funds from legal protection.
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forms of Fciendly Society.
Alongside the local Societies in the 1870s, the most popular
Friendly Society form were the Affiliated Orders. The 3U largest
Orders had over? 1,200,000 members by 1872 but were dominated by the
Independent Order of Oddfellows, Manchester Unity with 426,663 members
and the Ancient Order of Foresters with 388,872 (Gosden, 1961:26).
What 'these Orders attempted was to combine the benefits of local and
democratic control (the lodge) and the benefits to be derived from
(2l)affiliation. v ' Manchester Unity Lodges, for example, maintained
control over sick funds and management but contributed to a centralised
burial fund. Each lodge elected representatives for district
committees and delegates from these committees formed an Annual Moveable
Committee. Members of this Committee elected a Soard of Directors.
This hierarchy also represented the Union's appeals machinery for
aggrieved members. The Foresters had a similar democratic machinery
but, additionally, had no permanent headquarters, the 'seat of
government' being moved each year.
A large membership provided a degree of financial security for the
(28)
Affiliated Orders which they did not always obtain under the law. v '
Both the Manchester Unity and the Foresters issued members who required
them with a statement showing them to be 'in benefit'. Members could
tilen practice 'tramping' (travelling from town to town in search of
work) and be assured of support at brother lodges throughout, the country.
27. Yeo describes this as "the contradictory goods of democratic
branch autonomy with centralised scale and administrative/financial
back-up" (l97<jS:£L).
28. It was not until 1850 that branches (lodges) were allowed to
register and not until 1875 that Affiliated Orders could register as
such.
In addition, a member moving to another area could either transfer
entitlement to another lodge or could arrange payments to and from
ihe original lodge (Gosden, 1961:76-7).
G.D.H. Cole, in his Short History of the British Working Class
Movement, noted that unions, Eriendly Societies and the co-operatives
"were carried on under conditions which forbade access to the
poorer strata among the workers. Trade Union contributions were too
high. Eriendly Societies demanded an exercise of 'thrift' which was
beyond the reach of the less skilled operatives; the Cooperative
Society called for cash from men and women who were compelled to buy on
credit if they were to live at all" (quoted by Eearn, 1978:173). Ib
(29)
is apparent from the continued calls on the Poor Laws v J that self-
help organisations could not cope with the variety or the volume of
all needs. Amongst the poorer paid workers, and particularly in
agricultural areas, local Societies continued to meet some of the
minimum needs of members. The Manchester Unity and the Foresters,
however, began in the industrial areas of Lancashire and Yorkshire and
attracted better paid members. (3®) py exacting larger contributions th
Affiliated Orders were able to pay larger sickness benefits (Gosden, 1961
76,78). But the fact that the Affiliated Orders were associated rather
more with what has been called a 'labour aristocracy' than with a.
29. In 1891, according to Hanson, there were I;.2 million members of
registered Eriendly Societies: in 1892, 7UU>7f>7 claims to poor relief
(1972:121,116).
30. Agricultural labour did not require some of the 'benefits' that
the larger Societies could provide however; for example, the transfer
of entitlement or other facilities for a more mobile occupation.
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grass-roots labour movement is part of a wider consolidation of the
(21)
security of specific trades and occupations during the 19tn century. 1
Alongside the Affiliated Orders, but far less popular, were Friendly
Societies which acted very much as insurance companies. Often with
their headquarters in London, these Societies were controlled by
management committees which reported to annual general meetings. It
was argued, notes Gosden, that such a procedire was cheaper to run than
systems based upon popular control and it tended to appeal to those "of
a higher degree of respectability, artisans, tradesmen, domestic
servants ... who ... dislike the nonsense and mixed company of the club
nights and look for an investment of their savings on purely business
principles" (Sir George Young, Assistant Commissioner to the Royal
Commission on Friendly Societies, 1871-14, quoted by Gosden 196l:S>0-l).
These Societies, such as the Hearts of Oak with a membership in 1872 of
32,837, would allow subscriptions only from the better paid and
specifically excluded dangerous-occupation groups.
By the 1870s there was also a separate group of Societies known as
burial societies. The two largest in 1875 were the Royal Liver Friendly
Society with 600,000 members and the Liverpool Yictoria Legal Society with
31. This is what Lea describes as the 'monetization' of the class
struggle (1979:86-7). For many radical theorists such as Lea, Giddens
(1973:1114,158) and Haoermas (1976:21), the 'fundamental contradiction'
between labour and capital is 'depoliticised' and 'routinised' through
the wage bargaining process in which trade unions guarantee to
conventionalise conflict in return for stability of employment and wages.
It is not necessary, however, to view this process in terms of the
incorporation and deradicalisation of the 'working class' . Hie direct
producers under capitalist relations of production are rot inherently
radical or revolutionary and they do not embody a homogeneity of purpose
which allows c^ie to describe the position of a 'labour aristocracy' as
a 'sell-out1 to the 'working class'.
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200,000. Most burial societies were based in Liverpool, collected
subscriptions from house to house and spent a large proportion of
their income (up to 1+0%) on management expenses (Gosden, 1961:53-9)*
What we see, then, is a change in form in the Friendly Society
movement during the 19th century away from local and democratically
controlled mutual aid clubs and towards the large, centralised
insurance company model. She Manchester Unity suffered a rift in the
l8i+0s when the central authority attempted to tighten control over the
subscriptions and benefits of affiliated lodges (Gosden, 1961:28).
Central control within the Foresters was less certain but, as a consequence,
it was felt that the business efficiency of the Order suffered (ibid.:37)*
It seems clear, then, that the kinds of demands placed on the funds
of Societies, particularly in. industrial areas, required a centralised
management and a degree of actuarial calculation which were not particularly
conducive to the older ideals of the local clubs. Some lodges of the
Affiliated Orders, for example, began to refuse membership to miners and
railway workers because, as an occupational group, each made above
average demands on funds (Gosden, 1961:83-7)* It is also noticeable that
the management of the Manchester Unity and the Foresters was dominated by
professional and self-employed men (ibid.:88-93)* This is not to argue
that they were taken over by the petite bourgeoisie but rather to note that
the scale of organisation and demands of posts required educated leaders
who could arrange their time with a degree of flexibility not often open to
employees.
Friendly Societies describe a trajectory which does not fit well with
standard liberal and radical histories of the Welfare State. Despite the
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reluctant praise of the Royal Commission of I83U for their degree of
disciplinary control arid their adoption of social enquiry, Friendly
'
Societies do not form a, line of continuity with 19th and 20th century
social work practice. Primarily sickness and "burial clubs, Friendly
Societies required merely a confirmation of actual inability to work
(a requirement met by the doctor* s certificate for most Societies towards
the end of the 19th century) or of death. The science of statistical
probability rather than the science of Man and Society formed the basis
of calculation within the knowledge-power relation developed by
Friendly Societies. Despite the competition of finance capital in the
form of the insurance company (by the end of 1886, the Prudential
Assurance Company had 7>H1j828 industrial assurance policies in force;
Gosden, 1961:215-6), the Friendly Society was not entirely engulfed,
membership in 1970 being 1l.8 million according to Hanson (1972:137)-
Neither, however, did the Friendly Society entirely merge with, and
( 33)
disappear into, state benefit schemes. ' As advocates of 'national
insurance' towards the end of the 19th century recognised, Friendly
Societies did not meet the needs of those whose income was too small to
meet regular contributions, or who lost all rights to relief on falling
behind with payments. In addition, increasing longevity of members was
32. Three million, towards the end of the 19th century, according to
Thane (l98lb:8U).
33- In the context of the National Insurance Act, 1911 Fraser suggests
that "Generally the friendly societies were sacrificed to the more
powerful commercial interests ..." (l978:l5U)» Under the terms of that
Act, Friendly Societies became 'approved societies' and compulsory
contributions were directed their way until their status changed again
with the National Insurance and National Health Acts 01 19U6.
3h3.
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also putting a strain on the funds of Societies (Thane, 1981b; 81;).
Yeo has written that "... the creative, public, associations!
voluntary life of so many English working people during the second
half of the nineteenth century - for example in Friendly Societies -
has been subordinated, rendered less ambitious, or assimilated to
rational capitalist or bureaucratic models during the twentieth
century ..." (1979:69). Certainly the legal and economic conditions
of existence of Friendly Societies (the wage form; the commodity form:
the anarchic labour market etc.) made local, small scale and popular
control difficult. Friendly Societies, in a sense, were by-passed
rather than incorporated by capitalist relations of production. The
provision of health care and a minimal income maintenance scheme,
removed from the realm of the commodity form, has effectively supplanted
the Friendly Society. The lesson to learn from the history of the
Friendly Society is not that it was "assimilated to rational capitalist
or bureaucratic models" but that it remained, and has continued to
exist, outside the commodity form. ^ ' Friendly Society legislation,
then, still provides an interesting area for socialist political
involvement, especially when it is recognised that Building Societies
fall within the purview of the Registrar of Friendly Societies who
carries certain powers to control the transactions of registered
organisations and to protect the rights of their members.
3I1. By the end of the century, most Societies had contracts with
medical practitioners. Gosden writes: "The surgeon was conceived
of as the servant and employee of the members of the society; the
method of appointment - by all of the members gathered in their court
or lodge - emphasised this. A medical officer who failed to give
satisfaction Would also fail to be re-elected" (l96l:ll45-6).
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Friendly Societies, so often discussed within the context of
liberal histories of the development of welfare and social work in
Britain and within the context of the hegemonisation of 'working
class* organisation by the 'capitalist'-form ideology, can be seen to
be much less easily dissolved into such lines of continuity than we
are often led to believe. Foucault's concept of 'discipline' and the
iaicro-physics of power have little heuristic value for an understanding
of Friendly Societies. In addition, most Societies maintained a
distance both from the patronising organisation of moral missionaries
and aristocratic philanthropists and the legal and bureaucratic
machinery of the state, making accusations of their 'incorporation*
difficult to sustain.
(ii) TOie Case of Industrial Welfare
"... the rapid growth of commercial undertakings, and
in particular of munition works, makes it difficult
or impractical for the management to deal, unless by
special arrangement, with the numerous problems of
labour efficiency and the personal welfare of the
employee. Yet, without some such special arrangement,
there cannot fail to be diminished output, discontent,
and uosmooth working. In matters of discipline,
output, and long or exceptional exertion, the state of
mind of those who are actually at work is all important"
(Memorandum No.2 of Health of Munition Workers Committee,
Ministry of Munitions, 1915'Para, T(d))'.'
Hie work of F.W. Taylor represents, for Kinsey, the coincidence of
organisation and control wherein "discipline, properly so called,
obtains" (1979:60). Integral to this discipline of the workplace, notes
Kinsey, is the modern contract of employment: together they form what
Kinsey calls the "despotism of legality". Both Melossi and Lea, in the
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same collection of papers as Kinsey's contribution, also make
reference to Taylor, the 'father' of scientific management, but they
emphasise that 'capitalist discipline' has moved beyond the workplace
to cover "the whole of society" (Melossi, 1979:95)• ^5) if one
wishes to look for empirical signs of a ' disciplinary' knowledge-
power relation in the workplace, Taylor ism would seem to be a somewhat
flagrant and crude body of discourse to consider. Welfare discourse
provides, ostensibly, a more appropriate frame of reference for a
radical discussion of factory discipline. Whilst Taylor's mechanistic
and behaviouristic approach sits well with Ibucault's belief that the
"body-machine complex" of the labour process reflects a disciplinary
power which has "... the function not so much of deduction as cf
synthesis, not so much of exploitation of the product as of coercive
link with the apparatus of production" (1977:153)5 H offends his view
that discipline deals with "... a body of useful training and not of
rational mechanics ..." and, "... by virtue of that very fact, a number
of natural requirements and functional constraints ..." (ibid:l55)-
If the science of welfare represents the utilization of the sciences of
Man and Society and the techniques of the social enquiry in the policing of
idleness, it would seem legitimate to seek for its telltale signs in the
policing of labour and efficiency in the workplace.
35. For Melossi the Welfare State is an "administrative apparatus ...
in which conquests of the working class are turned to the real
advantage of capitalism" (1979:96). For Lea: "... the decline of
the discipline of factory and market and their replacement by the
inherently fragile structures of monetization" produces, as a
"response", an expansion and sophistication of data gathering
techniques "incorporating the welfare institutions" (1979:87)-
s
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For the beginning of just such an enquiry there are one or two
obvious historical signposts') The early 19th century reveals the
phenomenon of the enliggitened and philanthropic industrialist,
symbolised perhaps by Owen and the Hew Lanark mills. The early 20th
century maintains the continuity of that line through Seebohm Rowntree
and his poverty surveys. Marx, of course, provided another line of
enquiry through his discussion of the Factories Acts. As Mishra
discusses, Marx's analysis of factory legislation highlights the
tension between his recognition of the effectivity of the agitation of
the labour movement for improved conditions and the complexity of the
(^6)
social division of labour ' on the one hand, and the determination
in the last instance by the economic on the other which effectively
( 37 ^
negated any gains made V'-M ' (Mishra, 1975)•
The anarchic nature of production and commodity circulation under
capitalist relations of production does, of course, make calculation by
individual capitals of the benefits to be derived from welfare and
safety measures a risky business. We have already touched on the anxiety
expressed by philanthropic manufacturers that voluntary control over the
working hours of children placed them, competitively, at a disadvantage.
In examining the question of "employers' attitudes" to welfare issues,
36. Hay notes Marx's discussion of "the positive contributions of
government inspectors, 'progressive employers' and the landed
aristocracy" (1931:111-2).
37* A thesis given sophisticated treatment in Carson's studies of
the 'conventionalisation' of the Factories Acts (197C; 197^)-
Stearns (1979) provides a similar treatment in a Swedish context. The
non-enforcement of occupational safety laws, he suggests, "... is far
more invidious than agency non-enforcement. It is rather a symptom of
the stranglehold which the economic presuppositions of capitalism place
upon a continued dynamic programme of industrial control" (1979:20).
31*7.
Hay sees implications both for control and efficiency. He writes:
"... social control was only one motive for
employer interest in welfare. Considerations
of economic efficiency and cost ... were often
much more important ..." (1981:110).
To these considerations might be added the simple point that enterprises
have to make certain minimum efforts to attract and keep their required
labour force. Increasing co-operation of labour through the trade
union movement made wages and conditions a matter of genuine negotiation
and struggle. Correspondingly, of course, we find organisations which
purport to represent the interests of employers in specific industries
or in the national economy as a whole.
This sub-section will be looking briefly at 'the concepts of
industrial welfare and social work in an industrial setting. Despite
the imperialist tendency of professional social work, ^8) involvement
in the private sector is notably absent in the professional social work
journals, in training documents and even in histories of the profession.
Neither Young and Ashton nor Woodroofe make any reference at all to the
38. The regular reader of Social- Work Today, the journal of the British
Association of Social Workers, and Community Care, a journal sent free "to
professional social service staff", must be impressed by a social 'work
disccurse which attempts to embrace most practices in the name of method
(art and music as therapy techniques, for example; as well as Zen
Buddhism) and most areas of life in the name of genericisoi ("The impact
of heart transplant surgery can be overwhelming for both patient and
family. Mavis Shrimpton shows how social workers can help them cope".
Social Work Today, Y0I.I3, No.25, 2 March 1982:12). Gilbert and Specht,
describing a. meeting in the USA at which social workers were discussing
the content of a training course, write: "As the list of problems ...
grew longer and wider in range, one professional who works with the state
senate inquired, !Is there any problem that you think you cannot deal
with?' He tblen said he finds it difficult to convince the senate ...
that social workers can do anything well" (1977:223).
industrial welfare worker in their respective histories of British
(English) social work. Jeffreys (1965) notes that she included in
her study "welfare officers employed in industry" out decided to
exclude them from her Anatomy of Social Welfare Services. Whether
this was because she felt they were merely 'vestigial organs' or,
perhaps, 'foreign bodies', is not clear. Rodgers' and Dixon's
pioneering Portrait of Social Work (i960) dedicates two or three pages
to "Social Work in Industry" (ibid.:199-202) but the authors' primary
fccus was social work in statutory and voluntary organisations.
Youngh'usband, in both of her Carnegie Trust reports on the employment
and training of social workers (1947; 1951) provides some discussion
of personnel management but, again, these references are brief and
clearly peripheral.
It can, of course, simply be argued that social work in the work
place is called personnel management. There can be no doubt, however,
that we have here two quite distinct concepts and it is unlikely that
the Institute of Personnel Management and the British Association of
Social Workers would ever contemplate a merger. And yet the
Institute of Personnel Management began its corporate life in 1913 as
( 30)
the Welfare Workers Association.
39- Superficially, a case can be made for suggesting that contemporar
personnel management and social wcrx share some common ancestral
features. In a gestural section on "Historical Development", Cuming
writes in his The Theory and Practice of Personnel Management (1977):
"The origins of personnel management can be found wherever enlightened
employers have tried over the years to improve the lot of their workers
l ... 3 Robert Owen ... incurred the wrath of his business partners by
spending some of their profits on improving the working and living
conditions ofihis labour force ..." (1977■'4).
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She *origLns' of social work training axe located in the
triumvirate of the Gharity Organisation Society, Octavia Hill and the
Settlement movement. In 1896, a Joint Lectures Committee was
organised by the COS, with representatives from the Women's University
Settlement in Southwark, the National Union of Women Workers and the
COS. Octavia Hill's sister (Miranda) was an early lecturer (Smith,
1965:21; Woodroofe, 197^:53-^)« £n 190U? a School of Social Science
was established at the University of Liverpool througi the co¬
operative effort of the Settlement movement and the COS and,
subsequently, universities in Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds and Manchester
also established what Macadam calls "social training" (Macadam, 19U5:23).
Hie School of Sociology was established by the COS in London in 1903 and,
in 1912, was incorporated into "the London School of Economics and
Political Science as the Social Science department. By the advent of
the First World War, then, training for 'social* work and scientific-
welfare was closely linked with university teaching of the social
sciences (Smith, 1965:^8 et seq.; Macadam, 19145:23).
The agonising search for identity which is a particularly notable
I
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feature within the contemporary social work profession ^ ' is not a
new phenomenon. In a work published in 1925? Macadam was
acknowledging "the vagueness which surrounds the expression 'social
work*..." (1925:16) and was lamenting the lost opportunities for
meeting the demands for "a new profession" with "definite equipment"
which came from "Hew standards of public health, housing, conditions
and security of employment, treatment of the criminal, moral and social
hygiene ..." (ibid.:17). Macadam's 1925 book was entitled The
Equipment of the Social Worker. By 19^5 she was describing, in broadly
similar terms, The Social Servant in the Making. Despite purporting
to be A Review of the Provision of Braining for the Social Services,
Macadam's imperialistic designs for a, university based programme "for
the -training of social workers" (1945'32) left few areas of public and
private employment out of account. What Macadam reflects is the belief
that wherever those in employment must, as an essential part of their
task, deal with people (be they doctors or canteen assistants, Members
of Parliament or nursery school teachers), social scientific knowledge
1+0. A recent Community Care editorial noted: "... there have been
ten ... review groups since - but not including - Seebohm'and asks:
"How many more working parties do we need before we satisfy ourselves
about the nature of the role and tasks undertaken by social- workers ,..? "
(February 25, 19;32:l). Doubts and confusions over tine identity of
social work and how it ought to fulfil its tasks are regularly expressed
in the social work journals quite apart from periodic moments of crisis,
for example: on the creation of the British Union of Social Workers
(Community Care and Social Work Today "Letters" page for July 26, 1979
and 7 and. lip August 1979 respectively); over the social work national
strike of 1973/9: and the frontal attacks of June Lait and Colin
Brewer (Brewer, "Are social workers really necessary?", Community Care,
30 March, 1977; Lait, "Hie unnecessary profession", Community Care,
5 April 1979; Brewer and Lait, Can Social Work Survive? Temple Smith,
1980). The jyssue of the nature of social work has again dominated
social work journals during 1982 with the report of the Barclay
Committee (lUSW, 1981-2), (Social Work Today, 27 April 1932).
is of value. But if, at the beginning of the 20th century, there
was some tendency to describe a broad range of tasks generically as
'social' work, discourse on the role of industrial welfare work was
much less amorphous.
In September 19l5» Lloyd George appointed the Health of Munition
Workers Committee "To consider and advise on questions of industrial
fatigue, hours of labour, and other matters affecting the personal
health and physical efficiency of workers in munitions factories and
workshops" (Ministry of Munitions, Final Report, 1918. Hereafter
cited as "Munitions - Final Report, 1918"). Early in the Final
Report (para.ll) the Committee makes the point that, although the primary
concern is munition workers, the Report "deals also with vital principles
and practical methods affecting all forms of industry. Moreover the
health of the industrial worker - man and woman - is but a part, essential,
plastic, living, of the health of the people as a whole, which in its
turn raises manifold problems of administration, economics, social
relationships and even ethics ..." Fatigue and efficiency, then, are
to be interpreted and given significance by reference to a wider system
of considerations. That this was not mere rhetoric, the Committee set
about establishing almost .immediately. By December 19l5» "Memorandum
No.2" was issued by the Committee on the subject of Welfare Supervision
(hereafter cited as "Welfare Supervision, 1915")• The Memorandum notes
with some urgency that there are "conditions, outside the ordinary
undertaking of factory management" which affect the efficiency of the
workers: housing; transit; canteen provision; and the individual
welfare of the employee (para.l). To tackle these problems, the
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Committee recommended the establishment of officers with responsibility
for wel fare supervision.
Welfare work was not the 'brain child' of the Committee. In 1909
a conference on industrial welfare work was held in Birmingham to
which seventeen firms sent representatives. A second conference, in
York in 1913» attracted nearer thirty representatives (Cashmere, 1916:3
Munitions - final Report, 19l8:para.3). The Memorandum provided,
within its meagre pages, liberal quotations from "large employers of
labour" and "proprietors" in support of welfare work. One lamented
that large establishments made it impossible for an employer or his
directors "to be in personal touch" with employees. He continues:
"Those employers ... who recognise that their
responsibility towards their employees involves
duties beyond those realized through the medium of
the wage office, have to seek to fulfil these
obligations by other- means" (Welfare Supervision,
19l5:pa2-,a.l(d)).
This has led, the employer notes, to the establishment in a number of
factories "of an organized system of what is called social or welfare
work, carried on by specially trained men and women" (ibid.).
Rrom the varied quotations provided, the reader can build a picturs
of the employers' view of welfare work. The employer just quoted saw
the "main duty" to be "to humanize industrial conditions of life and to
foster and keep alive those right relationships which are the basis of c
well-ordered and harmonious community". In the pursuit of these broad
aims, the welfare worker must act as an intermediary: she is a go-
between. Acting with "the confidence of the employees", being "always
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in touch with them", the welfare worker can translate the
"dissatisfactions and misunderstanding" which arise. Hie welfare
worker is at once both guardian of business efficiency (J*suggesting and
advising upon improvements in conditions ... that may be helpful on
the business side") and of the total welfare of the employees
("initiating and supervising ... clubs, societies and classes";
"visiting the sick"; giving "advice and assistance" on matters both
'personal* and 'private') (ibid.). Such endeavours, "another large
employer" suggests. "... will show good results in the character and
well-being of the workers". Welfare work, then, emphasises the
Committee, is not something- to be regarded as extraneous to the factory,
it is "... a vital and integral part of the whole discipline and right
organisation of the business". And, as the second employer is quoted
as adding: "the economic results have justified the trouble and
expense" (ibid. :para.1(d)). Ostensibly at least, Cashmere, s.
contemporary observer, would seem to make a valid point in her suggestion
that, unlike the "scientific management" approach of welfare workers in
the USA, British welfare work was "philanthropic", "indefinite" and
"spora,dic" (i9l6:lj.).
It might be said that amongst the conditions of existence of the
concept of welfare work are economic considerations which require
calculation of the relationship between production and the physical and
IfL. "But there have been", Cashmore continues, "£rom the start, the
two elements that good morale, good conditions, good health, form an
economic asset ... and secondly, that it is a part of our duty to our
neighbour, a recognition that master and man are of the same flesh and
blood ..." (1916:1+).
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mental state of the available labour force. Part of this
calculation, for some employers, was a philanthropic concern for
the lives of those they employed. However, other specific
conditions were dictated by the political and legal environment and
by the consequent nature of the available national labour supply.
Hie First World War demanded a large armed force supported by the
industrial production of weaponry. Paradoxically, then, those
skilled, socialised and strengthened for heavy industry were required
on the battlefield and the munitions industry had to turn to young
men, "too young to enter the forces, and to female labour. Discourse
on welfare work is discourse about the policing of an unsuitable
labour force. ' Apart from a whole series of disparate and often
mundane duties performed by existing welfare workers, we find
unequivocal involvement in the policing of behaviour and morality both
in and outside the factory. One proprietor of "one of the largest"
munition factories is quoted: "... we feel it highly desirable that
the workpeople should keep their minds occupied with healthy recreation
whilst they are away from the Works, which reflects directly upon their
efficiency ..." (Welfare Supervision, lSlS:^ara..k). This particular
ij.2. The Memorandum of 1915" noted as a matter of urgency that a
system of Welfare Supervision was essential "where women or girls are
employed" (Welfare Supervision, 1915:para.7). The Memorandum moved on
to record matters - "particularly of discipline and conduct - in which
helpful oversight is specially needed in the case of women and girls".
Specific examples given were: "the conduct of foremen towards women
workers; ... the character and behaviour of fellow women workers; ...
the maintenance of suitable and sufficient sanitary accommodation; ...
the worker's own state of health; ... her capacity to withstand ...
physical strain ... long hours, overtime, or night work" (ibid.:para.8).
Welfare Supervision for male workers is mentioned in the two final
paragraphs but it is said to be "of particular importance in the case of
boys" (ibid::para.12).
firm had employed a Chaplain, who had "knowledge of workpeople", to
settle disputes amongst families living in hostels and "to generally
look after the children".
Hie well-being of employees is, without doubt, in the minds of
those who spoke for their firms (cinemas and concert halls were built;
doctors and operating theatres provided), but so also is the moral
standing of those in their charge ("A good Lady Superintendent ... is,
we consider, advantageous to secure good order and protect the moral
welfare of the girls The range of duties envisaged for the
welfare worker is more specifically outlined in the Sinai Report of 1918
and there are broad parallels with contemporary discussions about the
social work 5task*. First there are the mundane, practical duties.
For the present day social worker, a contentious issue is involvement in
the "... provision of bath adds for the handicapped, bus passes for the
elderly ..." and so on, which trained social workers see as net part of
their duties (BASW, 1977*para.3.5)• For the welfare worker, duties
could include making recommendations for the provision of seats for the
workers and the provision of overalls (Munitions - Final Report, 1918:
Appendix J). Secondly, however, there is a mixture of duties which
highlight what the BASW Report calls the "dual dimension of care and
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control" (BASW, 1977:para.2.5), The welfare supervisor, then,
should have responsibility for arranging the transfer of a worker
whose health was being affected by her present work; she should
ensure that clean and healthy conditions were maintained and keep in
contact with all cases of serious accident or illness. She should
also, however: "be responsible for all questions of general behaviour";
supervise cloakrooms and sanitary conveniences to ensure general
cleanliness, but also to prevent "loitering" and "pilfering" (Munitions -
Final Report, 1918:Appendix J).
"The first of the great operations of discipline is", writes
Foucault, "... the constitution of 'tableaux vivants', which transform
the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered
multiplicities" (197711^-8)» A major facet of the work of welfare
workers during both the First and Second "World Wars was the co¬
ordination of the transfer of workers to munition towns, finding them
accommodation, and arranging transport to the factory (Welfare
Supervision, 1915spara. 1 (a) - (c); Final Report, 1918:para.!;57s
Appendix J; Ministry of Labour and Rational Service, 19bl:para.l+).
Discipline also controls activity: it constitutes "a totally useful
1+3. Social workers struggle to 'resolve' what they see at worst as
a conflict and at least as a strain between their role as "an enabling
profession" and the authority they carry (statutory authority but also
professional authority) and the control it often requires them to
exercise. "Authority seems to be one of the most difficult concepts
for those cf us in social work to assimilate", writes one contributor
to a BASW conference - "Social work - an enabling profession" (Social
Work Today, Vol.11, No.6, October 9th 1979:1b). The tension is also
apparent in the perennial question examined in social work journals -
'is residential care part of social, work' and in the ambiguity
experienced by many Scottish social workers who, after 1971 > found
themselves operating as probation officers and, subsequently, staffing
prison social work units.
time" (Foucault, 1977:l5^)' "The Welfare Supervisor should have
some way of observing the health in relation to the efficiency of
the workers ..." (Munitions - Pinal Report, 1918:Appendix J.IIl(b)).
This might be done, the Report suggests, by watching wages earned:
falling wages being a presage of failing health. Or the welfare
worker could study time sheets and sickness records. In terms of
what Foucault calls the "body-object articulation" (ibid.:152), the
welfare" supervisor must concern herself with the "geneses of
individuals". "Regard must be had to the individuality of the
workers and. to the wide variations that exist in their physical and
mental capacity, and in their social circumstances and habits" (Final
Report, 1918:para.436(d)). The process, then, is one in which the
welfare worker individualises but for the purpose of normalisation and
homogenisation (Foucault, 1977^181+). It is a process which demands
social enquiry: 'files' are constituted, 'cases' constructed. "A
record should be opened for each new worker containing information as
to age, physical condition, home circumstances etc. To this record
should be added from time to time details of progress, ill-health,
broken time, and other matters likely to prove of value" (Final Report,
19l8:para.I|l|.6(b)). In the maintenance of files, welfare workers are
advised to do home visits. This is seen as an extension cf care:
"Workers who are ill may be visited in order to ascertain that they
are properly cared for ..." But it is also an extension of control:
"... visits may usefully be paid to the parents of the younger girls ...
to discuss ... the merits and progress as well as the demerits of their
children Q... B Minor offences by girls can sometimes be better dealtf
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with by the parents ..." ([Final Report, 19l8:para.l|53(i)) •
Similarly, in considering welfare supervision for boys and men,
the Report discusses the role of Boy Visitors whose task it is "to
get at the root" of problems such as "thriftlessness, ill-discipline
and other evils". Through "investigations of the boys' circumstances,
home life etc.", the Boy Visitor can "work towards getting contented,
well-disciplined boy workers, and the information he gathers will
always be available to assist the staff in the smooth working of the
factory" (ibid. :para.ii83).
Welfare Supervisors, then, assisted in creating an ordered work
force. They participated in selection interviews which acted as
normalising and sifting procedures. As one Supervisor is quoted:
"Gne rejects the old, the infirm, the undersized, the short si^ated,
the dirty, the flashy, the anaemic and the corpulent ..." (Pinal
Report, 1918:para.ip61+) . Once selected, labour is then categorised
according to the dictates of the "body-machine complex". One must
prevent, for example, "... a dull boy from being set to work which
requires thought, or a bright intelligent toy from being allocated to a
task which could well be performed by one who is mentally dull" (ibid.:
J4J4. Foucault talks of the ' de-institutionalization' of disciplinary
mechanisms (1977;211). It 13 not, however, being argued, as Foucault
does, that 5 discipline' begins to "circulate in a 'free1 state; ...
broken down into flexible methods of control,, which may be transferred
and adapted" (ibid.). Welfare discipline must be studied within its
specific conditions of existence and in terms of its own effactivity.
Welfare discipline as industrial welfare may become deinstitutionalised
to the degree that the conditions of existence allow practice outside
the factory in the same way that a prisoner on parole from prison
remains subject to the discipline of the prison extended into the
community (Fine, 1980:2lj.).
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pscca.Ij.88). Welfare Supervision controls activity within the factory
in the policing of a totally useful time. And it may also provide
knowledge about the phenomenon of 'lost workers' through "Intelligent
and sympathetic follow-up of absentees ..." (ibid.:Appendix D).
Chris Jones has argued that there are certain heuristic
advantages to be gained by studying social work through an analysis of
social work training (1978:v-vi; 1979:72). Training is, he argues,
a major means of socialisation into the profession. There can be no
doubt that as more and more employers of social workers demand specific
professional qualifications (e.g. CQSW), formal training will occupy an
increasingly important place in the recognition of agents as social
workers. The important point is, however, recognition. To be a
specific agent of decision and calculation requires recognition of that
status by other agents in a social relationship. Ibr man;/ social
workers, that recognition resides initially in the fact of being employed
by, for example, a social work agency identified as such by statute.
Continued recognition may depend upon acceptance by others (employer:
colleagues; clients) as a competent practitioner. This, in its turn
may depend on the acquisition cf certain skills and knowledge on which
decisions can be based. For many agents, recognised as social workers,
the means of reaching decisions were acquired through experience and
'desk training'. Formal training, then, is merely one form in which
one of the conditions of existence of social work is manifested.
Writers such as Macadam, writing in the first quarter of the 20th
century, were certain that they could identify a core of practices as
'social work', Those practising social, work might v/ork in a "great
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diversity of occupations" and some may practise in a "highly
specialised" manner but they could "be distinguished from professions
"for which social training is highly desirable" hut which could not
"he said to fall within the category of social work" (1925:112).
For Macadam, welfare work in factories, was unequivocally a specialised
branch of social work which was "rapidly becoming an independent
profession" (1925:113)* The Health of Munition Workers Committee
was also, in 19l5> prepared to acknowledge the relationship between
welfare work and social work more generally by recommending the Social
Study courses already in existence "for students preparing themselves
as members of various Local Government bodies, as Welfare Workers in
factories, and for ethers engaged in social administration ..." (1915:
footnote to para.9). in its later Report, the Committee went further:
"Though there will be exceptions it will generally be desirable that
candidates should undergo a special period of training" (Final Report,
19l8:para.Ij.66). The Committee, in fact, endorsed the recommendations
of a Committee of University representatives (The Selection and Training
of Welfare Supervisors in Factories and Workshops, 191?)• On the
basis of the latter Report, the Joint University Council for Social
Studies (JUC) set up another Committee to look more fully at the
training of welfare workers (Macadam, 1925:113-^)* Among those on
that Committee one might note: Hilda Cashmore, warden of Bristol
University Settlement; J.J. Mallon, warden of Toynbee Hall; Rrofessor
i>5. In 1920, the Welfare Workers' Institute required the possession




Urwick; and representatives of trade unions, employers'
organisations, welfare workers and the Factory Inspectorate.
Elizabeth Macadam was honorary secretary. The JOG report -
University Training for Welfare Work in Industry and Commerce (l92l) -
expressed the view that "students should qualify for social work
generally before specialising in welfare work" (ibid.:9). It is
clear that the Committee felt that welfare work should not be tackled
by those without a Social Studies diploma (ibid.:12).
Among those agencies in a position to influence the process of
recognition of welfare work (the state: the Ministry of Munitions made
the appointment of welfare supervisors obligatory in all national
factories and the Police, Factories etc (Miscellaneous Provisions) .Act
of 1916 required supervision of women on night shifts; the employers;
the welfare workers' associations; and the training establishments)
there was a marked acceptance that it was a branch of a wider practice,
known as social work. According to 'the Pinal Report of the Health of
Munition Workers Committee, the Central Association of Welfare
Supervisors had around 600 members (1918:para. 1175, footnote) and up to 1$0
Welfare Supervisors for boys had been appointed by April 1918, with a
h6. "The practical side of the curriculum roust necessarily include
training in administration under skilled guidance in connection with
Health, Housing, Employment and Unemployment, Education ...,
Administration of Justice, Juvenile Organisations ..., After Care etc.
In this way, students gain first-hand knowledge of social problems and
their proposed solution ..." (J(JC, 1921:11). The Committee went on to
recommend against a special diploma or certificate for welfare workers;
"the usual Social Study certificate or diploma, which should bear a
special endorsement to the effect that the candidate has satisfied the
examiners in thai part of the training which deals more specifically with
welfare work" .being seen as sufficient (ibid.: 12).
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separate association of Boy Welfare Supervisors "being planned (1918:
para.590, footnote). The rou^i figure of approximately 800
Supervisors, in munition factories alone, is confirmed "by a footnote
to paragraph 9(b) of the same Report. As a "branch of social work in
the first two decades of the 20th century, the relative size of welfare
work can be gauged by comparison with other acknowledged branches.
Hie first hospital almoner, so the historians of social work tell us,
was appointed in 1895 (Fido, 1977:228; Woodroofe, 1975:61; Chambers,
1959:367) and formal training began in 1905 (Younghusband, 1959:pa^'a-
207). According to Macadam there were 75 almoners in 1925 (1925:122) but
by 1957 the Institute of Almoners had 700 members (Younghusband, 1957:
para.15). Psychiatric social work, which, "made its debut in 1927 in this
country" (Chambers, 1959:372) could boast a total of only 523 persons who,
by 1951j had qualified as psychiatric social workers since formal training
began in 1929• Of these, 331 were said to be employed in the UK
(Ministry of Health, Mackintosh Repxjrt, 195l:pa^a*36). In 1900
I
there was said to be 100 police court missionaries (Young and Ashton, 1956
175)' By 1957 there were 750 probation officers and by 1950, 1026
(Younghusband, 195l:p3^a-50).
Despite the numerical dominance of industrial welfare work over the
other branches of social work, it occupies a noticeably peripheral
relevance within welfare discourse and, in the present situation, it is
unlikely to feature at all in general social work texts or in generic
57* By 1956/7, this figure had risen to 505 psychiatric social workers
in employment (Younghusband, 1959:Pa^a*805)«
363.
social work training courses. The British Federation of Social
Workers (BF£W) was formed in 1935 (Macadam, 1955:27) hut in 1957,
when Professor Simey chaired a Committee on Salaries and Conditions
of Work of Social Workers, the Institute of Personnel Management
was not affiliated to the BFSW. (^) The Institute was, however, one
among several organisations which provided evidence (Simey, 1957:16-7)
and was used, in a sense, as a pay analogue. Younghusband referred to
personnel management in both of her enquiries into the employment and
training of social workers in Britain (1957; 195l) but felt obliged to
record:
"The Personnel Manager may often engage in case work of
an intricate nature ... but his or her main concern is
with the worker's appropriate contribution to an
industrial undertaking rather than with the worker as
an end in himself, and it would be difficult to argue
that the Personnel Manager is primarily a social
worker ..." (1957:para.375)•
It should, therefore, come as less of a surprise to note that in presenting
a "Brief chronology of social work education and training in the United
Kingdom", CCEPSW was able to list as important milestones: the 1835 Poor
Law Act: the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913; and the abolition of the
Boards of Guardians in Northern Ireland in 1958; but make no reference
58. The Institute was incorporated in 1956 and hah, formerly, been the
Institute of Industrial Welfare Workers (1925); the Central Association
of Welfare Workers (1916); and the Welfare Workers Association (1913)
(Cuming, 1977:5).
59. Notable 'professional' associations which were affiliated were:
Association of Family Caseworkers; Association of Mental Health Workers;
Association of Psychiatric Social Workers; Institute of Almoners;
National. Association of Probation Officers,
r
36U.
to industrial welfare work (CCETSW, 1975:Appendix A).
Prom the earliest days of its discussion, welfare work was set
apart from other social work. In an article in The Englishwoman,
in 1916, Macadam outlined what she saw as the "very definite
attraction" of welfare work: "This lies in the fact that appointments
are made, or ought to be made, on a. definitely business footing, on
the grounds that the increased comfort and consequent efficiency of
the women workers justifies the expenditure" (1916: 2l|0). For Macadam,
the welfare worker was to fill the role of go-between by winning the
confidence of both employer and employee but, in the final analysis.
"Sne is engaged in a business relation and represents the employer in
matters relating to the general welfare of the ... employees" (ibid.:
2I48). In addition, whilst the welfare worker should, concern herself
with "technical matters and ... the business" generally, "above all, a
critical attitude must be avoided" (ibid. :2l],9) • If is understandable,
then, that at a time of increasing union strength and activity
there should be suspicion from unions about welfare work. As the
Health of Munition Workers Committee observed: "'Fie old antagonism cf
•capital' and 'labour* makes the motive of the employer in appointing
a welfare supervisor subject to suspicion that he is seeking profit at
the expense of his workers" (Final Report, 19l8:para.Ii72). Both the
Ministry of Munitions Report (1918:para.1)75) hhd the JUC Report (1921:7)
use the word 'misunderstanding' to describe the friction that can occur
50. It was out of concern about industrial unrest that the government-
set up a Gommittee of enquiry in 1916 under the Ministry of Reconstruction
and, in 1917- ;the Whitley Report recommended the creation of Industrial
Councils through which employers and employees could work together.
between employer and employee and both, refer to a memorandum prepared
by a Joint Committee of the Woolwich Trades and Labour Council and
(E>l)the Woolwich Labour Party v ' as containing "constructive proposals"
(Munitions) and as anticipating the "probable direction in which
welfare work is likely to turn in the future" (JUG). The proposals do,
in fact, lay down a serious challenge to both state and capital to
ensure that welfare work comes under the democratic control of the labour
movement. The proposals suggest, inter alia: welfare supervision
should be aimed at promoting the workers' welfare rather than increasing
output; welfare work should be under the democratic control of workers
and employers; welfare supervisors should be drawn as far as possible
from among the workers; conferences should be convened by the Trades
Council and Local Labour Party to consider the aims, scope and methods
of welfare work. The "constructive proposals" have to be viewed in the
context of a discourse of the industrial enterprise legitimated by
conceptions of scientific management and efficient production, rather
51. Reprinted in the Woolwich Pioneer for February 22nd 1918 and see
Munitions - Final Report. 19l8:para.l4,7h and Joint University Council,
192Mppendix which both quote in full the eleven-point conditions
suggested by the Joint Committee as being essential to any scheme of
welfare supervision.
than socialisation of the production process. ^ ' Tiley also have
to "be seen in the light of the knowledge that welfare workers policed
factories, rooting out the idle and the inefficient and, on occasion,
discouraging union membership (Riven, 1967:1+2), and were often "brought
in from other occupations (clergymen; teachers; organists; doctors;
gymnasts; cooks; ex-policemen; according to Cashmere, 1916:5) rather
than from amongst the workforce.
The scheme suggested by the Woolwich labour movement was far from
prophetic. Discourse on industriai welfare sits very well with the
discourse of the 'disciplines' described by Foucault but, if welfare
work is a 'discipline' in that sense, it did not follow the trajectory
of social work discourse. Given common epistemologLcal conditions ox
existence which provided the matrix of social sciences for both welfare
work and social work, the forms taken must be considered in their
individual specificity and according to quite separate calculations of
their effectivity. The history of personnel management, viewed throng
52. In reviewing the historical development of industrial welfare,
the Munitions - Pinal Report makes reference to the work of Sir William
Mather who attempted "One of the first control experiments" in his
engineering works in 1893/4- Mather's study, the Report maintains,
"demonstrates the value to the workman, the employer and the community
as a whole, of applying to industry the scientific method and the
scientific spirit" (1918:para.l4). The scientific method produced:
an increase of 0,4% in the ratio of wage costs to turnover; a power
(gas, electricity etc.) saving of 0.4%; a fall in the amount of time
lost, from 2.46% to 0.46%; a fall in piece workers'wages of 0.78%;
an "increased cheerfulness and brightness" amongst the workforce (ibid.
The scientific spirit produced the following statement from Mather:
"We seem to have been working in harmony with a natural law ... Of
this I am assured, that the most economical -production is obtained, by
employing men only so long as they are at their best - when this stage
passed there is no true economy in their continued work" (ibid.:smphasi
in original). ; The Committee describe Mather's work as an "admirable
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the history of its professional associations, is one of gradual
consolidation within the enterprise through a process of re¬
definition away from issues of individual welfare and towards labour
management. Niven's historical, survey shows that from the early 1920s
doubts were being expressed about the retention of "welfare" in the
nomenclature and that "labour management" and "personnel management"
were consistently being suggested as more suitable alternatives
(Niven, 1967:68,83,90). Although s-s late as the end of the Second
World War a social science based education was accepted as the most
satisfactory basis on which to build a career in personnel management
(Niven, 1967:109), the Institute of Personnel Management began to take
an increasing role in training. Fulfilling the role of go-between,
the personnel worker could not simplisticaiiy be described as working with
the management 'against1 the workers. A quite separate organisation of
employers, interested in industrial welfare, was started in 1919 - the
Industrial Welfare Society (Cuming, 1977:5) - and was most vociferous
( 83)
in its objections to the Institute's plans for incorporation in 1922. ••
In 1957, the Institute convened a study group to examine personnel
management. A vital question to be resolved emerged; "Is the personnel
officer a reformer, a missionary in industry carrying better ideals of
human cooperation ...? Is he a manager like any other ... carrying
neither more nor less of such moral and social responsibility as all
managers ...? Can he be both?" (Niven, 1967:139)- In the event,
53- As the Society recognised, incorporation would identify the
Institute as the representative body on all matters cf industrial
welfare and w^uld give it a formal recognition and increased influence
(lliven, 196,7:68-70) _
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Niven records, emphasis was given "towards incorporating the personnel
officer firmly in the management team" (ibid. :lliO).
1|. Realignment
At the beginning of the 19th century, certain of the conditions of
existence of industrial welfare located it broadly within the realm of
welfare disccurse as an aspect of social work. Conditions of existence
cannot be considered as immutable, however. At some point the balance
of conditions altered to the degree that 'industrial welfare' became
•personnel management'. Unlike other social work clients, for example,
many of those in employment were able to influence the conditions of
existence of industrial welfare by refusing to co-operate in company
'thrift5 schemes or to recognise the status of the welfare worker.
Stronger pressure could also be exerted by trade unions. State
involvement in influencing the conditions of existence of industrial
welfare appears to have been confined mainly to moments of greatest
crisis, during the two wars. The political conditions of existence,
then, were formed by the struggle between employers, unions and the
professional associations of welfare workers. Basically, then, the
major arena of struggle would have occurred in the private sector between
capital ana employers' organisations, and labour and unions and
professional organisations seeking to represent labour. It could be
Many social work clients are referred to the social work agency
by other agents. This nay mean they have little or no choice in the
decision about becoming a 'client', either because they are children
ftaken into care) or because they have lost the right to decide
^offenders made the wards of a social work agency by a court or for
after-care following discharge from a prison or other compulsory
confinement),
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argued that this arena differed significantly fkom that in which the
political, conditions of existence of other tranches of sociax work
were played out. At the very hub of capitalist relations, then,
the welfare form of discipline is displaced by another which seeks not
to police idleness but to regulate labour. 'Bie personnel manager is
a technical specialist exercising a necessary operation of capital:
"monitoring the performance of personnel" (Cutler et al., 1977:309).
It is of value to record, then, that welfare discourse is not
omnipresent and must be considered in its specificity. Welfare
discourse as 'discipline' is not merely one manifestation of an all
pervading micro-physics of power.
(i) Social Work : the Eractice of Scientific Welfare. For those
early-century pedagogues of social work such as Macadam, industrial
welfare was merely one among many occupations which shared the common
aspect of having "intimate dealings ... with working class people"
(1925:20). In a paper subtitled by Stedman Jones "Notes on the
remaking of a working class", he suggests that activities such as were
briefly outlined in Section 2 above (Charity Organization Society;
settlement movement; etc.) were designed tc 'civilize' the 'working
class'. He further suggests that, effectively, these strategies faile
that the 'working class' maintained a distinctive culture but that it
had become conservative and defensive (1973/h:passim). Whilst in no
way endorsing this amorphous conception of 'the working class', the
fact cannot he ignored that classes are often identified as 'sub-
cultures' . Certainly, those who participated in the production of
welfare discourse at the beginning of the century were often
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unequivocal about the target population for social work activity -
(55)'the working class', Integral to the training of a social
worker, then, was an 'ethnographic' knowledge of 'working- class'
life. Under the heading - "Access to Normal Working-class Life",
Macadam discusses the desirability and problems of gaining a
"sympathetic knowledge of working-class conditions". Whilst
acknowledging the precedents for actually living amongst the working
class for a while, Macadam cautions that "... it is open to question
whether it would be desirable to plunge young men and women ... into a
mode of life to which they were entirely unaccustomed" (1925:91-3),
Earlier, in 1916, Macadam had already noted as "the first practical
essential" in the training of industrial welfare workers the
requirement to obtain "Knowledge of working women and girls" (l9l6:2li|.).
The Joint University Council's Report on such training endorsed this
notion, recommending "residence in a settlement in a working-class
55« That social work is work with the poor, the deprived, the
residuum or 'the working class' more broadly is a familiar theme in
social work discourse. "It is estimated that poverty and bad housing
cause around 60% of the work under-taken by social workers" (CCETSW, 1976:
I4.3) - "••• social work is predominantly dealing with the more
vulnerable members of society, (those who by and large are not the prime
beneficiaries of economic and techno logical changes) ..." (BASW, 1979:2).
"Social welfare clients were disproportionately drawn from those living
in poorer conditions and from less well-to-do sections of the community"
(Jeffreys, 1965:6.3). Those working from a more radical orientation do,
of course, gain political mileage from this association; see, for example,
Handler (1973:l); Chris Jones (1979:8l).
56. As a suitable substitute, Macadam recommended Friendly Societies;
Church and Chapel Societies; Housing Councils; Flower Shows; and.
Temperance Societies; amongst others (1925:93),
57- To be gained, in this instance, from elementary school teaching;
district nursing: the Workers' Educational Association etc.
?:
neighbourhood" (1921:11)., But it is important to note that it
is not simply life amongst society's detritus which is being
recommended but also "some form of experience of the best type of
working women ..." (Macadam, 19l6:2i{l).) and "the normal conditions of
working-class life" (JUC, 1921:11). Cultural standards are relative:
the aim is not to raise the horizons of the 'normal working-class1 but
to raise up the detritus to become self-respecting 'working-class5
people.
Condemned as ineffective by the fbor Lav/ Commissioners of I83I+,
social enquiry became, during the 19th century, a necessary practice in
the policing of idleness. Given that social workers were rarely from a
'working cla,ss' background, it was necessary to educate them into
'working class' ways of life. Jeffreys, in 19&9, shoved that this
requirement had not lost its purpose. "Ideally", she felt,
"theoretical knowledge ... should have been reinforced by personal
experience of work in a manual occupation and residence in a working-
class area particularly if the trainee comes from a middle class
background" (1965:306). The Seebohm Committee, in its Report in 1968,
provided official endorsement of the view that the settlement principle
was the ideal form through which to provide social services. Talking
of the concept of the area team, the Report concludes: "The ideal
would be a purpose-built "building, which would serve as a focal point
58. One member of the committee, Mrs Caltbrop - representing the
women's section of the Ra-tional Union of General Workers, objected to
this recommendation, and suggested "practical experience in a factory
for at least six months to a year, This should entail residence in a
working-class /family, and the student should, if possible, live on
the wages that she earns as a working woman" (l921:li|.). See also
Casb.more's very similar suggestions (1916:15).
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for the local community (para.588). Territorial coverage,
often with individual social workers allocated to a particular
'patch', much like a police constable's 'beat', is a familiar
arrangement in social service and social work departments.
From its earliest moments discussion of social work training has
placed great emphasis on becoming practically involved in the 'doing'
of social work (the 'placement'). Writing in 1925, Macadam felt that
the relatively recent "shifting of the centre of training from
practical organizations to the university" had resulted in an over¬
emphasis upon the academic aspect of training (1925:79). Expressing
an apparently timeless concern in social work to achieve the 'right*
balance between theory and practice, Macadam felt that: "A well-
trained man or woman learns the facts on which his or her future work
must be built not only from books, but from real life. He sees things
as they are, not as they are supposed to be" (ibid.:8o). Traditionally
59- In the Scottish context, see Social Work and the Community
(Scottish Education Department/Scottish Home and Health Department,
1966:para.50).
60. An article on the use of the so-called "unitary approach" in
the practical placement aspect of social work training spells out
the requirement for the social worker to know his area. "The age
distribution, housing situation, employment opportunities, shopping
and transport facilities, access to schools, health centres,
community centres, provision of ... residential establishments, day¬
care facilities, play groups and. social groups, all these and more
highlight social problems and social needs. This knowledge enables
individual referrals to social services departments to be placed in
context" (Webber, 1977:^60).
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this balance has been achieved by dividing the avails-ble training
time neatly down the middle. The emphasis on empiricism,
highlighted by Macadam's equation of "real life" and "things as they
are", tends to dominate social work discourse. 'Theory' becomes
interpreted as a 'tool* and a 'skill' to be utilized eclectically by
the practising social worker in the real world. Social work
students, interviewed for the journal Social Work Today, spoke of
having "placements to keep us in touch with reality" and of having
joined the training course "to gain more tools" for dealing with this
reality. Trained social workers appeared to one student to know
"everything": joining a. course allowed one to "make mistakes" along
with other novices.
The art of social enquiry is the art of ohjectification of the
individual. "Tie examination combines the techniques of an observing
hierarchy and. those of a normalizing judgement" (Foucault, 1977
Empirical observation of the individual in terms of theories about the
"geneses of individuals" and the "progress of societies" are
interpreted and given form through an eclecticism which is variously
described as 'treating the whole man'; the unitary approach;
6l. "We consider ... as a rule, from one-third to a half of the time
should he given to practice" (JTJC, 1921:10; describing two year training
for industrial welfare work; and see Munitions - Final Report, 1913:
para.iiby). "We ... think that supervised practice in the field should
occupy about one-half of the total time" (Younghusband Report. 1959:
para.897). "... students should spend around 50% of the course in the
practice setting" (BASW, 1979:para.6.36 (2)). "It is ... recommended
that approximately half their time should be spent in residential
placements ..." (Williams Committee Report - Csring for People, 196j:
para. 28 ).
62c "Students talking ..Educational Special - Social Work. Today.
Vol.11, Ho.8, 23 October 1979:9-10).
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gersericism; and systems theory. This is an approach for which the
smallest of detail, viewed holistically, may have the greatest of
relevance.
"Every scrap of knowledge of any kind is grist to the
mill of the social worker, and there is something to
"be said for a wide and comprehensive basis of
education" (Macadam, 1925:62).
Hie utilization of theory becomes, then, in social work discourse, a
pragmatic exercise. 'Theories' become tools, keys with which to open
doors and solve particular problems. At the moment, social work
journals and training courses are giving a great deal of attention to
a systems theory approach to social work which, Webber suggests, is
one way of dealing "with the dilemma in the interpretation of 'generic'
necessitated by the development of multi-service agencies" (1977:555)-
Primary exponents of such a 'theory', Pincus and Minalian, suggest:
"Any theory cannot be expected to be adequate for all situations"
(quoted by Specht and Vickery, 1977'• 32). Theories are, in fact,
selected from a social work tool box and tried against the problem until
the correct 'fit' is found (Specht, 1977:31-2). ITo single theory
(6k)
will supply all the answers to a problem, v r' consequently as many as
63. In the same collection of papers MbOaughan, writing about 'group
work', notes: "The model that a worker selects for practice should be
relevant to the purpose of the group with which he works" (1977:159).
6I[. "In any instance, a single perspective will neither fully explain
the cause of juvenile delinquency nor provide the basis for designing
interventions that will fully eliminate it" (Specht, 1977:31). The
operative phrases are "cause" and "eliminate" and they reveal a profound
empiricism which seems to have remained impervious to the otherwise
saturating influence of labelling theory and the sociology of deviance in
general. -
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possible should be collected. ^ ■*' Pincus and Minahan, in their
contribution to Specht's and Yickery's Integrating Social Work
Methods (1977'103), endorse this view but, lest the reader should
imagine that "... the theoretical orientation appears to dictate the
purpose of the social worker's practice", "they emphasise that there
is a "social work frame of reference, derived from a clear notion of
the function and purpose of the profession" and this serves as the
"primary guide in analysing and dealing with social situations".
In its self-conscious desire to become an acceptable profession,
social work discourse often rehearses what it is that is essential to
its theory and practice, hence the near obsession with finding common
principles. That this central core is never delineated, least
of all to the satisfaction of social work practitioners and theorists,
remains a constant burden to social work. In some respects, control
65. "... different theories illuminate different aspects of a
phenomenon and, therefore, the wider, more flexible and more varied
our theoretical base is, the more possibilities we will have for
different types of social work intervention" (Specht, 1977:31)•
66. In a course outline, one university social work department has
noted as an objective of the course; "To concert rate on the common
principles which underlie all forms of social work practice, and on the
transfer of concepts from one field of practice to another. The main
emphasis is on 'differential diagnosis', or differential assessment of
a situation, and the choice of social work method best suited to that
situation" (Reproduced In Michael, 1976;Appendix F:66k-5). The attempt
to shed the last residues of terminology borrowed from other discourses
is often, however, a less than satisfying task. In the same course
outline we find: "'There were ... three years in which examinations
involved three papers, at first named Social Administration, Human Growth
and Behaviour, and Social Work Method, but latterly named Social Work 1,
2 and 3s since there was always some confusion about whether a paper- was
aimed at knowledge content or at practice content". And, a little later,
registering concern at "the medical sound of the phrase" - "differential
diagnosis and;treatment", the document suggests "psychosocial diagnosis
and choice of-treatment method instead" (19765667,668).
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over the definition of an occupation is a matter of relative control
and power. The medical profession has effectively hegemonised
discourse on pathology to the general exclusion of folk medicines,
faith healing and so on. Social work has also been successful in
hegemonising vast areas of practice but lives under a constant threat
of condemnation for poaching from the functions of other occupations
(the clergy; psychiatry) and other social institutions (the family;
the community). At a more fundamental level, the social work dilemma
over reconciling theory and practice is a reflection of its empiricism.
"It is a mark of British administration", suggests Heywood, "that it is
empirical., that it works on a preference for observed facts rather than
theory, and that changes come by the testing of facts against
accumulated personal experience" (Heywood, 196k:II). The recent
profusion of theoretical texts in social work reflects a concerted
effort to rid the profession of this empiricist legacy. Like the
social sciences generally, the argument has been that social work is a
(£n\
relatively immature enterprise, yet to come of age. ' However, like
•the social sciences generally, social work arose from a matrix of
discourses about Man and Society at the beginning of the 19th century.
67. Writing in Specht and Vickery (1977)? Younghusbana lamented
that "... training would be more effective if we had fairly precise
'hard1 knowledge about the application of theory to practice which we
could help students to learn to apply. But we haven't reached that
point yet" (1977:111).
r
Social work cannot, therefore, simply renounce its medical homologue
for example. The epistemclogical conditions of existence are those
of the human sciences in general. Speaking of the formation of the
human sciences, Foxicault rehearses what has been said above about social
work:
"Hie controversies to which a search for a. specific
positivity in the field of the human sciences has
given rise are only too well known: Genetic or
structural analysis? Explanation or comprehension?
Recourse to what is 'underneath' or decipherment kept
strictly to the level of reading? In fact, all
these theoretical discussions did not arise ... because ...
[[the human sciences [] ... had to deal, in man, with an
object so complex that it was not yet possible to find
a unique mode of access towards it, or because it was
necessary to use several in turn. These discussions
were able to exist only in so far as the positivity of
the human, sciences rests simultaneously upon the
transference of three distinct models. This transference
is not a marginal phenomenon for the human sciences (... a
detour to include some exterior intelligibility, a
confirmation derived from sciences already constituted);
nor is it a limited episode in their history (a crisis of
formation, at a time when they were still so young that
they could not fix their concepts and their laws
themselves). On the contrary, it is a matter of an
ineffaceable fact, which is bound up, forever, with their
particular arrangement in the epistemological soace"
(1970:356).
The "constituent models" of the human sciences, borrowed from biology,
economics and the study of language, have been discussed throughout
this thesis. Most social, work theorists would cite "the biological,
(68)
68. In its Eleventh Annual Report (i860), the Charity Organisation
Society emphasised that: "Charity organisation is not mare
investigation and detection; it is a diagnosis and the art of healing"
(quoted by Woodrcofe, 197^:^36? footnote). Eighty years later, the
Younghusband Report recorded tiat: "The processes used by doctors and
social workera are to some extent comparable - relevant history taking
and assessment of the problem, medical or social diagnosis, treatment
and follow up" (1959 :para. 976).
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psychological and sociological aspects of man" (Leonard, 1966:1) as
forming the framework of social work theory and practice. The
fundamental paradox about this is that, in categorising that through
which social work can be represented to itself, theorists "find
themselves treating as their object what is in fact [a J... condition
of possibility" (Foucault, 1970:361;) of social work discourse.
What we have here, then, is the source of that constant tension
which characterises social work discourse. The attempt to reconcile
theory and practice is the attempt to treat Man as an object of
scientific enquiry. The epistemological conditions of existence of
the social sciences necessitate that they analyse Man not merely as a
biological organism, not merely as homo economicus, but also in tarms
of the ways in which he represents life, desire, conflict and death to
himself. In seeking to describe the way in which Man represents
himself to himself, the social sciences of necessity must encounter
that "element of darkness", the "inathought", the Other (Moucault, 1970:
326). What we find in the development of the social sciences and
therefore in social work discourse, is the ircreasingly sophisticated
attempt to reveal this Other side to Man: the natural being behind the
alienated form; the reality repressed within the unconscious mind.
The projection of Man as "a strange empirico-transcendental doublet"
has led to the attempt "to make the empirical, in man, stand for the
transcendental" (ibi.d.:32l). Social work anguish over reconciliation
of theory and practice is a reflection of that wider chimera - the
reconciliation of the empirical and the transcendental throiigh the
sciences of Man. Radical and liberal attempts to solve this riddle
t
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reveal the conditions of existence which they both share and which
makes the one the mere mirror image of the other: "... a discourse
attempting to he both empirical and critical cannot but be both
positivist and eschatological ..." (ibucault, 1970:320). In fact,
both radical and liberal approaches must work within the "constituent
models" available to the human sciences, each one of which can be used
to interpret and criticise the others. Thus, if we take as examples
the 'models of social work practice1 outlined by Butrym (197^:16-39)j
the following comments can be made. 'Hie Problem-Solving Model*
portrays the tproblems* experienced by a 'client* as an extension of
the basic problems of life in general. The social work task is one
of helping the client to solve his or her own problems. 'Problems',
'then, are failures in functioning: the client is encouraged to adapt
to the situation by calling upon his or her personal resources. A
new norm is established. But such a model can be criticised as
lacking depth in terms of psychological and sociological diagnoses of
the problem. What has caused the breakdown in the normative and
regulative functioning of the client? ''The Psycho-Social Therapy
Model* seeks a 'medical' diagnosis. It has, however, been criticised
for an over-emphasis upon the psychological and a subsequent neglect of
the sociological. 'The Functional Model* has sought to remedy this by
emphasising social work intervention as one aspect of an agency's
functions: normative functioning is set within a wider system of
meaning. In marked contrast, the 'Behaviour-Modification Model*
describes a mechanistic relationship between function and norm. It seeks
to concentrates resources upon one specific problem rather than spreading
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the effort thinly over time and space. 5The Crisis-Intervention
lbdel' and the 'Task-Centred Casework Model' have similar short
term and immediate aims. But such approaches isolate problems of
functioning and conflict from wider environmental factors and
therefore fail to consider norms and rules a,s a system of meanings.
'Holistic Models' attempt to bring facets of the other models together.
However, as Butrym observes with reference to Pincus' and Minahan's
"four-systems model", "... it has gone to the other extreme and has
sacrificed some of the depth of the considerations which are intrinsic
to work with people, ... for the sake of breadth" (1973:37).
In the apparently unceasing process of self-reflection which
characterises social work discourse, that profession finds itself
|
treating as its object what is, in fact, its conditions of existence.
The 'nature of social work' (^9) j_3 qn +^9 nature of Man and
Society. As a consequence, as Foucault says of the human sciences
broadly, "They are always animated .,. by a sort of -transcendental
mobility. They never cease to exercise a critical examination of
themselves" (1970:3&h)* The next chapter will be locking at another
phase of that self-examination in its guise as 'radical social work'
but for the moment the important point to note is the line of
69. This is the title of Butrym's text. The dust-jacket suggests:
"This book argues that the present lack of consensus about the nature
and the functions of social work constitutes a serious problem which,
if allowed to continue, will result in loss of purpose and usefulness
by social workers. It therefore attempts to answer the question:
'vfiiat is social work?'" To ask such a question is, however, to work
within the same essentialist framework which the author (Butrym) sees
as lacking in consensus. It is the search for the essence of social
work in the essence of Man which creates the dilemma.
continuity which, at the epistemological level, represents one of
tiie conditions of existence of social work in Britain. Prior to
the Modern epistcme conception of Man as that "strange empirico-
transcendental doublet" there was no social work discourse. Since
the beginning of the 19th century, however, one can trace a discursive
regularity, a science of welfare which represents a practical
realisation of the social sciences. It is within the terms of this
continuity that those processes which others seek to study as the
growth and professionalisation of social work ana the unification of
its many theories and methods must be understood.
(ii) Welfare Discourse and State Intervention. Given the
epistemological conditions of existence of social work discourse, the
translation of knowledge about Man and Society into practical activity
becomes primarily a technical problem. Habermas, speaking about what
he sees as the general, phenomenon of scientism, argues that "... human
behaviour is ... now considered only as the material for science"
(197U:U3). As a consequence, "... the relationship of theory to praxi
can now only assert itself as the purposive-rational application of
techniques assured by empirical science" (l97ii-t25k). Social work, of
course, is often portrayed as an atheoretical pursuit. For every
article and letter in professional journals advocating greater emphasis
upon firm theories and models and a greater intellectual content in
training programmes, there are an equal number emphasising the
practical goals of social work, its reliance upon experience,
intuition and basic humanitarianism. But such arguments are about the
balance between theory and practice. Social work's empiricist basis
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is rarely questioned within the profession. Whether the social,
worker consciously seeks to apply a psycho-social therapy model or
merely blunders through on blind intuition, the 'client5 is taken as
the empirical object of attention. ^0) Whether the 'client5 is
taken as an individual, a family, or a community, makes little
difference to that process of objectification by which 'clients' are
formulated.
Social work discourse has determinate epistemological conditions
of existence. It would be a travesty of this theoretical generalisation
to suggest that these conditions are entirely determined by the capitalist
relations of production which characterise the British national economy.
One might no"t want to disagree too strongly with Chris Jones' contention
that "... social work has emerged as one of the ma.jor regulatory
strategies of the State ..." in its concern with the non-productive
sections of the population (1978:"Abstract"). But one should take issue
with his apparent view that this is a phenomenon peculiar to capitalist
relations of production. It is a manifest shortcoming amongst Marxist
70. Hie study of Social, Service Beams by Stevenson and Parsloe (1978)
confirms the abiding fact that social work clients are individuals,
despite major emphases in social work literature 011 viewing 'the family5
or 'the community5 as the client and on suggesting 'group work' and
'community work' as viable social work methods. "Virtually all the
social workers we interviewed indicated that the most common approach
was working with clients on an individual basis and sometimes involving
other family members where appropriate" (ibid.:99)- "Casework with
families seemed to deal with financial and material problems ... She
primary emphasis was on the needs of the individual member, identified
as having problems ..." (ibid.:103). "None of the social workers
interviewed worked exclusively with groups nor was group work regarded
by anyone as a substantial part of his method of working" (ibia.:l23).
"The social workers in our sample were acutely aware of community
problems which impinged on their clients and frequently tried to lessen
the impact .... by direct negotiations with other agencies ... Yet,
none said that this led naturally to incorporating- community work ...
into their daily work" (ibid.:128).
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theorists that any institution found within a social formation based
on capitalist relations must, ipso facto, be 'capitalist* in its
essential nature. But it is as absurd to argue that a Welfare Stale
is essentially capitalist as it is to suggest that it is synonymous
(7l)with democracy. Vl J There is a tendency for Marxists to be rather
j
more concerned with the demise of 'capitalism' (because with the fall
of capitalism, socialism will arise) than with the construction of
'socialism'. The next chapter will examine the dilemma, faced by those
critics of social work who attempt to construct a Marxist welfare
discourse from liberal discourses which they condemn as 'capitalist'.
For the moment, it is worth noting Hirst's warning that "There is no
distinctly 'socialist' policy or technique in matters of the medical
or socially therapeutic manipulation of individuals" (l580:90). "law
defines the status of ... specialist practices and sets limits to the
powers of the agents and institutions involved in forms of discipline ..."
(ihid.:92). Speaking of the USSR, Hirst suggests that social welfare
in that nation is a derivation "... from the sciences and practices
developed from the ei^iteenth century onwards by the European ...
bourgeoisie" (ibid,:90).
An examination of welfare discourse in the USSR illustrates the
absurdity of portraying *welfare-in-capitalism! as somehow
71. Robson states boldly that "What is not open to serious question
is that a welfare state must be democratic ... the government must
have been freely chosen by the citizens ..." (197^:16). Later, Robson
specifically excludes the communist nations of Eastern Europe because




essentially 'capitalist'. v J As Madison illustrates, income
maintenance policy in the Soviet Union is both a mechanism of work
incentives and assistance for the non-productive (l973:passim).
Given that the wage form of reward for labour predominates in the USES,
welfare policy is directed towards supplementing earned income for the
disabled who are able to carry out some labour tasks and of supplying
allowances to -those unable to work through disability, sickness,
pregnancy, or old age. As Mishra says, socialist ideology suggests
that the notion - 'to each according to his needs' - is a central tenet
of economic organisation under socialist relations of production and
distribution (Mishra, 1977:122). But, as Madison shows, the emphasis
in the USSR is upon the principle - 'to each according to his work'
(1973:100,101). There is no intention here to wander into that area.
of socialist apologetics which sees the Soviet Union as struggling
through a transitional phase between 'capitalism' and 'true' socialism,
or communism; suffice it to note that the Soviet Union has a welfare
policy which forms one element in a national plan for production.
Paced, for example, by chronic labour shortages (Madison, 1973;9S) the
Soviet Union state has implemented legislation "bo provide
rehabilitation for the disabled; sickness benefits based on length of
work career: paid maternity leave: and old age pensions which can be
(73)
paid even if the recipients remain in employment. '
72. It is net, of course, suggested that the USSR represents the ideal.
'JySt/iick in terms of socialist relations of production, simply that it is unlikely,
in the estimation of many commentators, to be characterised as an
example of capitalist relations of production,
73. for fuli details, see Madison (1973). Mishra (1977) kas a
chapter on "Welfare in Socialist Society" (Chapter 7).
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Socialist theorists mast accept the limitations of Marxist
discourse when it comes to providing a critique of welfare and social
work in Britain. Capitalist relations of production, as a concept,
implies a degree of organisation and control over the definition of
the labour force, by the state, through the formal mechanism of public
I
lav/. On the reverse side of this condition of existence we find
social policy legislation which seeks to police idleness - not only
the 'work-shy' ('the vagabond') but the unemployed, the unemployable
and those who must be retrained or rehabilitated - and to compensate
for the anarchic nature of distribution of production and the wage-
form reward for labour. Welfare discourse, then, provides some of
the conditions of existence of capitalist relations of production in
the British national economy. It has to be recognised that the form
in whj.ch these conditions are provided are, however, largely removed
C'7j. )
from the commodity form of distribution. v J Socialist political
attention ought, therefore, to be directed towards strategies aimed at
a greater degree of democratic control over the activities of welfare
agencies, whether they are providing supplementary benefits or social
work advice. Towards this end, it is necessary to appreciate what
7I1. In recent years, British social work journals have witnessed
an expanding debate over the issue of private practice in social work
(Community Care, December ll+th, 1977). Social Work Today, Vol.10, No.15,
December 5th 1978, reports on plans being made by BASW to produce
guidelines for private practice, and in the issue for September 25th 1979
CVol. 11, No.ii) details are given of the guidelines produced by BASW
(Private Braetice in Social Work). There are, of course, practical
limitations to the 'privatisation' of social work: many of that
profession's clients accept 'help1 under duress (probationers; after¬
care clients; children under supervision); a great many more could
not or would pot pay for the services they receive. See also
Community Care (l8th March 1982) for a report of controversy within BASW
over private practice.
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have been called the epistemo logical conditions oi existence of welfare
discourse; not merely to understand the ways in which such discourse
lends support to the ideological, conditions of existence of capitalist
relations of production but also to appreciate the manner in which
such discourse stands in the way of a more democratic control over its
functioning. Similarly, it is necessary to take account of the
political and legal conditions of existence of welfare discourse.
Welfare discourse in the USSR, for example, cannot simply be subsumed
(75)
by the dictatorial rule of the Communist Party. Income
maintenance programm.es in the Soviet Union are defined by legal statutes
and are subject to legal control and bureaucratic regulation. Disputes
over claims to allowances and payments made are subject to these
controls and regulations. One might not have much faith in Soviet
legal justice but public law in the USSR nevertheless provides an
important condition of existence for welfare discourse in that nation.
"For social work", writes Chris Jones, "the period between 191+5 and
1977 has been one of momentous charge, with the most significant feature
being the State's increasing take up of social work " (1978:35) • What
is significant is not so much the state's "take up of social work" as the
state's endorsement of the science of welfare which sustains social work
practice. The I83I+ Royal Commission rejected the application of a
science of welfare by means of the technique of the social enquiry and,
75. Madison reports on the Soviet's dilemma over how to encourage more
workers to remain in employment beyond retirement age: "Raising
retirement ages was apparently rejected as politically and socially
unacceptable. ITor was it considered feasible to lower benefits ...
Instead, Sovie;t policy-makers ..." introduced legislation to allow for
the joint payment of pensions and wages (3.973*3.08).
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even up to the time of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws of
1905, there remained strong pressure from the Local Government Board
( 76 ^(LGB) for the endorsement of the less-eligibility principle. ^ '
But we have seen that social enquiry demanded a 1 field of
surveillance* removed from the artificial panopticism of the poor law
institution. Hie *geneses of individuals' had significance only when
viewed within the wider system of meanings which it formed with analysis
of the 'progress of society'. The Charity Organisation Society and
other institutions for the dissemination of scientific welfare provided
the necessary social enquiry for the communal policing of idleness.
And, as Jones says, by the time of the 1905 Royal Commission, the
expertise of the COS was acknowledged by the Conservative government
through its inclusion of six COS representatives amongst the
Commissioners. Interestingly, however, by this time both the COS and
the LGB were in open dispute with Fabian socialist moves to dismantle
'ihe Poor Law mechanism in favour of a national welfare system and with
the subsequent Liberal government reforms which expanded welfare
provision outside of the realm cf the Poor Laws (Ccrmack, 1953- Hay,
1975; Rose, 1971:262-3; Eraser, 1978:1147)- The first two decades
of the century witnessed the loss by the COS of "its principal client
76. The words of James Stewart Davy, permanent secretary of the Poor
Law Division of the LGB, grace the pages of most histories of the
British Welfare State (Woodroofe, 197U:ll4l-2; Eraser, 1978:1147)-
Davy defined less-eligibility as consisting of "... loss of personal
reputation .,. loss of personal freedom, which is secured by detention
in a workhouse, and ... the loss of political freedom by suffering
disfcanchi3anont" (quoted by Woodroofe, IJJh'Ijl)-
group, the deserving poor, to the State" (C. Jones, 1978:25). '
State centralisation of welfare provisions provided a uniformity
of income maintenance and care at a standard minimum level. It is
generally accepted that the thinking of the Liberal reformers, Lloyd
George and Churchill for example, was a pragmatic acceptance of
'Bismarckianism': the heading-off of socialist appeal to the 'working
classes' through the provision of minimal welfare benefits (Eraser,
1978:151-2; Hay, 1975;36-7). George and Wilding are of the opinion
that the views of the Fabian socialists became "the orthodoxies of
social administration" (l976:viii). Beatrice Webb's Minority Report
for the 1905 Royal Commission emphasised the dismantling of the Poor
Lav/ system in favour of a centralised concern by the state for the
welfare of all (Cormack, 1953:16)° What we witness in the 20th century
is a growing political awareness that social enquiry, whether for the
general pur-pose of policing idleness and defining the workforce or for
the more specific aim of fighting socialist ideology, required
77. The Unemployed Workmen Act, 1905 (5 Ed VII, cap.18) allowed
specially constituted distress committees to assist the unemployed to
move to areas of higher employment. The Education (Provision of Meals)
Act, I.906 (6 Ed VII, cap.57) empowered Local Authorities to provide
school meals for needy children. The Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 (8 Ed
VII, cap.ipO) made pensions for the over 70s immediately available. The
National Insurance Act, 1911 (l and 2 George V, cap.55) made health-
insurance compulsory and thereby extended sick pay and 'free' medical
treatment.
legislative definition and a centralised control of welfare discourse. (78)
The state, then, may well have removed certain clients from both the
Poor Lav; system and from the COS but this reflected an endorsement of
social work technique as social, investigation. As such, the principle
of less-eligibility remained the organising principle of scientific
welfare. Thus, the Old Age Pension Act, 1908 withheld payments from
"criminals, drunkards and malingerers" (Eraser, 1978:ll|3j footnote).
As a non-contributory pension it was, of course, means-tested and the
personal circumstances of claimants were investigated by local pensions
officers of the Customs and Excise.
Regardless of the location of the agency controlling and
supervising welfare provision, the conditions of existence of welfare
discourse - economic, political, epistemological or legal - within a
determinate social formation maintain important lines of continuity.
Thus, we find that the 19th century overseer had duties in common with
the 20th century relieving officer (¥ebb and Webb, 1927:l61i>footncte).
Beresford's handful of interviews with retired relieving officers
endorses the view that they saw themselves as forerunners of local
78. Speaking of the Webbs® influence on the Minority Report, Cormack
suggests that they were interested less in the ability of the citizen
and rather more in the concept of the duties of citizenship (l9S3;l8).
As Pinker notes (1979:21), the Webbs "... held a generally poor opinion
of 'the average sensual man® and believed enlightened administrators
were the most reliable interpreters of what constituted the best
interests of the general public". This, of course, is the same
'enlightened administrator' that Macadams imperialistic social work
training was designed to manufacture during this same period. It comes
as no surprise to note, then, that the Webbs sought an increasingly
disciplined society. They fought the insurance principle because it
supposed unconditional right. They expected "an advance in conduct in
return for th§ increased income" their scheme proposed; they wanted an
"extension of''treatment and disciplinary supervision" (Cormack quoting
from Our Partnership, 1953®l6)'»
authority social workers (l9o9:721-2). ^9) thou^i it might
"be argued, that the Poor Lav; relieving officer probably had more in
common with later state officials concerned with income maintenance
rather than the amorphous role of the modern social worker, it is
worth noting the view of a Political and Economic Planning publication
of 1937 that "... the major task of the Unemployment Assistance Board
is to assist, and to promote the welfare of the households of married
men suffering from long-term unemployment (1937:139)• In similar
fashion, the Social Security Act, 1966 empowers the Supplementary
Benefits Commission to exercise its functions "in such a manner as
shall best promote the welfare of persons" affected by the Act (Picton,
j-973'ifootnote i). Picton1 s article, which appeared in the British
Journal of Social Work, describes courses for Unemployment Review
Officers which offered "an introduction to social and psychological
influences on human behaviour" (ibid.:i+lxl). One cannot ignore
the consequences of legislative changes which draw demarcations between
a basically income-maintenance system operated by a department of
state and a social work service -under the general responsibility of local
79• Both the Mackintosh Report on Social Workers in the Mental Health
Services (1951:para.38(c ) ) and the Youngbusband Report on Social Workers
in the Local Authority Health and Welfare Services (I959:p£ra.-L57), found
ex-relieving officers in local authority posts doing mental welfare
work. See also Rodgers and Dixon who, in their study of the social
services in a northern town, found the mental health section of the local
authority being run by two ex-relieving officers whilst 'the town® s ex-
public assistance officer was the Director of the welfare services
department (1960:45,So).
80. Ficton, a lecturer in social work, comments "that many S3 staff
operating in an extremely complex organisation are able to make
relationships .-and achieve results that stand comparison with what social
workers do" (1975:^+2). And see'Human relations training fox-
supplementary benefits work", Harwood and Mason (1978).
authorities, but it is apparent that- welfare discourse is common to
both. (8l)
There is, then, a continuity which refuses to recognise the claim
that the Poor Law has finally been laid to rest, despite its symbolic
removal from, the statutes in 19^8. We find Supplementary Benefits
officers stereotyped, according to Picton, as "harsh, insensitive,
punitive, judgemental" (l975iW-|l) and. we find residents of a BUSS re-
establishment centre complaining "This place is like a bloody prison!"
(Sharron, 1980:2). But we also find in Stuart Rees' study of
the views of social work clients, feelings of stigmatisation ("Every
time you've got to go to a department like that you begin to feel
degraded", 1978:75) and of resignation ("Most clients expect little.
G3ie.tr polite beliefs that everyone had their place, that if benefits
existed they'd get to hear of them, were a monument to a system of
socialization which welfare-state services had not displaced", 1978:37)•
In addition, commentators who have studied reports prepared by social
workers and probation officers for criminal courts often emphasise
81. See Evans' review of Stevenson's Claimant or Client? A Social
Worker's View of the Supplementary Benefits Commission and Jordan's
Poor Parents : Social Policy and the Cycle of Deprivation (1975) for a
discussion of conflicting views about this commonality.
82. The residential centres in question, described by the Claimants'
Union as "glorified workhouses", are designed to rehabilitate long' term
unemployed, persons who have lost the will to work. No specific job
training is provided. Under Section 10 of the Supplementary Benefits
Act, 1976 an appeals tribunal can males further benefit payments dependent
upon attendance at a re-establishment centre. Mary of those who attend
do so voluntarily but under threat of having benefit payments stopped
should they decline the offer. Length of stay depends upon assessment
of readiness for employment. Glue residents who had complained to
Social Work Today resented the petty regulations (no shave - no
breakfast; ncT lingering in toilets; compulsory Eriday afternoon
shower; indoors by 11 p.m.) (Sharron, 1930).
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their tendency to offer value judgements thinly disguised as
professional assessments (Bean, 1976:105; Curran, 1982:passim).
But the continuity lies not so much in the principle of less-
eligibility as in the welfare discourse which transforms political,
social, economic and ideological questions into technical problems.
In his inaugural lecture in 1951? Titmuss acknowledged that the ideas
and methods of the Poor Law era had been transplanted into the new
social services. But the target for Titmuss' critique was the
prevailing tendency to concentrate upon * individual disorders' to the
neglect of the 'real' "underlying causes in the family or social
groups" (quoted by Handler, 1973:^9)• Both liberal and radical critics
of social work dwell upon individual casework as social work's most
obvious tendency to neglect, 'structural issues', 'environmental factors'
or 'power relationships' . Unfortunately, the proffered solutions
invariably involve consideration of individuals-in-groups (the family;
group work; community work). Ultimately, the object of social work
discourse is Man: Man as a family member, working in groups, living in
communities. Socialists should be concerned to understand how issues
involving moral and value judgements are presented as technical
problems to be solved by professional workers with scientific knowledge
and skills. 'Prom each according to his ability' is a principle about
which calculations and decisions have to be made, as does the other
side of that equation - 'to each according to needs' , These are
problems to be faced and for which resolutions must be sought:
resolution does not come about simply by demanding socialist relations of
production in;place of capitalist relations.
The growing involvement of the state in welfare discourse is
part of a wider process in which the state acts as a co-ordinating
and organising condition of existence of capitalist relations of
production and distribution. The state brings order in the face of
the anarchy and hedonism of capitalist competition: an order which,
ideologically, the free market oug^it to ultimately guarantee. The
state arranges "ordered multiplicities" by replacing heterogeneous
and detailed systems of income maintenance with a homogeneous system
of minimalist income maintenance which can cope with crises of
depression and high unemployment. But the state also endorses a
system of social enquiry which polices both the edges of the income
maintenance mechanism where 'scroungers' and fraudulent claimaj.its
reside, and the ether, residual, categories of persons who fall
beyond the reach of other social institutions (children in trouble or
in need; criminals; the mentally and physically inadequate). Social
work is- a facet of a knowledge-power relation: it is the "infinitely
small of political power".
5. Summarising Discussion
"The 'welfare' state reflects a change .in policy
objectives, not a change in the economic parameters
to which policy is directed. The laissez-faire Hew
Poor Law involved a massive investment in its
institutions and their operation (it was moreover an
investment which singularly failed to achieve the
policy objectives set). (Cutler et al., 1978:250)
The Poor Law Commissioners of I83I+ rejected a science of welfare,




community, and attempted to substitute a revived "economy of
suspended rights" through a policy of panoptic incarceration.
Welfare discipline, as a discursive regularity within a knowledge-
power relation, polices idleness through a utilization of the social
scientific conceptions of Man and Society. But the panopticism of
I
■the workhouse test was clearly unable to cope with the cycles of
economic depression which created, vast numbers of unemployed and the
general flow of workers from region to region searching for
employment. Panoptic 'discipline' lacked effectivity as a general
policy for the policing of idleness because it relied entirely upon the
deterrent value of the workhouse test. The epistemological conditions
of welfare discourse necessitated the treatment of individuals, within
an historicist framework, as both constituted by, and constitutors of,
"the historical development of Society. Blue science of welfare demanded
an understanding of the relative nature of needs ana desires; relative
both, in terms of human functioning and the conflict of desires. The
science of welfare met the demand for "the construction of norms and
rules: it interpreted the significance of heterogeneity within a
conception of a social system based upon homogeneity.
At the beginning of the 19th century, a form of social enquiry
outside the realm of the Foor Laws was practised by charitable agencies
which sought to institute a system which related benefit to individual
needs based upon detailed investigation but which also sought not merely
to deter but to prevent destitution and its consequences. Hie process
of social, investigation cf the individual (the constitution of a 'file')
and the generalisation of that knowledge into an art of prevention and
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an act of police (the creation of a 'case'), is the process of
what Foucault calls "normalization". It is not a process of
regimentation and standardisation as in Huxley's 'brave new world'
but one in which individual difference is measured and catalogued
• I
relative to a norm which is, as it were, the average of
/
individualities. In such a system, the "infinitely small" detail
has a significance in relation to the whole by which it is measured.
Towards the end of the century, the Charity Organisation Society began
a self-conscious process of perfection of the science of the social
enquiry. The later 19th century witnessed a partnership of public and
private systems of income maintenance contributing to the ideological
conditions of existence of capitalist relations cf production. Heeds
and desires, within capitalist relations cf production, must be
satisfied for those without capital or property through the sale of
labour power. Systems of income maintenance must, therefore, ensure
that those unable to sell labour power, temporarily (children; the
sick) or permanently (the insane; the disabled and infirm), are
maintained without diverting them or others away from 'the labour market.
To the extent that capitalist relations of production require, as
conditions of their existence, legal and ideological mechanisms to
ensure an available labour force, the principle of less-eligibility,
legally and ideologically endorsed and enforced, constitutes a condition
of existence of those relations of production.
Welfare discipline, and its form as the science of welfare within
capitalist relations of production, is an aspect in the wider definition
and control of the labour force; welfare science polices idleness.
But this is not to argue either that welfare and social work
institutions are determined in their form and effectivity by
Capitalists' or 'capitalism', or that welfare discipline is
one facet of a homogeneous 'capitalist disciplinary hegemony*.
As in other chapters, the valuable and inspirational insights
developed by Poucault, which culminate in his concept of 'discipline'
have been utilised whilst rejecting Poucault's tendency in
Discipline and Punish to allow' that concept to hegemonise the whole
of discourse on social formations with capitalist relations of
/go}
production. ^ It is not, of course, being argued that there
cannot exist common conditions of existence for disparate discursive
formations. Quite the reverse. Following Foucault, this chapter
has sought to identify what has been described as the epistemological
conditions of existence of specific social formations with determinat
relations of production. ' But it has not allowed these conditions to
83. Although fbucauit's texts have never been xuiequivocally Marxist
oriented and have recently been patronised by an anti-Marxist
intelligentsia in Paris, the theme of Discipline and Punish clearly
appeals to Marxists who believe that the 'capitalist' national
economies of the West have been hegemonised by 'bourgeois' ideology,
politics and law. It is a theme to be found in historical analyses
such as that of Stedman Jones' in which "The policeman and the
workhouse were not sufficient. The respectable and the well-to-do
had to win the 'hearts and minds' of the masses ..." (1973/^:^-66).
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dictate forms and presume continuities. m0 illustrate the
issue at hand, this chapter has sought to describe two interesting
lines of discontinuity in 19'th century welfare disccurse. Eriendly
Societies were a form of mutual insurance for those in the labour
force who could afford to make regular contributions to insure against
loss of wages because of illness or old age (and, often, strikes).
In form, they maintained a degree of democratic control which contrasted
markedly with commercial insurance companies founded on finance capital.
Ultimately, the relevance of the Eriendly Society wan simply surpassed
when the state took full responsibility for the organisation and control
of funds within a National Insurance scheme. Eriendly Societies could
not compete in the market with commercial compani.es offering better and
more secure benefits. In addition to maintaining a degree of
independence both from the state and the capitalist sector, however,
Eriendly Societies provide an interesting study of a welfare form which
was not hegemonised bv the growing body of social work disccurse which
8I4.. Eoucault's works as a whole provide justification for suggesting
a continuity of discourses as a unitary knowledge-power relation. It
was Thomas Bernard, in the 19th century, who exclaimed "Hie man who
first made a practical use of the division of labour ... did not do
more essential service to mechanical than Id? Bell has done to
intellectual operations ... The principle in manufactories and in
schools is the same" (quoted by David Owen, 1965:117). But, this
thesis maintains, the continuity resides in the social scientific
understanding of Man which became a feature within the Modern epistems.
It is this regularity which is opened up by Foucault's many
genealogical studies and which this thesis attempts to reveal within
welfare discourse. But this does not constitute a homogeneous
knowledge-power relation which has hegemonised all discourse. This is
a, process of explanation xtom which socialists should distance themselves.
Discursive regularities, such as social work, must be -understood in their
particular specific forms and degrees of effectivity within determinate
social formations if this understanding is to prove of assistance to
socialist political action.
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sought to allocate "benefits based on investigatory knowledge.
Neither the liberal view that the Eriendly Societies form an
integral root of the blossoming Welfare State, nor the radical view
that they represent an instance of 'working class1 initiative
'incorporated' into 'bourgeois' culture, are particularly supported
by an analysis of Eciendly Societies in the British national economy.
The second line of discontinuity examined in this chapter is that
of the phenomenon of industrial welfare. Given particular
encouragement by the centred government during the war of i$li|--l8,
social work theorists and educationalists cast it very much as a
branch of social work. In the event, the hollow left by the retreat
of state concern after- the war and the failure of social work
pedagogues to retain a firm hold over the industrial realm was filled
by an alternative discourse - personnel management. Despite the
occasional appearance of personnel management in texts aiming fox-
comprehensiveness rather than clarity in their cover of the social
/O
services, ^ discourse on personnel management subsumes certain
aspects of welfare discourse and subordinates it beneath a discourse
on work discipline and motivation. Social work disco-arse did not,
then, hegemonise the realm of the work place. This is not to argue
that it co-uld not, although there were political and economic reasons
85- Younghusband did not include personnel management in her 1978
follow up study of her analyses of social work in Britain of 19U7 and
1951 "but Randall's British Social Services does. "Personnel managers
are not social workers", writes Randall, "... but are included in this
chapter since they have a welfare function ..." (1981:232).
f:
399-
why it did not. The imperialistic potential of social' work
discourse has been alluded to in this chapter. "Hie work place,
much as any other in which large numbers of people gather
/Q £ \
together, v ' may provide an avenue of expansion for the social work
profession. However, the legal and cultural conditions of existence
of welfare often determine that social work clients are, by definition,
those without the financial resources to 'buy1 their way out of
/O ry \
trouble, ^ '' despite Younghusband's belief that "... the personal and
social problems and needs ..." with which social workers deal "... are
found within all income groups ..." (l959:pa^,a-.63l).
In a national economy in which personal welfare depends largely
upon personal wealth it is inevitable that the majority of those who
cannot maintain personal welfare are those with little or no wealth.
The science of welfare has been absorbed, since the 19th century, in
the effort to find a technical solution to the problem of why, in
86. "The first civilian social, worker has been appointed to a senior
post in the Royal Navy's personal and family service, paving the way for
the appointment of other qualified social workars ... The appointment
follows the recommendations of the ... naval welfare committee (chaired
by Lord Seebohm) ,.. bringing an end. to the social worker posts being
occupied by retired naval personnel" (Report In Social Work Today, IRth
August 1979). And see "Caring for the professionals", an article on
social work with the armed forces, in Social Work Today, 6th May 1980:
12-li|. "
87. For example: by hiring assistance to care for the home or to
look after children or a sick or dependent relative; by purchasing
psychiatric support on a regular basis; "by travelling regularly to see
friends and relatives; by being able to keep the home warm and healthy;
by being able to purchase nourishing food regularly; and so on.
88. In a report advocating 'generic8 social work, a plea for social
work a.s general practice welfare was inevitable. "We ... hope that in
time the social work services ... will be used by all who need them
irrespective of income, class or occupation" (1959:para.63I).
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general terms, it is particular sections of the propertyless
majority of the population v.ho fail to maintain, themselves.
Consequently, given the scientistic orientation of the way in which
this question is framed, and solutions sought, knowledge is required
about individuals and their deviations from the norm: norms of
individual functioning, but also norms of familial and cultural
functioning. draining social workers is, therefore, the inculcation
of social scientific knowledge of norms and rules, meanings and systems.
It is a knowledge which:
"... refers individual actions to a whole that is at
once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation
and the principle of a rule to be followed. It
differentiates individuals from one another, in terms
of the following over-all rule: that the rule be made
to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to
be respected or as an optimum towards which one must
move. It measures in quantitative terms and
hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level,
the tnatux,e® of individuals. It introduces, through
this f value-giving1 measure, the constraint of a
conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces
the limit that will define difference in relation to all
other differences, the external frontier of the
abnormal £...1 In short, it normalizes" (Foucault, 1977:283
The following chapter will examine in more detail that knowledge-
power relation which, in the present century, has witnessed increased
state involvement in the definition, control and development of social
work discourse and the science of welfare.
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CHAPTER 7
The Crisis in Traditional Social Work Discourse
and the Radical Alternative
1. Introduction
It is the constellation of concepts - capitalist relations of
production, the Modern episteme, and the science of welfare, for
example - which form what have been called, in this thesis,
continuities. The analysis of the British national economy in terms
of capitalist relations of production and epistemological conditions of
existence, identifies a determinate discursive regularity - the science
of welfare - as a continuity. One facet of that discourse - social
work - has been discussed in terms of its general form, for example,
its dependence upon social scientific categories, and in terms of its
specific content, for example, the control of vagrancy and the
organisation of charitable endeavour. The previous chapter sought to
illustrate that the identification of welfare discourse is not the
identification of a necessary continuity, for example, in the case of
industrial welfare, and that the identification of one form for the
policing cf idleness - the Eriendly Society - is ret necessarily the
identification of scientific welfare discourse. This chapter continues
the analysis of discourse on social work by identifying further lines of
continuity linking the discourse of the previous two chapters to
contemporary social work issues. Finally, in this and the concluding
chapter-, ways are suggested in which £radical social work' discourse can
he conceived as a further facet of the continuity in question ana suggests
how that continuity might be fractured to form a socialist interpretation of
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discourse on welfare and the policing of idleness.
00 A Crisis of Confidence. Over the pact ten years, the growing
optimism amongst politicians and practitioners about social science's
potential for social engineering has taken a decisive reversal.
British criminology throughout the century has been closely associated
with social policy and the search for the 'causes' of criminal
behaviour. This discourse has been interwoven with welfare discourse
in a ceaseless correlation between criminal behaviour and specific
features of 'working class' life. The 'failure of treatment'
literature which began to appear in the 1970s has been primarily
aimed at a revelation of the failure to 'cure' deviant behaviour,
with obvious implications for social work discourse. In the USA,
programmes designed to attack the causes of crime ana to ameliorate
poverty and inequality have, research suggests, failed. In Britain,
the failure of the 'IMPACT' probation treatment experiment has had.
obvious implications for the concept of probation as an aspect of
h )
social work intervention in the lives of offenders, whilst two years
earlier, the Maria Colwell Report had drawn public attention to a
1. The scene was initially set by the mammoth publication -
Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment - A Survey of Treatment
Evaluation Studies - by Lipton, Martinson and Wilks (Rraeger,1975) ♦
Segal had, however, already published a, review of literature on
"social work therapeutic intervention" in 1972, producing equivocal
findings pointing strongly "in the negative direction" (1972:15) *
By 1978, Fischer's review of treatment programmes in social work,
psychotherapy, corrections, psychiatric hospitalisation and education,
suggested that the results of social work intervention were amongst
the least successful (1978:218). The results of the British 'IMPACT'
(intensive Matched Probation and After-Care Treatment) programme were
published in the same year as the Home Office Research unit study by
Brody - The Effectiveness of Sentencing (1975) which endorsed the
'nothing works' message of the American literature.
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failure in the child care network. Against this background,
social work journals have featured a stream of articles and letters
questioning the bases and fundamental principles, the functions and
(2)the quality of training, of social \york. s ' Such questioning,
however, often ends in reconfirmation that social work is, after all,
'on the right tracks' and all that is required is more time and a
tightening up of its technical apparatus. In an editorial for the
British Association of Social Workers5 journal. Social Work Today,
for example, Terry Bamford notes that despite the immense growth in
the influence and power of the profession, social workers are
"depressed, disillusioned and disaffected" (Bamford, 1977)« Bamford
lists some of the scapegoats often blamed for "this sorry state" but
his discussion of social work's "disarray" is a perfunctory act, a
preamble to a reconfirmation that "social work is a skilled activity",
a profession with "a recognisable body of knowledge and skill".
"Bespite the widespread gloom there are some signs that the tide is
now receding" (ibid.). One of these signs, apparently, is the BASW
publication - The Social Work Task - which identifies "the specific
social work function". That document, in fact, provides a definition
of social work described by one lecturer in social work as being "so
2. For example: "Does social work education work?", Social Work
Today (July 26th, 1977): "Is social work necessary?". Community Care
(January 10th, 1980); "Who needs fieldwork training?", Community Care
(September 20th, 1979); "What we have to do to shift the image of
social workers Social Work Today (June I7th, 1980): "How
training may 'unfit1 people". Social Work. Today (September 20th, 1977; a
paper read at a BASW conference - 5Who needs social work?'); "On the
-unpopularity of social work", Community Care (June 25th, 1981).
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broad and general as to be meaningless" (Milner, 1580:20).
This self-examination of social work discourse displays what
Burton and Carlen describe as the discursive redemption of
legitimation deficits (1979:138; passim). The Maria Colwell Report,
for example, adopts the empiricist tradition which Burton and Carlen
note epitomises the approach of the Royal Commission; witnesses are
heard; evidence is taken; judgement passed. Thereafter, "techniques
of negation" are used to explain how things 'went wrong' (ibid.: 112
et seq.). First "material negation": the state cannot simply assume
responsibility for children in need but must also provide the resources.
Secondly, "empiricist subjectivism": mistakes of judgement were made
by certain individuals. Finally, "fraternal critique": provided in
the Maria Colwell case by Olive Stevenson's Minority Report which
marginalised the "empiricist subjectivism" component of the main body
of the Report. Ultimately, however, the Report 'blamed' the
amorphous realm of "the system": training; administration; planning1;
liaison and supervision. Thus, whilst stating unequivocally that a
goeat deal of re-thinking about child care was overdue, such a re-think
was cast more in line with the efficiency of systems than with the
3. The definition suggested was:
"Social work is the purposeful and ethical application
of personal skills in interpersonal relationships
directed towards enhancing the personal and social,
functioning of an individual, family, group or
neighbourhood, which necessarily involves using
evidence obtained from practice to help create a
social environment- conducive to the well-being of
all" (BASW, 1977:para.3.17).
the working party acknowledged that its brief was "... so enormous and
complex that |his report should not be seen as a final definitive
statement of what social work is ..." (l977:Pa;'::'a'*l•£)• Presumably
implying that, given time, such a statement could be made.
ho$.
relevance of theory and practice.
Olsen also adopts "techniques of negation" in an article based
on his inaugural lecture ("Social work under siege") when he outlines
seven major criticisms levelled at social work. Olsen castigates
such criticisms because of their unscientific bases: "... few are
founded on objective analysis. At best they rely upon
impressionistic research confounded with statistical and
methodological inadequacies" (l98l:l6). Olsen also outlines seven
possible explanations for "the bad press and public reproach", amongst
which one might note: social work's role a-s "conscience of society"
and consequent association with society's residuum (as Bavies (1981)
puts it, social workers "are judged by the company they keep"); the
complexity of the various statutory tasks allocated to local authority
social work and social service departments; "the poverty of resources";
and the "dubious knowledge base" of social work (Olsen, 1981:16-7).
But, for Olsen, the two most prominent problems for social work are:
"... the consistent failure to measure the performance of the
individual social worker, or of the profession as a whole, in meeting
stated objectives ..." and "... the adverse consequences of concentrating
on theoretical models rather than on constructing a methodology for
analysing the facts and prescribing action" (ibid.:17). Without such
k. The Colwell Beport was forecast and subsequently interpreted as
an attack on social work(ers). It does, nevertheless, provide
'evidence' in a form which allows commentators to utilise a "material
negation": 'pressure of work1 and 'lack of resources'. Both
reactions are commonplace whenever social work effectiveness is
questioned. See, for example, the discussion of criticism of social
work services;by the Scottish judiciary following the integration of
the BcobatiorJ Service into generic Social Work Departments, in Curran
(1932;"General Introduction").
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rigid guides to action, social work will always respond to
changes in theoretical and political fashion: "... social work
roust involve itself in tire search for accuracy and embark on
greater experimentation. It must also continue in its search, and
develop its own knowledge base ..." (ibid.).
Such soul-searching articles invariably reject their own
invitations to an open discussion of the 'validity claims' of social
work discourse. Practical questions of a moral and political nature
are relegated to relativism or are ruled 'out of court' entirely,
whilst theoretical questions are reduced to a consideration of social
work technology. For example, Martin Davies' series of articles for
Community Care, which questioned the validity of the assessment
procedures on social work training courses (Davies, 1979)? was quickly
met by very defensive replies from CCETStf, BASW and two eminent social
work educators (Pciseilla Young, 1979; Cypher, 1979; Parsloe and
Stevenson, 1979)» Parsloe and Stevenson tackle the
representativeness of Davies' sample of education establishments and
Young picks up the same point in her contribution. Parsloe and
Stevenson also outline what social work educators are doing to improve
(9)the assessment of "demonstrable competence". ' These 'improvements'
5- There are noticeable parallels between these new methods and
social work practice. For example: "A search for ways of getting
behind the recommendations of field teachers and tutors to the facts
about a student's ... work". Hecommendations parallel 'presenting
problems' as the surface manifestation of deeper issues. This 'method'
is broken down into what amounts to 'contract work', that is, written
agreements between student (client?), the academic and field teacher
(therapist; social worker?) about what is to be done; 'self-
examination' by the student through a written account of what has been
done and leqrhed; the 'personal interview' in which the student is
orally examined and the examiner has reports from the field teacher.
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are, however, technical innovations: a widening and improvement of
the means of evaluation without tackling the fundamental, issue
raised by Davies - what is being evaluated? There are, notes Davies,
social work educators who feel that social work is so amorphous that
they could rarely .justify failing any student who had tried. Given
the epistemological conditions of existence of social work discourse,
theories or methods grounded in the constituent models of the social
sciences can always be complemented or criticised by others but never
entirely superseded. Wo perspective in social work is ever completely
on the wrong track; there are merely degrees of rightness and
wrongness and prestige often depends on having a wide grasp of
alternative perspectives. Self-doubt in social, work discourse is a
function of its epistemological formation and usually ends on a note of
optimism given that there is always an alternative perspective to fall
back upon. For Olsen, then, "The truth of social work will remain a.
tree of slow growth". For Davies, "There is ... a great deal of
confusion, bat the careful observer can begin to see and feel new
shapes emerging" (1979:25).
Social work apologists rely heavily upon the view that such work
requires specific and special skills and methods which distinguishes
6. Although social work has had to face set-backs from the present
Tory government, there is little reason for the profession's pessimism
concerning its public image. Roberts suggests that the press does not
so much 'basil1 social work as relegate it and he attributes this, in
pari, to reluctance in social work to enter into debates through the
media (1980:17; and see Hills, "How the press see you", Social Work
To day, 20th May, 1980). A recent national opinion survey
commissioned by the Barclay Committee, whilst suggesting that the pubLie
valued social ^workers less than doctors, policemen and Citizen's Advice
Bureau workers, also suggested that "The public's attitude is almost
unambiguously favourable" (Weir, 1981:216).
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social work from other activities. Twentieth century developments
in social work discourse are to he examined in the sections which
follow, particularly in terms of what is called the unification of
social work.
2.. Generic ism, Essential!sm, Scientism
Numerous commentators have argued that social work occupies a
particularly unusual and often stressful position in the realm of
individual and social values. Writers such as Plant (1970) arid
Ealmos (1978) cast the issue in terms of what has been discussed in
this thesis as the "ontological gulf" between individual and society.
Both are concerned, for example, about the appropriate balance between
individual freedom and the 1 demands* of society, Haimos in particular
(l)has attacked those who would use social work politically. - ' Social
work, for Olsen, occupies a position "... where outer and inner needs
meet to bear on the individual" (1981:17); a position, he believes,
which is apt to lead to the false belief that social work is
omnipotent. As ."Davies puts it, simply, "... the tendency of social
workers to claim too much for themselves" (1981:12). Davies, however,
believes that such over-enthusiasm can be mitigated by "improved training
and reciruitment policies" and, thereby, neglects the numerous other
conditions of formation of social work discourse. As Olsen notes, there
7. Hence the dichotomies in the title of Haimos* book - The
Personal and the Political. Social Work and Political Action.
"Equilibration" and "caution" are advocated by Haimos, largely because
he works on a continuum which casts the political and the "exclusively
socialised" at one extreme and the personal and individualized at the
other.
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axe some "%k Acts, regulating Acts and rules governing social
work practice" (1981:17). Whilst in what follows these legal
conditions will receive scant attention, it must he emphasised
that they cannot he divorced from any analysis which examines social
work discourse.
(i) Generic Social Work: A Family Service. Social work's 'hard
times' are often attributed to the Seebohm Report of 1968 and the
subsequent generic social services departments. As a ITew Society
editorial notes: "... swelling demand, staff turnover and the
expertise required to do the ta.sk well, have caused a reaction against
Seebohm's 'generic' concept" (2nd October, 1975). Additionally, it is
argued that rapid expansion of local authority social work and social
services departments has resulted in the creation of a, bureaucratic
machinery which alienates clients from social workers and social
workers from their own hierarchy.
One of the aims of the Seebohm Committee, was the amalgamation of
the various personal social services into a coherent family and
community service. It is a commonplace criticism of social work to
suggest that it concentrates on tie problems of individuals whilst
ignoring the relevance of the dynamics of the family and the influence of
the social environment. This, however, is something of a red-
herring which has allowed social work discourse to operate upon the same
8. Liberal theorists tend to talk about 'the environment* as a
residual category implying almost anything lying outside the person
of the individual, whereas rshical theorists talk about 'structural
determinants', a pervasive concept which allows anything lying outside
the person of ;the individual to be used to dominate him in the name of
'the system'.1
principles of content whilst arguing that it has developed important
and radical new avenues of intervention through> for example, group
work and community work. Butryia (1976:2-3)', amongst others, has
argued that the significance of the "psychiatric deluge" on British
social, work has been exaggerated. Hiere are, however, important
contrasts in the treatment of the client-as-individual which are lost
when compounded in this kind of environment/individual dichotomy.
First, there is the approach which identifies problems of normative
functioning within the individual and a remedy is sought, perhaps, by
inducing a personality change in the client. It is this picture of
the "psychiatric deluge" which Woodroofe portrays in the chapter she
heads by that phrase (i9?U: H8-U7) and which Butrym considers not
particularly appropriate to British social work. But, secondly, ther
is the approach which is illustrated by the view of Florence Hollis
who, according to Handler (1973:8), accepted the reality of
environmental factors but felt it was a basic presumption of casework
that the client "can almost always do something about his problem and
that the worker's task is to increase his capacity to do so".
Bcoblems, then, may be structural but the client must be encouraged to
find ways of coping and making changes within the existing regulative
framework. Thirdly, there is the approach advocated by Leonard (1973
passim) in which the client's false consciousness is liberated through
the educational process cf "conscientization". From this perspective
problems reside in the environment (structure) but contaminate the
individual consciousness; the function/conflict set has significance
only within ti^e system of norms and rules by which the individual is
C9)
alienated. K '
Ml such approaches share an ontology of the individual and his
relation to the world and an epistemological framework through which
this relationship is interpreted. It is a fundamental argument of
this thesis that this ontology and its accompanying epistemologies
have a great deal in common. The balance sought between emphasising
the pathology of the individual or the dysfunctions of the
environment; the attempts to bring them together, tc bridge the
,:ontological gulf", or to treat them ' dialectically1; all such
approaches amount to variations on a common epistemological theme.
•To castigate social work for concentrating on the individual may have
moral and political benefits but it does little to advance socialist
understanding of social work discourse and its demoeratisation.
Unfortunately, for many radical theorists the logical consequence of
criticising social work's individualism is to move analysis to the next
most complex institution. If not- the individual, then the family; if
not the family, then the community; and so on and upwards to the
amorphous social structure.
Yoimghusbana, in her chapter on "A Family Service: Foreshadowings
of Seebohm" (1978, Vol.I:227), illustrates how, over a number of years,
government reports and White Papers had pointed towards the
desirability of integrating the personal social services into a
comprehensive family service. What is particularly noteworthy, however
9. Per completeness, one mi.git mention the position represented in the
CCETSW discussion paper Values in Social Work (l976:psras.3.01-G2) which
seems to suggest that either one can consider the individual or one can
consider society and that the former is a liberal perspective and the
latter is a'collectivist position.
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in documents such as Social Work and the Community, for Scotland
and Local Authority and Allied Personal Social Services (Seebohm
Report), for England and Wales, is not so much the emphasis upon
the family as upon the rational integration of services which,
in interaction with wider 'community' resources, would provide more
efficient and economic services with preventive potential.
This emphasis represents a line of continuity, forming a link with
19th century concern over the 'dangerous classes' of under and
unemployed who occupied the slums of the major cities. In the
Younghusband Report (1959), discussion centres on "problem families"
(para.316); in the Seebohm Report, discussion concerns "problem
areas" (para.2i.86); and by 1972, Sir Keith Joseph wan using the concept
of the 'cycle of deprivation' and a, programme of research, funded by
the Social Science Research Council, was begun into 'transmitted
deprivation' (Younghusband, 1978, Yol.2;l57).
10. Hie Seebohm Committee record their belief: "We could only make
sense of our- task by considering also childless couples and
individuals without any close relatives: in other words, everybody"
(para.32).
11. Che White Paper - Social Work and the Community argues: "In
order to provide better services and to develop them economically it
seems necessary that the local authority services ... be brought within
a single organisation" (l966:para,10). And, in speaking of the co¬
ordinating role of the proposed social work departments, the Paper notes
the need for "... the improvement and promotion of measures which 'would
help both to prevent the occurrence of these problems and to enable
communities and individuals more readily to surmount problems and
resolve tensions by their own efforts" (para.13). The Seebohm Report
speaks of the notion of a community as implying "... the existence of a
network of reciprocal social relationships, which among other things
ensure mutual aid ..." (l968:para.i;76). Hie Report identifies two
forms of pathological conmronity which might manifest delinquent
behaviour: those in which there is "little sense of community" and
those in whicii there is a strong community sense but the dominant values
are delinquent.
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Discourse on deprivation represents an interesting
interweaving of the concepts of prevention, individual and social
pathology and the community. The family appears as the institutional
link within this discourse in its various forms because it is the
vehicle which transmits genetic and cultural mutation. It is the
Local Authority Social Services Act, 1970 and. the Social Work
(Scotland) Act, 1968 which provide the legal conditions of existence
of social work discourse on deprivation and its eradication and they
represent a political and legal legitimation of social work discourse
broadly.
It is, of course, commonplace to argue that, as a means cf
policing the ' dangerous classes1, philanthropic effort was directed
towards inculcating the ideal of the 'bourgeois family1. Stedman
Jones argues that "this middle-class onslaught" failed but that working
class culture developed its own brand of conservatism "oriented towards
the family and the home" (l973/U'^-71 et sea.). Ibnzelot's view is
that both the 'bourgeois1 and the 'working class' family were
transformed, within the 19th century, through "the propagation ... of
medical, educative, and relational norms" but, for the 'bourgeois'
family, this was a purposeful act designed to protect their children,
whilst for the 'working class' family, order was imposed (1980:xx-xxi).
Ihe 'working class' family was reorganised "in terms of socio-economic
urgencies" (ibid.:26). In both theses, the denouement is the
'incorporation' of the 'working class'.
Within social work discourse, the concept of the 'problem family'
encapsulates: fa concern with the minimisation of economic costs arising
within a social formation with capitalist relations of production
and s, system of distribution determined by contribution rather than
need; a concern to police idleness through the calculation of
individuality and normality. A concept such as the 'cycle of
deprivation' represents the discursive product of a social science
eclecticism which weds theories about genetic deterioration with
theories concerning psychological and cultural deterioration. Such
a union results in notions such as the 'culture of poverty' and the
'deviant sub-culture'. Deprivation, as a multiplex phenomenon,
contaminates, ossifies, degenerates. Unchecked, it multiples costs.
She depraved contaminate housing and the environment: deprived
environments contaminate the depraved. Social work intervention,
then, is seen as a holding operation - a family which breaks up becomes
more costly in terms of local authority child care facilities, for
example, than a family which can be kept together. Bub its preventive
potential is also explored. Prevention or, at least, amelioration of
the cycle of deprivation would have definite economic and ideological
benefits. Welfare discourse on the family is less about the policing
of families than about the policing of idleness. The 'problem family'
represents the extremity, the residuum, for a science of welfare which
seeks not so much to classify into 'normal' and. 'abnormal' but, rather,
to allocate positions within a homogeneous social body in terms of
degrees of normality. Within the Modern episterna, knowledge proceeds
not, as in the Classical age, through the discovery of identities and
differences, but throiigh analogy and succession.'
Hie ''psychiatric deluge" represents a change in content of social
ias.
work discourse in the early 20th century. this was a change with
specific consequences, for example for clients, but it does not
represent a change in the epistemological conditions of formation
of social work discourse but simply a movement in emphasis of its
(±2)constituent models. v ' Long before Sir Keith Joseph spoke of
"... personality factors arising from illness or accident or genetic
endowment ... And ... factors which affect patterns of child rearing"
(quoted by Carman, 1975:116-7), the Board of Education, Board of
Control, Joint Committee on Mental Deficiency was tracing "the
external frontier of the abnormal" (Foucault, 1977:183). Written
in 1929? the Committee's Report covers the familiar parameters of
Younghusband's "problem families" and Seebohm's "problem areas" as
well as the rationale for the Community Development Projects.
12. At various points Woodroofe contrasts social work discourse of the
19th century with that from the 20th century, usually noting the moral
tone of the former and the scientific basis of the latter (though she is
not oblivious of the continuity they form, 197U:5l-2). Eor example,
she contrasts the treatment by the Charity Organisation Society of" a case
with one in 191+8. In the former case from 1883, a client's desire to
change employment was supported because of his good "character" and the
belief that his desire was neither frivolous nor fraudulent. In the
1948 case, a client's desire to change employment was resisted,
personality tests suggesting the client had a "character disturbance" and
that his desire was pathological (ibid.:ll8-9)• Again, in discussing a
comparative study of case records from 1901+ and 1931+, Woodroofe describes
as a significant change the discussion of personality and family
relationships in 193U, ia. contrast to the discussion of material
conditions and behaviour in 1901+ ('cleanliness'; 'honesty'; 'sobriety')
(ibid.:139)' Hhe impact of such discourses is not being underestimated
here. Wootton's major fault in her campaign against "the lamentable
arrogance of the language" of social work (1959:279; 1980) is to have
judged the gap between what social workers say and what they do as
unproblematic. However, whether fcom I083, 1901+ or 191+8, social work
discourse specifies: an ontology of Man which defines 'suitable cases
for treatment' (change); an epistemology which prescribes a method
(social enquiry); and a system which normalises (treatment;
intervention)I In fact, the 'moral judgements' from 1901+ manifest
themselves unambiguously in the language of the social enquiry reports
prepared by social workers for criminal courts (Curran, 1982).
1+16.
Dividing imbecility into primary amentia (genetically induced) and
secondary amentia (environmentally induced), the Committee were
of the view that primary amentia was the last stage in a process of
family degeneration which formed "a vicious circle" with poor
environmental conditions (1929, Part III: paras. 92; 93) • "Let lis
assume", suggests the Report:
"... that we could segregate ... all the families in
this country containing mental defectives of the
primary amentia type. We should find ... a most
interesting social group ... as everyone who has
extensive practical experience of social service would
readily admit ... insane persons, epileptics, paupers,
criminals (especially recidivists), unemployables,
habitual slum dwellers, prostitutes, inebriates and
other social inefficients. The overwhelming majority
of the families thus collected will belong to that
section of the community which we propose to terra the
•social problem' or 'subnormal' group. This group
comprises approximately the lowest 10 per cent in the
social scale of most communities " (Part III:para.9l).
Elsewhere in the Report, the Committee clearly associate large
concentrations of the 'subnormal group' with "rural areas with a poor
type of inhabitant" and "slum districts" (l9295 Part II:pare..91) •
The Committee's Report reflects what it is that, in terms of
epistemology and ontology, conditions the existence of the social
sciences. Rising within the realm of the purely biological, mental
illness is referred to an analytic of finitude - what Man is in his
normality requires an analysis of that dark area wherein lie the
boiuidaries that "define difference in relation to all other
differences" -• the Report seeks "'bo prevent the racial disaster of




describes concentric circles. But at once such an analysis must
seek after origins: "Prevention ... is concerned not with end
results but with .... remote antecedents" (ibid.). Mental deficiency
must, then, be placed within a history of Man's ontogenesis and
phylogenesis. It concerns a discourse on the interaction of functions
and norms, desires and rules and it requires their interpretation in
terms of a meaningful system - a culture of poverty or a cycle of
transmitted deprivation.
Produced in 1929, this Report demonstrates an open desire to purify
the quality of the race through the application of eugenic principles
in the name of economic efficiency and national welfare. KJ y But to
specify conditions of existence is not to determine outcomes. Hie
Report examines the implications of attempting to prevent mental defect:
"... we must deal not merely with mentally defective persons, but with
the whole subnormal group from which the majority of them come" (ibid.).
The Committee acknowledge that only those found certifiable could be
segregated or sterilised whilst the other "'carriers' of the defect"
would continue to breed mental defectives. The prevention of
reproduction by fully 10 per cent of the population, through segregation
sterilisation or the regulation of marriage, is written off as
"impracticable" (Part III:para.93)• Instead, mitigation of the problem
is sought: through "the lengthier incarceration of the subnormal in Poor
13. "The whole problem of the prevention of primary amentia, is one of
vital importance and the first nation to arrive at a solution of it will
have an appreciable advantage" (Part III:para.95)• Coming at the
beginning of a decade which would witness the systematic extermination 0
racial degenerates in a programme of national regeneration in Nazi
Germany, such a discourse allows little room for complacency about the
purity of national ethics and morality.
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Law institutions, mental hospitals and prisons and through more
thorough supervision on release; and through "education in trie
widest sense" on the dubious basis that education raises "the
cultural level" by "spreading downwards through the various social
groups" and leads to a decrease in the size of families (Part III:
para. 9Uj95>) • 'Education in the widest sense' was to become manifest,
in programmes such as the Community Development Projects initiated by
the Home Office forty years later (Younghusband, 1978: Yol .2; 21+6) and
in other 'positive discrimination' projects such as that for
Educational Priority Areas, as well as being an integral element
in the Kilbrandon Report (196I4) in Scotland and the Seebohm Report in
England and Wales.
the Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee has not been mentioned
to show that social work is really about psychological adjustment to life
and has not emerged from the "psychiatric deluge". That Report
encapsulates the entire spec-brum of concerns which arise from the
epistetiological matrix of the social sciences and the stud3r M3-31 an8.
Society: what is pegged-out for us is the space occupied by social work
discourse. Social work discourse is not about individuals or groups
or communities:
li|. "Formulated criteria fcr success ("in CDPsJ included increased
personal care, better family functioning and child-rearing practices,
and improved physical conditions in the neighbourhood" (Younghusband,
1978: Vol.2:21+6 , who also notes: "There v/as also to be a Home Office
central team, with the whole project closely related to the urban aid




"... a 'human science' exists, net wherever man
is in question, but wherever there is analysis -
within the dimension proper- to the unconscious -
of norms, rules, and signifying totalities which
unveiTlo consciousness the conditions of its
forms and contents" (F'oucault, 1970:361*).
The Mental Deficiency Committee was instituted to explain the
apparently wide geoegraphical variations in numbers of mentally
defective children being registered under the Mental Deficiency Act,
1913» Were variations due to differential diagnosis? In fact,
the Committee had to move beyond a rigid biology ana into the realm of
the social sciences. The social sciences are not so much concerned
to describe the line which divides the normal from the pathological but
rather, the outer-boundaries which set the limits within which humanity
laay be defined: they trace "... the limit that will define difference
relation to all other differences ..." (fbucault, 1977:183).
this which allows social work discourse to describe a normal
distribution and plot ranges of normality upon its curve:
"... everyone ... should accept the mentally handicapped
person as an individual in his own right thougi he may
suffer from varying forms and degrees of handicap which
affect his capacity to function as a full member of
society" (CCETSW, 1979:3* Emphasi"s~added7.
Chris Jones maintains that the financing and expansion of social
work services by successive governments since 19h5 was based upon the
belief that social work could solve the linked, problems of juvenile
delinquency and problem families (1978:36). Full employment and the
shortage of labour concentrated attention, in social policy terms, upon
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"enhancing the quality of the rising labour force" (ibid. :39) •
But as Jones also acknowledges later, an emphasis upon the family
is not a new phenomenon, the Charity Organisation Society, for
example, tended to deal with family units rather than the individual
claimant (ibid.:90), By the 1950s, several government
departments were showing concern over 'problem families' (Handler, 1973s
5l-3), however, we should not be surprised that a concern for children,
in particular, is expressed in a national economy in which distribution
is not based upon need. If social policy registers a concern for the
rising labour force it is a concern which cuts across crude boundaries
between 'good' and 'bad'. Social wcrk discourse represents a.
knowledge-power relation which imposes homogeneity through normalising
judgements,
(ii) The Unification of Social Work Discourse. It should be immediately
emphasised that this section will not be concerned with an analysis in
terms of the sociology of the professions. Interest will not centre on
whether or not social work is 'really' a. profession and will not,
therefore, seek to enumerate its traits and attributes. ^ The
unification of the various sites of social work 'discourse and its
increasing influence upon, and support by, successive governments, have been
15. Bhe COS changed its name to the Family Welfare Association in 19ipU♦
16, Johnson (1972) provides a brief review of sociologies of the
professions. Etsioni's The Semi-Professions and Iheir Organization (19^9)
is a classical example of the 'trait' approach (teachers, nurses and social
workers achieving only semi-professional status) and of the sociological
discussion of the 'tensions' said to exist between the concept of
profession and that of organisation. See, particuiarly, Scott in Etsioni
(1969) for an-application of this approach to social work.
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processes which apologists and critics alike describe as the
'professionalisation' of social work. Attention is to be given
here to this process of unification and to social work training because
they illustrate the consolidation of social work discourse as a science
of welfare through a process which identifies the essence of that
discourse, its generic central core. 'Professionalisation1, then, is
not being underestimated but simply being refused ontological privilege.
'Pkofessionalisation' within social work has been a particularly self-
conscious process, pursued, ignored or fought over by various agents
and its specificity and effectivity should not be overlooked.
It could be said that ever since Abraham Plexnsr defined the major
traits of a profession in 1915 and decided that social work did not
qualify because it lacked a technique of its own and merely mediated
between those with problems and "those with solutions (Becker. 1962;27-8),
there has been a marked desire to achieve just such a specific technique
and the related appellation of 'profession'. Flexner was not, however,
suggesting that social work lacked a body of scientific knowledge but,
rather, a "practical communicable technique" derived from the "raw
material" of "science and learning" (quoted by Kunitz, 1975:16). In
her history of social, work education in Britain, Smith suggests that the
controversies which occupied the early days of COS training were the same
as those concerning contemporary social work educators (1965:7)•
Basically, these controversies surrounded the distinction between the
theory and the principles which underpinned social work and the methods
and skills pursued in its practice. The Special Committee on Braining
of the COS punished its first Report in 1898 and expressed its regret
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that there was a marked tendency within District Committees to
concentrate upon the practical issue of casework to the neglect of
Cl7)"the advocacy of principles". x ' In these early writings we
witness the struggle to bridge the same gaps with which present-day
social scientists wrestle. Work with the individual client is seen
as a practical task which must be given meaning according to wider,
more general, social principles.
The year 1901 saw the formation within the COS of the Committee on
Social Education and, in 1902, a conference was held to discuss the
teaching of social sciences in universities and its relevance for social
work education. .Again, issues are rehearsed which have seen numerous
repeat performances. In his opening paper, Professor Marshall praised
the Committee for its proposal to "combine social thougat and action",
much as the Greeks had done but which the English had largely ignored!
(Smith, 1965:37)- Corrigan and Leonard (1978:109) note that the
Aristotelian notion "of the individual as a social and political animal
disappears with the growth of capitalism". What is significant about
these references to the ancient Greek conception of politics is the fact
that the Greeks saw politics as a continuation of ethics, to be
17. Smith reproduces the Report (1965:79-81;) which appeared originally
as a COS Occassional Paper.
18. Smith quotes from a paper by Mrs Gardner on the training of
volunteers within the COS in which the point is made that training
should not concentrate simply upon specific tasks but upon the "whole
article" (1965:18). In a paper written six years later (1900)
Mrs Bosanquet notes that the training of workers was, first, a matter of
learning principles, attitudes and a social philosophy and, secondly, the
learning of skills (1965:29). firs Bosanquet ends her paper by
emphasising that casework individualises the client tut that this is only
one half of. the work to he done: help for the individual must be combined
with the aim of "raising the district to which" the case belongs (1965:30)-
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understood in terms of "praxis rather than techno. Political
discourse constituted a different order of knowledge from scientific
knowledge (Hahermas, 197i+:Ul-2). Corrigan and Leonard miss the point
when they insist that the "cult of the individual" under 'capitalism'
has meant that Man is no longer seen as 'social'. As Habermas chows,
what is of more consequence is that political knowledge has been
scientised. The Social Education Committee ultimately rejected the
view that it should attach its training to the London School of
Economics because the courses organised by the latter were lacking in
the necessary social and ethical aspects and because the School had
"been associated conspicuously with one school of thought" (Smith, 1965:
39--UO). What "the COS was clearly looking for was a system of what a
recent LASW document calls "liberal education" (1979:para.3«2(i); and
see Heywood, I96I4.: 10-11) . University representatives believed that
■university education provided just such a service. Marshall felt it
provided for the development of imaginative powers (Smith, 1965:36-7);
another speaker saw the university as training the student's mind,
inculcating the power of judgement (rbid.:38). The COS, however,
viewed, university training as being too removed from the actual conditions
of life.
In the event, the COS provided its own brand of training for social
work, through its School of Sociology, until 1912 when financial problems-
forced it to amalgamate with the LSE. Thereafter, university
19. The Health of Munition Workers Committee was later to endorse just
such a 'liberal education' as ideally suiting welfare work: "breadth of
judgement, wise understanding, good sense and all that general combination
of qualities which belong to the educated man or woman ..." (l9l8:para.i|68
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departments began providing courses in social studies which included
some consideration of practical training but the COS and other
voluntary organisations also developed practical training courses
(Smith, 1965:62). It seems likely, therefore, that the COS wanted
the kind of education in the social sciences which the universities
could provide but guarded with jealousy the business of creating
social workers. A liberal education was a politically neutral
education and, in 1925> Macadam was firmly of the belief that such
neutrality was more easily fostered in the cloisters of the "university
than elsewhere. Both the BASW document and Martin Davies agree.
Both feel that social work education benefits from the kind of "cross
fertilization" to be experienced within a university and which prevents
the development of a narrow perspective (BASW, 1979:pa3?a.6.7; Davies,
1979:2]*). But. as Davies also notes, this is not the view of many
"practice agencies", that is, those who employ social workers.
At a very early point in this controversy, however, the Greek ideal of
praxis was lost, A "liberal education" has become defined as "a
broad understanding of society and human personality" (BASW, 1979:
para.3.2(i)). The real question has become one of deciding the balance
to be achieved between academic education and the education achieved in
20. One Director of Social Services has written: "Some of us are
appalled at the quality of training now undertaken ... The CQSW is
no more than social work square-bashing ..." (Royoroft, Social Work
Service, Ub.l8, December 1978:27, ISSS).
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the social work 'university of life' (actual experience). ^ '
This disservice to Greek ideals was apparent in 1902 when Marshall
described Greek thxnight and Greek action as being "indissolubly
\tfelded together" (Smith, 1965:37)• It is is- the social scientific
casting of Man as at once object and subject, empirical and
transcendental, that we find the source of social work's anguished
attempts to weld together that which, by prior definition, is not
compatible.
Social work discourse has epistemological conditions of existence
and it also has legal, cultural, political conditions which influence
its form and content. The attempt to describe a discursive
regularity must, however, avoid the imputation of an unquestioned
coherence, an identifiable and identified social institution. This
thesis has explored what Foucault calls the 'surfaces of emergence' of
social work discourse in 19th century Poor Law legislation and
21. In writing of the amalgamation of the COS and LSE courses, the COS
Annual Report for 1912 noted that that success depended "on its Director
£ Urwick ] having been himself trained in the practical duties of case
work ..." (Smith, 1965:57)- Liberal education, but on the terms
dictated by social work educators, is an understandable reaction from a
profession conscious of its own identity and destiny. The issue
reappeared in 1977 when a number of 'unqualified' social workers were
appointed to directorships of social work/services departments. Rot all
social workers support what they see as BASW's elitism in aiming for a
fully qualified profession and a process of accreditation (see letter in
Social Work Today, 19th April 1977: "Hiding behind qualifications").
And clearly not all social workers feel that their Directors ought to be
professionally qualified. See, for example, the support given to the
unqualified candidate in Grampian Region (Social Work Today, l8th January
1977: "Grampian social workers back deputy director"). BASW, of course,
has insisted that Directors should be qualified (Social Work Today, 25th
January, 1977:U) the government has endorsed this view by
implementing its powers under the Social Work (Scotland) Act to prescribe
the qualifications of Directors (Social Work Today. 28th June 1977)- The
position in England, which has social services departments is, however,
more ambiguous (Social Work Today, 22nd February 1977:3>l6: and 2kth
July 1979)- A similar controversy rages over the appointment of non-
social workers to chairs of social work (Rees in Community Care, 22nd
November 1973).
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charitable policing of idleness and its "grids of specification"
which correspond to the constituent models of the social sciences
(Foucault, 1972:1(1-2). In the present century, we witness a
political and ideological contestation of the question - who is
speaking? What is the status of those agents who, as Foucault has
it, "... have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically
defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?" (ibid.:
50).
Despite the contemporary proliferation of self-aoiibt literature in
social work journals, the casual observer cannot fail to be impressed
by the contrast between the professional and unified identity of social
work today and the confused, incoherent and amateurish image of only some
twenty years ago. Figures fr-om 1975 suggest that almost all senior
social workers and team leaders are qualified and that at least half of
all basic grade social workers hold a qualification. K ^' Research
published in Social Work Today (Glasser and Walklate, 1979) suggests
that social work clients in Liverpool showed a great deal of support for
social workers during their strike in 1979 whilst a national opinion poll
shows that many members of the public have some notion of who social
22. These are figures for England and Wales (Social Work Today.
12th April 1977). Figures for Scotland show that nearly all local
authority social workers hold a CQSW (Social Work Services Group
Statistical Bulletin - Staff of Scottish Social Work Departments, 1979).
Figures for those employed in residential care usually show a much,
lower percentage of qualification.
j;
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{2 3 ^workers are employed by and what they do v (V/eir, 1981). In
marked contrast, the portraits presented by Rodgers and Dixon (i960)
and by Jeffreys (1965) suggest services staffed largely by
(2h)
unqualified but dedicated spinsters. v 4' In addition, both studi.es
illustrate the breadth of work which both researchers and respondents
were prepared to include within the concepts of social work and social
(25)servxces. v '
The fragmented nature of social work until recent times reflected
the diversity of institutional sites created by cultural and legal
conditions of existence. Specific bodies of social WDrk discourse
depended upon specific conditions of legitimation and described specific
sites of application. In general, however, "they can be seen to depend
"upon the Poor Laws and upon charitable endeavour as their 'surfaces of
emergence', and upon the incursion of medicine and political economy by
the social sciences for their "grids of specification".
23. When asked "Who do they work for?", 27% of respondents said the
local authority; 5% the social services; and 3% the welfare department.
148^ of respondents described social, workers as "caring people in a
difficult job"; lj.1% described them as being "there to help people find
their own solutions to practical or emotional problems".
2I4. One can gain a flavour of the pen-picture supplied by Rodgers and
Dixon from the following example (1960:63). Discussing the town's youth
employment services, the deputy youth employment officer is described as
having no academic qualifications but a long and varied experience of
work with young people. "After several years in the cotton mills she
spent ten years as games mistress, secretary, and deputy headmistress in
various approved schools". And then, in a footnote, "She had attended a
leaders' course in physical education and also possessed the Amateur
Swimming Association teacher's certificate, a diploma in life saving, and
an advanced folk-dancing certificate'.
25. And see the list of occupation groups discussed by Younghusband and
supplied by local authority health and welfare services (1959:para.320).
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"In a system of discipline, the child is more
individualized than the adult, the patient more
than the healthy man, the roadman and the delinquent
more than the normal end the non-delinquent"
(ibucault, 1977:193).
<
The task of the first hospital almoner supplied in 1895 hy the
COS was to assess the needs of the numerous persons who crowded into
hospital out-patient departments (Cope Report, 1951 :para..110-111).
Prevention of abuse of public (Poor Law) and private (charitable)
hospitals by those who could afford to pay was a task of the almoners
until the Rational Health Service began (Curtis Interim Report, 191+6:
Appendix; Chambers, 1959:366). But the assessment of patients' needs
was social work in a medical setting (Younghusband, 1951:para.221), and
the status of the almoner as social worker was enhanced through
association with the prestigious medical profession. Phis association
fixed the status of the almoner vis a vis other social workers but also
vis a vis the medical profession. As a professor heading- a medical team
is quoted as saying: "It must never be forgotten that medical social
work is quite different from an independent branch like family case work
where ... the worker has I presume the right and duty to direct the
social treatment. Where social work is an adjunct to medicine, the
medical view comes first ..." (Chambers, 1959:371). Nevertheless,
within the general field of social work, almoners had the prestige
associated with a separate professional association which registered
qualified almoners and organised its own training school. Phe suggestion
made by the Cope Committee (l95l) that the almoner was one medical
auxiliary amongst many ana should come under the supervision of a general
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Council which would register auxiliaries in the MS, was opposed
in a Minority Report by the almoner on the Committee who argued
that the professional responsibility of almoners would be undermined
(and see Younghusband, 1978, Vol .1 :ll+|>-6). In 1953* the Ministry of
Health confirmed that almoners would not be classified as medical
auxiliaries.
Like the Cope Committee, the Mackintosh Committee was appointed
"to consider the supply and demand, training and qualifications" of,
in this case "social workers in the mental health services". This
category included psychiatric social workers (PSWs) and there was no
suggestion of their being considered as medical auxiliaries.
Younghusband described PSv/s as "the most exclusive category of all
social work" (191+7:para.b.07). 1° the extent that psychiatry was seen
as an exclusive medical specialism, PSV/s gained additional, status over
almoners. Since its inception in Britain in 1929, PSW was closely
associated with child guidance which again added prestige to the work.
The Mackintosh Committee had no hesitation in acknowledging the
distinction between PSW and other social work tasks in the mental health
(?f> }
field ^ ' but registered difficulty in circumscribing the tacks of
26. The Committee had been asked to present a separate, interim
report on psychiatric social workers which it did in April 19U9-
In its full Report the Committee recommended that "The term
'psychiatric social worker' should be restricted to persons holding a.
university mental health certificate. These persons should be
regarded as specialists ..." (1951:"Recommendation" 5)« In 1959 "the
Younghusband Report made the same plea for qualified almoners (para.1+35).
v
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what it called "mental welfare workers" (l95i:pa^a-.38).
Nevertheless, Mackintosh was prepared to claim "that specialisation
has gone too far" and to suggest general courses of training for
social work based upon social science courses but with a greater
emphasis upon "the actual practice of social work" (l95l:psQ?a" 97) •
In fact, no action was taken and, eight years later, Younghusband was
to "deplore the time lost" (1959:para.226).
With the provision of school meals in 1906 and a school medical
service in 1907j School Care Committees were created to assess
parental payment, if any, for such services. In addition, however,
they offered a welfare service, acting as go-between for school and home;
advising children on choice of employment; providing a general
supervision during the early years of employment (Political and
Economic Planning, 1937:70) • In London, such work was carried out by
specialist workers (children's care organisers). The Curtis Interim
Report recorded that organisers were carrying out broad welfare duties
with children and their families and were expected to hold a Social
Science Certificate and have a specific period of practical training
(19^6:Appendix, para.6). Compulsory education, of course, necessitated
the introduction of officers to ensure compliance (school attendance
officers). By 19U5, Curtis was able to report that a number of
education authorities were employing "welfare officers" to carry this
27. The Curtis Interim Report had earlier suggested that mental health
workers were to be distinguished from, psychiatric social workers because
they were, for the most part, only concerned with mental defectives
(Appendix, para. lip). Mackintosh noted that a number were former
relieving officers and carried general social work duties (l95l:psra.3S).
r
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and other statutory duties and in acknowledgement of this
welfare role, the professional association changed the name of the
profession to that of education welfare officers (Ralphs Report, 1975:
para.15). In i960, Rodgers and Dixon were able to note that the
education welfare officers (©70s) in their study saw themselves as
social workers (l960:60). Nevertheless, despite agreement within
(29)
the Council for Training in Social Work v ' that opportunities should
be developed for allowing ©70s to enrol on social work courses, decisions
were deferred, first until the Plowden Committee had reported (19S7) and-
then until publication of the Seebohm Report (1968). As Younghusband
notes: "With some justification, ©70s felt themselves neglected" (1978:
Yol.2:28l). Not until the Report of the Ralphs Committee, appointed by
the Local Government Training Board, was published in 1973 were the work
and training needs of ©703 reviewed. That Report recommended that ©70s
should take the CQSW as their professional qualification. The Report
also recognised that an a,spiring profession has to relieve itself of
routine administrative tasks and identify those functions requiring the
attention of trained professionals (l975:psra.125-136)♦ The Report, in
fact, relegated the original duties of the attendance officer (enforcing
attendance; preventing employment of children) to the bottom of its list
28. For example, writing reports for juvenile courts; the supervision
of children under a 'Fit Person Order' (interim Report, 191*6:Appendix,
para.7).
29. Created under the Health Visiting and Social Work (Training) Act,
1962 and. based on the recommendations of the Younghusband Report (1959).
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of potential functions. Of primary concern was the "assessment
of social, emotional and educational problems" (para.130). CCEfSW
agreed with the Committee's recommendations and Yourghusband was able
to suggest, in 1978, that: "At long last policy moves had begun to
bring EWOs in out of the cold"(Vol.2:231).). ^0)
What the Curtis Interim Report Appendix describes for us are the
various "social workers in child care". Not until the recommendations
of that Committee were implemented through the 19U8 Children Act was a
branch of social work designated with the specific responsibility of
dealing with children deprived of a "normal home background1 .
Episternalogical and economic conditions of existence of social work
discourse do not determine the form through which that discourse is
implemented. What we can identify, however, is the increasing
scientisation of social work discourse and the consolidation of that
discourse around certain central concepts and through the active
intervention of the state and social work agents. Thus, moral, welfare
work, which had its 'surface of emergence' within voluntary religious
organisations, was already searching, in 1919? for "a more scientific
basis" for its work and turned to psychology to provide it (Chambers,
/ oft \
1959:382-3). Some of the work done by moral welfare workers was
30. Nevertheless, in 1980, Milner was of the opinion that social workers
remained disinclined to accept the EWO as a 'true' social worker. Milner
argues that the day to day work of the EWO is clearly social work and that
the main point of conflict is over the importance placed upon regular
school attendance by EWQs. Social work holism dictates that, in some
instances, school attendance should take a secondary place to other
considerations (1980:21). She important point to note, however, is that
the furtherance of the professional ambitions of EWOs resides in adopting
social scientific knowledge: its application in practice defines EWOs
as social workers.
31. Horn 1920, training was provided in Josephine Sutler Memorial House
in Liverpool.
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transferred to the Erobation Service after the Children and Young
Persons Act, 1933 and, as Chambers suggests, other duties were
taken over by other professional groups (e.g. health visitors) as
unmarried mothers became less dependent upon charitable assistance
(ibid.1363). As Younghusband maintains, problems of illegitimacy
and the unmarried mother were, perhaps, inappropriately distinguished
from wider sociaA work concerns with families (l959'Pa^a"525) • The
social scientific 'grid of specification' of social work discourse,
particularly in terms of that constituent model which allows the
interpretation of norms and rules to be cast in terms of systemic
meaning, directs the attention of those within the profession and the
state who would seek to 'improve', 'rationalise' or 'professionalise'
that discourse towards unifying concepts such as 'the problem family'
and generic social work.
During the 1950s and 1950s we witness the active efforts of
specific occupational groups and state enquiries to measure the
relationship of these groups to a recognised social work discourse as
the science of welfare. In 1953> the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust-
published a report of its experimental funding of courses in youth
leadership. The report emphasises the Bursary Committee's task of
choosing candidates with "the right innate qualities for leadership"
and provides a profile of the "born club leader": "a whole person",
happy both with groups and individuals and able to work with dedicated
but professional detachment (1953'H) • Only two training courses were
actually available. The YVCA course required the student to spend
three months dAi a COS office and three months in the YWCA college
1.
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studying, inter 3,11a, social administration; psychology; social
hygiene; history; public speaking; and relations with government
departments (ibid.: 18). (3%) Possession of a Social Science Diploma,
or a teaching qualification brought exemption from certain aspects of
the college work. The other course, organised by the National
Association of Girls1 Clubs, covered two years and required attendance
on a Social Science Certificate course: "this certificate is a
requirement in most other forms of professional social work and the
segregation of club leaders was felt to be undesirable" (ibid.:19).
Part-time work in a social casework agency was also required in order
to gain experience in helping "those in distress for economic reasons
or because of some personal problem of maladjustment" (ibid.).
By i960, the youth service had not developed greatly and the
Albermarle Report was highly critical of government failure in this
field (Younghusband, 1978, Yol.2:262 et sec;.), recommending a ten-year
development plan. For our purposes, the point to note is that a
National College for the Training of Youth Leaders was created in 1961
and. remained in operation until 1970- Younghusband describes for us
the curriculum: "... principles and practice of the youth service ...;
social studies; social group work; and social psychology (including
human growth and development) ..." (ibid.:27l). In its review of the
32. This was an emergency 12 month course. The usual training lasted
two years and, presumably, COS observation and college education would
have occupied 6 months each. The remainder of the course was spent in
practical training in clubs, thus conforming to the social work
tradition that half of the available training time must be spent on-"the-job.
r
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training given to youth workers, the Consultative Group on Youth
and Community Work braining records:
"... there seems little doubt that full-time youth
workers have been encouraged to model themselves
on social work professionals as well as the
educationists with whom they were formally allied
in the 191+2+ Education Act ..." (l978:30-l)« (33)
One year after publication of the Carnegie report on training
for the youth service, the Ministry of Education produced, a report on
community centres (19I+I+) in which it discussed the qualifications
required of potential wardens of the new centres. A "liberal
education" is recommended (para.59) and- strong emphasis is placed upon
"the right type of person" rather than ^^pon "any specific academic
qualifications" (para.5b). Nevertheless, training was seen to be
necessarily based "on the study of social science, if possible up to
university diploma standard ...". In addition, "training in
practical psychology" vras recommended as well as a period of
apprenticeship in a community centre (para,.58). Maturity was
emphasised and some support given to the notion -that suitable people
from other occupations might be encouraged to change employment and
become wardens though, strangely perhaps, youth leaders were not
considered to be necessarily suitable candidates (para.6l). One might
speculate that the community centre warden appeared to be at the edges
33» As Younghusband notes, in the late 60s greater interest in community
work led to an increase in tension over the youth service's dual
association with education and social work. It is worth noting that some
educational establishments offer courses in youth and community work
(Moray House1 s; School of Community Studies, for example).
S;
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of social work discourse in the 19i|0s, given the role of promoting
the "social and physical training and recreation of the community"
("Prefatory Note") which was envisaged by the Ministry of Education.
But association with the education services and, perhaps, the
emphasis upon the role being a second career suitable for later years
of employment, has militated against such an institutional site as an
appropriate location for social work discourse.
In contrast, the site of the approved school, so named by the
Children and Young Persons Act, 1933* provided a tradition through its
rehabilitative work as the former industrial schools and reformatories
for children and through its association with one of those illustrious
figures of 19th century social reform, Mary Carpenter (Young and Ashton,
1956:165 et seq.). which would suggest it as appropriate for the
gestation of social work discourse. Nevertheless, the Home Office
report of the Committee on Approved Schools and Remand Homes (1956)
felt that, self-evident though "specialised training" migit be, it had
not been carried out in any systematic way, most serving officers
bringing experience rather than professional training to the work.
Training for officers in approved schools was felt to he necessary to
forestall wasteful periods spent in 'learning from experience' and to
separate the suitable from the unsuitable. The special training
advocated would, for housemasters, follow on from a social science
certificate or diploma course and would include, inter alia, study of
social and economic conditions and the social services; child
development; elementary psychology and the causes of delinquency;
intelligence |esting; and club work and youth organisations. There
1+37-
was, of course, to 'be practical work, including visits to approved
schools and remand, homes.
Undoubtedly, the approved school ps one specific location
within the matrix of sites that play a recognised role in the
utilization and formation of welfare discourse. Social work discourse
has a place within that site, although its acceptance and effectivity
has not gone unchallenged. If social work discourse has struggled
for recognition within the realm of education, a similar struggle has
C 3d)
been evident within the criminal justice system. w/
These three strategic sites (the youth club; the community
centre; the approved school) have simply been referred to by way of
illustration of the use made by state bodies and other agencies of the
social sciences as the appropriate medium for sifting, training and
allocating workers within the welfare network of institutions. The
19I4OS were, of course, a time of reappraisal as self-conscious efforts
were being' made to create' a 'welfare1 state out of the conglomeration
of public and private institutions offering welfare services. As we
have already seen, the 1950s also witnessed a series of enquiries which
located a number of occupational groups in terms of their relationship
3I4. ITow known as community hemes in England and Wales and List I)
schools in Scotland.
35. Many community homes and List L schools remain under the
management of charitable and religious organisations and it is likely
that headmasters are selected for what are seen as wider qualities than
simply knowledge of social work principles. Interestingly, Hoghughi,
Principal of Aycliffe School, has provided a caustic critique of social
work theory and practice which is, effectively, an endorsemeiit of the
scientistic and eclectic epistemological basis of social work discourse
generally (Eoghughi, 1980). Ho^iu^ii is, however, exceptional in his
excursions inJco social work discourse.
1+38.
to social work discourse. Younghusband notes, for example, that
the 1930s "... was the period when the claim of health visitors,
and of others on their behalf, to be ... 'general purpose social
workers' was at its hei^it" (1978, Vol.1:205). In contrast, in
1956, the Piercy Committee declared that it was not convinced
that disablement resettlement officers should be recruited from the
ranks of trained social workers, the "social element" to the work
being appropriate, rather, for separate referral to a social worker where
necessary (para„l86). Work in residential care is currently portrayed
in social work journals as the poor cousin of 'real' social work. In
its Interim Report of March 191+6, the Curtis Committee discussed -the
■training of House Mothers for Children's Homes and recommended the
creation of a Central Council for draining in Child Care and a
programme of training- for a Certificate in Child Care. Practical
training was, of course, advocated but the "theoretical work" was
noticeably pragmatic: household management; prevention of disease;
record keeping; with, additionally, some 'liberal education' -- ("Some
courses devoted to improving the general standard of culture ..." of
the student) and some "non-technical instruction" in child development
(l9i+6:para.ll(.). The Williams Committee, set up by the National Council
of Social Service in 1962 with advisors from various government
departments, recommended in 1967 that a two year training course be
36. And see the discussions in Rodgers and Dixon (1960:39);
Jeffreys (1965:61p—89); and Chambers (1959:372).




created in residential care and again, emphasis was placed upon
subjects being taught in a "practical way", with students not
requiring "specific academic qualifications" (1967:209).
The Williams Committee attempted to define a generic course of
training for residential workers built around the belief that all
clients in care "... need understanding and help for themselves as
individuals. It is the sustaining of personality with which the
worker is concerned ..." (1967:165). Earlier, of course, the
Younghusband Report (1959) had written of the need "to appreciate what
is common in a variety of human situations ..." (para.55U). The
unification of social work discourse, for which Younghusband in
particular struggled from the end of the Second World War
(Younghusband, 1978) ¥ol.2:Chapter l), had to surmount the kinds of
fragmentation at the institutional and professional level which has
been illustrated in this section. It is clear that the state, in
particular successive governments and a variety of government
departments, has played an important part in the identification of the
'central core' of social work discourse. University social studies
38. In 1959 the Younghusband Report made the minimalist claim: "It
is clear to us that in certain respects residential work ... contains
a social work element" (para,.L92). The 'professional' status of
residential care has, however, remained confused, the promotion by
CCETSW of the Certificate in Social Service, in the mid-1970s, merely
bringing this to a head once more. CCETSW have described this training,
carried out on a day release or sandwich course basis, as not being a
social work qualification (Manning, 1978:21). The Residential Care
Association, in its turn, has insisted that the CQSW is the appropriate
qualification for its members (see letter in Social Work Today, l5th
February, 1977) and the CSS has been described as having a "cut-price
image" (Pryce, 1977:7). The Williams Report supplied an outline course
which it recommended ("Appendix C") and which differs little, in general
terms, from social work courses, though lacking their intensity.
kko.
departments in Britain have, since their inception, accepted the
role of social science as the theoretical "basis of a practice
(39)
called, earlier in the century particularly, social administration. w y
The Younghusband Report (l959) undoubtedly made a major contribution
to the unification of social work discourse through its
recommendation of a generic training system, on a national basis, for
what it termed "general purpose social workers". Younghusband has
described the distinction made by the Committee between professional
and general purpose social work as "unfortunate" (1978, Yol.1:222) but,
as the Committee recognised, such a proposal was more readily acceptable
to existing specialisms (e.g. psychiatric social work). The
Council for Training in Social Work, recommended by the Report, although
primarily concerned with the health and welfare services, immediately
acknowledged its aim of training "social workers whose knowledge and
skills enable them to work in a variety of ways with individuals and
groups within the community" (quoted by Younghusband, 1978, Yol.1:221;).
39. "Nearly all students choose and are selected for these [[social
studies J courses because they wish ultimately to take up some kind of
social work. Thus the courses ... f[have ] a vocational bias ..."
(Joint University Council publication, 1952, quoted by Younghusband,
1978, Yol.2:27). Even in 1973? Webb was able to write that despite
the antipathy of sociology department staff towards social work, it was
"... the single most important occupation entered by sociology
graduates" (1973:800).
i|0. The first generic course in applied social studies which began in
195U at the LSE under funding from the Carnegie Trust, was a one year
post-graduate course. Students were accepted for fieldwork placements
by family casework organisations, the Probation Service and in the
medical social work field but not in the psychiatric social work specialism.
Specht and Yickery have written that "A great deal of the history of social
work in the United Kingdom between the end of the Second World War and 1970
relates to the struggle between the expansion of specialised fields of
practice on the one hand and the drive towards genericism in training on
the other" (1977:38).
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The CTSW provided the national framework for its successor - CCETSW,
and the generic courses provided in colleges of further education
under? CTSW guidance formed the basis for the rapid expansion of demand
for trained social workers following implementation of the Social Work
(Scotland) Act, 1968 and the Local Authority Social Services Act, 1970.
(iii) Crisis or Presenting Problem? In 1966, Social Work and the
Community proclaimed that homogeneity would be brought to the wide
ranging responsibilities of the new departments, which had a duty to
provide community care and support, by having their basis in "the
insists and skills of the profession of social work" (para.lO), The
Social Work (Scotland) Act subsequently gave to Local Authorities the
general duty of promoting social welfare. In England and Wales a
similar general duty was not entrusted to Local Authorities but,
nevertheless, the Seebohm Report was largely welcomed as an endorsement
of the social worth of social work. A decade later, however, witnessed
the apparent crisis of confidence which -was discussed briefly in the
introduction to this chapter.
Contributors to a Fabian Society conference in 1969 on the Seebohm
Report had, perhaps, already laid the basis for an explanation of this
'crisis8. In general, it was felt that the Report ignored essential
discussion about planning and objectives (Townsend, 1970:7)> reorganisation
was an exercise in the name of managerialism rather than welfare (Parry
et al., 1979:163). In his contribution to the Fabian, conference,
Sinfield enumerated the areas of concern in relation to social work.
Unification would bring increased professionalisation which could isolate
social worker^ from client and community; faith in the efficacy of
ki>2a.
social work was not supported by necessary research evidence;
definitions of the social work task tended to rely upon social
workecs' definitions to the exclusion of clients and the wider
public; lack of resources would cause frustration amongst social
workers; trained social workers would have to be used effectively
(Sinfield, 19?0:23-1|5) • The 'accuracy' of these 'forecasts' is
apparent.
Ac is so often the case, Horth American experience provided a
number of commentators with a view of how social work might develop
in Britain. In a paper published in 1955j David Donnison outlined
what, for many (although apparently not for Donnison), were the
shortcomings of the general basis of social work "Graining to be
obtained in university social studies departments in Britain in contrast
to training available in Horth America. Many of the differences,
Donnison notes, could be summed up by saying that the Canadian School
of Social Work studied offered "professional training" whereas the
British university department offered an academic foundation for
subsequent professional training (1955s3U2). Mere specifically,
American students learned "to become social workers rather than to study
social work" (ibid.), and were equipped to enter a wide range of agencies.
In Britain, on the other hand, the student had, generally, to commit
herself to one specialism, either through professional qualification, or
by on the job training. Whilst the British student studied academic
psychology the American student experienced a professional socialisation
and a self-understanding (ibid.:3UC)• "The kind of fundamental
skepticism encouraged in other university departments", writes Donnison,
1(1(2 b
"may even prove a handicap in courses in which students are
required to become something rather than to study something" (ibid.).
A quarter of a century later, Martin Davies, in his inaugural
lecture, has implied that the teaching of sociology to social work
students is, perhaps, less than helpful in producing the kinds of
workers required. Hie tendency to see training "as an extension of
liberal education" has often resulted in an exacerbation of the rift
between theory and practice, the university and the fieldwork
placement (1981:19). Ia part, Davies' position is understandably
pragmatic: students apply for courses in the belief that social work
is "viable"; employers second staff and have "a right to anticipate
the end product" (ibid.). But Davies was also saying something about
the nature of social work: agencies and clients expect newly qualified
workers "to have achieved a. minimum degree of efficiency, competence
and self confidence". Hence, "Social work curricula must become much
more practice-based than hitherto" (ibid.). For Davies, the problem
with social work is that it fails to marry theory with practice, to the
detriment of the latter. In part, Davies' solution is to be found in
the masters degree course offered by his own department: in effect,
Davies demands greater control by the profession over social work
0+i)discourse. /
Similar assessments of 'the problem' are made by other social work
ipL. Davies writes: "Hie social worker ... has to learn to live
with [imperfection [J ...; his skills are designed to take it into
account and still to do his best for both agency and client ...
Hence the need for the profession to have control both over the
development of practice and the future share of training" (1981:19).
r
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educators. For Coull and Hall (1981) the major problem for all
vocational training "is the splitting of theory and practice". It
is the structure and values of higher education which are in
"fundamental contradiction" to the acquisition of practice skills
(1981:12). In the educational establishment, knowledge reflects
tutors' interests: knowledge should be determined "by the needs of
practice" (ibia.:13). Parsloe has suggested that "the way social work
education is organised may unfit students for employment" (1977sl5).
One solution to bridge the gap between education and practice, Parsloe
suggests, would be to insist that all social work teachers be involved
in social work practice (ibid.:16). In her inaugural lecture, two
( | o \
years later, Parsloe emphasised the same issue. '
Concern about the relationship between theory and practice, the
training institution and the practice agency are reflected in other facets
of the social work 'crisis' . Five years after CCETSv/ took
responsibility for probation officer training, Hugh Barr was writing about
anxiety within the Probation Service over the feeling' that it had lost
control of training; that generic training meant- loss of probation as a
specialism; and that the newly Qualified were ill prepared for probation
practice (Barr, 1978). Elsewhere in the professional journals we
can read about: the need for social workers to be accountable to
i|2. "Bridging the gap between training and practice", (Social Work
Today report on the lecture, March 27th, 1979s6). And see "Jcint
appointment helps to close the credibility gap" by Bob Stevens (Social
Work Today, January 2lpfch, 1978:7-8).
k3. Bruce Lynch makes a similar point about the role of Scottish
social worker# in supervising offenders ("Does supervision work?",
Community Care, May 28th, 1981:18-19).
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themselves but also to their employers arid their profession more
generally; the tensions of working as a professional within a local
authority bureaucratic structure; the conflict and lack of
communication between social workers in area teams and their
management superiors.
Donnison, in 1955» was noting that research into social work
practice was a "neglected field" and recommending post-graduate social
work programmes. "More postgraduate work might", felt Donnison,
"also strengthen one of the weakest links in the British education
chain - that between the universities and the field" (1955:3^8).
However, Donnison was endorsing the tradition of a 'liberal education'
in social, work rather than suggesting a means of consolidating the
essential nature of social, work knowledge.
"If social workers are to give leadership in the
development of social services they must be more
than experts in human relations skills. They must
be aware of the impact of their work on the client
and his family, but aware also of its social,
political, and economic implications. Perhaps they
should recognize,too, that the job of helping people
will always demand a critical approach to accepted
methods and assumptions, and a willingness to hold
heretical and unpopular- views" (1955:350).
nevertheless, Donnison's early paper can be read as a celebration of the
kind of professional training available in North America, the main
difference being that American students had already had their 'liberal
education' as undergraduates. By 196k, Heywood was recording her view
that a 'liberal education' in social studies was a facet of social work




teaching about the dynamics of human behaviour and. of helping people
under stress (1961;: 10-11). By 1975, CCETStf was arguing that social
work students should acquire "skills and knowledge". It was argued
that professional practice was the appropriate use of skills on the
ba,sis of knowledge. The document expressed the view, however, that
the acquisition of knowledge had been more hi^ily valued than the
acquisition of skills (l975:paca.5.2). In an earlier paragraph
the CCETSW document identifies the "knowledge and skills for basic
practice" (para.1^,5) and. they reflect the location of social work
discourse within the matrix of the social sciences: knowledge of human
development and behaviour, of society and its institutions and the way
they interact (the "ontological gulf"). Basic skills were confined to:
the ability to apply this knowledge and the ability to "use oneself in
serving individuals and groups, communities and society". The dilemma
reappears: social work finds itself treating as its object what is in
fact a condition of its possibility. The ability to apply social work
knowledge depends upon knowledge of Man and Society: the ability to
"use oneself" depends upon knowledge of oneself as a functioning organism
within a system of norms and located within a social structure of
conflict and rules. The ability to apply social work knowledge depends
upon social work knowledge. Despite an obvious recognition that Man's
ill*. The CGETSW working group on Education and Training for Social
work note that this is a reflection of a general emphasis in higher
education rather than simply the conviction of social work teachers (1975) •
V
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historicity "both constitutes and transcends him, social work
writers are constrained to find technical solutions to their dilemma.
This can he seen in the attempt to define the essence, the central
core, of social work and in the emphasis upon the selection of students
with 'appropriate' qualities.
it5. "social \rork's boundaries are not readily identified and
may be constantly changing" (CCETSW, 1973:paha.^-8); "... in any
responsive profession, methods and approaches will need to adapt to
changes in society" (BASW, Social Work Education : Hie Way Ahead, 1979:
para.3«2).
h6. The CCETSW document attributes its failure to identify social
work's common 'core', in effect, to the lack of a core to the social
sciences (l975:pai,a-^.7) • Others, however, continue the search.
Davies, for example, apologises to readers of his series of "Community
Care Practice Handbooks" because a hoped for volume - Basic Skills in
Social Work - had "proved too elusive to pin down at the moment"
7community Care, 1st November, 1979:23). Candidates for social work
training require exceptional abilities: "A commitment to the
enhancement of human well being; to the maintenance of personal
integrity and the development of professional skills; maturity,
respect for individuals, ability to work without bias, capacity to cope
with a range of feelings, ability to work on one's own and as a member
of a team, reliability and imagination" (BASW, 1979:psra.6.23). These
are merely the "personal qualities" required, the list of "intellectual
qualities" is longer. As those who select are social workers, they
already possess these qualities and have the skill to spot them in
others. One university course was more explicit about this process
of 'social working' the social workers: "The main objective is to form
an opinion about the ego strengths of the applicant ..." (Michael, 1976:
683).
Social workers search for certainty„ v 1 And yet the logic of
social work's normalising judgements, seeks rot to define the good and
the bad, the normal and the abnormal but, rather, the mere or less
good and the more or less normal. Consequently, social work ideals
of being non-judgemental, of halving respect for the person, spill over
into social workers' views about their colleagues and neophytes. And
here we find another source of tension. The epistemological conditions
of existence of social work discourse imply that whatever the social
sciences produce by way of theory and method can find a place within
social work discourse. Social work crises of identity are the
presenting problems which reflect the tensions drawn from these conditions
of existence. Thus, acceptance of 'society's' deviants is often at odds
with social work's responsibility to that 'society'. When a deviant
group such as the self-styled radical social workers attack the profession
from within, tolerance is stretched to its limits.
i|7. Social workers have to have exceptional abilities to be able to
cope with the exceptional skills they are expected to acquire; "...
skills in small group functioning and influencing sni3.ll groups ,..
research, understanding and preparing reports ... public speaking ...
lobbying .. » understanding how the system works and. how to influence
it ... determining priorities ... judgement" (Marsha.ll, Social Work In
Action. 1979:55); "Discriminating use of material and social resources,
work with volunteers and collaboration with colleagues of the same and
different disciplines ..." (BASW, 1979spaa?a,.6.30); in addition, "There
is a need on qualifying courses for some teaching in management and
organizational skills ..." (ibid.: para.. 6.32); and the ultimate
analogue, "... the skilled surgeon is able to deal with emergencies
during an operation and the skilled social worker is able to deal with
changes in information and behaviour during a period of contact with a
client ..." (CCETSW, 1979:9). Little wonder that Wootton felt talk; of
skills in social work involved "... claims to powers which verge upon
omniscience and omnipotence" (1959:271).
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3- Radical Social Work or Radical Social Workers
"Many generic social work courses consist of little
more than systematic indoctrination of students in
sectarian political ideas. Curiously enough,
this is done in the name of encouraging students
to develop flexible minds. In fact, however,
students are being trained, not to support the
society that pays their bills, but to be its
gravediggers" (Senior Probation Officer, quoted in
Gould, 1977:22).
A contribution from the Probation Service to the moral panic
over supposed infiltration of higher education by political extremists
of the left is not, perhaps, very surprising. The advent of
radicalism within social work broadly has, however, caused some bitter
reactions. Bu'trym has dismissed i.t as reflecting "... a preference
for slogans over concern with issues of substance" (1976:127). Pinker
has argued that the "politicisation of any professional activity is an
abuse of trust". Social workers should not become involved in
1+8. This sub-title is based on a pa,per by Sankowski, llungham and
Young - "Radical criminology or radical criminologist?" (l977)« Rb,e
proliferation of texts cn 'radical5, 'new', 'Marxist' and 'socialist'
criminology has been paralleled on the social work side and for much the
same reasons. Criminology has traditionally been an applied social
science in the realm of crime and punishment and its genealogy runs
, parallel to, and intersects with, that of social work, constituting as
they do, facets of a wider welfare discourse.
1+9. The Attack on Higher Education appeared in September 1977 and was
produced by Julius Gould for the Institute for the Study of Conflict.
Concerned to reveal the influence of "certain Marxist approaches" on
higher education, the report contains sections on social work education.
Steven Lukes does not have to work hard to show that the report falls
according to its own standards of scientific objectivity but in describing
the thrust of the report as "a grand conspiracy theory, invulnerable to
evidence and poorly argued ..." (1977:13) has to be acknowledged as no
better or worse than many of the Marxist theories it attacks,
t
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explicitly political activities at the local level, a task,
according to Pinker, appropriate only for community workers (l979Ls595)•
Much the same argument is made hy Halmos in. his plea for the "personal"
over the "political" in social work (1978). A CCETSW document
discussing Values in Social Work suggests that those committed to
revolution must ask themselves whether they are "using" their clients
(1976:143) • Letters to social work journals complain about the
"dogmatic monologue"; "Marxist Stew" and "Token Radicalism" and readers
are informed that a Secretary of State for Social Services has warned
social workers about the dangers of becoming involved in local politics
(Community Care, February 19th, 1981). The Daily Telegrarh has carried
headlines about Marxist infiltration of the Probation Service (October
6th, 1976) and NAPOs president, Lord Hunt, has declared thai probation
officers cannot pursue both professional and political objectives
(Social Work Today, May 31s"t« 1977)« Finally, certain local authorities
hai^e reacted against welfare radicals: Bradford* s, for example, by
considering the introduction of a code of conduct restricting employees*
rights to join pressure groups and Birmingham5 s by producing a blacklist
of social work training courses (Social Work Today, September ;;th, 1978;
and November llth, 1978).
The dilemma for liberal commentators is that social work disccurse
has always found room for what is often euphemistically called 'social
action5. In recent years the social work establishment has seen
advocacy on behalf of clients as a legitimate function within the social
work or social service department. Such functions have usually appeared
in broad definitions, in words which speak in hushed tones: "to bring
l*5o.
about any necessary improvements in the environment" (Youn^usband
Report, 1959:para.616). But even when the issue is supposedly
being openly tackled, one can detect a reluctance to handle certain
concepts. Hie CCETSW document - Education and Training for Social
Work - speaks, historically, of "the neglect of society and the
environment" but then conducts the discussion in terms of 'environment1
without examining what radical commentators would call 'structural aspects
of society' (l9755Pa^s-s.2.lij. - 2.15). A BASW report on Social Action and
Social Work illustrates even more clearly the dilemmas experienced when
certain premises such as 'social work is about social change' become widely
accepted within the profession and are then pursued to their 'logical'
conclusion. But. such a discourse also suggests that radicalism can
be contained within the recognised parameters of social work theory and
(5l)
practice. x ' For the radical social worker, the current 'crisis' in
social work is a reflection of the wider 'crisis of capitalism': for the
liberal social worker, the 'crisis' is simply a surface manifestation of
functional problems which can be corrected 'therapeutically' through
selection procedures for students; improved teaching; refinement of
methods; and so on. And yet, there is a constant tension in most
50. For example, the document advises: "Before going beyond the brokerage
role in any sort of social action social, workers and social work agencies
must work out an escalating series of strategies so that if the gentlest
and most traditional strategies are unsuccessful, a 'harder' or more public
approach can be threatened (l97U:para.2.2.3. Emphasis added).
51. The "Introduction" to the document records that Janie Thomas addressed
a BASW Council meeting "on the part the Association could play in social and
political action. The Council decided to set up a working1 party on social
action ..." 'Political action', then, disappears and social, action becomes
another method-to add to the existing repertoire.
£
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radical social work discussions which must acknowledge that the
socialist revolution is far from imminent (although, it is invariably
immanent) and, consequently, client problems can only be treated an
surface manifestations (inequality; false consciousness) of
'capitalism'.
(.i) The Radical Paradigm. The theoretical basis of the radical
critique of the Welfare State was discussed in Chapter 2 and it is
clearly the basis adopted by most radical social workers on which to
(<2)
build their practice. v J There are, of course, areas of disagreement.
Some radicals have adopted a stance which allows little or no room for
manoeuvre within the existing conditions of existence of social work
discourse. Simpkin calls this the libertarian position and
distinguishes it from his own Marxist revolutionary view (1979:21).
The libertarian stance coincides with what Bankowski et al call radical
phenomenology within the sociology of deviance (1977:39) and it clearly
derives influence from the hew Left movement of the 1960s ana the
attempts by Marxists such as Marcuse to find revolutionary potential
within fringe groups, including the 'residuum'. Hie 'dangerous classes'
are to be aroused by the radical vanguard: "... nuts, sluts and. perverts
not only have ethical authenticity but a possibly transcendent political
authenticity as well" (Bankowski et al., 1977:39)- Libertarian social
workers reject authority, concentrating their efforts on enhancing the
authenticity of the social deviant through self-help groups and community
$2. Corrigan and Leonard (1978) remains the major statement of the
Marxist framework supporting radical social work and radical welfare
broadly. Simpkin's (1979) position seems to be broadly the same as
does that adopted by Brake and Bailey (1980).
action and through concentration upon the encouragement of
alternative life-styles (Simpkin, 1979:21-2). Emphasising the
standard social wo'rk idea-Is of respect for the individual and being
non-judgemental, the libertarian rejects all aspects of social work
which embody 'social control'. As a consequence, the libertarian
tends to induce a new cult of the individual in which 'anything goes',
how although writers such as Simpkin maintain that the:/ are concerned
to change the structure of society by working through the class struggl
their attempts to unite theory and practice reflect, on a number of
occasions, a marked dependence upon rather basic sociological theories
and a failure to move beyond traditional social work principles. This
can be seen, for example, in radical social work's own brand of
individuali sm.
Corrigan and Leonard have written about "... a problem which
social workers on the left experience in relation to their practice"
(1978:107), that is, the conflict between a structural analysis and an
understanding of individuals and their experiences. But, as has been
suggested, this is a perennial issue in social work in general. For
the traditional social work theorist, solutions are sought through
fieldwork practice during training; the use of video equipment to
monitor practice skills; and through an ethnographic knowledge of how
the 'other half' lives. Corrigan's and Leonard's solution to the
problem is to postulate a 'Marxist psychology', a materialist
interpretation of individual consciousness in which "What is human is a
social product and a result of the interaction between man and the
social world" .(1973:119) • But this is surely a most uncontroversial
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view which would probably be endorsed by most social scientists,
including behaviourist psychologists. To it, Corrigan and Leonard
merely add an historicist view that the form of the individual is
historically specific. In place of 'bourgeois' psychology's
search for a "basic human personality", these authors wish to talk
about the "potentialities" of the individual and a form of
consciousness which is not ideologically "limited" by 'capitalism' .
Social work practice becomes the act of inducing in 'working class'
clients a consciousness of their "experience as a class experience"
(1978:118-123). Social work education, then, becomes the art of
developing "An understanding of the processes involved in ...
collective work and the development of skills in order to further it ..."
(Leonard, 1979:23). The "key task of radical practice", argues
Leonard in his endorsement of the technique of "conscientization", is
"an educational one" (1975:57) but to this brand of individualism must
be added the radical's belief that contemporary social workers have
been de-skilled and, therefore, 'proletarianised' (Leonard, 1978:li7)-
What seems to emerge then, is that social workers are people with
particular skills but what really matters is the consciousness of the
social worker. Thus, Simpkin writes that "... an active proletarian
consciousness seems vital for the development of alternative therapy.
We do not need less therapeutic skills but its very different
expression" (1979: ll+3) • A "proletarian consciousness" is obtainable
through the experience of being exploited (for the social worker, this is
the consequence of Seebohm bureaucratic welfare structures) and through
active participation in the labour movement (usually trades councils and
b$b
trade unions - Simpkin, 1979:1^3; Corrigan and Leonard, 1978:li6-7j
-passim; Brake and Bailey, 1980:19-20, 21O-IJ4).
It appears, then, that for some radical social workers, critique
is best levelled at traditional social workers rather than traditional
social work. For Simpkin, as for many others, social work, taken
"to its logical conclusion ... is an inherently radicalising activity .
(I979s3)- "After all, which other workers have first-hand knowledge
of the consequences of the workings of our economic system for an
increasing proportion of the population?" ask Brake and Bailey (198O:
( 93)10). Hire kinds of examples of 'radical practice' provided in
Simpkin's book show the reader the radical social worker but not the
radical social work. Simpkin remains free to use, with his authority
as a senior social worker in a psychiatric hospital, a traditional
social, work language of the human psyche. In one case, Simpkin report
he was "able to build up a discussion 011 the family and how its
imperfections were not necessarily the fault of the parents ..." (±919'
10. Emphasis added). Later, he talks of "weaknesses of personality"
but tells his reader "they are not essentially of the individual" but
are, rather, determined by class (ibid.:5l). In a further, tragic,
example Simpkin provides the reader with the "traditional social work
view" which would trace the problems to the client's weaknesses of
personality and then the radical approach which begins with the "social
demands and expectations" which formed and reinforced these weaknesses
(ibid.:55)« But the contrast is spurious. Bhe traditional.
53. One alight suggest that the police have, particularly in their new
role of community involvement. Seeing the 'unacceptable face of
capitalism' is not, per se, a necessarily radicalising experience.
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interpretation mi^it well have acknowledged the social demands and
expectations but would have been concerned to understand why this
individual showed 'weaknesses' whilst others, similarly placed,
apparently did not. Therapy might well have been directed towards
making the client aware of his weaknesses and their social causes.
Simpkin's task seems to have been "to lift ... the burden of guilt
and inadequacy for the individuals concerned ..." and then to help
them "understand how blame and responsibility must really be
distributed" (ibid.). Both approaches, then, take problems as merely
'presenting problems' and then seek to unearth the real problems,
located in the grey areas of life, the Other world of the unconscious
(mind) or the pre-conscious (history;. v/
Traditional social work discourse is decidedly not being' supported
but what is being suggested is that, in many instances, the ra.dical
(55)
alternative offers little that is new. K ' Nor is the 'reality' of
mental illness being denied. What is being- questioned is the degree
to which radical social work discourse frees itself from the
epistemclogical conditions of formation of social work discourse in
general. Simpkin's radicalism is based simply on the view that "the
capitalist principle that human nature will not alter" must be replaced
by the view that consciousness is socially determined (1979'38-9)•'
51+. At another point, Simpkin provides the reader with a picture of
Brian, socialised into brutality by the army, who had a "death wish"
(1979:57-8).
55» Statham writes that "... consciousness raising attempts to awaken
people's awareness in order that they can critically reflect on their
experience ..* This can be compared with social work's aim of enhancing a
person's, a gfcxip's, or a community' s capacity to look at their own
situation ..." (1978:15). In either case, the implication is that there
is an objective situation which is only partially comprehended, the
consciousness raiser educates and dymystifies throu^i the power of his
all-seeing wisdom.
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There is, then, for Simpkin a 'human nature', a potentiality, and he,
as exponent of the science of welfare, must assist in its ultimate
realisation. Bankowski et al have noted of the radical criminology
of Taylor, Walton and Young: "... the theoretical implications of
their conception of radical criminology are restricted to a
reification of personal moral outrage at the manifest inequalities of
capitalist societies. Their work is capable only of producing a
radical criminologist not a radical criminology'" (1977:38). Much the
same could be said of radical discourse in the social work realm.
Social working the social workers is an inevitability so long as
social work discourse treats as its object of analysis that which also
constitutes a condition of its existence. Consciousness raising as a
social work method is, then, inevitably directed inward. In
discussing the development of a. social work area, team, for example,
Bennett writes: "'Consciousness raising' (a term borrowed in our case
from the women's movement) became part of the team's ethos and with it
came a corresponding growth in personal confidence and awareness" (1980
I6I4.). Headlines about socia.1 work students being indoctrinated into
Marxism are, at the very iea.st5 insulting to the students concerned.
But it is an argument which has also been used by radical writers to
describe the professional socialisation of those on social work courses
Given an acceptance that social work as a profession embodies 'special
features' beyond, the mare functioning of an occupation within a
technical division of labour, those involved in the business of enforcii
and reinforcing that special quality will accept the notion of being
socialised into a profession. 5br example, the BASW document on Social
Work Education emphasises the place of the practice teacher "in
providing the student with a model of social work and a pattern for
his future experience" (i979:pa^a-6.36). Essential features for a
practice teacher are a social work qualification and two years post
qualification experience, along with "a high sense of commitment to
social work" (ibid.). One university social work course records in
its notes for the assessment of fieldwork, and under a section entitled
"Development as a Social Worker", that at the end of the student's
first placement the tutor should look for a "growing sense of
identification as a professional social worker" (Michael, 1976:703)-
By the end of the course, however, there should be: "Identity with
social work and acceptance that the responsibilities of being a
professional person include the capacity to question traditional
policies and practices" (ibid.:706). The demand for self-regulation,
which is a conscious feature of those occupational groups striving for
recognition as a profession, has the obvious consequence, so rightly
highlighted by radical critics, of sheltering the group from wider
public scrutiny. The reaction of BASW to claims by the Ombudsman that
social services staff were too defensive provides an illustration of
what is involved. Clearly, BASW would want to draw a distinction
between professional and administrative decisions and demand self-
regulation over the former. This is reflected in expressions of
*
concern that a layman should be involved in the investigation of
complaints against social services. Commission staff "are not always
as knowledgeable about social work as we like", BASW's general secretary
1*58.
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is reported, to have complained (Community Care, July 12th 1979*3). '
Such attempts to define social work as a technical and professional
enterprise, only fully to he comprehended by trained social, workers,
is also reflected in the issues of selecting suitable candidates for
(57)
training and assessing their performance during the course. W,J'
Heywood, for example, sees selection as the assessment of "ability to
be trained"; an ability depending in part on "certain standards of
behaviour and ideals having been laid down ... in early life ..." (l96U:9)<
Prom the radical perspective, Pearson's work has contributed to the
•special qualities' portrayal of social work and to the view that the
essentially critical aspect of social work is socialised out of
existence during training and practice. Pearson has argued that "the
social worker [jLs "} ... essentially a political deviant" (1973*209).
Oliose entering training are altruistic: they define "the business of
daily life as boring, meaningless, and antisocial: in a word,
•alienated'" (ibid.;217)- Pearson's main complaint is that such
"deviance" remains "privatized". It is the recruit who is escaping
from the routine world by entering social work whilst failing to see his
56. A further illustration of self-regulation is provided by 3ASV7s
suggestion that CCETSW has too few professionally trained social workers
and social work educators amongst its membership "to give professional
social work considerations due weight" (l979*para.5.3)•
57« Hie latter point has already briefly been mentioned in the
introduction to this chapter. lhere is a small body of literature on
the selection of students for social, work courses and their professional
socialisation. On selection see: Schubert (1963; 1961;); Edwards (1971);
Ellis (1975)? Shaw (1977); Dunlap (1979); and Kleiman and Lounsbury
(1978). On professional socialisation see: Syle and Breen (l97U)j
Pearson (1973; 197U; 19756). Por a prediction study of success on a
social work equrse see Hack (1973) and. for a study of the assessment of
student performance see Morrell (1930).
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own feelings of alienation as a "public; ill". Soth in this paper
(1973:2210 and. elsewhere (l97^:J+6, 1975^:22), Pearson has endorsed
the sociological and psychological acceptance of the phenomenon of
professional socialisation. Pearson's "brand of methodological
individualism suggests that social work ideology- denies existence to
the essentially political nature of social work. Chose who retain
a radical nature are left to express it through minor rule-breaking
("industrial deviance", 1975b;21; et seq . ).
Radical discourse, then, has a great deal to say about the way in
which traditional social work separates theory and practice; the
personal and the political; the individual and society; and Hie
relationship between this fact and the imperative of self-interest and
individualism under 'capitalism'. And yet that very critique works
through the same form of analysis "based on the essentialist belief that
social work is fundamentally a critique of the relations of 'capitalist'
production. Selection for social work training is used "to weed out
potential deviants" (Cannan, 1972:259), whilst those who express
radical views during training are 'social- worked' by tutors who treat
criticism as 'acting out' (Cannan, 1972:25o), or as 'immaturity'
(Pearson, 1973:225). Whilst traditional social work is said to
58. Simpkin summarises the view thus: "Pearson, rightly suggests that
the choice of a social, work career is a public statement not just about
internal drives but about a desired relationship with the world ...
Entry into the profession is often accompanied by a revulsion at existing
social priorities and a desire to work for change. However, the
.individual focus of traditional social work ideology and training
sabotages that desire by eradicating the social context and purpose of
its expression. This ... is the first step towards subjection to
professional culture and control" (1979:7^)-
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endorse contradictory principles through valuing client self-
determination and defining client behaviour as irrational, radical
social work is concerned with "the problem of overcoming bias and
reaching a true understanding, that is, consciousness ..." (Cannan,
1972:253-4). For one faulty psyche is substituted a faulty
consciousness. Traditional social work, of course, is blamed for
playing a part in maintaining this false consciousness, althou^i
Cannan absolves social workers from blame because they "don't
consciously set out to do this" (ibid.:256). They too suffer false
consciousness. What we witness, then, in these statements is much
more the kind of orientation described by Simpkin as libertarian
radicalism. It is a radicalism which glorifies the 'working class' as
the embodiment of socialism and which seeks to bask in that glory
through a tenuous association between the exploited 'working class' and
the exploited, de-skilled, proletar.ianj.sed basic grade local authority
social worker. It is a radicalism which demands a new form of self--
regulation for the basic grade social worker, free from hierarchical
supervision whose "real purpose is simply work-supervision to ensure
that the agency's priorities and responsibilities are carried out"
(Simpkin, 1979:84). It is a radicalism which glorifies the power of
the collectivity, often, it seems, any collectivity. But in arguing
for "the decentralizing and democratizing of team work ... to ...
counteract hierarchical structures ...", writers such as Bailey and
Brake (l980:20-l) fail to tackle the issues involved concerning the
accountability of such a. team, not just to the clients with whom
association is always postulated, but more generally.
t
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Radical social workers, as socialists, turn to Marxist analyses
of capitalist relations of production to find a theoretical "basis for
their practice. But their practice is not concerned with the
fundamental concepts of Marxism: social formation; relations of
production; means of production; and so on. "What social work radicals
turn to is a 'Marxist sociology' which confronts consensus theories with
a so-called conflict theory. In effect, social work radicals never
reach the point of questioning the epistemclogical and ontological
presumptions which underpin all such sociologies. For example, given
the eclecticism of the science of welfare and social work technology,
Peter Righton finds little difficulty in providing models fbr social
work course curricula which can. reflect the ideological positions of
their designers along a continuum from conservative to radical (1979?66).
The radical position can, consequently, he delineated by the goals of
the radical ("preference for social change") and the methods adopted
(innovation; "mobilisation of self-help"; "consciousness-reusing";
"collective .action": etc.) (ibid.). 'Marxist sociology1, then, joins
the growing repertoire of social sciences which forms the knowledge base
of social work discourse. As Simpkin says: "We draw on an immensely
wide variety of sources; there is hardly a human science which is not
in some way relevant" (1979:121. Emphasis added). In effect, the
knowledge is neutral: "What is unique in social work is not our
knowledge but our praxis ..." (ibid.). Consequently: "There is a
place for social work techniques traditionally used, such as casework,
group work or community work, but these need to be used by a social
worker who has, analysed his/her relation to the State and has developed
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some form of political understanding of his/her role" (Bailey and
Braize, 1980:18-9). It is the consciousness of the worker which
generates radical practice. Hie emphasis is clearly upon radical
social workers, not radical social work. Socialism, as a "political
framework ... can be used to sensitize the social worker ..." "This
means that traditional techniques such as casework ... and such
traditional humanistic concepts as the autonomy of the client, are given
a new meaning and a new dimension when affiliated to a radical socialist
perspective" (ibid.:23). Not surprisingly, then, Leonard's "Paradigm
for Radical Practice" utilises Parsonian systems theory, the highly popular
unified models of social work constructed by Pincus and Minahan and by
Goldstein and consciousness raising. To these, Leonard simply adds the
word 'radical' (1975:^8, 5l, 55).
(ii) Radical Practice. It has been argued at various points in this
•thesis that theoretical protocols cannot be allowed to subsume the
effectivity of a discourse. There is, then, some obligation to examine
what radical social workers achieve in their practice. That radical
social workers d.o not take for granted that their personal political
orientation can be translated into their social work practice receives
confirmation from the title of Brake's and Bailey's text - Radical Social
Work and Practice. "We have", note Bailey and Brake, "to translate our
theories of society into a practice that at once helps and assists the
victims of our system, and simultaneously, contributes to the creation
of conditions which will transform that society into a socialist
democracy" (1980:12-3)• They seem, therefore, to suggest two different
activities: yelping clients (social, work); and political practice.
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Two questions might be asked of such aims: first, does
"simultaneously" imply that the act of helping is also a political
act (undoubtedly, this is the thrust of most radical social work
discourse); secondly, what conditions are to be 'transformed', those
associated with the calculation and meeting of the client's needs or
those conditions of existence of capitalist relations of production
which are said to cause these needs? Some attempt will be made to
illuminate the issues around these questions by examining radical
practices, mainly as they are described by contributors to Brake and
Bailey (1980).
Bailey's and Brake's opening essay provides a categorisation of
radical practice based upon a dichotomy of activism - "collective
action and individual practice" (1980:19). Collective action can be
realised, first, through team work and the involvement of client groups
in the discussion of policy and needs; secondly, through social service
■trade unionism: thirdly, through involvement with radical groups outside
social work (feminist and 'gay' groups); and finally, through welfare
rights and advocacy. Individual practice is, however, less clearly
delineated. It acknowledges the ever present individual need for help
which is the daily routine of social, work practice. It is here that
Bailey and Brake endorse "traditional techniques" (1980:23); acknowledge
the client's perspective; and find it "'essential to work through people's
feelings of depression, aggression or despair" in order that they might
be given "a wider understanding of self and of society" and a chance "to
become whole enough so that they can engage in struggle against, their
situation" (ibid.;2ip) . Social work, then, is the first-aid centre on
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the battlefield of socialist conflict.
The remainder of this section will examine some of these arenas
of radical practice in some detail. first, the team collective.
Bailey and Brake describe enthusiastically a community-based team in
•which workers know the area "rather in the way of the old 'pa.tch system'"
and have an "intimate knowledge of community resources" including
voluntary workers, clergy and trade union organisations. This was, of
course, the image of the community-based personal social service
advocated in the Seebolim Report (para.583 et seq.). Bennett (1980)
describes the creation of one such sub-office and the impact it was
able to have on the community it served. It is clear that the team
worked hard to achieve a collective approach to practice and to provide
a comprehensive service. Nothing in the essay makes it clear what the
individual or collective political ideologies were and much of the work
described - a pensioners' club; youth club; close contact with a variety
of agencies and organisations - would not look out of place in the workload
of a police community involvement branch. Other aspects would have looked
out of place - provision of a day centre for homeless families; the
facilitation of communication between residents and council departments -
but such work does not appear to move beyond the definition of appropriate
duties likely to be found in most social service/work departments. Given
a commendable dedication to their work, the members of the team described
by Bennett (their team leader) clearly managed to initiate a range of self-
help community projects as well as carrying caseloads requiring intensive
casework and fulfilling statutory duties. One is left with the feeling
that 'radical fwork' was initiated despite having to do social work.
465.
Extreme effort and the avoidance of 'unnecessary® conflict with the
hierarchy of the social service department produced a level of
respect for the skills developed within the team such that Bennett is
able to describe certain areas in which the team was able to influence
departmental policy. As Simpkin puts it: "In order to persuade
officials of one's worth, it may be important to consider what can be
done for them" (1979:1U2-) •
The team collective is seen as an essential medium for radical
practice (Bailey and Brake, 1980:19; Boiger et al., 1981:79-80). For
those such as Bolger and his co-authors, emphasis is placed on the
dynamic qualities of the collectivity. We are treated to an idealism
which is reminiscent of Burkheim's views on the power of the collective
effervescence engendered by religious gatherings. Bailey and Brake,
"ideally", want to see "de-hierarchized" teams. What has to be noted
about Bennett's sub—office is that its creation depended upon the
agreement of the local authority's social services committee and its
continued existence, presumably, depended upon maintaining the committee's
general support for the principle. 'Hie organisation of a community-based
social work service on the principle of small, sub-offices has to be argued
for on the basis of its effectiveness in meeting needs in the community
being served. This is a matter requiring consultation and negotiation
between social work agencies, the social service committee and residents'
groups, not an "anti-management stance" (Clarke, 1979:13l)>
Closely associated with the team's collective activism is the belief
that active involvement in a union is a medium for the expression of
social work radicalism. Hie "rise of trade unionism provides some form of
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common collective experience ... which greatly assists the
possibility of team work", argue Bolger et al (l98l:8o). The Seebohm
reforms and the rapid expansion of social services have meant an
increased bureaucratisation and centralisation of services. Increasing
control by managers means, suggest Bolger et al., a reduction in social
worker autonomy which, in consort with ' deskilling1, produces a situation
for social workers similar to that experienced by labour within
'capitalist' production (1981:65-6). This results, they argue, in a
split in social work between mental (management) and manual (social work)
labour. That such a split has theoretica.1 and practical consequences is
endorsed by Simpkin who argues that managers "represent a different
interest" (1979:117)• for most radical social workers, this process is
accepted as a process of proletarianisation of social workers: social
workers, they believe, can now experience a 1working class consciousness'.
To have and to retain this consciousness, social workers must also obtain
a "trade union consciousness" (Bailey and Brake, 1980:19). For Bolger
and his colleagues the important factors in this process, which they
believe has received a boost from the social work national strike of
1978-9, are that social workers identify with the "working-class
movement" as a whole against management and that their collective knowledge
of social services puts them in a position to organise services
themselves (1981:77)•
Several comments can be made about this kind of formulation. As has
already been argued in Chapter 3, oncological privileging of productive
labour is an essentialism which must be rejected. The effectivity of
collective action by welfare employees cannot be ascertained through a
£
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subjectivist reductionism which locates the essence of that action
within a consciousness, 'working class' or otherwise. Having rejected
traditional Marxist 'laws of tendency' in that chapter, it is not
intended to repeat the critique of class consciousness and the thesis
that class interests are represented by agencies in the labour movement.
It should be obvious, however, that if the Marxist distinction between
productive and unproductive labour is to be rejected then any argument
which utilizes that distinction to theorise an antagonistic relationship
CE>9)
between social work managers and social workers must be seriously
questioned. rfhe conditions of existence of capitalist relations of
production determine the separation of direct producers from the possession
of, and effective control over, the means of production. OZhe provision of
welfare services in Britain is largely removed from the commodity form of
production and distribution, and it is, therefore, vacuous to apply a
Marxist analysis based upon the concepts of relations of production and
economic class relations. This is not to suggest that writers such as
Bolger et al do not draw attention to areas which ace valid arenas for
socialist efforts to increase democratic control and accountability.
Clearly the assessment of welfare needs and its provision axe processes
which demand greater consultation with those who fund them through rent
and rate payments and those who are defined as 'clients' and they are
processes which require control and scrutiny over the determination of
priorities and spending. But it must be recognised that management
59- Discussing the kind of theory appropriate to her image of social
work, Garrett writes: "Clearly for me it must be a class theory - one
that recognizes the deep divisions between those who own/manage and
those who produce/service ..." (l980:20i}.-5>).
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through, social worker collectives (teams; shop stewards; unions)
on the basis that they represent the interests of the 'working class'
and, therefore, clients is not, per se, more democratic or socialist.
Trade unions are agencies with specific conditions of existence.
Both managers and social workers are employees of the local authority
througji, for example, the powers vested in the local authority and its
social work committee by the Social Work (Scotland) Act, 1968. As an
employer, the local authority has statutory rights over employees; the
right to discipline or terminate employment within certain legal
parameters, for example. The employer also has certain legal duties
concerning conditions of employment. Tra.de unions have their
conditions of existence within this matrix of rights and duties of the
employer and within their own rights and duties, defined in law.
Managers often have their own union or professional association but there
is no inherent reason why managers and 'others' should belong to
different unions. In her essay, Garrett provides examples of the
ways in which her union has been able to negotiate with managers and
"expose" their "lack of caring" and "upside-down priorities" (l980:21l).
Given that Garrett's ambition that all social service workers achieve
60. See Hugman's discussion of the tendency towards such fragementation
in the Probation Service. "'Management' have much to answer for in the
increasing alienation and conflict within the service, but we may be
contributing to the worsening of those processes if we simply confirm
the distance and difference by destroying the collectivity of the whole
service" (1930:139)• Hugman's fellow contributor to Brake and Bailey,
Garrett, is not likely to agree. For her, management can never be trusted
or relied upon. She seems unwilling to acknowledge that if social workers
have managers 'holding them hack', managers have social work/services




•trade union consciousness' is far from realisation, the superiority
in knowledge and caring obtained by her union must be questionable.
Representatives of all grades of employees in social services ought
to be able to contribute to discussion over spending and priorities
and have a role in enforcing the accountability of managers.
Aggressive intervention by one union over specific issues cannot be
legitimated on the ground that a union represents the best interests
of all basic employees, clients and the •working class' . This is
merely the substitution of one arbitrary decision-making procedure by
another and has to be seen in the context of traditional trade union
action designed to further the interests of its membership. Similarly,
union action designed to assist "Troublesome networks of clients out
there in the community" must also be recognised as an offer of help to
one category of clients which cannot necessarily pretend to embrace
the full range of obligations and priorities in. relation to all other
(6l)
client groups. v ' The logic of Garrett's views would require client
group involvement within the social service unions and presumes a forum
in which all groups - managers, unions and clients can negotiate.
This is not, on the face of it, a realistic alternative to the
bureaucracy condemned by all radical social, workers.
This takes the analysis into the third arena for radical practice:
involvement with radical alternatives outside social work practice.
Given the wide definition of the responsibilities of social work/
services departments, relations with a wide range of organisations is
61. The arbitrariness of Garrett's stance is open to view when she
continues: "ihey may require resources ... which could be interfered
with by management. It is a good idea to have some machinery, usually
the trade union, to defend them ... in the way that suits them best"
(1980:210. Emphases added).
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clearly legitimated. The most commonly referred to in radical
social work texts are political parties and 'gay' and feminist
liberation organisation.
'Sexual polities' has been of interest to those in the welfare
field for a number of reasons. Social work has been seen as having
something to contribute to the alleviation of problems specifically
experienced by homosexuals, either on the ground that the homosexual
had personality problems which social workers could help to 'solve' or
that homosexuals needed counselling to assist them in accepting their
sexual orientation in the same way that the heterosexual accepts his or
hers. Many of the clients and most employees working in social
services are women. Feminism has attracted attention to the
obvious relationship between woman's disadvantaged social and legal
status and her status as 'client', as well as to the low status and
pay of many female auxiliary workers in the Welfare State. Allied to
the homosexual and feminist movements, but with its own genealogy,
condemnation of the social and cultural institution of the family has
found a relevance in the social work realm. Socialists in the 19th
62. Jeffreys found that almost three-quarters "of those serving in the
social welfare field in Bucks in 1960-61 were women". Certain
occupations were the exclusive domain of women - health visiting;
almoning; home help organisers; home teachers; and occupational therapy.
Of 118 district nurses, only two ware men (1965:26). Women were, however,
a minority in the National Assistance Beard; disablement resettlement;
the youth service; school attendance work; housing welfare: and
probation. Jeffreys also found that "JCP/o of the "main clients" seen by
staff in a week were female (ibid.: J4.O). Professional social work is
increasingly being seen as a ' suitable occupation' for men although a
study of students attending one-year postgraduate university social work
courses in 1975/6 found that only yy/o were men (l977:119)« Statistics
for Scottish social work clients (local authorities only) suggest that Sk%
were female (Social Work Services Group, 1980).
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century were ready to condemn 'the family' for its endorsement of
individualism and male supremacy and for its role as the medium of
transmission of wealth and privilege between the generations. More
recently, Aithusser's inclusion of the family in his all-embracing
ideological state apparatuses and works such as Donzelot's The Policing
of Families have reinforced the Marxist conception of the family as the
state's mechanism through which the relations of capitalist production
are reproduced.
Much of what has been written about 'sexual polities' in radical
social work texts appears as a facet of the 'consciousness-raising'
process already discussed. A great deal of attention is .given to the
reinforcement of the 'gay' and the female as a 'whole person'; someone
who can contribute to a collective power; someone who has worth in the
world. Hart's contribution to Brake and Bailey is largely given over
to lengthy excerpts from an interview he held with "Hasel" in which she
discusses "her evolution from 'a personal problem' orientation to a
political analysis of both her own and her clients' positions a.s women
in this society" (l9SO:i|5)• It is clear from this account that being a
homosexual social worker can lead to work with clients being an uracil
social worker-orientated as client-orientated. ^ 1 A similar comment
63. At one stage, Hazel describes a female client who 'accused*
Hazel of being a lesbian. Hazel experienced a personal dilemma because
she also described herself as a lesbian. The client began to
persistently pester Hazel, making numerous 'phone calls each day. "In
the end I think it only got solved when I left the borough, I also moved
home and she didn't pursue me ..." concludes Hasel. Unfortunately, the
client in question had a predilection for accusing women of being
lesbians, according to Hazel's account. 'It only got solved' for Hazel
when she left^the borough (1980:51-2) and we do not hear whether it ever
got solved for the client.
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could be made about blind social workers dealing with blind clients
and social workers with a history of 'mental illness1 dealing with
'mentally ill5 clients. The thrust of Hart's summing up is a
reaffirmation of the sociological platitude that sexual orientation and
the 'normality' of having children and living in families is a, cultural
artefact and that non-subscription to such values is not a sufficient
ground for persecution and negative discrimination in the job market.
Lee and Pithers similarly offer a challenge to family life as the only
acceptable forum for child-rearing in their discussion of "radical
residential child care" (1980).
Undoubtedly, social work with homosexuals and with woman must take
into consideration the social, political and legal conditions of
existence of such statuses in the same way in which it must when dealing
with juveniles, the disabled, the delinquent. Active involvement in
sexual politics must be seen for what it is, however. Pressure groups
have their own conditions of existence; specific modes of practice; and
particular realms and definitions of effestivity. They are not
unquestionably democratic in organisation or practice and are neither-
more nor less socialist than any other group demanding equality of
treatment and opportunity. Social work with homosexuals stands as a
particular specialism alongside work with the deaf or "social work practice
With ethnic minorities" (Husband, I9S0). Belief that one demands more
attention than the others is a political decision based upon calculation
and ideologic ad orientation and certainly not upon an ontological
principle that coloured people or women axe the quintessential
embodiment ofr'working class* exploitation. As stated earlier,
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emphasising the demands of one specific client or pressure group
inevitably results in a relative neglect of other clients.
Individual social workers have to accept that social work has
specific conditions of existence, amongst which are the statutory
definitions by public laws of its field of responsibilities.
Although the general welfare of the community may be at the heart of
such legislation this does not provide a carte blanche to individual
social workers to define clients and the content of the assistance to
be offered. For example, children taken into care by a local authority
are not taken entirely out of the ambit of the parents' responsibility.
In those cases in which the local authority assumes parental rights and
powers, such rights and powers reside with the local authority and not
*
in individual social workers. those in residential child care cannot claim
by fiat the right to use residential child care to provide ''alternative
experiences which challenge the immutability of present social, forms"
(Lee and Pithers, 1980:112). : Socialism is about providing people
with choices and the knowledge on which to make decisions. ' A radical
social work which bases its practice on a belief in the inherent, worth
of its political theories to the exclusion of others ("Membership of a
party like the National Front is not ... compatible with social work".
61+. Lee and Pithers describe ways in which children in care can be
provided with such alternatives without running away from the reality
they must face on leaving care. "In another home a group of black
children have formed themselves into a special association. They spend
a lot of time together ... and are involved in what would be called
'consciousness raising' or 5solidarity' groups. They had not heard of
such terms until a politically conscious member of staff explained them"
(1980:113). We are not told what the political orientation of the
member of staff was nor whether the black children ware enlightened about
other political stances.
hlh'
"As a Marxist social worker I am prepared to offer personal
assistance to anybody ... If I find that person repugnant by
(6%)
temperament or belief I will refer them on" - Simpkin, 1979:l5l, IbO.
Emphasis added), contradicts its own ideals of freedom of choice,
(.iii) Marxist Theory and Social Work Discourse. In a brief essay
outlining the relationship between critical sociology and radical
social work, Clarke (1979) makes the interesting suggestion that one
way of overcoming the "tension between theory and practice" would be to
pose the relationship as between political theory and political practice.
A political theory of welfare would allow for the assessment of specific
forms of social work action and their consequences, a7.'gues Clarke.
Specific areas of practice require analysis of their progressive facets
and those which ought to be rejected. Political analysis should
"identify realistically the limits of particular struggles and areas of
action rather than making the assumption that the creation of a radical
social work is necessarily the only or final solution to the problem"
(1979:136 et seq.)« Clarke identifies Corrigan and Leonard (1975) as a
move in this direction. It might be presumed that what Clarke wants to
see is a move away from, critical sociology and into Marxism as a
political theory. The main concern of Clarke's essay, in fact; is the
tension between academic theory and practical social work as a situation
in which theoreticians have failed to produce knowledge that can be
65. Occasionally such arrogance slips through despite the intense
purity of concern, amongst radicals to fight professionalism within
social work which they see as engendering professional autonomy and
control over clients. One might well ask by what authority Simpkin
would 'refer' th.is repugnant client 'on' .
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applied to particular cases (ibid.:129). Clarke locates the
source of the division between theory and practice within the
division of labour necessitated by the "capitalist state". What
Clarke appears to be asking for is not a radical reappraisal of
theory as knowledge but, rather, the adoption of 'theories of the
middle range*. Though offering an important critique of the
functionalist pessimism of many radical theorists and the voluntarism
and libertarian approaches of many radical social workers, Clarke
does not question their epistemological protocols.
Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that there are
significant areas of continuity between traditional and radical accounts
of welfarism in Britain. This is not, however, an ontological argumenu
about the necessary nature of welfare or social work. Webb argues
that social work is defined by its dualistic- concern for the individual
and the environment and that to step outside this rule is to step outside
of social work (l98l:lli7). Thus, Marxists who enter the debate within
social work must subscribe to the rules which define it (ibid.:3-53) and,
consequently, suffer dilution (ibid.:l55)« Nov although Nebb
demonstrates a continuity, he seeks to justify his apparent contention
that a Marxist social work is not possible, through a determinist
definition of social work. What Webb seems to argue is that social work
deals with 'capitalism's* problems, Marxism seeks to supersede




5capitalism', therefore an uncompromised Marxism negates social
work. In a similar fashion, Bankowski et al (1977) seek to claim
a privileged space for Marxist theory on the premise that it subsumes,
in this case, the analysis of law and crime. And yet Bankowski et al
do not make it clear why they claim Marxism as the superior knowledge
form, ^ ' although they maintain that Marxism works at the level of
"essential forms" in opposition to all other epistemologies which
operate at the level of "manifest forms" (ibid.:l+7)«
Marxist theory has its own conditions of formation but one cannot
claim by fiat that its form and content are thereby determined. There
is no essence to Marxism which makes it inappropriate to the analysis
of crime or welfare needs. [Thus, whilst it is argued that Marxist
theorists have adopted analyses which differ little from liberal social
sciences, Marxist theoretical protocol does not determine the content
of Marxist discourse. This thesis, however, has also challenged the
privileging of knowledge claimed by epistemologies, Marxist or
otherwise. Hie question asked - radical social work or radical social
workers - has a certain poignancy for there is a decided tendency in
radical social work discourse to offer sociological conceptions that
many find alien to Marxism. More importantly, however, one must be
prepared to challenge Marxism5 s claim to offer a radical analysis of
social relations given its allegiance to the scientific framework within
which social sciences generally find their legitimation. The attempt by
67. The authors argue that Marxism specifies its own objects of
analysis and that the relationship between these objects arid
epistemology fs internal to Marxist theory. This form of knowledge in
which the concrete object world is appropriated in thought has been
discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 1+.
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Marxist theorists to utilize Marxist concepts, formed as a critique
of capitalist relations of production and as a political theory, to
problematise and theorise about social, work and welfare in Britain
has been marred by a willingness to accept these concepts as
scientific blueprints, as the keys to an understanding of all social
relations under 'capitalism'. Hollowing Paul Hirst, it is
suggested that such a critique of Marxist 'knowledge' implies that
socialists must be:
"... prepared to accept that in questions of sexuality,
family forms, methods of training and social control ...
conventional Marxism may have little that is positive
to say and the classic prescriptions of socialist
ideology may be at best Irrelevant" (Hirst, 1979:2).
Socialists require a political theory providing general aims and.
ideals and Marxism has largely supplied that requirement. But this
does not imply that theory provides the answers for action. Radical
social workers, like their liberal colleagues, constantly seek permission
for their practice from a body of guiding theory. ^ Socialists have
to accept that they are acting in specific arenas with varying conditions
which do not allow, necessarily, for a simple application of Marxist
concepts.
68. Corrigan, in a recent article, warns his readers not to demand too
much from Marxist theory: "theory cannot be 'completed' without 'practice'".
However, Corrigan finds hope in Marxist analysis of contradictions 'which
show him that 'capitalism' is vulnerable: "refuse the unitary experience of
defeat and have hope because the working class is still alive and well"
(1982:9). Corrigan then turns to the concept of class to suggest that
"most social workers and all their clients have only their labour power to
sell to keep themselves". This common identity is a source of power and
collective understanding which can bring change. Marxism, declares Corrigan,
is "a practical theory of becoming" (ibid.:10). To theory is added the
mysteries of a new "Revelations".
1+78.
"The means employed in political calculation are
not confined to political theory. The means of
calculation are conditioned by and involve political,
apparatuses, practices and struggles and their
effects. Theory has no necessary privilege in
relation to this complex of means, it is in no sense
necessarily primary in the construction of situations
of action. Such modes of calculation have conditions
of their operation in and are therefore limited by the
practices for which they calculate" (Hirst, 1979:3)«
Within social work, the area team provides an interesting forum
through which to supply a service to specific communities. Ease of
access and familiarity might mean a greater willingness from people to
come along for advice and assistance. Social workers are also placed
in a position to make judgements about needs in the community. A team
working for the same ends clearly can get more done than workers
practising individually. But such a corporate effort cannot be left to
depend upon achieving a shared 5class consciousness1, nor can co¬
operation within the community be expected to accommodate to such an.
essence. A team, leader carries little authority in terms of the
hierarchy to be found in social, work/services departments and, therefore,
influence upon wider policy decisions depends upon workers at the team
level producing reasoned and supportable arguments for new priorities
and resources. This was the way in which Bennett (1980) operated his
sub-office. Little will be achieved by alienating managers according
to a banal analogy with 'capitalist owners'. The 'struggle' which
socialists talk of is not that of 5 guerrilla warfare' with management
but, rather, the constant attempt to achieve processes of democratic
and accountable decision-making. Par from the "anarchist
w
i*
consciousness'" which Garrett (1980:205) finds an essential ingredient
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in socialism, socialists in social work must "be prepared to fight
for, and work within, complex structures guaranteeing greater
control and accountability. Hie struggle against professional
insulation from public scrutiny through scientism and claims for
professional self-governance must be accompanied by a willingness
amongst socialist social workers to abandon the tendency to see
radicalism as another method or skill.
If the strength of a trade union can. be used to achieve
representation on working and study groups which inform policy or
if unions can make- an impact on decisions by providing information
and expertise then clearly the union becomes a medium for exerting
socialist influences. But a welfare trade union cannot be presumed
to embody socialist principles on the ground that its members are
quasi-1working class1 .
In a wider context, the union should be seen as a medium through
which influence can take effect at a national level. Hie expertise
and information which a large union should be able to call upon places
it in a position to influence debate through the Trades Union Council,
members of Parliament and the media. This is a clear and traditional
area for socialist political calculation and practices which provides
opportunities for struggle against capitalist relations of production
and distribution. Effectivity does rot, however, depend upon the
historical destiny of the workers1 movement and the enlightened,







Tbis chapter has sought to illustrate what is often described
as the 'crisis' in contemporary social work and has suggested that
certain features of this 'crisis', for example, the
professionalisation and bureaucratisation of social work practice,
are facets of the scientistic nature of welfare discourse in the
Modern episteme. Radical social workers who criticise traditional
social work discourse without rejecting the epistemological protocol
upon which such discourse rests offer, it has been suggested, a
gestural radicalism which fails to free itself from the continuity of
traditional welfare discourse. The adoption of orthodox Marxist
theoretical discourse cannot, of itself, induce a 'Marxist social work',
It has been suggested that the struggle for socialism within the
context of the British Welfare State must often be small-scale. The
attempt to understand welfare discourse through the untheorised
utilization of Marxist concepts is likely to lead to disillusion and
sterile political practice. If socialists are to struggle to change
attitudes to women, homosexuals, the disabled, and so 011 then such
changes have to be sought in the name of democracy and socialisation
rather than in vacuous slogans about 'smashing capitalism'. As
Hirst says: "Wage labour and the production of commodities by
enterprises for profit are compatible with a vide range of educational
systems, management and occupational structures, family forms, etc.
Our politics has to be capable of taking account of this" (1979:17)•
Socialist social workers should, then, direct their energies towards
changing the igays in which welfare needs are calculated and met and
should not view such work as merely ameliorative, a strengthening
of the monolith of 'capitalism', and subordinate to some wider
and amorphous revolutionary cause. "Reforms are not reformist if
they create new grounds for struggle and new sources of strength"
argues Hirst (ibid.). If one accepts that the situation in Britain
is not amenable to revolution then it should be acknowledged that
the language of revolution is counter-productive and may simply serve
to alienate politically powerful opponents, making them anxious and
unco-operative. Simpkin, for example, insists upon describing his
position as 'revolutionary' even though his radical social work is an
acknowledgement that "... we have to engage in a continual struggle
for reform ..." (1979:160). And. yet he feels obliged to end with a
cryptic call for 'real' change by "... joining with all those who are
exploited in an organised mass movement ..." (ibid.).
Moderation of revolutionary posturing is not, however, a call
for subterfuge and opportunism. It is an acknowledgement of the
existing power structure and the necessity of working through the
existing machinery of consultation and influence. fhis work must
depend upon realistic calculations of the gains to he made as
worthwhile goals in themselves and not upon the view' that they are
unhealthy compromises and a distraction from the ultimate goal of
revolution.
This thesis has argued, then, that socialists can have an important
impact upon the institutions and machinery of the Welfare State but they
69. See Cutler et al (1978:271 et seq.) for a discussion of the
"insurrectionism" and "opportunism" of the political left in Britain.
must be prepared to challenge the form and content of the
epistemological conditions of formation of existing welfare
ideologies. Although radicals have begun to question the
technicist content of social, work training, for example, they have
been, it has been suggested, too prepared to accept the form of
knowledge within social work as a science based upon the objective
reality of the world. Decisions about welfare needs, and how they
are to be met, are made on the basis that they are technical problems
to be solved, albeit with a Marxist science, rather than political
issues to be struggled over. Such struggle should be based upon
calculation of appropriate action in the given circumstances and not
upon a programmed acceptance "that capitalism contains within it the
seeds of socialism" (feolger et al., 1901:156).
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CHAPTER 8
Socialist Welfare ; A Propaedeutic
This thesis has sought to challenge the theoretical and
epistemological bases upon which much contemporary social theory
rests. Declaring itself to be an enterprise in critical social
theory, the thesis has sought to develop socialist theoretical
discourse through, "the analysis of a particular substantive topic,
welfare discourse and the policing of idleness. Little attention,
of necessity, has been given to the !current situation5, the primary
task being seen as the theoretical, deconstruction of available liberal
and radical discourses and the reconstruction of the central concepts
of this discursive regularity. This final and brief chapter will,
however, attempt to highlight the form which a socialist discourse on
welfare and the policing of idleness might take in order to fracture
the existing continuity.
Che concept of welfare under socialist relations of production
should not he considered, as a contradiction of terms. A social,
formation based upon a completely socialised production and
distribution system cannot be presumed to correspond to an industrial
communism in which all distinctions between individuals and agents are
erased. As Cutler et al counsel, socialists must consider seriously
what they mean by communal possession of the means and conditions of
production (1977020). As they show, 'relations of production1
presumes some form of separation of direct producers from their
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conditions of production.
At various points in this thesis, welfare and social work have
been discussed as discourses about the policing of idleness. If
socialist ideology and political calculation are to be based upon
concepts such as the social formation and relations of production then
socialists ought to accept that this implies the definition of concepts
such as labour-force and, therefore, necessitates consideration of how
the well-being of those who do not or cannot utilize labour-power is
to be maintained. Even within the principle of 'from each according to
ability, to each according to need' and its implied superseding of a
money-based economy and the necessity to provide incentives to work,
socialist production and social relations generally will require some
form through which 'ability' and 'need' are to be assessed. She well-
being of children and the aged, the sick and the disabled, has to be
ensured, though its form may differ considerably from that adopted in
social formations based upon 'capitalist' and 'socialist' production at
the moment. But such a system must be policed. The policing of
idleness within British feudal relations took the form of a repressive
apparatus, thai within capitalist relations the form of a science of
welfare which has sought to look below the surface to identify the
mechanisms which motivate or induce idleness. The science of welfare
seeks not to identify dichotomies - the 'good' and the 'had', the
'normal' and the 'deviant' but, rather, subtle shades of goodness and
1. "... it is necessary to recognise that communal possession always
involves definite communal agents of possession and the consequent
separation of .the labourers from at least some of their conditions of
production" (Gutier et al., 1977'322).
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nuances of normality. Socialists, it is argued, have to recognise
(2)
the necessity to police idleness. v What must he struggled
6)against are those coercive modes ox discourse which Foucault
identifies in his discussion of sthe disciplines' and which appear as
knowledge-power relations immune from public control and lacking systems
of accountability.
Although this thesis has utilized the parameters of Sbucault's
'discipline' in its analysis of welfare discourse, it has argued for
rejection of their unquestioned relevance to all aspects of social,
relations and it has also argued that there is no necessary relation
between the content of welfare discipline and the conditions of
existence of capitalist relations of production. Hiere are features
of 'discipline' which cannot simply be discounted as coercive, as a
reflection of domination. 'Hierarchical observation', for example,
does not have to take a panoptic form. Hie 'examination' is a
requirement of any system of organisation which has responsibilities for
deciding the legitimacy of claims on resources and assessing the level
or degree of those claims, and the complexity of such an organisation may
necessitate a hierarchical arrangement of control and accountability.
Judgements have to be made,. However, under a socialised and
democratised social formation, judgement would be based more on the
principles embodied in Habermas' concept of the ideal speech situation
■
2. At the most utopian level, socialists talk of the 'withering away
of the state' „ In paradise: "The establishment of a just society would
obviate any need for the profession (jsocial work_7 as control would not be
necessary and the individual could promote his own well-being" (Bitensky,
1978:7l)o H^is stance seems less common amongst British commentators.
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rather than upon the current practice of "norDiali zing judgements" .
This is not to argue that expert opinion would he irrelevant butj
rather, that it would take its place beside other forms of advice
and representation.
If socialists are to affect change within the welfare institutions
of Britain they nrust begin to consider alternative forms of
organisation which will be able to cope with the kinds of demands made
through conceptions of democracy and socialisation. To close this
thesis, some of the issues involved in just such a consideration will be
spelled out by looking at an important paper by Paul Hirst - Law,
Socialism and Rights (1980).
In his paper, Hirst sets cut to illuminate the issues concerning
public law, the state and its regulation under socialist relations of
production. Socialist states, Hirst emphasises, "... by increasing
the scope and variety of state agencies and functions, accentuate rather
than reduce the need for an effective framework of public law to
regulate the 'public® domain and its relations with other agents" (198O:
77-8). The state is not a single agency of control but a "complex of
differentiated agencies of decision" (ibid.:66). The status and
regulation of these agencies are set by public law. To argue for the
socialisation of relations is to argue for the extension of the public
3. For Habermas, claims to 'truth® "... can ultimately be decided
only through critical discussion and not through a direct appeal to
sense cartainty ..." (McCarthy, 1973:307). The deciding factor becomes
'the force of the better argument* and this presumes a situation free
fcom domination and constraint. There must be a symmetry of opportunity
to contribute and to question the contributions of others. As McCarthy
observes, the symmetry requirements concerning the expressive and
the interactive use of sx>eech refer only indirectly to discourse and
directly to the organization of interaction ..." (ibid.:306).
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sphere: questions of public lav;, then, should be central to
socialist discourse.
In the realm of welfare, public law defines the status and
capacities of certain agents such as, perhaps, social security or
social work departments, claimants and clients. Apparatuses of
adjudication are also defined by law, to deal with disputed claims
by claimants for example. Means must also be provided for enforcing
the decisions reached by that apparatus (ibid.:62). As Hirst notes,
the law defines, and sets the limits of power of, the various state
agencies but such a condition of existence does not circumscribe their
practices and effects. Conceptions of 1 sovereignty' as the guardian
of legality are, therefore, a fiction and are no guarantee against
corruption and -the misuse of power. This is so whether the sovereign
power is conceived of as a democratically elected parliament or 'the
will of the people5. Socialists, then, must give serious consideration
to the construction of legal and organisational limits to state end
corporate action (ibid,:79). Such regulation cannot reside simply in
legal and statutory conceptions of individual rights and duties but
must reside in the mechanisms of decision and control, in terms of the
powers of specific agencies to scrutinise and limit the practices of
others.
Within welfare agencies, then, radicals, it is suggested, should
abandon notions of popular control by basic graie, proletarianised
workers or by clients. Such notions do not constitute the 'withering
away' of the state but the substitution of one form by another which
ignores the complexity of the co-ordination and decision-making involved,
j:
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She technical division of labour is not a Capitalist1 form but a
requirement of efficient and effective management. Hirst suggests
that socialisation, because it cannot be essentialised as the pure
expression of socialist relations of production, socialised property or
'the working class', must lead to an increase in differences of policy
line and objectives, and to disputes between bodies of interest within
state agencies and between agencies and the public (ibid.:So). To
imagine that socialism leads to a reduction of organisational problems
because 'capitalist contradictions' have been superseded by a 5working
class consciousness' is naive. Team collectives or client pressure
groups represent only certain sets of issues and cannot be allowed to
dictate policy. Differences of interpretation and emphasis have to be
allowed expression but according to certain procedural rules.
Disagreements will have to be resolved through the medium of an
adjudicative machinery. It is "... only by developing and extending
means to permit serious examination of alternatives according to rules
of procedure that socialist states can make any claims to advances in
political organisation over 'capitalist democracies' ..." (Hirst, 1980s
How, although this thesis has offered a critique of the science of
welfare, it has not denied the necessity for certain agents who must
decide upon matters of welfare. Socialism, far from implying a
residual role for such agencies and their personnel, will require a
greater involvement not only at the level of the work of the agencies
themselves but also in matters of national policy. 'This is not merely
a reaffirmation of the function of welfare organisations as pressure
80).
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groups "but, rather, the suggestion tlaat "enterprises, hospitals,
unions, groups of specialists and so on require a presence on
legislative bodies" (Hirst, 1980:83).
One of the targets of Hirst's critique of libertarian socialism
has been the radical criminologists (1975; 1980:94-5) whom:
"Socialism or communism means, as an -ultimate objective, a society
without complex differentiated organization, without irreconcilable
differences or conflicts" (198O:95). As has been suggested, radical
social work displays elements of libertarian!srn but it tends not to
be central to its discourse, appearing rather as a mode of
electioneering. Radical social work discourse has concentrated;
upon the analysis of the organisation of the Welfare State and its
social service agencies; upon offering a critique of traditional theory
and practice within social work; and upon suggesting radical
% alternatives for practice. .Almost no attention, however, has been
given to exploring the consequences of a radical social work in terms
of the organisation of welfare and the policing of idleness under
socialist social relations. Bolger and his colleagues, in one of the
most recent texts on radicalism in the welfare apparatus, make a number
of suggestions for democratising welfare institutions and their machinery.
But, as always, these suggestions insist upon such a struggle being a
class struggle which must exploit the inherent contradictions of the
system. By clinging to the security of the Marxist notion that the
'answers' are available within the structure of 'capitalism', socialists
side-step the task of constructing a political theory which tackles
questions of how socialised relations are to be organised and governed.
Until radical welfare workers accept the need to begin such a
construction they will remain uncertain about their own actions
as social workers, for it is only by identifying the nature of the
organisation of welfare and the machinery for ensuring its effective
control through processes of inspection, consultation and
accountability, that socialists can begin to delimit the conditions
for construction of socialist welfare.
1+91.
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